The Significance of the Luxembourg Crisis - Case Study Example

Luxembourg Crisis Introduction Europe re-creates and reshapes its current concept of sovereignty from the destruction and devastation experienced during World War II (Wallace 1999). Specifically, West European governments have sought to establish a system wherein there will be a careful balance of their sovereignty while at the same time pursuing prosperity and security among themselves (Wallace 1999). In fact, Europe today is more peaceful and prosperous than any other time in its history (Dinan 2007). Moreover, political and economic integration has never been more observed as it is today. However, European integration is not smooth sailing. It is a bumpy ride full of twist and turns. This paper will look into one of the most challenging concerns encountered by the members of the European Economic Community (EEC), the ‘Luxembourg crisis’. The Treaties of Rome established EEC. In these Treaties, free trade, liberalisation, mobility of people and federalism creating the supranational institution European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were the principal and foundational principles of the Treaties. Although opened to all countries of Europe, the initial members of the EEC were limited to six countries namely France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and The Netherlands. The Luxembourg crisis is a result of France’s unilateral renege of the importance of qualified majority votes and re-asserts the “right to veto a proposal in the Council of Ministers by declaring that a vital or very important national interest was at stake” (Moravcsik 1991, p 20). The ‘Luxembourg crisis’ is largely influenced by Charles de Gaulle. This action is deemed as the most threatening event in the history of European integration (Dinan 2007, p. 1141). It is also known as the ‘Luxembourg accord’ or ‘Luxembourg compromise’ or the “empty chair crisis”. In this regard, this paper will address the question “what is the significance of the ‘Luxembourg Crisis’ in the context of the development of the West European Integration?” The paper does not only seek to have a historical look during the foundational period of the EEC, but it asserts the position that it has a significant impact in the political and economic interaction that has been continuously happening among the European countries fifty years after the happening of the Luxembourg crisis. A Historical Change: Franco-German ‘Co-operation’ Undoubtedly, after WW II, one of the primary concerns that West European governments had to deal with was the rehabilitation of their own individual countries. However, the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), more than the economic vision of a common market for Europe, the move was political (Pollack, 2005; Wallace, 1999; Weiler, 1998). So much so that, paradoxically, it has been claimed that the foundation, in which the notion of European integration is built, rests on the idea of compromised sovereignty (Pollack 2005). It was compromised because it was working around the conditions attached to the Marshall Plan Aid of the American Administration, the provisions of security through the Atlantic Alliance and the re-integration of (West) Germany in the regional system. There were various interpretations and stories with which these conditions had affected European integration. Some scholars saw it as the opening of the movement beyond the nation state towards a European federation (Duroselle 1990), while others interpreted the pivotal role of the United States as imposing the order and securing Germany and its neighbours by removing the threat posed by Germany (Lundestad, 1998; Wallace, 1999). Finally, some scholars regard it as an opportunity for nation-states to re-build their nation states as they enjoy economic mobility and liberalisation under the EEC (Wallace, 1999). However, regardless of how one constructs the narratives around the conditions surrounding the foundational period of ECSC and EEC, one of the most significant change resulting from the Treaties is the resolution of the conflict between France and Germany. The Franco-Germany rapprochement is considered as a win- win situation for both countries. France ‘offers’ international reconciliation to Germany and in return, it enables France to access Germany’s resources. Meanwhile, for Germany, aside from the economic gains, it will rectify Germany’s international image. As such, it has been claimed that the Franco-Germany co-operation, drastically changed the relationship between the two countries as it creates the venue wherein prospect of war between them becomes simply unthinkable (Dinan 2007). On a larger scale, this relationship has also opened the notion, not only nationalistic ideals relevant to European integration, but has set the tone in which national–state agendas is lobbied in the then EEC and now, European Union (EU) (Dinan 2007). From this brief historical tracing, the Franco-German ‘co-operation’ together with the ensuing economic free trade, liberalisation, common market in coal and steel and the establishment of the supranational institution resulting from the Treaties of Rome were the fundamentals of European integration. More than that, it paves for European integration as a new paradigm in international politics and governance, while at the same time, revolutionising the political and economic system and relations among the member nation-states. The Significance of the Luxembourg Crisis The Luxembourg crisis, although informal in nature, and repealed in the Single European Act in 1986 as the act affirms the qualified majority voting as the formal approach in decision-making among member states, Luxembourg continues to be an enigma whose salient influence in EU’s decision making persists (Heisenberg 2005). It is significant because: First, the Luxembourg crisis has become the primary manner that most West European countries use to protect their national interests in the face of socio-economic and political policies, which EC may decide upon and implement. Initially, this ‘protectionist’ approach deters the creation of supranationalism in Europe. It is considered as the return of the national-states’ interests over EC, which, has been attributed as one of the many causes of war among countries in Europe prior to the inception of EC (Dinan 2007). It is perceived as deadlock, stagnation in the development of European integration and the devolution of Europe (Pollack, 1991; Urwin, 1997). On the other hand, Luxembourg Crisis has created an informal approach in the decision-making in EEC – consensus building (Heisenberg 2005). It is acknowledged that the formal process of arriving at a decision in EEC is via qualified majority voting (QMV). However, the Luxembourg compromise shows that there will be instances wherein the countries will adopt a protectionist stance in the face of policies that appear to be disadvantageous for their national interests. Nonetheless, if this attitude will be adopted, then there will be no EEC or EU. In this context, what has evolved is consensus building among the member states. It has created a framework wherein the pursuit of one’s national interests is no longer veiled within the principles of national interests but is sanctioned within persuasions, choices, arguments and lobbying to promote better opportunities for member countries. Through consensus building, countries have come to build relationships with other European countries, not by constraint but through coordination and cooperation. If a country does not want to negotiate, then the other country can offer to other member countries without causing maximal damage to the other party –countries. As a consequence, it has dramatically altered the manner in which intergovernmental relations and resolutions of issues among European countries are achieved. It has placed paramount importance to the reality of negotiation among the EEC, now EU, Member States. The Luxembourg accord helps in shaping the culture of consensus among the member States. In this culture of consensus, it is necessary to establish thick trust, reciprocity, mutual responsiveness, consensus-reflex and a culture of compromise among Member-States (Lewis 2000). In this sense, the interaction between countries moves beyond bargaining towards transactions wherein each participant is aware of what the other party wants and the question revolves on how the requirements can be met. Moreover, the culture of consensus is deeply entrenched in EU and as such, this informal process is a way of ascertaining the norm in EU decision making. More importantly, “it facilitates bargaining, it compensates losers, it keeps the ‘nationalistic’ out of the public’s eye, and it avoids the overweighting of the small countries’ parochial interests that could destabilize the EU while avoiding the tyranny of the large countries” (Heisenberg 2005, p 82). At the same time, it highlights a serious weakness – the facade of not arriving at a consensus. When it comes to critical issues, that require immediate response from the Member-States, they can always claim that no consensus has been reached. Nonetheless, the culture of consensus, which is built on the Luxembourg compromise, has solidified West European Integration and European integration in the past fifty years. At the same time, it presents the reality that the Luxembourg crisis laid down the coming up of an alternative informal approach in decision-making. Second, the Luxembourg crisis is significant in the development of the West European integration because it highlighted the heterogeneity of Europe and as such, pave for the formulation of a possible European identity. Europe’s heterogeneity is how non-Europeans perceive Europe (Habermas & Derrida 2003). The rich history of the continent does not show one Europe, but the continent’s history manifests conflicts, and struggles based on differences and how these “differences are communicated, contradictions institutionalised, and tensions stabilised” (Habermas & Derrida 2003, p. 294). The Luxembourg crisis shows the essential differences existing between nations, yet it has also, opened the possibility of determining a European Identity based on the recognition of their differences as the existing commonality among them (Habermas & Derrida 2003). In this context, there is no denying that Dutch are not that at ease with Italians. Culturally, the Dutchman, English and Germans are more comfortable with the Canadians than to Spanish, Italians and Greeks (Schemers 1991). However, in spite of these, it cannot be denied that the pacification of class conflict through social welfare, the entrenchment of the ideals of the French Revolution, the chimera of progress and the assurance of social security and regulations on the premise of solidarity (Habermas & Derrida 2003), provide for the paradigm of the European Identity. In this regard, as the Luxembourg crisis heightens differences, it also creates the impetus to move beyond the differences and appreciate the fact that their fundamental differences are, in effect, the seeds of European Identity. Finally, the third reason why the Luxembourg crisis is crucial in the context of the development of West European integration is the assertion that Luxembourg accord shows the reality of the relationship of the countries that are member-States of EEC and now EU. Although Charles de Gulle has always been considered as the villain in the quest for European integration, his protectionist position does not impede the idea that he acknowledges the fundamental role of the common market for coal and steel in the economy of France in particular and in the pursuit of European integration in general (Dinan 2007). This ‘tension’, although it paralysed the efforts for supranationalism in European integration, has been the pattern. As West European countries try to push the interest of their own countries, they have always considered European integration as always part of their agenda. The effort to find the balance between national interests vis-a-vis regional interests has been the tension. As such, the Luxembourg compromise has become the catalysts for moving forward despite the drawback. This is significant since it shows that there is no wavering in the history of European integration. There are ups and downs, stagnation, deadlocks, but it has not deterred European integration. The significance of the Luxembourg crisis in the context of the development of West European integration is perceived in the informal procedure adopted in decision-making – the culture of consensus. Likewise, it re-affirms the heterogeneity of Europe. In this case, it is not seen as a hindrance but a reality that has to be accepted and valued as offering the possibility of establishing a European identity. Finally, it shows the pattern of the tension of European integration – the attempt to find the balance between national interests and European integration. In fact, despite this pull the second half of the twentieth century has been considered as the golden age of Europe (Hobsbawn, 1995). Conclusion The Luxembourg Crisis is considered as a step back in European integration. However, looking at its effects in West European integration, it shows that Luxembourg accord has become significant not only because its negative impact during the event, but more importantly, is that it has become valuable event creating new possibilities and direction for European integration. References Dinan, D 2007, ‘Fifty Years of European Integration: A Remarkable Achievement’, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 31 iss 5, pp. 1118 – 1146. Duroselle J-B, 1990, Europe: A history of its peoples, London: Viking. Habermas J, & Derrida J, 2003, ‘February 15, or what binds Europeans together: A Plea for a common foreign policy, beginning in the core of Europe’, Constellation, vol. 10 no 23, pp. 291 – 298. Heisenberg D, 2005, ‘The institution of consensus in the European Union: Formal versus Informal decision-making in the Council’, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 44, pp. 65 – 90. 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