Operation Junction City - Case Study Example

s Operation Junction was a military operation, airborne in nature, which was carried in the South Viet se province of Tay Ninh on February 22, 1967. The mission was extended to May 14 (Hickey 24). The airborne operation was conducted by the US armed forces units along with the units of the South Vietnamese in an effort to counter communism. This operation was one of the largest operations carried out by the US army units in the history, followed only by one of the other massive operations carried out during the Second World War, i.e. the Market Garden Operation. Getting into the depth of the Operation Junction City, it was especially designed to seek and then destroy the enemy combatants hiding out, i.e. the North Vietnamese along with the Viet Cong army units on the War Zone Area C which was situated along the North Western side of Saigon. In addition, the mission was aiming at destroying the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) which was the base of the operation of the enemy combatants. The entire activities being carried out Laos Cambodia alongside that in South Vietnam were being planned in these headquarters, thus the army units were sure that breaking the office would serve the purpose of the mission. The Operation Junction City turned out be a success in the end, mainly owing to the use of innovative technology and modern artillery. The American units were able to destroy the communist units and camps where they ended up killing around 1.728 enemy combatant troops along with the Central Office of the Viet Cong which fled towards the Cambodian territory. During the entire conflict in the Southeast Asian conflict they remained in that very region. However, the Office which was also the headquarters wasn’t destroyed completely as a result of the operation. The main reasons for that being that firstly, the sanctuary was in close proximity to the COSVN, secondly, there were issues with the infiltration of the troops into the Viet Cong and lastly, strategic errors in the positioning of the US troops. However, the success factor can only be accounted to the modern artillery employed in the mission. Thus, elaborating in detail on the aim of the mission is crucial to the context of the study since the outcomes can be deduced based on these aims. Also, the success attributed to the modern artillery can also be measured against the intended as well the un-intended aims of the mission. The sole aim of the US division, three in number, was to spy and locate the main headquarters where the communist insurgency was being planned targeting the South Vietnamese region. The headquarter was the main office, i.e. the Central Office of the South Vietnam (COSVN), which the main target during the entire three months of operation. This office wasn’t just perceived as a meager locality with a few insurgents planning the operation, rather, a few had reported this headquarter more to resemble more like a mini-Pentagon where everything was so organized as to contain typists and even file cabinets, not to mention trained staff workers constituting what would comprise a formal bureaucracy. However, in reality, once the war was over and the headquarters were revealed, it was a small place with a group of not-so-trained people. Most of the facilities were rather ad hoc and so, most of the combatants were successful in escaping the central office right after the bombings nearby. Analyzing the tactical plan is also crucial to the context of the paper, since the success or the failure of a mission relies of the strategy. The tactical plan of the Operation Junction City is referred to as the ‘hammer and anvil’ owing to the grand strategy that airborne forces would aim at completely wiping out the VietCong office which was also their headquarters. In other words, the term ‘hammer and anvil’ implied treating them with a well prepared anvil of strategically located forces. The forces earmarked especially to gain strategic depth on the location included mostly the first Infantry Division along with the Twenty-Fifth Infantry Division. Also, the Twenty-Seventh Infantry Regiment of the US i.e. the ‘Wolfhounds’ along with the One-Ninety-Sixth Light Infantry Brigade were earmarket for the mission. In addition the airborne troops mostly comprised of the One-Seventy-Third Airborne Brigade along with major elements comprising of the Eleventh Armored Cavalry Regiment (Rogers 117-118). The operation was initiated by the Second Field Force of Vietnam on February 22, 1967. This initial phase of the mission was conducted by two of the infantry divisions i.e. the 1st and the 25th. The first was being led by General William DePuy while the latter was being led by General Frederick Weyand. These forces were aiming to target the north where they wanted to build an anvil over which the VeitCong division was plotted to be crushed. More importantly, the infantry being utilized during the time included around 249 helicopters and around eight of the battalions which proved to be quite an effective move. This induction of artillery on the location took place around the same day when the paratroopers were launched. This was the only launch of the entire operation which was also the largest once since the Second World War. The 173rd Airborne Brigade also went to action at the western side of the deployment locale of the 1st and 25th Infantry (Pimlot 77-79). At first, the operation was essentially a success after the positions designated were approached without any massive scale resistance. Later by February 23, another strategic move was struck which also bore fruits for the mission, i.e. the 25th Division along with the 2nd Brigade constituting the ‘hammer’ was struck right against the ‘anvil’ comprised of the airborne and the infantry which completely blocked the enemy combatants from escaping. However, as it turned out, the VietCong forces were quite mobile in nature also elusive, thus they had scattered their information sources in South Vietnam and thus, they managed to relocate their headquarters in Cambodia where they were also successful in launching attacks at a massive scale. The struggle reached its climax on two points i.e. on the February 28 and later on March 10 when there were two bloody clashed between the VietCong forces and the US cavalry (Icks 59-60). The first encounter is referred to as the Battle of Prek Klock I while the second one is called the Battle of Prek Klok II. The US troops carried out powerful airborne strikes which managed to repulse the VietCong troops yet success rate wasn’t as satisfactory. The second phase was later conducted after General Palmer replace General Searman and directed the strikes to the east by virtue of mechanized division, i.e. the 1st Infantry and the 11th Cavalry. This time, the strategy was shifted since the cavalry was reinforced by the 1st Brigade along with the 9th Infantry. Thus, this paved way for quite a battle referred to as the Battle of Ap Bau Bang II, where the 273rd VietCong posed quite a competition to the US cavalry. These attacks were followed by two more attacks where VietCong units targeted the 25th and the 1st Infantry Division, which were repulsed successfully by the US forces and thus, VietCong forces were immensely weakened and started preparing for safe retreat towards he border region of Cambodia. The third phase was thus initiated on May 14 in agreement with MACV where the 25th Infantry Division undertook the task of propelling towards the villages and the bushes in search of the enemy where they were able to retrieve certain material logistics of the VietCong forces, who had now moved towards the defensive end. Resultantly, the VietCong troops suffered a great defeat in the Tay Ninh province where around 810 tonnes of rice was captured along with around 600 tonnes of arms, documents and other materials. However, on the American end, reports reflected that the 9th Division suffered a great deal of loss with around 1, 728 men killed and 34 captured. Around 200 Americans also gave up their lives where around 1500 of them were injured. The success of the US troops can solely be attributed to a large consumption of equipment and artillery, to be specific, around 355,000 rounds of the artillery were procured where 3,235 tonnes of bombs had to be disposed which secured success for the US troops in the operation (Operation Junction City 55-59). Thus, conclusively, the operation was one of the largest operations carried out by the US army units in the history, followed only by one of the other massive operations carried out during the Second World War, i.e. the Market Garden Operation. Getting into the depth of the Operation Junction City, it was especially designed to seek and then destroy the enemy combatants hiding out, i.e. the North Vietnamese along with the Viet Cong army units on the War Zone Area C which was situated along the North Western side of Saigon. In addition, the mission was aiming at destroying the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) which was the base of the operation of the enemy combatants. The entire activities being carried out Laos Cambodia alongside that in South Vietnam were being planned in these headquarters, thus the army units were sure that breaking the office would serve the purpose of the mission. The Operation Junction City turned out be a success in the end, mainly owing to the use of innovative technology and modern artillery. The American units were able to destroy the communist units and camps where they ended up killing around 1.728 enemy combatant troops along with the Central Office of the Viet Cong which fled towards the Cambodian territory. Works Cited: Hickey, Lawrence J. Operation Junction City. Christiansburg, VA: Dalley Book Service, 1997. Icks, Robert J. Famous Tank Battles. Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1972. Print. Rogers, Bernard W. Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turning Point. Washington: Dept. of the Army : for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print Off, 1974. Print. Operation Junction City, Vietnam 1967: Battle Book. Ft. Leavenworth, Ks: Combat Studies Institute, 1987. Print. Pimlott, John. Vietnam: The Decisive Battles. New York: Macmillan, 1990. Print. Read More