Realism Factors Four Assumptions in International Politics and Relations - Article Example

Bipolarity and International Relations History and Political Science Introduction The frameworks that are used in international relations, trade and diplomacy have their underpinnings in ideology and theory. One of these theories of international relations is realism. In itself, realism has it that international politics is anarchical and marked with conflicts and conflicting competition among states, as these states pursue their own interests and goals, and as these states struggle for power against one another, and thereby disregarding reference to moral values and ethical norms. Although several factors may contribute to the rise of realism in international relations and politics, yet, one of the most dominant factors that gave realism its thrust into international politics is the failure of the ideals in Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points to stave off World War II. Realism factors four assumptions in international politics and relations. The first assumption is that the state is the principal actor in international politics and relations. Secondly, realism assumes that the state is a rational and unitary actor and as such, speaks with one voice. Thirdly, realism assumes that international relations are in essence conflicting because of anarchy. By this chaos, realism does not intend to have anarchy misconstrued as chaos, but to be understood as the absence of a higher authority to arbitrate disputes or to stem aggression. Fourth, realism assumes that high politics comprising strategic economic and political issues and security, have dominance in international relations. Finally, in respect to the foregoing, it is true that among other ideals, realism intimates that bipolar systems are far more stable than multipolar systems. In order to appreciate the standpoint that realism makes concerning bipolar systems and how bipolar systems help shape international relations and politics, understanding bipolar systems is inevitable. According to Buzan (1993, 330), particularly, a bipolar system in international relations is one wherein there are two evenly matched players or powers in international relations. The existence of the US and the USSR as two centres of power during Cold War serve as an apt exemplification of the bipolar system of the bipolar systems. The thrust of this postulation is that at the time of the Cold War era, the United States knew well and easily what its adversaries were: the communists. As such, drawing allies was easier since an ally would easily or automatically be anyone who was not a communist. The deduction that would be made from this standpoint is that the US and the USSR used much less effort and resources in gathering intelligence to identify potential threat. At the same time, the US and the communist Russia did not have to fear and act upon hostilities emanating from multiple fronts. According to Waltz, Kenneth (1993, 189), if one is to further vindicate the idea that bipolar is relevant in understanding the present international systems, then other phenomena in world politics suffice to be pointed out as clear testimony. Another case that typifies and validates bipolarity as a concept that is self-evident in international relations is the present development in the Middle East. Although some disparities in power among states in the Middle East exist, there are no two powerful nations or states therein that are more powerful than the rest of the countries in the same region. This denies the states therein, the opportunity to be aligned alongside either of the two centers of power in the Middle East. On the contrary, this makes the states in the Middle East to have a tangled web of friendships and rivalries. Resultantly, the political situation in the Middle East is one that is perpetually tense, given that every nation therein is forced to remain alert from threats from multiple potential adversaries. This heightens the chances for misjudgements and misunderstandings among Middle East states concerning prevailing political situations (Waltz, 2000, 47). Personal Reflection on the Concept of Bipolarity in International Relations As a scholar in the making, it behooves me append reflection on the foregoing discussion. Specifically, it is highly questionable if the concept of bipolarity can be used to fully understand present developments in international systems. More specifically, it is debatable if it is fully correct to use the Middle East to underscore bipolarity in international relations and politics. In the Middle East, there is only one economically developed and full-fledged democracy which is Israel. While the rest of the states in the Middle East are not democracies and are characteristically Islamic and Arabic, the concept of bipolarity barely suffices as a fitting example. States in the Middle East have more in common and have less animosity among themselves, contrary to Hirst’s (2002, 255) postulation. This is because, Middle Eastern nations and states are bound by religious affiliation (Islam) and race. It is for this cause that the Six-Day War (June 5th- 10th 1967) and the Battle of Yom Kippur (October 6th- 25th, 1973) saw the countries in the Middle East (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Algeria, Morocco, Kuwait, Libya, Tunisia, Sudan and PLO) rally alongside each other against Israel. Cuba, the Soviet Union and North Korea are other members that joined the aforementioned list in the Battle of Yom Kippur. The import of the point above is that political dynamics in the Middle East may not be a matter of bipolarity. Instead, it is more underpinned by nationalism that transcends the borderlines of these Arabic or Islamic states. This ‘we-feeling’ among Arabs and Muslims in the region is solidified by the plight of the stateless Palestinian Arabs who are fighting for the recognition. Thus, it is less likely that the advent of another power in the Middle East will stabilise or ameliorate the political situation therein. Unlike the situation during Cold War, even if a formidable power should emerge to parallel Israel, the rest of Middle Eastern countries will rally alongside it, by the virtue of being Arabic and Islamic. Another weakness that is easily identifiable in the concept of bipolarity in international relations is terrorism. Terrorism has become faceless and is profound in the Middle East, even in countries that are Arabic and Islamic. At the same time, terrorism is globally distributed, so that it is impossible to see it as being profound in the Middle East because of the absence of bipolarity. The emergence of another power is therefore neither likely to extirpate terrorist onslaughts in the Middle East, nor make Israel the sole target of such attacks. Even at the moment, there is no bipolarity that is to drive world politics, yet the absence of this bipolarity has not threatened to exacerbate another world war. While the world is relatively stable, there are no clear vestiges of bipolarity. It is given that there are states allied to the US and NATO, states to allied to Russia, and states that still push the Non Aligned Movement agenda. Finally, even Layne (1993, 45) contends that even if bipolarity should be acknowledged as indispensible in international relations, the danger that accosts it cannot also be sidestepped, in as much as some may want to taut it as a stabilising factor. Immediately two centres of power (the US and USSR) emerged in international relations after World War II, the world came to the precipice of World War III twice, and thereby discounting the stabilising effect being attributed to bipolarity. The Bay of Pigs Invasion that took place on 17th-19th April, 1961 and the Cuban Missile Crises of 16th-28th, 1962 brought the world on the brink of World War III, simply because of the polarising effect of bipolarity (Sagan, Waltz and Betts, 2007, 145). Bibliography Buzan, Barry. 1993. “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School”, International Organization, 47 (3): 327-352. Hirst, Paul and Thompson, Grahame. 2002. “The Future of Globalization”, Cooperation and Conflict, 37: 247-265 Layne, Christopher. 1993. “The unipolar illusion: why new great powers will rise” in International security, 17 (4): 5-51. Sagan, Scott, Waltz, Kenneth, and Betts, Rihard. K. 2007. “Peace, Stability, and nuclear weapons” in Journal of International Affairs, 60 (2): 135-150. Waltz, Kenneth. 2000. “Globalization and American Power.” The National Interest, 59: 46-56. Waltz, Kenneth. 1993. “The new world order”, in Millennium, 22 (2): 187-195. Read More