North Korea: A Multi-generational Personlity Cult - Essay Example

NORTH KOREA: A MULTI-GENERATIONAL PERSONALITY CULT (The Unique Dynastic Ambitions of the Kim Family) by: ID Number Contemporary Worlds 1 Presented to: Dr. Kate Murphy Monash University Melbourne, Australia Estimated Word Count: 2,551 Due on: April 29, 2012 Introduction The world today is a much more complex place with changes going on at a more rapid pace. Business executives and political leaders have to contend with complexity more often and it is manifested in the global political arena where events take place at a dizzying pace. In other words, the complex changes occurring today require a deeper insight in how to deal with it. Problems like food scarcity, water shortages, terrorist threats and the mad scramble for much of the dwindling fossil fuel supplies have created a dynamism that requires different tacks. It is incumbent to be knowledgeable about these events as these affect everyone; events from a far-away place can have an impact on everybody, often indirectly or even directly. One of the seminal events in the last century was the Cold War, in which there was a bi-polar world divided into the democratic and communist blocs. The Cold War was a fight for world dominance; it flared up during the administration of Pres. Dwight Eisenhower (1953-1961) in which both America and the Soviet Union fought a series of proxy wars, using client states as proxies. Eisenhowers legacy was stopping in his term the Korean War but to his everlasting regret, the Korean peninsula also became divided. Its northern part became the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) and was a client state of two giant communist countries of China and the Soviet Union (at that time) while the south became the Republic of Korea, patterned after the United States in terms of its economy (capitalist) and in political structure (democratic) although it had itself experienced some periods of military dictatorship. North Korea is a carry-over of the era of the Cold War and is an anachronism in this time and age. It has also become a rogue state and exports some of its nuclear-weapons technology for much-needed foreign exchange while a missile and space program is underway although it is not so well developed yet, as shown by the recent failed rocket launch. This paper attempts to explain the enduring hold on power of the Kim family, which passed it to a third-generation successor and how a desperately poor country changed from a dictatorship to a dynasty. Discussion Much of the modern history of North Korea is closely intertwined with the fate of the Kims (Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and now, Kim Jong-Un); that history started with the end of World War II when the eldest Kim (the grandfather of the present paramount leader, Kim Jong-un) came back to Korea from his anti-Japanese wartime struggles to help establish the foundation of this country from the ashes of the global conflagration. He had attained the rank of a major in the Soviet Army and with the help of the Soviet occupation forces, established his political dominance in the country by eliminating competing rival factions to consolidate his powers in the new communist state as a virtual dictator (Tai, 1977:174). Kim Il-sung suffered from a severe case of personal insecurity and feelings of inferiority complex, because he had been in many ways maligned by his rivals. In this regard, he undertook an extreme case developing a personality cult unprecedented anywhere else in the world. He was also very astute and may be even a bit politically wiser than either Mao Tse-tung of China or Stalin in Russia. He had quietly laid the foundations of dynastic succession in his country by grooming his son. Political experts and military strategists have often wondered how he was able to do this in a country that often suffered from chronic consumer shortages and agricultural missteps that is managed centrally characteristic of one-party states. Plausible explanations had been offered in this regard and this paper contributes to this growing political discourse by offering some cogent reasons why a poor country that suffered frequent famines can continue to tolerate a political dynasty in their midst despite North Korea not having a royal historical hierarchy; the Kim family has been a royalty of sorts. This is a country that defied facile rationalizations of dynastic rule, considering it had steadfastly pursued a communist agenda despite its former patrons China and Russia having embraced the hybrid measures of reforms towards a market-based economy and even some imited political or civil society freedoms. Ideology – any country needs a strong or unique ideology by which the people can be rallied around and an astute leader like Kim Il-sung used his concept of juche (Korean term for self-reliance) to marshal the nationalistic fervour of his countrymen. It is a particularly appealing concept since Koreans are proud of their long and glorious history; it having experienced the humiliation of being annexed by Japan encouraged the Korean people to be fully accepting of a newly-termed ideology which they can identify themselves with. It is a legitimate rallying cry for the people to unite themselves and re-build their country after the war and any person who thinks otherwise is considered as unpatriotic or even a traitor. But this concept was good in theory only, for in reality, North Korea was very much dependent on continued aid from its two patrons, China and Russia at that time. Kim Il-sung had even used rivalry between these two countries for influence in North Korea and turned it to his own advantage. Juche is a very compelling ideology but it is detached from reality, as perceptions differed in what is actually happening in the country. The more the North Koreans suffered from a host of wrong-headed policies, then the more this juche ideology is used against them to make the people try, sacrifice and work harder to attain self-sufficiency and be self-reliant. Moreover, scholars, economists and academicians had suggested that the staying powers of the Kims are in no way related to economic distress or deprivation of their people (Noland, 1997:106) but may even help to consolidate a shaky hold on power. An economically-prostrate people is all the more susceptible to control and manipulation by a dictator who uses the levers of power in strategic ways. It is psychological gimmickry in which the shortages and famines can be conveniently blamed on subordinates who committed those mistakes while any of perceived achievements (economic, scientific, political or otherwise) can be attributed to a great leader so North Koreans will then worship him even more and may not even question his authority or legitimacy to power, even that of his family, close relatives and political friends. Bogeyman – political leaders who survive for long periods of time created the concept of the bogeyman, which is some sort of an amorphous (shapeless) but imaginary being used to scare credulous children into some form of desirable and compliant behaviour. North Korea is still technically in a state of war with South Korea since its partition as the 1953 armistice did not include the signing of a formal peace treaty ending the Korean War. Kim Il-sung justifiably used juche as a political mantra to re-build the country into a strong state but his successor, Kim Jong-il, needed to have a new ideology that can be uniquely or be closely identified with his own personality and this he found in the threat of forced re-unification with the southern Republic of Korea. This external threat (real or imagined) was being used to rally the North Koreans in the same way his father united the people with his self-reliance idea. It also has the added benefited of consolidating his inherited powers and legitimize it. People of North Korea had been brainwashed into thinking they will be attacked by the south, as both Korean countries claimed sovereignty over the entire Korean peninsula and each state dreamed of re-uniting both nations either under a communist state or a democratic state. It is also literally quite unbelievable how this notion of being attacked gained so much credence when it is the other way around, with North Korea so belligerent in its state behaviours. This fear of the bogeyman had been translated into official state policy with right formulation under Kim Jong-il as the “military first” policy, to maintain a strong military for whatever it takes even at expense of the people; the Korean word for it is songun. This policy manifests itself with North Korea being a nuclear-weapons state, having developed the atomic bomb as a credible deterrence (Coleman & Siracusa, 2006:25). The military is given top priority to its scarce resources; Kim Jong-il justified this with pride by saying he will not commit the error of Moammar Khadafy of Libya, who mistakenly believed in Western assurances, gave up his nuclear program and got attacked instead and eventually deposed (Inoljt, 2012:1). Juche and songun ideologies had been joined to fuse with Korean nationalism to achieve the near-impossible task of assuring the successful transfer of power from father to son. A key to this delicate political process was the insistence of Kim Jong-il to use nuclear deterrence as a weapon to protect his hold on power and at the same time strengthen the state. He rejected all attempts at reconciliation with South Korea, despite the efforts of three of its presidents, who were Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myung-bak (Haggard & Noland, 2009:99) and this state policy seems to be the same under the new leadership of Kim Jong-un. The 6-party talks between Japan, China, Russia, the United States, South Korea and North Korea was a complete failure, with no agreements being signed despite several rounds of negotiations. Unitary one-party state – as a Stalinist, totalitarian state, it is easier to impose on its people a cult of personality of the Kim family. The North Koreans have no idea of what is happening outside their country because all information and news are tightly controlled by the political party and the military (it being a police state). However, a more crucial factor in achieving its dynastic ambition of the Kims is elimination of any viable alternative to their rule; there are no credible future leaders who can challenge their hold on power. The lessons from Manuel Noriega, Saddam Hussein and Moammar Khadafy were not lost on the Koreans in the north who see the U.S. military with a high-level of mistrust and so only a descendant of the Kim patriarch is deemed capable of repulsing this threat, in his grandson Kim Jong-un, who can carry out the same vision for their country as his forebears, to be still independent. A country that operates on fear and repression can hardly be expected to trust other countries, even China as the patron of North Korea has a hard time imposing its influence on the Kims. Previously, Kim Jong-il follows Chinas advice only if he sees it fit for him but not if there is any doubt of Chinese ulterior motives. His son Kim Jong-un will most likely be like his own father, who sees his survival as the paramount consideration above all other factors. Personality cult – North Korea is a leftover of the Cold War which had polarized Asia and the development of two armed camps on the Korean peninsula today (Best et al., 2008:248). This country, however, is very unique in a number of ways and one of these is a personality cult of its leaders in the three generations of the Kim family. The grandfather (Kim Il-sung) started it due to his obsession with greatness and his son, Kim Jong-il, also assumed the same approach to bolster his claim as a rightful political heir to his father. Both had assiduously perpetrated a cult in terms of a carefully-managed and well-choreographed public image for themselves in the eyes of their people. Kim Jong-il had been carefully groomed by being trained in secret before his formal ascension to power. The grandson, Kim Jong-un and despite his relatively young age, had likewise been a recipient of this careful grooming and meticulous training in managing the affairs of the state. All the important centres of power are now in his hands and this includes holding crucial positions in the political party and the military hierarchy such as First Chairman of the Defence Commission and Supreme Commander of the Peoples Army. This personality cult is anchored on the principle that blood is thicker than water, and so Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il did not commit the mistake of Chairman Mao in choosing political successors people not related to him by consanguinity and whose loyalties were questionable. Conclusion Its cult centred on the Kim family has been a deliberate strategy combined with its juche and songun ideologies to perpetuate a hold on power (So, 2004:5) but Kim Jung-on needs to find fast an ideology of his own distinct from both his predecessors. His two immediate forebears did it by enshrining their personality cults into the dominant ideologies during their lifetimes (French, 2007:49) and he may need to do the same thing to be acceptable as their new leader. The idea is to make his personality cult also an integral part of North Korean society. It will likely persist as there are no effective mechanisms for expressing public discontent. Kim Jong-un is still young as a leader and the responsibilities forced upon him will require a lot of help from the colleagues of his fathers generation. However, he must also exhibit a bit of charisma that will justify his own rise to power and he needs a new ideology of his own to perpetuate himself in power. He may need to re-cast himself as a Great Leader, or his version of being a Great Teacher, in the traditions of Mao who was once a schoolteacher himself, but in this instance, his teachings are not to be in the nature of school work but profound and very insightful pronouncements with regards to the direction that North Korea will be taking in the foreseeable future as its guiding light in the formulation of state policies (Heller & Plamper, 2004:45) but he must at the same time watch his back and not get assassinated by any adviser who has close access to him, as what happened to General Park Chung Hee of South Korea. Kim Jong-un needs to formulate his own ideology, create a bogeyman (attack by the U.S. or by South Korea, or even Japan), gradually put into positions of power his own trusted men, to keep a tight lid on news and information, hold tightly the reins of power and fuse or join his new personality cult with the ideology he develops, thereby ensuring his future legacy and his staying power at the top of the heap or he could unexpectedly get deposed if he gets careless. He needs to develop social cohesion using ideology, the threat from the south and personality cult to tighten his grip on power by mixing them with Korean nationalism and in effect be the symbol of sovereignty for his country by a belligerent stance (Medlicott, 2005:69); however, modern statecraft requires that this symbolism should be conflated with performance as well. Reference List Best, A., Hanhimaki, J. M., Maiolo, J. A. and Schulze, K. E. (2008) International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond. 2nd ed. Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge. Coleman, D. G. and Siracusa, J. M. (2006) Real-world Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy. CT, USA: Greenwood Publishing Group. French, P. (2007) North Korea: The Paranoid Peninsula – A Modern History. London, UK: Zed Books. Haggard, S. and Noland, M. (2009) “North Korea in 2008: Twilight of the God?,” Asian Survey, 49(1), Jan.-Feb., pp. 98-106. Heller, K. and Plamper, J. (2004) Personality Cults in Stalinism. Bristol, CT, USA: V & R Unipress. Inoljt. (2012) “North Korea: A Very Rational Country.” [on-line]. My Direct Democracy, 18 January. Available at [accessed 28 April 2012]. Medlicott, C. (2005) “Symbol and Sovereignty in North Korea,” Abstract. SAIS Review, 25(2), Summer-Fall, pp. 69-79. Noland, M. “Why North Korea will Muddle Through,” Foreign Affairs, 76(4), Jul.-Aug., pp. 105-118. So, C. J. (2004) The Impact of Personality Cult in North Korea. Seoul, Korea: Korea Institute for National Unification. Tai, S. A. (1977) “North Korea: From Dictatorship to Dynasty,” Asian Affairs, 4(3), Jan.-Feb., pp. 172-183. Read More