Prohibiting Obscene Animal Crush Videos in the Wake of United States - Article Example

Prohibiting Obscene Animal Crush Videos in the Wake of United s v. Stevens InUnited States v. Stevens, the Supreme Court demolished a federal law which criminalizes any intentional creation, selling, or owning of videos depicting animal cruelty if performed for commercial purposes. The statute excused depictions with important artistic, historical, journalistic, educational, scientific, political, and religious use. The statute was ratified in 1999 mainly to forbid alleged ‘crush videos,’ which show crushing of helpless animals, often by human feet and habitually in a sexually explicit environment (Epstein & Walker 362). Nevertheless, later issues of dogfighting resulted in the law being imposed on sources of audiovisual materials depicting dogfighting. This paper analyzes the United States v. Stevens case, which specifically includes an analysis of the original decision, historical context of the case, other related cases, and the long term implications of the Court’s decision in the case. Analysis of the Original Decision and the Historical Context of the Case Robert J. Stevens, who owns an online site promoting and selling such materials, was charged of infringing the law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit contradicted and proclaimed the law null and void under the First Amendment. In discussing the statute, Congress placed emphasis on ‘crush videos’. Furthermore, because President Clinton was worried about the statute’s constitutionality within the context of the First Amendment, he instructed the Justice Department to concentrate on “wanton cruelty to animals designed to appeal to a prurient interest in sex” (Epstein & Walker 362) when he endorsed the law. As claimed by the head of the Humane Society of the United States, this had the consequence of “almost dr[ying] up the crush video industry” (Epstein & Walker 362). Yet, lawsuits persisted, largely against those collecting or selling audiovisual materials showing dogfights. Robert Stevens asserted that the law encroached upon his free speech rights protected by the First Amendment. The government retorted with a recommended evaluation to establish whether the First Amendment concerns a specific kind of expression (Epstein & Walker 362): “Whether a given category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs.” Since shows of ‘illegal acts of animal cruelty’ certainly ‘lack expressive value,’ the administration argued that they must ‘be regulated as unprotected speech’ (Siegel 37). Basically, shows of animal cruelty must be included in the list of forms of ‘unprotected expression’ that involves obscenity and libel (Siegel 37). Acts showed in crushed videos are usually forbidden by the animal cruelty laws ratified by the District of Columbia and fifty states. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech” (Hall 174). Generally, the First Amendment implies that government holds no authority to limit expression based on its content, theme, or message. Section 48 clearly limits expression on the basis of content: The law regulates “visual [and] auditory depiction[s],” (Siegel 36) like sound recordings, videos, or photographs, hinging on whether they show acts wherein a living animal is deliberately maltreated. Per se, Section 48 is in all probability null and void, and the government has the responsibility to disprove that assumption. Nevertheless, since 1791 the First Amendment has allowed regulations of speeches’ content in a small number of specific areas, and has under no circumstances allowed a leeway to ignore such traditional restrictions (Hall 174). These traditional and established forms involve speech associated with criminal act, incitement, fraud, defamation, and obscenity. The argument is not only that Congress could restrict portrayals of animal cruelty bound by the First Amendment, but that such portrayals are beyond the Amendment in general. As argued by the government, the ban on animal cruelty has been historically present in American law, beginning with the Colonies’ initial settlement. However, there seems to be no related practice eliminating portrayals of animal cruelty from the First Amendment’s ‘freedom of speech’ (Hall 174-5). The government argues that historical proof about the scope of the First Amendment is a needless requirement for regulation at present, and that speech categories could be excluded from the guarantees of the First Amendment without any well-established practice of regulating that speech. Rather, the government refers to the legislative decision of the Congress that portrayals of animals being deliberately harmed and slaughtered are of quite negligible positive value as to consider them undeserving of the protection of the first Amendment, and appeals to the Court to support the prohibition on the same grounds (Siegel 37-38). Hence the government suggests that an appeal of categorical exclusion must be assessed through a direct balancing analysis. As a free-flowing trial for First Amendment scope, such idea is shocking and threatening (Siegel 37). The protection of the First Amendment of free speech does not merely involve speech categories that endure an informal balancing of comparative societal costs and benefits. The First Amendment expresses a verdict by the American public that the advantages of its regulation on the government overshadow the disadvantages. The constitution excludes any effort to look over that verdict merely based on the idea that certain speech does not deserve it (Epstein & Walker 364). The constitution is not a manuscript recommending restrictions, and proclaiming that those restrictions could be ignored anytime. However, it is only reasonable to mention that the opinion of the government did not arise out of nowhere. As rightly declared by the government, this Court has habitually defined traditionally unprotected speech categories as possessing minor societal worth as a way to truth that any advantages that could be gained from them is definitely overshadowed by the social concern for morality and order. However, these definitions are simply definitive (Siegel 38). They do not lay down a test that could be exercised as a broad issue to enable the government to send to prison any speaker provided that his/her speech is judged to be pointless or inconsequential, or as long as an informal cost-benefit analysis supports the law. When speech categories are established as completely beyond the guarantee of the First Amendment, it has not been derived from a plain evaluation of costs and benefits. Perhaps there are several categories of speech that have been traditionally undefended, but have not yet been exactly recognized or conferred as such in the nation’s case law (Epstein & Walker 364). However, if that is the case, there are no proofs that portrayals of animal cruelty are one of them. Stevens questioned Section 48 facially, claiming that any principle protected under the law would be unconstitutional. In order to triumph in a usual facial claim, Stevens would need to prove that no specific conditions exists which would be binding under Section 48, or that the law does not have obviously reasonable coverage. At this point the government claims that Stevens cannot win because Section 48 is obviously valid in cases of crush videos and depictions of animal cruelty. Resolving this case by means of a conventional facial evaluation would necessitate determining whether such exercises of Section 48 are indeed in keeping with the constitution. Related Cases and Long-Term Implications of the Court’s Decision in the Case The Depictions of Animal Cruelty Law has been limitedly but successfully exercised in the years after ratification. There have been several cases petitioned to take legal actions against sellers of videos depicting animal fighting. Although there have been no trials for the trading of animal crush videos, the statute practically destroyoed the industry. Nevertheless, because the Third Circuit reversed the law, the industry of of animal crush video has been restored, and such videos are being offered to and bought all over the world (Overbeck & Belmas 110-111). As the triumphs of associations such as the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) show, the problem of animal cruelty is a controversial social and political issue. Congress ratified the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) in 1992. AEPA was designed to penalize involvement with commercial operations using animals for experiments or research (Overbeck & Belmas 111). In 2009, in the United States v. Fullmer, the Third Circuit supported its constitutionality. The petitioners, a group of advocates against animal cruelty, claimed that AEPA illegalized their online speech (Overbeck & Belmas 112). The court stated that several parts of the online speech was unprotected under the Brandenburg principle (Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969))—to establish when provocative speech aiming to support unlawful action can be prohibited—and, some parts of the speech were soundly regarded to be ‘true threats’ due to the fact that, as emphasized by the court, “given the success of the campaign in the past, including the destruction of private property and the telecommunication attacks on various companies, the implied threats were not conditional, and this speech rightly instilled fear in the listeners” (Overbeck & Belmas 112). Irrespective of the Senate’s decisions and the approval of an amended law, the decision of the Court in the Stevens case has a number of possibly adverse repercussions for other parts of law. The reluctant dependence of the Court on precedent indicates that it deals with new cases employing an informal assessment, as its decision in Stevens concerning First Amendment rights does not appear dependent on previous case resolutions (Tolley 88-89). If animal fighting and crush videos like those of Stevens are categorized as expressive speech, it indicates the Court radically lowered the criteria for categorizing speech as expressive. The decision of the Court in Stevens and other related cases “suggest that the Roberts court is prepared to adopt a robustly libertarian view of the constitutional protection of free speech” (Tolley 89). Furthermore, the Court’s refusal of the suggestion that animals should be given the same protections provided to human beings creates a huge obstacle on the prospect of animal rights. The resolution essentially suggests that any time the Court is faced with animal rights cases it will spontaneously equate the rights at issue to similarly positioned human rights. In numerous instances, animal rights are inseparably attached to human rights, as shown by the proposition the Court obtained that crush video offenders were planning to use a human child for such videos (Overbeck & Belmas 112). It is indisputable that human rights prevail over animal rights, but that reality on its own should not diminish the level of support animals receive from the constitution. Most surprising is the impact Stevens could have on the rigid scrutiny principle of the Court. The resolution will limit the capacity of the court to discover a convincing interest, and it will make it unlikely for courts to exercise intensified scrutiny when faced with an animal rights case. The resolution of the Court has already raised doubts in the lower courts, as proven by the resolution of the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Skoien (Harr et al. xx). The case involved rights protected under the Second Amendment and whether Congress can correctly endorse a categorical exclusion against firearm possession for individuals charged of misconduct offenses; at this point, domestic abuse (Harr et al. xx). The court depended on the evaluation of the Supreme Court in Stevens but failed to acquire proper direction because the Court was unable to determine the needed level of public interest in order to implement a new categorical restriction on free speech. Conclusions Animal rights should be completely protected by law, no ‘buts’ or ‘ifs’. The Stevens case is a blatant proof that animals are not adequately protected from human abuses and violence. These helpless animals are used for purposes that are inhumane and not even useful for the greater good, like those crush videos containing sexually explicit messages. The constitution should be clear-cut about animal rights. And the Supreme Court and lower courts should adopt a stricter and more thorough evaluation of animal rights cases. Works Cited Epstein, Lee & Thomas Walker. Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and Justice. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2012. Print. Hall, Daniel. Criminal Law and Procedure. Mason, OH: Cengage Learning, 2011. Print. Harr, J. Scott et al. Constitutional Law and the Criminal Justice System. Mason, OH: Cengage Learning, 2014. Print. Overbeck, Wayne & Genelle Belmas. Major Principles of Media Law. Mason, OH: Cengage Learning, 2010. Print. Siegel, Paul. Cases in Communication Law. UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011. Print. Tolley. Tolley’s Communications Law. New York: Tolley Publishing Company, 2002. Print. Read More