Internal Political Structural Changes in France - Case Study Example

dear client, this is not yet the fully revised paper. I will upload the revised paper in an hour. Thanks! Introduction Wars and international conflicts were significant issues in 18th-century France. Events overseas led to social transformation such as militarisation inside the French society. Throughout the period 1789 - 1906, there were various wars, international events and foreign pressure that had led to internal political structural changes, as well as militarism. For instance, the process of French Revolution was greatly influenced by the geo-political atmosphere. This paper supports the argument that event overseas and international relations, especially with Austria and Germany, had more influence on France in the period 1789-1906 than mere domestic matters. Internal political, cultural, and economic changes had been taking place in France during the period, but these were bolstered by foreign events, particularly by conflict within the international community. Internal Political Structural Changes The French Revolutionary Wars were a series of major conflicts fought between the French First Republic and several European monarchies from 1792 to 1802, and, specifically, the war with Austria and Prussia in 1791 was considered to be the most important one. The plight of Louis XVI and the growing radicalisation of the revolution changed the situation. The significance of the war is shown by the fact that even before the war actually broke out in France the society was already affected by foreign influence and internal division occurring between different political groups. Evidence for this would be the different responses inside France towards the Declaration of Pillnitz issued by Emperor Leopold and Frederick-William II of Prussia.1 The declaration claimed the joint support of the Holy Roman Empire and of Prussia for Louis XVI against the French Revolution.2 Some army commanders such as Lafayette and the Brissotins supported war, whilst Robespierre was one of the minorities who was hostile to war.3 Robespierre believed Lafayette and other generals wanted war to overthrow the new constitution and, consequently, destroy the revolution. Suspicion and distrust were formed among the leaders. It was suspected that Louis favoured the war and hoped that France would lose the war so he could be restored.4 This assumption later became the main reason of his execution - the King betrayed his own people. The war that begun between France and Austria on the 20th of April 1791 or, more particularly, the failures of France, divided the French nation further; France failed in the first stage of the war because the armies lacked organisation and training.5 The pro-war lobby blamed the failure of the troops on counter-revolutionaries at home. The court, nobles, refractory priests and other traitors were accused of passing secrets to the enemy. It was the war which radicalised the French politics and destabilised the newly established political structure.6 The urgent wartime situation convinced the authority that anyone who showed signs of hostility or opposition towards the war should be considered as counter-revolutionaries. Furthermore, the war diminished the power of the King and the radical masses started to grow rapidly. Evidence supporting this would be the demonstration in Paris led by the members of the radical Cordeliers Club, the Sans Culottes.7 On 20 June, 8,000 demonstrators stormed into the Tuileries, demanding Louis to withdraw his veto over the deportation of refractory priests and disbandment of the King’s Guards. Although the King acted with dignity and did not give in, this maximised the tension between the revolutionaries and the monarch.8 Then the Brunswick Manifesto came into being, which was eventually viewed by the French people as the final proof that Louis XVI was collaborating with the Allies. In July 1792, the Duke of Brunswick, commanding general of the Austro–Prussian Army, issued his Brunswick Manifesto, in which declared that if the French royal family were harmed, then French civilians would be harmed.9 This is another event showing how foreign threat exacerbated Frances political tension and deepened the passion and sense of urgency caused by the war in the society. The First republic was proclaimed in September 1792 and the National Convention was formed, and this transition from a constitutional monarchy to a republic was a significant political change within France.10 The relationship between this change and war was indivisible. According to William Doyle (2002), the failure of the short-lived constitutional monarchy system was partially due to the hardship engendered by the war, which contributed to the existing tensions.11 War with Prussia and Austria undermined the basis of the constitutional monarchy system and not just led to the end of the system, but also the King.     War Leads to Dictatorship Contribution to the war gradually became the first priority of every individual in the community. This provided an opportunity for Robespierre and his followers to establish a series of emergent wartime measures and institutions such as the Committee of Public Safety and Committee of General Security, which marked the beginning of the period of Terror.12 As argued by Marisa Linton, “From the spring of 1792 onwards France was involved in a spiral of war, revolt and civil war.”13 Although these measures helped establish control and prevented riots, the use of restrictive controls did undermine some of the principles that the early revolutionaries had fought for. For example, by the new Law of Suspects issued on 17 September 1793, anyone believed to be a danger to the Republic, whether through royalist or Catholic sympathies, or simply by hoarding or evading state laws could be arrested and imprisoned indefinitely without trial or brought before the Revolutionary Tribunal.14 One certain conclusion is that the war began the period of Terror, in which it transformed the society and led the authority into a different path. As stated in the “What was new after September 1793” by D.G. Wright, “was that the terror was organised and became for the first time a deliberate policy of government.”15 D.G. Wright describes Napoleon I as an opportunist, who came to the stage of politics at the exact right time. Wright suggests that Sieyès, the Director in 1799 was “Searching for a general who was willing to employ military force in order to push through the revision and act as a barrier against both royalism and Jacobinism.” 16 Napoleon took advantage of the wars during late eighteenth century and uprisings from the army. The Coup of Brumaire in 1799 was one of the many examples in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries showing how military leaders could seize power using armed force.17 Another example was his nephew, Napoleon III, who trailed on his uncle’s reputation. First outcome of constant warfare and aftermath of wars was that international tension persuaded Napoleon to emphasise the importance of an authoritarian government and military development. Napoleon crowned himself as the Emperor in 1804 and the First Empire was established.18 The Emperor’s belief of the importance of a strong military base could be explained by several reasons. Napoleon himself came to power due to the tension between European powers in 1799. Constant warfare meant the army need many talented soldiers. Napoleon as a rank and file in the army, alongside his outstanding military talent allowed him to quickly rise from the ranks.19 However, during peace this would be less likely to happen. As stated by Sylvia Neely (2008), a change in political system from a constitutional republic to an Empire could be led by wars.20 Wars and events overseas had undermined and destabilise a new established republic; the First Republic and a strong military government could easily replace it. In the years 1804 to 1811, Napoleon led France into numerous military victories and his empire expanded across Europe. One example would be the wars against the Third Coalition in 1805 to 1808. Napoleon was at the height of his military success. He forced an Austrian surrender at Ulm in October 1805 and defeated a larger combined force of the Austro-Russian army at Austerlitz in December.21 Napoleon’s continental empire was vast, for example, Northern Italy and Kingdom of Holland were under French direct control and Kingdom of Spain became French satellite state since its defeat in 1795.22 However, it was not until the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 that Napoleon finally failed, and this remarkable war in the early 18th Century did not only bring an end to the Napoleonic regime, it was also the turning point of the whole nation. After Napoleon’s failure in Waterloo on 14 June 1815, Louis XVII was restored. The victors came to agree to the Vienna Settlement between 1914 and 1915, which involved restricting France by establishing a cordon sanitaire of buffer states around the country.23 Peter Burke (1990) explained that the settlement was not unduly punitive but it nevertheless humbled France. Most importantly, the settlement decided the succession of Louis XVII.24 The influence of international relation on France did not only affect territories, it also reshaped the internal political structure of France. The Second Restoration of Louis XVIII was not entirely the decision of French people, foreign powers such as Prussia, Austria and Britain had put pressure on France.25 To conclude, a weak position in international relation could lead to changes in internal affairs. Pressure from foreign authorities had forced the return of the Bourbon and the beginning of a period of constitutional monarchy. The Battle of Waterloo The Battle of Waterloo suggests the second impact of war on France-- one single military failure could end the rule of Napoleon and a well-established authoritarian government, as well. The Battle was definitely the turning point of Napoleonic regime and the significance of the Battle was that it showed that the outcome of foreign conflict could reform the entire political system. International events could cause a shift in regime, and the Frist Empire became a constitutional monarchical system. During July and August 1870, French Army suffered a series of defeats, which culminated in the Battle of Sedan. The Third Republic was proclaimed after the defeat of Napoleon III. A conclusion drawn by Roger Price is that ‘the final collapse of the regime was to be caused by the incompetent management of foreign policy.’26 Price further argues, ‘The contrast with past military glory was extreme. With this the Empire lost all credit. It simply faded away. Catastrophic defeat destroyed its claims to legitimacy.’27 The end of the Second Empire was similar to the end of the First Empire and both Napoleonic regimes collapsed due to a single military failure. In addition, the defeat in the Franco-Prussian War did not just end the Second Empire in the long term; it became a factor contributing towards the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The hatred towards Germany continued to grow during the Third Republic and the disastrous failure and humiliation of the French led to radicalisation of nationalism. The Aftermath of the Battle of Waterloo Between 1873 and 1877, Germany repeatedly manipulated the internal affairs of France. The German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck put heavy pressure on other European powers such as Spain and Italy, hoping to obtain the election of liberal, anticlerical governments. His plan was to promote republicanism in France, and believed that by transforming France to a more liberal state it would help the French republicans defeat McMahon and his reactionary supporters. During the Third Republic, France was involved in several international conflicts; the most significant one in the period 1870-1905 was the First Moroccan Crisis between 1905 and 1906. Kaiser William II of Germany visited Tangier, Morocco and declared his support towards the sovereignty of the Sultan in March 1905. This statement posted a challenge to French influence in Morocco. The French foreign minister, Théophile Delcassé took a defiant line and refused to attend the conference presented by Germany. The German Chancellor, Count Bernhard von Bülow threatened war over the issue. The crisis peaked in mid-June when the French cancelled all military leave and Germany threatened to sign a defensive alliance with the Sultan. This suggests that even within a well-established regime like the Third Republic, event overseas can still have a significant effect on internal politics. Foreign pressure could be decisive and when the government was facing a threat of war, they would put the national interest in front of everything else. The republican government was aware of the fact that France was not capable of experiencing any more military conflicts after nearly a century of wars. The event also created hostility towards Germans, especially after the defeat in Franco-Prussian war. An anti-German legacy and strong desire to revenge had continued to have a significant impact on internal politics until 1914, when the First World War broke out. MILITARISM War is transformative and within the entire 17th century, France was frequently at war. As a result, militarism became an important feature of French politics and brought wide influence in the society. The belief and desire of various governments throughout the period 1792 to 1905 was that a country should maintain a strong military capability and be prepared to use it aggressively to defend or promote national interests. The army had played a significant role in the society and there was a general belief in the authority that the protection of the army was vitally important. The idea of militarisation could be traced back to the Revolution in 1792. Due to the French Revolutionary War, war effort had become first priority of every single Frenchman. The degree ‘la patrie en danger’ was issued on 11 July 1792, along with the Levée en masse declared the next year. The Levée en masse states: “From this moment until such time as its enemies shall have been driven from the soil of the Republic, all Frenchmen are in permanent requisition for the services of the armies. The young men shall fight; the married men shall forge arms and transport provisions; the women shall make tents and clothes and shall serve in the hospitals; the children shall turn old lint into linen; the old men shall betake themselves to the public squares in order to arouse the courage of the warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of the Republic.”28 In addition, as the decree suggests, majority of the civilian population was turned towards supporting the armies through armaments production and other war industries as well as supplying food and provisions to the front. Idea of militarism had spread through the country and no one could be excluded from participating in military service or at least being involved and contribute to war effort. This once again suggests how events overseas influence internal French society and brought changes to lives of ordinary Frenchmen. Frequent warfare created tension within the country and the lifestyles of the people changed. Majority of men in France had to participate in military activities and all sectors in the society must put the nation above themselves. The government of Napoleon I believed it was crucial to establish an educational reform, not only as a means of moulding minds and forming opinions, but also as a source of highly-trained civil servants,29 in order to promote the principle of war and army should be the first priority for everyone. In practice, free schooling was offered to boys, mostly the sons of notables. The educational reform suggests how education in France had transformed from the traditional religious dominated studies to more militarised schoolings. Wars and foreign conflicts had led to the indoctrination of militarised ideas and beliefs amongst the younger generation. Thus, for most Frenchmen, living in a militarised state, the victory of the country would be most important. This created the first shape of the idea of nationalism. Evidence supporting this view would be the Dreyfus Affair in 1898. Dreyfus’s sentence in 1894 was an outcome of miscarriage of justice. According to Tombs, when the affair was exposed to public later in 1899 it showed “France’s continuing sense of insecurity and her eagerness to find scapegoats for her military setbacks”30. When Dreyfus was sent back to France for the Rennes trial in 1899, “the army high command presented a quasi-ultimatum: if the country had no confidence in the honour of its soldiers, they declared, they could no longer ensure its defence of the nation. Faced with such a choice, the court martial again found Dreyfus guilty.” 31 This event showed the government’s protective attitude towards the army and during the early stage of the Third Republic, the government and Parliament demonstrated its preference for the honour of the army above the fair justice of a Jewish soldier. France was experiencing changes brought by militarism which had led to the belief that a strong military backup was essential for the country and nationalistic sentiment was provoked in the society. The interest of the army was far more important than a single man’s innocence and this was because constant warfare had created a sense of insecurity in France. The authority was protecting the honour of the army and inside the society; there were numerous supporters of this belief such as the anti-Dreyfusyards.   The nationalistic atmosphere continued to grow in after the Dreyfus affair. Another major result of the event in French politics even though it did not originate from the Dreyfus affair, was the Boulanger Affair, 1886 to 1889. When General Boulanger was appointed as Minister of War in 1886, “his sympathy with the common soldier, his veiled threats to Bismarck, heightened by his press coverage, made him enormously popular.” Cuplin and Henig suggest “Republicans were paranoid over the dangerous appeal of the ‘strong man’ in French politics and sent him away from Paris” 32 The popularity of Boulanger showed that French society was again holding a positive and supportive attitude to a successful military leader similar to the Bonaparte. Constant warfare had transformed the French society and due to the fear of future war and sense of insecurity, the general public had approved Boulanger’s military aim and it suggests the Frenchmen’s desire for a strong military leader. Therefore, it shows how overseas events influenced internal political atmosphere. Militarism had changed the French public political preference and the republican government could foresee the potential threat of such a popular military figure. As a result, when Boulanger posed the threat of a coup détat in 1889, he was accused of treason and later fled to Brussels. Furthermore, the decision by the Third Republic government to make La Marseillaise the national anthem was evidence of how military elements had a profound impact on the regime. La Marseillaise was a revolutionary song, an anthem to freedom. The song was featured by strong nationalistic and military elements, it called for the citizens to mobilise and fight against the tyranny and foreign invasion. This illustrates how wars had influenced internal politics and how foreign events had shifted the Third Republic towards a more militarised state.   CONCLUSION As shown in the discussion, wars, international events and foreign pressure had led to internal political structural changes and militarism in France in the period 1789-1906. The main events that led these internal changes are the transition from a constitutional monarchy to a republic, the French Revolutionary War, the Battle of Waterloo, the Franco-Prussian War, the French Revolution, and the establishment of the 3rd Republic. Predominantly, these important events have led to growing nationalistic sentiments among the French masses and to an increasing awareness that the French society is in need of a Great Man—a successful military leader like Bonaparte. Bibliography Robert Tombs, France 1814-1914, Pearson Education Limited, New York, 2014 D.G. Wright, Napoleon and Europe, Pearson Education Limited, Harlow, 1984 Sally Waller, France in Revolution 1776-1830, Heinemann Educational Publishers, Oxford, 2002 J.P.T. Bury, France 1814-1940, Routledge, Oxon, 2003 Roger Price, Napoleon III and the Second Empire, Routledge, London, 1997 Robert Gildea, France 1870-1914, Longman, London, 1996 George Rudé, The Crowd In History, Serif, London, 2005 Roger Magraw, France 1815-1914: Bourgeois Century, Oxford University Press, 1986 Keith Jenkins, Re-thinking History,Routledge, London, 2004 Sally Waller, France in Revolution 1776-1830,Heinemann, Great Britain, 2002 ARTICLE - Author, ‘Article Title’, Journal Title, Volume & Number, Year Price Roger, ‘Napoleon III: ‘Hero’ or ‘Grotesque Mediocrity’?’, History Review, Issue 45, 2003 Marisa Linton, ‘Robespierre and the Terror’, History Today, Volume 56 Issue 8, 2006 Burke Peter. History and Social Theory, Cambridge, Polity Press; 2nd Edition (2005) WEBSITE- Page Title, Full URL, Date & Time of Access Read More