The Legitimization of the Actions and Operations of the VOC - Research Paper Example

EIC and New Ways of Waging War Introduction March 20, 1602 marked the genesis of a new entity that would later become a key actor in the conflicts and the emergence of a new method of warfare, privateering, along all-important Malay Peninsula. On this day, a group of Dutch merchants and other independent companies, having grown impatient of the Portuguese’s monopoly on the spice trade in the East Indies, and with committed efforts to keep the Imperial merchants from Britain in check, founded the Vereenigde Landsche Ge-OKtroyeerde Compagnie- better known as the Dutch East India Company, or the VOC.1 At the time, the company was led by the Heeren Sewentien, better known as the Lords Seventeen, and had adopted a federal structure with six chambers.2 With the VOC strategically being formed as a way for the Dutch to suppress competing European activities through privateering, a serious competition for a stake in the lucrative East and West Indies trade routes was building up. Grotius the VOC jurist The VOC was formed as a private company whose main aim was to counteract the dominance of Portuguese interests in the East and West Indies region, as well as target Spanish interests in the ongoing conflict between the Dutch and the Spaniards. Grotius was appointed by the VOC Company as an advocate to champion the freedom of navigation and free access to markets that were under the strict control of the Portuguese.3 He conducted a campaign whose main aims were to legitimize the operations of the VOC as a body interested in fighting for free trade, the abolition of monopoly, and freedom of navigation in the East Indies waters; all of which the Portuguese were not willing to accept.4 The primary purpose in founding the VOC was so that it could anchor Dutch interests in the East Indies by moving fast to take advantage of lucrative trade routes that were under threat from British Imperial merchants. The VOC was awarded a government charter, and guaranteed the right to partake in the spice trade monopoly in East Indies. The monopoly given was more than just a guarantee of the right to trade in spices. It also guaranteed the VOC power to colonize and occupy territory, as well as enslaving indigenous peoples according to VOC political imperatives, and market requirements.5 As a young philosopher, Grotius laid the foundation for a new understanding of international law and Just War Theory that formed the basis for Dutch arguments towards the legality of their operations in the East Indies. For example, in 1609, Grotius anonymously published Mare Liberum, or the “Freedom of the Seas,” which was a way to declare war outside the European continent mainly driven by low profits from the West Indies trade, and increasing competition from the English.6 As the main VOC jurist, Grotius advocated for the legitimization of the actions and operations of the VOC, arguing that they were legal and moral. For example, on the issue of extradition, Grotius argued that all nations had the natural right and duty to either extradite or punish malefactors.7 Moreover, Grotius held that subjects of the United Netherlands had a right to sail and trade in the East Indies.8 This challenged Portuguese, Spanish, and English interests in the East Indies. Mainly, this was argued on the principle that every nation had the right to trade with any nation it pleases.9 Moreover, Grotius’ argued that the Portuguese and Spanish did not have sovereignty over the areas they occupied in the East Indies. Hence to deny the Dutch any trade rights or the rights to passage would be absurd and unjust. This paved the way for increased competition and conflict in the East Indies amongst the European powers. In February 1603, the VOC seized the Portuguese vessel Santa Catarina along the Singapore coast, on the pretext that Portuguese merchants had aggrieved Dutch vessels, and therefore seizing the ship was justified as a form of reparation.10 Grotius argued that the Portuguese had denied the Dutch the natural right of access and trade in Asian markets, that the sea ways were open to all, and that no one had the sovereign power to control such routes; this satisfied conditions for “Just War.” Moreover, the seizure of the ship was both legal and morally just- the task was implemented with the sovereign order and support of the Sultan of Johor, who was an allied sovereign at war with the Portuguese.11 However, despite Grotius’ philosophy in preserving morality, his ideas were mainly shaped and directed by Dutch colonial and trading policies.12 Therefore, it was political and economic interests that led to the idea of self-preservation by European countries, which was seen to be a necessity. As Tuck observed the sovereign right in self-preservation depended on individual persons or groups. For example, Grotius justification of Santa Catarina seizure in international waters was a strategic approach by VOC to claim their share in the East Indies market and advance Dutch interests. The Shift from Morality to International Law In the middle ages, the modern international law from colonial powers developed gradually benefiting from the gradual breakdown of the feudal order, and global pursuits of the emperor and the church.13 For example, Grotius’ writings as a Protestant and as an international jurist at this stage compounded his understanding on humanity; these writings were used to formulate his international law concepts and to legitimize the expansion of Dutch policies in East Indies. As Grewe explains, these concepts are illustrated in Grotius’ approval of attacks on European vessels.14 The religious domination of global affairs was slowly vanishing, and was being replaced by the new colonial interests and expansion to new territories outside Europe. Grotius in his ideologies regarding state to state relations, and the rights of individuals in a state, brought about a new perspective in international law, away from the morality. New international law replaced the earlier universal moralism law that was mainly held by the church as a universal authority. Grotius’ new order of international law was gradually replacing moralism. The new international law was slowly gaining roots as European powers positioned themselves strategically to expand and control their interests in other regions through colonialism. Grewe terms European - colony relations as disguised imperialism.15 This because, countries such as Britain spread their tentacles in the Malay Peninsula in a peaceful way; in most cases, they signed numerous treaties with sultans and merchants on what seemed to be purely trade interests, but were later to colonize areas around Singapore. With the new international law, political and economic interests became the main agenda, with European countries using both force and treaties to expand their interests in their new colonies. This is illustrated by EIC and VOC which used two contrasting approaches in furthering their interests in Southeast Asia. The only restraint in the new world order where political interests took control was the balance of power. The European antagonists with interests in East Indies were involved in periods of war and peace, depending on the interests at stake.16 The conflict between Dutch and Spain over trade routes in East Indies illustrates how this restraint was used. Grotius’ defense of VOC in the role of an apologist of company interest, and as an independent researcher, makes him the first jurist to significantly change the international law. In this case, Grotius is remarkable for having designed and framed elements of international law, particularly dealing with state and individuals. Therefore, the church universal law of morality was gradually replaced by an international law that was effected as more European countries spread to other regions in search for markets and law materials17 Consequently, Grotius was instrumental in supplying a legal and theoretical foundation to the VOC’s notorious trade monopolies in East Asia, and could be considered an early and important architect of European colonial rule in Asia and beyond.18 VOC and EIC Relations Both the VOC and the English owned EIC were formed to take advantage of the spreading European interests in the Asian continent and beyond, as private trading companies with an aim of obtaining profits through trade activities. However, the approaches taken by the two in their trading activities were different. The English EIC only operated under formal and informal contracts with the Southeast Asian natives and merchants.19 The English EIC was founded in 1600, and had the monopoly of English trade with East Indies and contributed to filling state coffers immensely; the commercial activities of the company were instrumental in the establishment of British Rule in the subcontinent between 1757 and 1771.20 The senior employees in the company arranged contracts with suppliers, negotiated treaties with local officials, and determined how company assets were to be used.21 In 1786, the English leased Penang from the local Sultan, and later seized the important port of Malacca from the Dutch to set up Singapore as a colony from which most of the British interests in East Indies were centered. Making Singapore a free port made it more attractive than Dutch Batavia, and led to it attracting more trade. This in turn led to the rapid growth of Singapore as compared to other colonies/entities in East Indies region.22 Interestingly, the EIC towards the nineteenth century supported Iranun and the Balangingi pirates as privateers against the VOC in the Malay Peninsula.23 However, the pirates became too powerful to control, forcing English to realize that piracy was a common threat to trade along the Malay Peninsula. Ironically, this led to the signing of a treaty between the British and the Dutch in 1824.24 On the contrary, the VOC was plagued with management and operation problems that made the company fragment. As a result, the VOC forbade any private trade. This led to the impoverishment of the VOC employees since they cannot profit from the lucrative trading routes compared to EIC employees, who benefited immensely from private trade.25 In addition, the VOC lacked standardized systems of operations, and pay scales were low. The VOC was formed largely as a war company to spread Dutch interests in the East Indies by force. Thus, Dutch had to use any possible means to access markets that were held by the Portuguese or the Spanish. This led to Grotius formulating international law on the need to have freedom to sail through any waters, or trade in any region in East Indies, and that the Portuguese had no sovereignty to declare a monopoly in these regions as they could not have any sovereignty in a land that was not their own.26 This was the main philosophy behind the formation of VOC, and was observed in the attack of Santa Catarina in the international waters, for what they termed as waging war on the Europeans who had formed a monopoly over Asia, and were not allowing the Dutch to trade in such areas. Thus VOC was primarily set as a privateering organization. The attack of ships was a strategic move towards the use of force in competing for a stake in the lucrative trade. It was one of VOC’s strategies towards dealing with other European countries.27 The philosophy of Grotius explained that the Dutch after being denied entry into the trade zones had to wage just war against their enemies, leading to privateering activities along East Indies, and expanded these activities towards the Japanese Archipelago.28 VOC as a Privateering/ Piracy Company The VOC privateering acts were expanded in 1602 after the company received the powers of monopoly on Asian trade. Privateering activities increased as a VOC subsidiary company was formed in 1612, and given the mandate to engage in any form of privateering activities against any enemy ship in this region, particularly in the Straits of Singapore, where the Santa Catarina was seized.29 The reason behind seizing Santa Catarina was given as reiteration after Portuguese aggression on Dutch merchants in the East Indies. This was later supported by Grotius as the justification behind VOC privateering activities. Such attacks opened a new chapter of warfare along Singapore archipelago. The company appointed a new general, and passed a resolution to increase attacks on any Spanish or Portuguese ship in the Asian waters, which succeeded impressively. Though Grotius justified VOC attacks and predation on Portuguese vessels, mainly as a reiteration after Spain denied the Dutch free access to East Indies markets, VOC as a privateering group had its activities leaning towards piracy. Privateers were issued with letters of marque that permitted the seizure of goods from the enemy only in cases where the holder of the letter had suffered a prior loss. In addition, the seizure of goods from enemy vessels could only occur in a state of war.30 However, in practice, VOC privateering was targeted at any vessel along the Malay Archipelago. VOC privateers seized ships and merchandise part of which was surrendered to the company’s headquarters at Batavia, while the company’s managers benefited from part of the loot. Borscberg argues that all VOC privateering victims labeled the Dutch in Asia as thieves, bandits, and as pirates.31 The VOC to a large extent before its disintegration had moved away from any trade activities and was only targeting other ships,32 which drew a thin line between its privateering activities and piracy. The VOC transformed from a complex trade company that was formed to take advantage of the Asian trade into a new tool of waging war to other European countries, as well as the native people though enslaving them and forcefully occupying their lands.33 Due to increased corruption among the company’s employees, the VOC was declared bankrupt and its holdings were taken over by the Dutch government.34 As time progressed from the 17th to the 19th century, privateering gradually started to lose its appeal as trade escalated along the Malay Archipelago. This was driven by growing profit margins from the Spice trade. The European countries, using the Malacca straits trade route, which had highly organized privateering activities, had to focus on establishing strict legal controls that would eradicate privateering activities, to make the strait safer for shipping. This led European countries to attempt to exercise control over the Malay Peninsula. This greatly inconvenienced privateers and pirates, both of whom were regarded as a threat to effective trade within the region.35 The Sea Baggers were privateers who leaned towards piracy. They devised new ways to gain economic profits by seizing an entire cargo from a vessel without the letters of marquee. After that, they sold the cargo without the permission of their managers at Batavia, and failed to remit a share of the sales to the authorities. Therefore, privateering soon became outright piracy. Conclusion In conclusion, Grotius, the “Freedom of the Seas,” or the Mare Liberum, was a way to declare war outside the European continent, mainly driven by low profits from the West Indies trade, and increasing competition from English. The VOC did not only wage war against the Europeans and other Asian trade powers from its headquarters, but they waged full war to the indigenous East Asian indigenous people, in an attempt to increase trade and income in the East Indies. Privateering became the best way for Dutch to suppress other European powers in the competition for East Indies trade stake. In retaliation, English supported other pirate and privateering groups to revenge against sporadic attacks by VOC. The same privateering techniques were later used by the natives against the Europeans. However, the Europeans viewed privateering by local groups as outright piracy, though the groups targeted any vessel along the Malacca strait, similar to VOC privateering. Therefore, Privateering was embraced as the best way of waging war against perceived enemy groups and their interests as competition for a share in the lucrative East Indies trade escalated. In retaliation to losing land and other resources to the Europeans, and European interference with the locals’ social-political and economic systems, the locals embraced privateering through Sultans, which later turned to piracy due to lack of control and structure in such privateering activities. Bibliography “Freedom of the Seas,” the Mare Liberum http://riowang.blogspot.com/2011/02/pirate-privateer-or-freebooter.html Accessed 12the March, 2013 Blakesley L.Christopher, The Practice of Extradition from Antiquity to Modern France and the United States: A Brief History, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 4.1, (1981) Borscberg Peter, Hugo Grotius East Indies trade and the King of Johor, Journal of the Southeast Asian Studies, 30.2(1999), 225-248 Borschberg Peter, Hugo Grotius, the Portuguese and Free Trade in East Indies, NUS Press, Singapore, 2011. Clulow Adam, Pirating in the Shortgun’s Waters: The Dutch East India Company and the Santo Antonio Incident, Bulletin of Portuguese/Japanese Studies, 13 (2006), 65-80 Disney Anthony, Book Review: Hugo Grotius, the Portuguese and free trade in the East Indies, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. 43.1 (2012): p184 Grewe G. WIlhem, The Epochs of International Law, NY: De Gruyter, 2000 Haakonseen Knud, The Rights of War and Peace. Political Thought and International Order from Grotius to Kant, Mind, 111.442, (2002), 499-502 Hejeebu Santhi, Contract Enforcement in the English East India Company The Journal of Economic History, 65.2, (2005),496-523 Ong G. Graham, Piracy Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca strait, Institute of Southeast Asian studies, Singapore, 2006. South African History Online, Dutch East India Company, VOC http: //www.sahistory.org.za/topic/dutch-east-india-company-deicvoc, Accessed 12th March, 2013 Read More