The War between Soviet and Afghanistan - Assignment Example

Soviet-Afghanistan War The period of two decades was not enough to present the Afghanistan nation with a cloud of peace. Unrelenting political domination, which had suffocated the many developing countries of the world, had finally reached the state of Afghan. Socialist Soviet was determined to bring this Afghan-Muslim nation not only to change its political perspective but also to influence an overhaul of their religion. What seemingly looked like a weak opposition from Mujahedeen forces turned into wrecking force to Russians since they invaded the country back in 1989? The confrontation of the Mujahedeen’s leading to unconceivable defeat to the Second Powerful Nation of the Socialist Soviet was a ridicule as well as dawn of another era. Of course, one expects glimpse of joy from their fiercest rival-Americans to have rejuvenated their process to dominate they policies in the world. They indirectly supported the Mujahedeen’s. Considerably primitive, they fought a deep willed war and guerrilla tactics changed the way and methodology of combats across the world. One remains unconvinced how this desert country could win the war in the first place and secondly show one of the best combating skills. How the super powers changed to adopt this remains a joke comparing their destructive weaponry they had molded for years. Narrow Topic: This paper presents a discussion on the Afghanistan Soviet Union War that began in 1979. Thesis Sentence: The Soviets were crippled by the Mujahedins favored tactics of staging ambushes or sniper attacks, then melting away into the local population; the Soviets often did not know whom they were fighting. Introduction Origin of the war After twenty years of peaceful days, the period that would follow remained a dark cloud in the history of Afghan nation. The country for years experienced constant turmoil back before 1933. Political interests from super power countries led Afghan into inconsistent leadership procedures (Bonosky, 2001). These countries caused such imbalances. For example, the motives of Russian government and secretive involvement of U.S.A brought the country in uncontrollable civil wars that brought divergent of ideologies and subsequent coup de dat. The aftermath of King Zahir Shar rule, after adopting Soviet Government policies in Afghan, led to subsequent conspiracies and coup de tat that killed Daoud, Taraki’s communistic rule and later Amin. These countries conspicuously led this Muslim nation into war. One concludes that Afghan natives were not happy especially those loyal to Mujahdeen. The shooting of Amin by the Russians placed Babrak Kamal as president to run their desired policies, made many loyal Afghan soldiers join opposing Mujahdeen and weaken the Kamal army (Tarzi & Tarzi, 2009). With 85000 Russian soldiers in support Kamal, Mujahdeen called for jihad against Kamal’s governance and the supporting Russian soldiers. Was this a political conspiracy in favor of dark motives?(Goodson, 2001). The war itself The December of 1979 arrived with Russian troops already in Kabul. They had come to help Amin reinforce his socialist ideologies in Afghan considering that the strong tradition of Islamic was there. It was indeed not the president’s own mind, but Russians. Mujahedeen formed a guerilla force that collaborated with U.S.A., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and even communist Chinese (Goodson, 2001). To some extent, the move was acceptable. Mujahedeen’s’ waged a jihadist war against the ready equipped Russian forces. The war had begun. What majority failed to know was that the war was a conflict of interests. Mujahedeen’s knowledge for his country and mastered ambushes proved how porous Russians stood (Bonosky, 2001). 75% of the country was now under Mujahedeen control and the morning of February 15th, 1989, Borris Gromov, the commander of the Russian army, crossed the Afghan border and went back home to U.S.S.R (Tarzi & Tarzi, 2009). A defeat to Russians after a decade of war in Afghan was the last thought in their minds. Unfortunately, the Russians had lost shamelessly in Afghan territory and the war was over. The players Imagine the mighty Goliath, and the little David. That is how the war seemed. The Soviet Union military was the second largest after the American. Its defeat to lesser and poorly guerilla tactics of the Mujahedeen was a better side the nether world expected. (Goodson, 2001). Ruling oversees countries was a sign of superiority. They were determined when they invented the Afghan soils. The Russians wanted to control and monopolize the Afghan country through its socialist common wealth ideologies and this angered the natives especially when Kamal’s rule of Ant-Islamic came to power (Bonosky, 2001). Through President Taraki, Amin and Kamal’s reign, the Russians had one message to the Islamic country. They had brought sweeping programs of land distribution, emancipation of women, and destruction of old Islamic culture to a social communist country (Tarzi & Tarzi, 2009). The experience of Russians in controlling and establishing a socialist empire had given them some nerves over Afghanistan invention. Russians had high technological advancements but this could not form a convincing reason to attack Afghan (Goodson, 2001). The preservation and expansion of socialist ideology, and further proselytizing the masses to the doctrines of communism remained in the minds of the Soviet State. One would conclude that Russians aimed for a political gain. Consequentially, the Soviets planned and launched a war in their boardrooms that would initiate their ultimate demise. Not even the claim that Amin had invited them and that they were not invading the country could save them. They were already in a mess. Naively, motives of Russians in Afghan came to a shameful defeat when Mikhail Gorbachev pulled the Soviet Army. Had the Russians cowardly pulled out or their economy was unstable? On the eve of 1980, the commander announced the Russians defeat in Afghan invasion (Bonosky, 2001). Conceding that Afghan was a minnow in this war is unconvincing. It was a seemingly weak, inexperienced and essentially a primitive central Asian backwater (Tarzi & Tarzi, 2009). Just like today’s struggling nations, Afghan saw decades of turmoil and turbulence because of conflicting ideologies of the western super power countries (Goodson, 2001). However, was it ill equipped to enter in to what later narrowed to civilian war? The country depended on its guerrilla tactics. The guerrilla policy in Afghan was a test of national will and the ability to endure as compared to Russian towering technologically but seemingly non-incisive weaponry. The Soviet Union was to encounter the Afghan worrier society led by Mujahedeen who were uncomfortable with western influence in the Islamic country. The Muslim leaders, who had fled to the mountains fearing Amin’s rule; combined forces and forged an army with Mujahedeen to rebel (Bonosky, 2001). They old and out fashioned weapons proved magic. The war was a justified holy mission for Allah, a jihadist approach that fuelled and energized the scattered groupings as they brought Russians into their knees. Operating from the mountains of Kabal, Mujahedeen forces proved too lethal for the Russians. From the scorching weather conditions, which suffocated the Russians and the intensive knowledge of the deep ridges in these mountains, Mujahedeen had superpower moves to defeat the Soviet army. The Taliban invasion in 1980 was the dark side of the war as natives killing by this group infused strict rules on the Afghan population. Who had caused this if not the Russians? (Goodson, 2001). The Mujahedeen Tactics The Mujahedeen methods of provoking and attacking the Remains too primitive compared to Russians war experience. It all began during the rule of Taraki (Tarzi & Tarzi, 2009). Armed resistance fighters attacked his wobbly government continuously. They caused mayhem and a bloody period for these Russians constituted Afghan leadership until the Soviet came in during Kamal’s rule. This caused majority of Afghan 17th Infantry Division to cease-fire and join the opposing resistant forces (Goodson, 2001). The forces resisted against Kamal’s rule of running the Afghan country in line with Socialist ideologies. Through this, they had weakened the Afghan government army and, thus, provoking the Russians to invade and try to save their diminishing influence over this Islamic society. Their plans had worked. Timely, when Afghan Air Force bombed the city in retaliation and killed hundred Soviet citizens, the Soviet General Staff called it time to enter into war with these rebellious groups. With a number totaling to 50,000 soldiers, units and brigades joining resistant Mujahedeen led group, started what would result into a bloody primitive jihadist approach but ultimately it proved effective (Bonosky, 2001). They had played it offensively. In 1979, when Russian paratroopers landed in Kabul capital ready for war, the mujahedeen now staged their own retaliation methods. They had to defend themselves from the war that they had rattled. Mujahedeen followers rose to defend their land. Their approach was guerilla warfare. A religious zeal characterized by fervent resistance and unwavering attitude upon the course in hand. The defensive back wall was a jihadist holy war for Allah (Goodson, 2001). They defied the wisdom of Russians tanks and tactics and armed themselves. Joining into small groups, attacking and sabotage weakened Russians. Open resistance ensured and the entire Kabul populace went against Russian invasion, thus infuriating the Soviet general into full war (Tarzi & Tarzi, 2009). The Afghan’s were brave. The Mujahedeen warriors sent thousand of its fighters to kill the Soviet army. Through the thick and deep valley of the mountainous region of Afghan, combat began against Russians and slowly they began to take control of their own country. As the years progressed, the harsh and intolerable land was not favoring the will of the soviet soldiers. Afghan’s virtues, faith, and love of Islamic freedom won them the war (Bonosky, 2001). The aftermath of the war The aftermath of the war brought diverse effects to the socialist state of Russia (Tarzi & Tarzi, 2009). They were not only defeated but they were depleted. The process of the war exposed their weaknesses in military prowess despite being the second in military proficiency. The advanced technological weaponry blatantly put into shame. This was the greatest irony remembering that the Soviet State had much control over many European countries. Afghan, being a vast desert country, proved too lethal to the Russians (Goodson, 2001). Their tactics where now deemed inferior compared to the fierce rival of the west. The defeat also led to lose of monopoly over the control of the political market of this communist state. The war brought 15,000 missing Russian soldiers, and close to 469,685 casualties, which was a great loss to the country. Diseases such as hepatitis, typhoid led to dismiss of close to 415,932 soldiers. It was such a weakening environment and a hard hit defeat to the Russian state (Bonosky, 2001). This exposed the Soviet’s troop life and welfare, concluded their poor military hygiene among them. The end of the war also had displayed to the world how guerilla warfare was too good for the worldly approved military combats. It was disbelief for Russian to lose in such low rated war field outstanding to the striking parallelism between the two states (Tarzi & Tarzi, 2009). Despite Soviets advanced tactics, the guerillas adapted to their forms of combat and retaliated in full force. Their weakness in weaponry was unmatched with their effective intelligence. At some point, they acquired a Stinger shoulder-launched air defense missile, which ended up destroying the low flying Russian warplanes (Goodson, 2001). This gave Mujahedeen a greater advantage of the rivals. It proved to super power countries that guerrilla war is not about technological assembling, but it is a force of endurance and national will. The victory in guerrilla tactics is a moral commitment to the groups ideological, religious and patriotic spine compared material assembling of the west nations. They gave a lesson that victory in open battlefields could prove difficulty but a determined morale, persistence, and survival for the fittest begets any battle army the deserved win (Bonosky, 2001). Some believe that the Soviet’s failure in Afghanistan was a result of a poor counterinsurgency plan-not really; it was a defeat in tactics. The Soviet military had thought that the Mujahedeen had very little or no impact on their war plan and was not the result for withdrawing from Afghanistan. Conclusion In conclusion, the war brought both internal and international political reforms. After the withdrawal, the then president of U.S.A, Carter, issued a trade impediment on the Socialist U.S.S.R. commodities such as grains and weapons and other staff came to a halt (Tarzi & Tarzi, 2009). This drowned the prowess of USSSR power and marked the state of its decline and disintegration. International relations and U.S.A stern warnings had damaged the status of the Soviet state (Goodson, 2001). The students of Islamic Knowledge Movement, referred to as the Taliban’s, who ruled the country for six for six years (1996-2001), still exist. It is the tribe of Pashtun, that even today their presence in the country calls for respected since they are the majority. Today, the force is of new young generation, which relies on the older generation philosophies (Bonosky, 2001). One ought to separate the Taliban group and the Al-Qaeda. They are not synonymous though they share some ideologies. They today Taliban group is not opposed to western influence in their country but only to specific policies. The today’s Taliban members and the older generation are supposedly the only group rallied on ending terror scare in Afghanistan. References Bonosky, P. (2001). Afghanistan- Washingtons Secret War. Washington: International Publishers Co. Goodson, L. (2001). Afghanistans Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban. Washington: University of Washington Press. Maley, W. (2002). The Afghanistan Wars. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ross, D. (2011). Bin Ladens Legacy: Why Were Still Losing the War on Terror.London: John Wiley. Tarzi, R., & Tarzi, D. (2009). The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan. Harvard: Harvard University press. Read More