Factors That Lead to the Korean War - Research Paper Example

The Korean War [Name Of Student] [Name Of Institution] INTRODUCTION The collapse of the Soviet Union and the absence of a cold war force one to reconsider the structural conditions associated with major war. After 1989, the emergence of the United States as the single dominant nation did not materialize into the anticipated holocaust. Moreover, NATO has persisted despite arguments that an independent Europe should be a "balancer" between the United States and Russia, or China, or even Japan. We first take a global perspective and discuss past and future relations between China, the United States, Russia, and Japan. We also adopt this perspective to look at the Korean peninsula. AIM OF THE PAPER In this paper I will discuss the factors that lead to thee Korean war and will analyze through different perspectives whether it could be avoided during the cold war or not. BACKGROUND By applying the power parity perspective to the global and regional levels, the empirical and logical merits of the power parity perspective are clarified. Policy implications derived from this assessment follow. We start with the proposition that power parity can lead to major war, whereas a dominant arrangement ensures peace. From this perspective, the theoretical insistence that balance of power ensures peace is inconsistent with the structural reality of the international system.[ 1] We argue that prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the perspective of power parity (Kugler and Lemke 1996)--also frequently labeled power transition (Organski 1958, Organski and Kugler 1980) or even hegemonic theory (Gilpin 1981)--remained faithful to the empirical record. There is substantial empirical support for the power parity proposition throughout conflict literature. Organski and Kugler (1980), using the record of major wars among the main Western powers, show that power parity and transition were necessary conditions for major wars between 1870 and 1970. Lemke's contribution is important because he shows that severe conflicts of all types follow conditions of power parity. Finally, work by Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), using a sophisticated bounded rationality approach, shows that while conditions for conflict and peace in the balance of power are inconsistent, the conditions identified by power parity are consistent with the model and with the prevailing evidence. This article attempts to provide a consistent account of such disparities by exploring the implications of the power parity perspective for the East Asian region and the Korean peninsula. EAST ASIA IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT Power parity provides the structural conditions for conflict and cooperation. While power is central to the deductions of balance of power and power parity, the conditions that lead to war and peace each advances are very distinct. The critical elements of power parity are that parity or balance of power allows contenders to choose between peace and war, that an extended dispute--in particular, a lasting territorial dispute--is required for a serious confrontation, and that military buildups indicate the willingness of contenders to choose war over peace when both parity and an extended dispute are present. Applying the power parity logic to East Asia, we believe that interactions among major powers have a potential to escalate to a serious confrontation and possibly a major war. 1 compares the relative performance of major global competitors to that of the United States, the dominant nation, from 1945 to 1995. The conditions for parity are met when a challenger has over 80 percent of the capabilities of the dominant nation and cease when the challenger has exceeded that dominant nation's capability by 20 percent--when it would become the dominant nation. In order to address the Asian region, we will detail the global context in terms of structural power relations before moving specifically to East Asia. At the global level, the lack of open confrontation between the United States and Russia, so feared by most analysts during the cold war, is completely consistent with the power parity perspective. The Soviet Union did not approach parity with the United States between 1945 and 1989, and despite arms buildups and ideological confrontations, the Soviet Union could not overcome American preponderance. Consider next the U.S.-European interaction from the parity perspective. Germany, even after reunification, would approach the size of Japan, and given its population base, in the foreseeable future cannot overcome the United States, China, or even Russia. Thus, European nations as major players in East Asia from a parity context can occur only if the EU becomes a political coalition in addition to an economic union. Under such circumstances, the EU bloc has aggregate economic and demographic resources that fall just under the parity threshold with the United States. Despite the potential situation of parity, the conditions for a confrontation are not met. AN INSIGHT INTO THE CAUSES OF THE WAR There is no ongoing or looming core territorial dispute between the EU and the United States. Thus, unless major changes in the current international system occur, including the breakdown of NATO, the emergance of military buildups, or the presence of a core dispute, the likelihood of confrontation with the United States at the global level is minimal. Moreover, despite the transition between China and the EU no major conflict is anticipated. Finally, it is important to note that two potential contenders do not meet the preconditions that power parity has set for major war. Japan, which frequently has been touted as the next hegemon, is far too small to challenge either China or the United States. Although it is highly unlikely, if growth rates revert to patterns of the 1950s and 1960s, Japan could reach parity with either the United States or China in the coming decades. Neither Japan nor Russia is expected to be an initiator or defender in a major confrontation. What are the chances of a major war between Japan and China? There are recent reports of the possibility of conflict over Daioyu or Senkaku, tiny islands in East China Sea. Clearly, we do not imply that regional rivalry between China and Japan will disappear because power parity is not met; however, we do propose that in the absence of parity, such incidents will not result in a major bilateral Sino-Japanese conflict. In the specific case of China and Japan, he argues that they could still be in conflict provided the United States sides with Japan and creates conditions for parity. We agree with this possibility, but have discussed it under the dyadic U.S.-China portion since the United States, not Japan would be the actor that decides whether or not the conflict will escalate. Thus, the willingness of the United States to enter into conflict would be the same under dyadic or multilateral conditions; however, the timing of war could be extended well into the future by the actions of Japan. The structural conditions that surround Russo-Japanese relations in the subregion are quite different from the China-Japan dyad. Given the dramatic collapse of Russia's economy, as shown in 1, Japan has overtaken Russia and both are close to parity. With the potential for Russia's rapid recovery in the next decade, one anticipates persistent parity between these actors in the future. At the core of this dispute are four islands occupied by the Soviet Union in the waning moments of World War II. Finally, given Japan's steady military buildup and technological sophistication, and the current decline in military effectiveness of Russia, the possibility of a confrontation cannot be dismissed.[ 2] Indeed, unless the territorial disputes are resolved before a major turnaround in Russia's economy moves that country away from parity with Japan, the relationship between the two is expected to be confrontational and has the potential to escalate to a serious regional war. As shown in 1, the United States and China are the lower bound of the parity condition and the challenger--China--is growing at a faster rate. This dynamic is generating the conditions for increasing power parity. Moreover, a serious dispute looms over the status of Taiwan, presenting China with a territorial grievance of serious proportions. Both nations have nuclear weapons, and these arsenals assure destruction of China in the case of the United States, and approach such assurance in the case of China. It is difficult to conceive of a set of circumstance where China would overtake the United States to become the leading nation in the international system. The key question from a parity perspective is whether a dominant China would openly challenge existing international regimes or join the international community before imposing its own stamp on the future. What we can ascertain is that conflict is possible between China and the United States, and a global war that could exceed the parameters set by World War II may be waged. Taiwan seeks independence. The reason immediate independence can be achieved is that China still cannot directly challenge the United States and its dominant coalition--the EU is part of NATO, Japan is allied, and Russia is probably neutral. Thus, parity suggests that Taiwan may become independent without conflict because for China to stop a movement toward independence at this time risks a conflict with other nations, including the United States, that would disrupt the investment flows needed to sustain the rapid economic growth now under way. In the longer run, however, as China grows in power and reaches parity with the United States, and the existing alliances are restructured in response to declining U.S. dominance, the possibility for peaceful accommodation diminishes. Indeed, the conditions postulated by power parity, military buildups, and rivalry based on a territorial dispute would all converge. The possibility of a major war would loom large. Taiwan is incorporated into China. China's reunification could also be accomplished if the United States withdrew support for Taiwan even in the face of direct threats and forced incorporation. When the central issue is removed, parity and military buildups would be insufficient for action. Tensions over Taiwan could continue with repeated crises between China and the United States resulting in high tensions. Under such conditions, as China approaches parity with the United States (given current trends, this overtaking should take place sometime in the period 2020-2050), an attempt by China to use coercive means to reincorporate Taiwan into China would provide the very conditions found prior to World Wars I and II. Given heightened territorial grievances, parity, and buildups, the prospects of war loom large. As indicated above, China and the United States could eliminate their increasing disagreement over Taiwan through outright independence for the island state or through reincorporation into China. Second, the conditions for parity may change. Further, the expansion of Japan's relation with such an expanded NATO structure would further delay parity conditions. Thus, the conditions identified here denote the U.S.-China dyad as one where a major war can be waged, and the Japan-Russia dyad as one where a conflict of lesser magnitude is possible. On a more positive note, in East Asia, structural conditions tell us that the parity condition cannot be met between Japan and the United States, or Japan and China, or Russia and China. Likewise, unless the EU becomes a political unit, the European nations, despite previous challenges, will not intervene in East Asia. THE KOREAN PENINSULA AS A SUBREGION The protracted confrontations between North and South Korea over the future status of the peninsula is a self-contained dispute within the larger East Asian context and can be treated as a sub-region. As at the global level, power parity conditions preceed serious regional conflicts, as happened in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa (Lemke 1996, 1997). One has to be careful, however, that the impact of third parties--such as United States, China, Russia, or Japan--does not distort power relations in a regional conflict. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the outcome of the 1950s Korean War without taking into account, first, the actions of the United States and its UN allies, and then the response of China. The actions of the United States and its allies were instrumental in defeating the initial incursion of North Korea into South Korea. Likewise, the response by China determined the ultimate border between South and North Korea. We consider major powers' security concerns over the Korean peninsula in the context of the post-cold war East Asian region. We then discuss the parity conditions between the two Koreas and make some projections on the future of the North Korean regime. MAJOR POWERS' SECURITY CONCERNS OVER THE KOREAN PENINSULA As a new world order finally seems to be settled in Europe with the enlargement of NATO, East Asia has been struggling to accommodate the rivalries of four major powers--China, Japan, Russia, and the United States--with a united Korea someday making a fifth. Tension over the Korean peninsula is the locus of various territorial disputes in this region. Chinese fear of containment. China clearly is an up-and-coming superpower. Based on the so-called one-China policy, Chinese officials commonly proclaim that if Taiwan seeks independence or even a mere declaration of independence, it means war. In this sense, according to a conservative group in the United States, China is a bully that needs to be disciplined, not indulged. Like the Soviet Union during cold war days, China is a nation to be contained now, not later. In much the same way, the United States blocked China's membership in the World Trade Organization. Lilley answers his own question: "A ring around China."[ 3] China is particularly suspicious that a redefined alliance between the United States and Japan is simply another term for containing China. The combined capabilities of the United States and Japan are clearly preponderant over those of China. Although Chinese military officials view the present gap in their capabilities as temporary and their long-term goal is to be a global military peer of the United States, the reinforced alliance between the United States and Japan deepens the Chinese doubts. Further, they suspect that a unified Korea under Seoul's dominance with 1.3 million well-trained soldiers--the sum of the South and the North armed forces, which is roughly half the current Chinese forces--backed by 37,000 American forces stationed in Korea can serve as an effective strategic base to contain the Chinese sphere of influence. As the geopolitical dynamics in East Asia continue, the Chinese fear of containment persists. Japanese fear of entrapment. The end of cold war did not change Japan's security concerns. Traditionally, their policymakers worry about three possible adversaries: Russia, Korea, and above all, China. The Japanese also worry about the future of Korea. Although Japanese aid and investment are crucial to Chinese economic development and Chinese markets are highly attractive to Japanese industry, the Japanese regard a increasingly powerful China as a rising source of tension. The Japanese have become more aware that North Korea has pointed its missiles as much at them as it has at the South Koreans. Because Japan's natural rival in the region is now China, a nuclear power, Japan would be strongly tempted to go nuclear also if they feel the nuclear umbrella of the United States to be less secure. If Japan were to go nuclear, as many experts predict, South Korea and Taiwan might follow. Russia seems to be relatively neutral on the issue of the Korean peninsula. Although Russia and North Korea had been under a mutual defense pact since the 1950 Korean War, Russia recently announced that it would no longer honor the treaty. Investment-hungry Russia has been signaling to South Korea that they are willing to help the South to ease the tension between the two Koreas. But when South Korea and the United States suggested four-way talks to discuss the issues concerning the peninsula with North Korea and China after the Geneva agreements on North Korea's nuclear programs, Russia was upset because of not having been invited. Although their military presence in the region has been reduced significantly, the Russians traditionally proclaimed that they were "a nation in East Asia." Given the reinforced alliance between the United States and Japan along with the growing capabilities of China, Russia has become aware that its traditional role as a major player in this region will be redefined. The Chinese issue is the focal point in East Asia for the United States. Containment could create those security problems. It could push China to accelerate its defense modernization, which would contribute to a regional arms race, increasing the likelihood of military conflicts in hot spots like Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and the Korean peninsula." For engagement to work, the United States must maintain its military presence in Asia in order to stabilize the entire region and reassure not only Tokyo, but also Beijing and other Asian nations that are worried about Japan's rearming. TRANSITION IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA As shown in 2, power parity in Korea began in 1960 and persisted until 1965. The conditions for a renewal of the Korean conflict were present at that point, but the presence of American forces, on one hand, and China and the Soviet Union, on the other, probably prevented repetition of that conflict. In 1970, North Korea was no longer in parity but still has approximately 70 percent of the resources held by the South. Rather, stability with accommodation by the North to demands from the South is anticipated from the power parity perspective. Serious concerns were raised when the North mobilized troops along its border. Such actions are inconsistent with both parity and balance of power structures. Recall that balance of power advocates would anticipate conflict but would not anticipate challenges and incursions by North Korea into the South. Rather, they would anticipate incursions by the preponderant South Korea into the North. Moreover, power parity effectively accounts for the current situation. The status quo nation in this dyad is clearly South Korea, which has much to gain from stability. Initiating action against North Korea would threaten their relations with the United States, could prompt reaction by China, and at best, would isolate the South as an aggressor not unlike the North itself. Power parity suggests, therefore, that such action is not warranted and that the dominant South should seek accommodation with the North, anticipating that any terms reached will be closer to their own demands if the North continues its economic slide. We have focused our analysis on overall capabilities, but a word about nuclear weapons in the Korean peninsula is unavoidable. A decision to develop nuclear arms--by the South Koreans--can be postponed." This was written at the height of the North Korean threats to build nuclear weapons. We now know that North Korea has all but abandoned efforts to build a nuclear arsenal. We also argued that there were poor payoffs for the South if they build nuclear weapons because "if North Korean attempts to build a nuclear arsenal are confirmed . . . South Korea should proceed rapidly to exceed such efforts" by either preserving alliance with the United States or developing their own countermeasures that would, given their massive industrial advantage, ensure nuclear as well as conventional preponderance. The drawbacks of creating an independent nuclear force in South Korea, however, is that when nuclear weapons are developed, nuclear parity can be achieved with more powerful neighbors. Despite its conventional inferiority, South Korea could reach Japan, main sections of China, and the periphery of Russia, increasing the probability that conventional confrontations with such larger neighbors could escalate. Thus, avoiding the nuclear step is beneficial for both Koreas because--whether divided or united--they inhabit a larger subregion that includes Japan, Russia, and China. As witnessed during the North Korean nuclear debacle, the North Korean regime has shown that they can pursue rather successfully this kind of dangerous diplomatic maneuver. As a result, the United States and South Korea agreed to supply light water reactors and other economic assistance in exchange for inspection of their nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and for halting the construction of the plutonium-processing nuclear power plants. In brief, the possibility of status quo in the Korean peninsula--thus, consolidating the North Korean regime--is higher than usually expected. Soft Landing. This option regarding the future of the North Korean regime is by far the most frequently mentioned by bureaucrats and academics. The origin of this policy is the South Korean leadership in 1988 when the South worried that the sudden collapse of the North may cause a serious problem. Supporting South Korean efforts, the United States has been pursuing a "modest initiative" toward North Korea, including the normalization of diplomatic relations, the replacement of armistice with a peace treaty, and a series of economic aids to the ailing North Korean economy. In February 1993, however, when the IAEA was denied access to suspected North Korean nuclear facilities and North Korea threatened to withdraw from the nonproliferation treaty, the very idea of a soft landing seemed to fail. The North even threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire." Since then, even South Korean bureaucrats unofficially have been wondering about the practical utility of this policy. Initially designed by South Korea but actually implemented by the United States, the policy of soft landing still dominates the arena. In short, the soft-landing policy is intended to help the North Korean "self-rescue" mission and to provide a positive incentive for them to sit down at a negotiation table--the recently suggested four-way talks among the United States, China, and two Koreas. It is based on the speculation that the North Korean regime may not handle the current domestic crisis. It is anticipated that if the current economic woes continue, North Korea will enter a catastrophic phase that eventually will destroy their regime. Further, frustrated by the continuing economic hardship and power struggles among North Korean elites, violent mass uprisings--following mass defections to South Korea, Japan, and China--may occur. In brief, given the continuing practices of cold war diplomacy by major powers in East Asia, the status quo in the Korean peninsula--North Korea's "fly-away" option mentioned earlier--seems most probable in near future. CONCLUSION Based on the absence of power parity conditions, the probability of major war is minimal in the short term. I believe that this war was inevitable as per the prevailing conditions of that time but yes better strategy if adopted in the past would have lead to a war-free and better zone. In the longer term, stability could be impaired for the China-U.S. and Japan-Russia dyads, as both face parity conditions and have persistent disputes. Regionally, the conditions for serious confrontation are not present in the Korean peninsula. We see no indication of potential conflict between Japan and China or between Russia and China. Finally, we do not anticipate that the European Union, even if it were to achieve political consensus, would generate a confrontation in East Asia. In sum, confrontations may continue to simmer in East Asia but they do not have the potential for escalation to serious war. ENDNOTES 1. Most analysts of international politics, particularly in the United States, support the argument most effectively advanced by Waltz (1979, 1993) that a balance of power ensures peace. Indeed, mutually assured destruction is derived directly from early notions of balance proposed by Brodie (1946, 1959) and articulated effectively by Intrilligator and Brito (1987). Such arguments propose that the main reason for stability during the long cold war was the presence of a nuclear balance among the United States and the Soviet Union. Given such beliefs, the rise of a single dominant nation following the collapse of the Soviet Union is seen as destabilizing. 2. When two nations are at different levels of technological development, a more effective indicator of power incorporates political capacity in the calculation (Organski and Kugler 1980, Kugler and Lemke 1995). We rely on GNP estimates here because of the unreliability of fiscal data for China and Russia during the critical periods. 3. Time, 25 March 1996. 4. Asahi Shimbun, 19 April 1996. 5. The Economist, 7 October 1995. 6. For details, see U.S. Department of Defense (1995), U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region. As a summary of the U.S. grand strategy in the post-cold war era, this report indicates three major aims--the enhancement of security by preponderant military power coupled with effective diplomacy, the enlargement of economic prosperity, and the diffusion of democracy around the world. 7. Time, 25 March 1996. 8. There is also some speculation that if the junior Kim's power succession fails, an alternative leadership may emerge either in collective form or in rather violent form such as a military coup. However, given the level of repressiveness of the North Korean regime, those chances seem quite slim. 9. Korea Herald, 9 July 1997. 10. Washington Post, 17 April 1997. 11. Chosun Ilbo, 8 January 1997. 12. Joong-Ang Ilbo, 9 July 1997. 13. China will reach parity with the United States in a few decades. Preserving the status quo in Taiwan during parity is dangerous as China will increasingly become a credible challenger. To diffuse the potential conflict between China and the United States, one can opt to concurrently resolve the Taiwan issue and expand NATO. Including both Russia and Japan in NATO would reduce the potential for an early China-U.S. confrontation, but would not eliminate the underlying issue. At the same time, if Japan and Russia were members of NATO, their own conflict could be averted. Finally, we anticipate that the future of the two Koreas will be determined in large part by the South. If integration is chosen, it may be costly to the South, but the major burden will be carried by the inhabitants of North Korea. REFERENCES ------. 1959. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ------. 1993. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics." International Security 18: 44-79. ------. 1995. "The Stability of Alliances: Balance of Power versus Power Transition." Korean Political Science Review 29: 333-58. ------. 1996. "Small States and War: An Expansion of Power Transition Theory." In Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger. ------. 1996b. "Power Transition and Strategic Stability in East Asia." Presented at the ISA-JAIR Joint Convention, Makuhari, Japan, 20-22 September. ------. 1997. 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