The Soviet Union Famine of 1932 - Case Study Example

THE SOVIET UNION FAMINE OF 1932 Type of the Paper April 18, 3028 Words of the School OUTLINE THE SOVIET UNION FAMINE OF 1932 1. INTRODUCTION 2. WHY STALIN TOOK THE DECISION AND HIS MINDSET DURING THE FAMINE 3. MAJOR REASONS WHY THE FAMINE TOOK PLACE a) To suppress peasants resistance to collectivism b) To suppress nationalist aspirations of Ukraine c) Unfavorable weather d) Harvest decline e) Food exportation during crisis f) Food rationing system 4. WHAT WAS THE FAMINE LIKE? 5. THE SIGNIFICANCE THE FAMINE HAS ON STALIN, HIS REIGN AND SOVIET UNION 1. Introduction Thousands of people suffered from the great hunger of the Soviet Union in the early 1930s. To date there are numerous accepted theories put forward that explain the tragedy that befell the society. It was not the first one that affected the peasants and violated their human rights, but looking through from the 1920’s, another major calamity that Ukranians faced was somehow liked to the devastating events of the 30s. The reasons are well elaborated through the political issues that existed between the two calamities. The famine targeted on a specific group, the peasants, and unlike the previous 1920s famine, this one affected the urban population the most. Though there are controversial reasons attributed to this, one factor raises questions over the influencing forces to the famine. “There was no famine in the heartland of Russia; the famine was limited to Ukraine proper and the adjacent territories to the east, inhabited in great part by Ukrainians and to the other non-Russian minorities.”1 Thesis: The 1932 famine was an oppression to the Soviet Ukranian society, which led to the destruction and deaths of innocent people as a plot for political power. The causes were highly influenced by human actions and the basis of it was political reasons. This document provides a comprehensive and integrated discussion of the series of events and how man-made affairs took a center stage for selfish gains in politics, to undermine the survival and lives of those who posed threats to the communist regime. It addresses the ill-conceived policies of the communist government, collectivization and the concept of dekulakization. 2. Why Stalin took the decision and his mindset during the famine The five year modernization plan for the Soviet Union was the reason Stalin undertook the collectivism and rationing policies among others. For Stalin’s government, the way forward to industrialization was through agricultural production, hence intended to build on his policies to improve agricultural production that would be used to finance his modernization plan. It was clear that certain factors, especially opposition and lack of finances would impair his plan upon implementation. Stalin needed the unity of his people to aid his plan through working on collective farms for better harvest not only for exportation, but to feed the huge number of people in society who would migrate to towns to work in factories. Rationing and exportations were measures targeting more savings to support the government’s plan and activities. He aimed at suppressing the opposition and raising more revenues to raise capital for industrial construction and further investment in reinforcing the military. Major Reasons why the Famine took place a. To suppress peasants resistance to collectivism It is believed that agricultural production was controlled by peasant farmers before collectivism was introduced in the Soviet Union. Land privatization was introduced by Lenin before the 1920s. However, the owners still used primitive modes of production. It is no doubt that the need for scientific measures would have helped improve and develop the state’s agricultural production. Stalin believed that collectivism was the way forward to advancing the agricultural state; where pieces of peasants’ farms were consolidated into larger farms (collectives) in which scientific methods of farming and mechanization would be used. The peasants did not react positively to Stalin’s policy, they knew it meant losing their own lands that they had worked hard for years to raise their families and improve their lives. After numerous trials to convince poor peasants to collectivism, both the rich and poor peasants were certain that Stalin’s policy was headed to taking advantage of them, and in turn objected it. Resistance was deemed unfavorable for Stalin’s strategy of industrialization. It was expected that through collectivism, produced yields would be sufficient to feed more workers who were to work in factories in the following 5 years of modernization. Despite the imposed penalties, peasants remained opposed; they not only ignored the instructions but went as far as destroying their produce. Stalin embarked on eliminating disobedient peasants, which began as an anti-kulak plan. Hunger and starvations was used as “instrument to break the resistance of the peasantry to the new system, oblige them to work under state’s provided conditions and deliver what the government demanded.”2 It obvious the famine was deliberately induced to wipe out the peasant and leave the government in control of the land. Witnesses confirmed that government sent agents to peasants’ houses, confiscated all their grains/livestock including the households’ reserves, set high grain taxes. It basically ignored the life of a peasant and were left to nothing but a sure famine death. b. To suppress nationalist aspirations of Ukraine Ukrainians had for a long time tried to maintain their identity and culture under the vast Russian rule. During Lenin’s tenure, the tension between Ukrainians and Soviet Union existed but there were an agreement was reached and were given the power to practice their cultures. Other than the Russian community, they were the second largest group in society and posed a nationality threat in the nation’s politics. Power consolidation for Stalin in areas where Ukrainians lived was problematic as he was faced with opposition in each of his policy. The majority of the peasants who opposed his collectivism move were from Ukraine’s regions; mean while the Ukrainian national aspirations becoming very influential to rebel Soviet’s nationalist.3 The Expected rumor of deportation of the Ukrainian nationalists never occurred, instead other tools including collectivization was set to reduce their power. The number of Ukrainians was too large to be deported elsewhere. Therefore Stalin had to come up with a way to eliminate the class enemies. Tauger states that “Ukrainian nationalist interpretation holds that the soviet regime, and specifically Losif Stalin, intentionally imposed the famine to suppress Ukrainians and Ukraine’s nationalist aspirations.”4 It was the final crushing blow that took advantage of the political and economic factors to induce famine and starvation as a lesson to Ukraine’s nationalist. c. Unfavorable weather Other than political aggravated reasons, there was an element of poor weather condition that did not favor agricultural increased productions. Most politicians, economists and civilians do not want to admit that Soviet region in the time was under the strain of natural disasters, even as the political bitterness began. The harsh political actions have shadowed the proven truth of natural disaster, which most feel Soviet had the capacity to prevent. There was considerable recorded drought in 1931 and highly experienced in the stepper region, which was followed by another on in 1934 that affected Ukraine’s yield along the years.5 The central region was affected by the weather conditions, where drought has a long history in Russian region. It was beyond reasonable doubt that extent of the drought contributed to crop failure. The Speech that Stalin gave in 1933, though controversial admits that the drought of 1931around Volga region and the subsequent unfavorable weather conditions experienced in Northern Caucasus and Ukraine in 1932 resulted to huge looses for Soviet.6 There are variations based on the research of Mace and Penner, but all agree there existed drought disaster between these years. All in all whether they disagree or agree it occurred in 1931 or 32, the effect of the drought had contributed agricultural production variation from the past productive years. The regions were known to have fertile soils and produced huge harvest under favorable weather condition. Penner admits that the fertile counties of Northern Caucasus territory were afflicted by “hard November frost, ten to twenty days of steady rain during harvest period and a summer drought” especially in Kuban counties.7 Other productive regions also experienced hot winds besides the drought and the rainfall range fell below the normal rate in the summer and winter seasons. It’s evident that poor climatic condition during the period propagated the ill government policies to enhance the famine. d. Harvest decline The effect of the drought, hot winds and reduced rains was crop failure in most parts, which contributed high grain ratio to the Soviet Union. The harvest in certain productive areas had hit lower than drought effect of 1921, in turn causing the dependent regions like urban towns to suffer. Despite the large areas of land put into crop production, only minimal yields were harvested. Areas like “middle Volga in 1931 gathered only 2.5 centners on average while sovkhozy had garin yields of 1.8 and 2.5 centners compared to 1930s yield of 9.3 and 13 centners; krai had lost approximately 3.5 million tones of grains” after crop failure in around 25 of its districts.8 Similarly, labor had reduced in the fields as most people feared the policies imposed by the government were oppressing them. Much of the share they worked for an harvested went parted with the government, which seemed rather unfair. For some it was better laying idle and putting down their work tools rather than work for produce to be snatched away by communist government. The instituted grain procurement policy saw majority of the peasants in the fertile central and Ukraine region hand over their surpluses, food reserves and even seed grains for next planting season. As a result, they not only experienced food shortage, but required seed grain loans for year 1931. All together, the harsh treatment for peasants, poor payment for labor work and oppressive policies of the government were excessive demands peasants could not stand. “In many places peasants simply stopped working as hard, and total sown acreage decreased by about 4-5% in 1931.”9 Resistance among workers intensified day by day; rather than focusing in tilling the lands, many people left their crops unattended. A lot of crops were exceeded by the weeds, and to worsen the situation large acres of oat and wheat crops were left to rot in the fields. In an already hit region by the drought, refusal to work also contributed to the food shortage. e. Food exportation during crisis Stalin’s government had been engaged in food exportation to foreign markets for several years before the famine struck. Though a good strategy in pursuit of the nation’s progress, it was unexpected of the government to continue in trading food crops in foreign market while some regions of the nation were suffering hunger. The nation’s procurement quota in 1929 and 1930 were quite high and the grain yields exported were very high. Despite the quota lowered with the drought food reduction in 1931 afterwards, Stalin’s government continued to export even the little that was left for the nation. Despite the drought the grain quotas policies and exportation was mandatory, where food stuff were shipped out into foreign markets to generate capital that would support Stalin’s five year plan to transform Soviet Union and fund its military organizations and activities.10Considering that the harvest had reduced as an effect of the droughts and reduced labor, the government established ways to keep high their yields exportation; they kept constant the procurement at least in 1931, but opted on confiscating reserved harvest from the peasants. Regardless of the harvest out turn, “Moscow kept up the Soviet export of grains…ignoring reduced grain harvest in Ukraine from 1930 that trended at the ratio of 23: 18: 15: 22: 12 to keep the nation’s revenue stable,” which explains the food shortage in the period after raising the crop exports from “0.14 to 7.3 percent” from 1928 to 1931 respectively.11 Reduced grain quotas after the famine and political decisions taken in the period were not sufficient to rescue the nation from hunger; instead, households’ reserves were depleted very easily. Soviets agricultural production had failed to recover in due time when another catastrophic drought struck them again. The manner in which the government operated was harsher in certain regions than others. For example, while a decree was issued to decline the grain procurement quota in Kolkhozy from previous 22.4 to18.1 million in 1932, Sovkhoz region’s quota was raised from 1.7 to 2.5 million tons.12 Famine was inevitable for such regions and most people slipped into the category that depended on emergency food aid for survival. f. Food rationing system Stalin’s hope of modernizing Soviet Union led to his government issuing of a rationing system that brought more harm to the society than its intended good to regenerate money and stabilize the economy economic factors. The rationing system that was introduced after market breakdown in 1929 run through to 1935; it rationed both produced food stuff and non food consumer items for the people in the towns, but also varied based on their occupations.13 Together with the high set food prices food access remained a problem to the poor in society. The pay for a labor day could not equate to an individual’s needs on a daily basis. Majority of industrial consumer goods and key food stuff for the society was included in the rationing system to sell them in the foreign markets for higher prices while citizens suffered. The industrialization and economical gains for Soviet Union were highly regarded than consumption for its population for survival. Food rations distribution was biased based on social classes in society. The people of lower status were undermined by the policy to give higher priority of food allocation to classified high esteem persons. Groups of lower priority workers and non working family members were excluded from the central rationing lists; generally, people of lower status relied on the supply of few local resources, which only occurred after the pooling resources to the centre and redistributing them to those categorized in the central rationing list.14 The distinction allowed disparities to exist for the people, in regard to the quality and quantity of food allocated to individuals/households in 1932. The same years saw escalated food prices internally and with the preferential treatment, only the top two list category of consumers were guaranteed the bread ration.15 The rationing system translated into further loss of productive people in society and stretched to affect capable urban residents. The implication was Stalin’s government budget deficit, denying not only the nation, but citizens’ sufficient purchasing power to overcome food shortage. According to Osokina, the prolonged rationing system leveled workers’ salaries by scant rations, hence undermining the labor incentives and triggering decreased production to reduce trading activities; and as a result of budgets deficit, investment reduced, workers’ salaries were delayed and the government increased money circulation.16 Whatever intended economic significance attached to the policy at inception was overstated. It left the people who worked hard for it in starvation and the rations they received could not even cover their basic necessities. What was the famine like? A nation that was considered the breadbasket for the huge yields of wheat in Europe turned around after 1931. The well fed citizens in the union from the agricultural production had their lives altered for political gains. The society (peasants, town residents ad especially kulaks and Ukrainians) were reduced to government laborers under dehumanizing conditions. Grains and livestock confiscation left families with nothing to consume to force them into collectivization. Numerous witnesses and survivors have attested to how they watched their family members succumb to death under starvation, while government exported and stored most. Higher death rates were experienced in 1932 and 1933; thousands of people lost their lives per day to amount to approximately seven million lives. Although the nation had a severe famine, Soviet Union denied of its existence by duping and preventing members of the foreign press and relief food shipments at the border.17Some people dropped dead on the streets and rebellious ones were shot. People were denied to cross the borders for refuge in foreign lands and forced to dye in their Soviet Union under starvations. Death left children orphaned and swept most of the peasants’ villages among elsewhere in towns. The significance the famine has on Stalin, his reign and Soviet Union The political induced famine brought Soviet Union to far worse position than before. The subsequent four years after1931 reduced the nation’s economy that they strived under a budget deficit and reduced labor power that slowed down production. Though expected to be a success in economical gain, it amounted to lost years in economic achievement, what can be said a successful in mass elimination of members of society for political achievements. It also meant uprooting opposition successfully, but also painted Stalin’s dictatorship and his reign in Russian world as the most dehumanizing. The famine of the 1932 exposed Stalin’s ill political motives that sustained his tenure. It left a wounded society that to date can commemorate it with hope never to occur again. 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B. “The Ukranian Genocide/Holodomor, 1932-1933.” uchicago.edu, Accessed 18 April 2014. http://cis.uchicago.edu/sites/cis.uchicago.edu/files/resources/100113-ukraine-holodomor-curriculum.pdf, p.24 Maslo, C. “The Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 as an Act of Genocide.” faminegenocide.com. Accessed 19 April 2014. http://faminegenocide.com/2003-competition/01-maslo%27s_ukrainian_famine_of_1932-1933.html Osokina, E. A. 2001. “Our Daily Bread: Socialist Distribution and the Art of Survival in Stalins Russia, 1927-1941.” New York: M.E Sharpe Inc. Penner, D. R.“Stalin and the Italianka of 1932-1933 in the Don Region.” Persee.fr. Accessed 17 April 2014. http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/cmr_1252-6576_1998_num_39_1_2512, Serbyn, R. “The Causes and Consequences of Famine in Soviet Ukraine.” faminegenocide.com. Accessed 17 April 2014. http://faminegenocide.com/resources/causes.html Stark, A. “Entitlement to Eat: Explaining the Ukraine Famine of 1932-1933.” e-ir.info. Last modified 20 January 2011. http://www.e-ir.info/2011/01/20/entitlement-to-eat-explaining-the-ukraine-famine-of-1932-1933/ “Stalin’s Forced Famine 1932-1933 7,000,000 Deaths.”historyplace.com. Accessed 18 April 2014. http://www.historyplace.com/worldhistory/genocide/stalin.htm Tauger M. B. “The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933.”Slavic Review, 50 (1) 1991: 70-89. http://www.as.wvu.edu/history/Faculty/Tauger/Tauger,%20%27The%201932%20Harvest%20and%20the%20Famine%20of%201933,%20SR%2091.pdf Tauger, M. B.”Natural Disaster and Human Actions in the Soviet Famine of 1931-1933.” The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, (1506). Accessed 17 April 2014. http://www.as.wvu.edu/history/Faculty/Tauger/Tauger,%20Natural%20Disaster%20and%20Human%20Actions.pdfp.8 “Ukrainian Famine-Holodomor; Motion February 5, 2009.” adrianpederick.com. Accessed 19April 2014. http://www.adrianpederick.com/media/debates/M.Ukrainianfamine-Holodomor-5Feb09.pdf Read More