The Rwandan Genocide: the Most Atrocious War Crimes of History - Research Paper Example

Rwanda Genocide Introduction No government or international body can take away the extreme pain of losing a family member or a loved one to the bullets of army men who were out to undertake ethnic cleansing of the society one lives in. The Rwandan genocide was a striking example of violence that went to unpredicted levels and killed as many as one million people. 1994 was a year of horror for residents of Rwanda who bore the wrath of the RPA and the other extremist groups of the leading political powers of the country, during the hundred day time-span that the war lasted namely, from January to December in that year. This has gone on record as one of the most atrocious war crimes of history (Zorbas, 2004, 32), surpassing the Second World War in terms of number of people killed. The United Nations has been making several efforts to recover and reestablish the law and order scenario in the country. The government of Rwanda has also taken definite steps to keep the war out of the people’s minds by creating judicial solutions that the common people can relate to. But how far have they succeeded? Rwanda was a peaceful and nature loving corner of Africa wherein peasants constituted a major percentage of the Tutsi and Hutu populations that resided together (Melvern, 2006). Post-genocide, the country was a picture of disarray and destruction, with thousands rendered homeless. What actually caused the genocide to erupt? As always, a certain amount of frustration had been dwelling in the hearts of the Hutus, but their eruption happened as soon as the frustration reached planning in cold blood. According to analysts, the genocide resulted due to massive conspiracy from the heads of political parties that were in power in and before 1994. These heads believed and spread that the Tutsi tribe was evil and needed to be removed from the face of the country. All the militant outfits that were related to such political parties were mobilized all at once and around 800,000 Tutsi members were killed by their Hutu neighbors (Melvern, 2006). The military killed many members of the Hutu tribe since they were regarded as co-conspirators of the Tutsi clan. This led to outrage and counter killing. The killings were gruesome no doubt, but what is more horrible is the condition that the country has been left in after the reconciliation measures were initiated. Ten years down the line, the cataclysm has left behind a legacy that the world would be shocked to hear about. We assess all the steps and measures taken by the United Nations and the Government of National Unity of Rwanda to ensure that justice was served to perpetrators of the killings. A lot of lives were lost, in what was a direct result of war crimes, but more importantly, a lot many homeless souls lost their living. This article highlights all these aspects of the failure of the reconciliation measures that the UN and the Rwandan government have initiated and followed. The futility of the efforts only reveals that the even the best international community bodies cannot reduce the impact of planned mass murders, especially those that took place at a national level. When Did It All Begin…And Why? We will begin our study through a thorough analysis of the steps that the United Nations took to initiate the Arusha Accords. Trouble began soon after the Arusha Accords were signed by the RPF government of Rwanda in 1992 to put an end to the Rwandan Civil War (Uvin, 2001, 75) and ensure that there was peaceful power sharing between the government and the rebels. The Arusha Accords were followed up with a well detailed UNAMIR, that was to operate in protecting the capital city of Kigali from any harm, assist in ensuring that the general elections were completed in due time, and cater to the security needs of any Rwandan party that registered under the UNAMIR. This approach is often considered a slow start to the reconciliation process in Rwanda, in the post Civil War era (Barnett, 2003, 54). January to December 1994 saw renewed fighting and huge number of killings, and the UNAMIR was forced to change its stand of the military troops acting as mere security watchers and extend their role to providing security to all civilians and refugees, irrespective of whether they took refuge in the UNAMIR or not. Most experts agree that if the United Nations had been quick in its moves, and had conducted the arrests faster, violence after the UNAMIR started could have been stopped. In fact, world historians have maintained that the genocide was a direct result of inaction and premature withdrawal of the military troops from sensitive areas. UNAMIR, the military back-up that the UN provided to the Rwandan population to ensure that the Arusha Accords were strictly followed, started in 1993 and ended in 1996. However, it failed to prevent the genocide from happening. As soon as Rwandan rebels killed a few Belgian officials in April 1994, Belgium decided to withdraw its troops (Melvern, 2000, 4). And havoc reigned. The Post-genocide Trauma The picture after the genocide turned out to be something more horrible for humanitarians to take. In fact, one look at the process of reconciliation and how it resulted into more killings of and by Hutus leaves us with a feeling of despair. As soon as the genocide was brought to a halt by the international community, the emotions of the Tutsi and the Hutu clans were interrupted and there was silent dissent to the foreign intrusion. The renewed killings bore testimony to this dissent and dissatisfaction that the UN proceedings were causing (Zorbas, 2004, 34). Political planning behind the genocide further deteriorated the state of affairs. Many blame the RPF government that came to power soon after the genocide and comprised of elite class conservative members of the Tutsi tribe, to having caused further killings of Hutus to take due revenge of the Tutsi killings (Des Forges, 1999). This resulted in further killings of members of the judiciary. Around 750 judges were present in the country’s judiciary system before the genocide, a number that dwindled to a meager 244, after the genocide (Tiemessen, 2004). Let us now take a quick look at the role of UN in the years after the genocide. Just as it had failed to control all factors that led to the genocide, the UN has been failing consistently in relieving the distressed sections of the Rwandan population of their societal and political handicap. UN right away started by punishing the war criminals, which included eminent officials of state and political heads. The Prime Minister was himself convicted for initiating the genocide, a first in world history, where a political head of state is blamed and held responsible for an event as massive as genocide. The body that it set up to bring the perpetrators of crime and the killing to court was the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The ICTR was seen to constantly renew its resolutions and improve upon them to cater to the needs of the Rwandan society. What critics note is why an international body as large a UN could not decipher or predict the direction in which the Rwandan society would be propelled post-genocide? The Tribunal was a silent member of the UN, who failed to bring in the necessary drive in the judicial proceedings, owing to a bulky and very slow bureaucracy. To add to the despair, officials who were a part of the Tribunal were unfamiliar with the judicial needs of the Rwandan community that was essential at that point in time. As a result, all processes were slow and way behind time in predictions. The UN initiative notwithstanding, the Rwandan government led by the RPF again got back in power an initiated a whole new strategy to bring in normalcy in the already destroyed lives of Rwandans. The UN merely stood as a spectator as hundreds of prisoners were taken in and left to live in unhygienic conditions. Some of the prisoners do not have any charges against them and are entitled to lead the normal lives of free men. While the Rwandan government’s judicial system was parallel to the UN initiative, it still was not able to involve the common man of the country and derive his consent. TO make things better, the government revived the Gacaca system (Tiemessen, 2004), wherein judiciary court processes and bulk trials were undertaken in full public view. While this only woke the people to the fact that judiciary did exist in their country, the fact that the processes were of no consequence to the people already imprisoned caused further dissent amongst the common people. Is Reconciliation The Right Term Even? While UN stood as an international bystander, the government went forward to create the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC). The NURC was to look into reducing poverty and improving national unity. And this is where the futility of UN’s loud programs got highlighted. Although the UN Security Council held meetings twice a day (Madalina, 2010) to devise new strategies to address the Rwandan crisis during the genocide, it still left a huge part of the mountain untraversed. The Council focused mainly on troop placements to stop the killings. However, the UN has failed to create the right approach that would convince the common people that justice would be served to them. The poverty situation was dismal by 2002, wherein eight out of ten people were living on less than a dollar per day. The government struggles to create a Poverty Reduction Program (Jones, 2001, 56) that hopes to resolve the difference between the poor and the rich sections of the society. But can that be equaled to reconciliation? Will that bring to justice all those innocent people who are lying half-dead and half-nourished in the prison cells? No strategy used y the UN or the local government can be called a process that is equivalent to reconciliation as there can be no reconciliation for the dead and the dying. When The Mighty UN Failed The growing distrust in ICTR and the UN Security Council was only mistranslated to trust for the local government, and the people of Rwanda were left with no other choice but to follow the dictates of the renewed RPF government which claimed to declare and pursue national unity. The Rwandan example is an out and out failure as far as United Nations and its international ventures were considered. Genocide was predicted twice from two different sources, and was considered a potential threat to the Arusha Accords. ( Madalina, 2010). While the UN had failed in stopping the genocide, it performed miserably in clearing out the perpetrators of the main crime. Today’s Rwanda recognizes different sections of the population by terms like refugees, returnees, victims, survivors, and perpetrators, often referred to in political speeches and agendas (Staub, 2006, 868). This is a direct indicator that the society although following a dualist structure (Tiemessen, 2004) is run by the locally formed government, which relates to people by outlining these sections and differentiating them from each other, reminding them of the gruesome past. The dissent for perpetrators, most of whom are innocent, is still present, as they happen to be Hutus who survived the genocide. The second indicator of UN’s failure is the need to use the indigenous Gacaca system to bring back trust in the judicial system. While UN started through a retributive approach that was present mostly from 1994 to 1996, the local government employed the Gacaca courts and undid the severity of punishment. The survivors of the genocide, only wanted to see the perpetrators punished even if it was only through lifetime imprisonment. Hanging as a death sentence was reduced to life imprisonments and this was where the Gacaca won in the process of reconciliation. While many victims were left penniless, social awareness programs and education was the only way the dualist society would learn to live in peace (Tiemessen, 2004). What Does The Future Hold In Store? Since the Tutsis and the Hutus have been unnecessarily pulled into judicial and public processes over the past ten years, they have to ensure that differences are not allowed to creep in to their society again. This has to be a mutual process with both populations agreeing to co-operate with each other and live in harmony and mutual respect. Although difficult, reconciliation may come in a less severe form than what the UN promised. And this will only lead to good of the nations. New humanitarianism is on the rise and all the nations of the world, including the United Nations has to understand that crime as massive as genocide cannot be allowed to happen. Niether can they be ignored , nor can they be cured. So, just as a crippled Rwanda hopes to make it big in the world map someday, the world learns from its example, how important restoration is for the good of any dualist society. The Lesson Learned The ICTR is past. The Gacaca is the present. Rwanda may have been forgotten in the wake of the recently closed World Recession, but it is the first example of a new way of political thinking and societal rearrangement. If reviving an indigenous practice is good for the society, then every country could go for it. United Nations had mighty promises for the world in the form of globalization and international judiciary. These examples prove that not all UN resolutions are applicable to third world countries and closed societies. Instead, foreign intrusion only breeds contempt in the minds of the local population, leading to a catastrophe that can be as massive as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Why did UN fail? There can be many reasons to clarify the failure, given the dismal history of Rwanda and Congo. UN had never devised schemes for multi-tribe populations. And this is where it failed to see how heads of two tribes staying in the same country could attack and neutralize international initiatives as big as the Arusha Accords and the UNAMIR. Conclusion - What can be done to undo the failure? New humanitarianism is one solution to ensuring genocides do not happen. The world does not need cruel reminders in the line of the Holocaust to ponder on how ruthless power hungry people ruin stability and peace to cause destruction in established societies and cultures. Even hough it has fauiled to restore judiciary power in the country, UN can presently help in developing a good amount of societal stability by concentrating on soft elements in a society. Art and culture, dance and music, folklore and handicrafts, all these form an integral part of a place’s history. To revive the lost glory of RWanda, creating common platforms that showcase both Tutsi and Hutu cultures without any bias is really important to keep the old memories from returning. While the local government concentrates of political education, the United Nations can concentrate on cultural and societal education and growth. People of Rwanda have only recovered from the genocide and have a long way to go to be able to pave a path for their country and call their society a stable and prosperous one. The world needs to realise this importance and undertake international initiatives headed by the UN to help the people use their lost luster to gain back financial and emotional stability. Poverty can be removed only if tourism and indigenous industries are encouraged in the country. Museums that serve as milestones in the country’s journey from genocide to normalcy must be honored and opened to the international public. Such an approach coupled with a proper taxing system alone can help the government bring down the ruins of genocide in society that are both political and emotional in nature. References Barnett, M. (2003). Eyewitness to a genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda.  Cornell University Press. Des Forges, A. L. (1999). "Leave none to tell the story": genocide in Rwanda (Vol. 3169, No. 189). New York: Human Rights Watch. Jones, B. D. (2001). Peacemaking in Rwanda: the dynamics of failure (p. 128). Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Melvern, L. (2006). Conspiracy to murder: The Rwandan genocide. Verso. Melvern, Linda (2000). A people betrayed: the role of the West in Rwandas genocide (ill. ed.). Zed Books Nan, E. M., (2010). New Humanitarianism With Old Problems : The Forgotten Lesson Of Rwanda, The Journal Of Humanitarian Assistance, retrieved on April 3, 2014 from : https://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/780 Stanton 1, G. H. (2004). Could the Rwandan genocide have been prevented?.  Journal of Genocide Research, 6(2), 211-228. Staub, E. (2006). Reconciliation after genocide, mass killing, or intractable conflict: Understanding the roots of violence, psychological recovery, and steps toward a general theory. Political Psychology, 27(6), 867-894. Uvin, P. (2001). Reading the Rwandan genocide. International Studies Review, 3(3), 75-99. Zorbas, E. (2004). Reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. Afr. J. Legal Stud.,1, 29. Tiemessen, E.A., (2004). After Arusha: Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda, African Studies Quarterly, retrieved on March 3rd, 2014 from : http://asq.africa.ufl.edu/v8/v8i1a4.htm Read More