Cuban Missile Crisis - Coursework Example

Cuban Missile Crisis The decision to deploy Soviet missiles in Cuba can be divided into two categories Soviet insecurity, and 2) the fear of losing Cuba in an invasion. During his presidential campaign, Kennedy had repeatedly spoken of a "missile gap" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Despite having been informed by the Pentagon that the U.S. had more missiles than the Soviets, Kennedy maintained his claim that U.S. were less. After the 1960 election, Khrushchev began to test the new president. In the summer of 1961 Khrushchev put pressure on Berlin and eventually built a wall around West Berlin. In response, the Kennedy administration found it necessary to reveal to Khrushchev that he had not made any space missiles. Khrushchev had always known the U.S. had more missiles but now he knew that the Americans knew. Khrushchev knew that Soviet missiles were sufficiently powerful to be launched against Europe but U.S. missiles were able to find all of the Soviet Union. (Article Think Quest, 2011) Moreover, Khrushchev felt boxed in the enemies. For example, he cited the U.S. missiles in Turkey, only 150 km away from the Soviet Union, Cuba was only 90 km from the coast of Florida, but the gap of 60 km was "no anti-missile" Khrushchev said. Above all, however, Khrushchev feared the first strike in on whether the Soviet Union lost the arms race so badly, he worried, call the first strike with nuclear weapons the United States because of Khrushchev began looking for a way to counter the United States, for example. (Article Think Quest, 2011) One of the main reasons was the fear of invasion of Cuba, the United States since he came to power in 1959, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro was aware of certain United States is trying to move him. First there was the failed Bay of Pigs invasion by CIA-backed Cuban exiles in 1961. One was a U.S. military exercise in 1962. The armed forces in a mockery of an attack on a fictitious Caribbean island to overthrow the dictator, whose name was Castro Ortsac back. In addition, the United States was drawing up a plan to invade Cuba (Operation Mongoose). Mock attack and the attack plan was drawn up to keep Castro nervous. Finally, the CIA was running covert operations throughout Cuba trying to damage the Castro government. So, Castro was convinced the United States was seriously invade Cuba. (Article Think Quest, 2011) In April 1962, designed the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to the idea of ​​placing intermediate-range missiles in Cuba. Deployment in Cuba would double the Soviet strategic arsenal and provide a real deterrent to a possible U.S. attack against the Soviet Union or Cuba. Khrushchev promoted the KGB station chief in Cuba Alexander Alekseev to Ambassador to negotiate for Castros approval of the plan. Castro did not openly reject the idea at first, but instead he gave it serious. To believe it is better to risk a great crisis than wait helplessly for an invasion, Castro accepted Khrushchevs offer. In mid-July 1962 the USSR began its construction of offensive weapons in Cuba. The crisis could have and should have been avoided. If we had done an earlier, stronger and more clearly explain our position regarding Soviet nuclear weapons on the Western Hemisphere, or if the Soviet government was more thoroughly assessed the evidence existed at that point, it is likely that the missiles would never have been sent to Cuba. Importance of accurate assessment of mutual interests between the two superpowers, are clear and consistent. Reliable intelligence and allows the effective selection, the response was just the right time. It been mostly political mistakes, and professionals who have made a lot of intelligence is available in the past. But it was also a timely recognition of the need not fly to the bottom of the dangers that produced the decisive photographs. The need and extent of control from above, including the audit work of the Soviet missile withdrawal should not be underestimated. When the importance of accurate data crucial policy decision is high enough, otherwise the risks are not acceptable to collect information may be entirely reasonable. The President took his time wisely in choosing an approach. A quick decision would probably have been less carefully designed and could easily be made a much higher risk of disaster. The fact that the crisis does not become public in its first week of classes it is easier for President Kennedy to discuss his options with care maximum and minimum external pressure. Not all crises in the future will be so calm in its first phase, but the Americans must always respect the need for a period of confidence and careful in dealing with a major international crisis. The decisive military element in resolving the crisis was clearly accessible and usable our superiority in conventional weapons in the field of crisis. U.S. naval forces to blockade the rapid deployment of offensive weapons that were susceptible called quarantine, and the availability of U.S. ground forces and air sufficient to execute an invasion, if necessary, made the difference. U.S. nuclear superiority was not in our view, a crucial factor for the fundamental reason and controls a nuclear war, already in 1962, was an unprecedented disaster for both parties, the balance of terror so eloquently described by Winston Churchill seven years earlier was in full operation. None of us has ever suffered nuclear balance of comfort in these difficult weeks. The Cuban missile crisis shows no importance, but significant superiority in nuclear forces to survive thermonuclear retaliation. The political and military pressure created by the quarantine has been offset by a diplomatic effort that does not ignore the appropriate means of communication with our friends and our opponents. Communication and our allies in Europe was intense and sturdy support. The Organization of American States gave its legal and moral support of the quarantine zone, making it clear that Soviet nuclear weapons were profoundly undesirable in the Americas. At the UN, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson went home with an angry and eloquent irrefutable photographic evidence of the facts of the Soviet deployment and deception. More important, communication has been established and maintained in our basic course was created, with the government of the Soviet Union. If the current crisis shows that the costs of mutual misunderstanding, the decision showed the value of communication and sustained serious, and in particular the direct exchange between the two coalition leaders. When large countries, nowhere near the threshold of the nuclear age there is no room for games of blind man’s buff. Nor can lead to the silence of friends. They must know what we are doing and why. Effective communication is more important than ever when there is a military confrontation. This diplomatic effort and, indeed, how we operate greatly enhanced by the fact that our position is directly based on conclusive evidence that the Soviet government was doing exactly what he had repeatedly denied that he would do. Support our allies, the preparation of the Soviet government to pull back have been strongly influenced by the overall presentation of the behavior of the Soviet Union, which simply could not be defended. In this demonstration, no evidence in less than a clear and authoritative as the photo would have been enough, and was one of President Kennedy, the best decisions that the ordinary demands of secrecy in this matter should be made by a convincing explanation of interest . There are times when the display hard evidence is more valuable than the protection of intelligence techniques. The successful solution of the crisis, was selected as important as strength. In particular, we avoided any opening at the beginning of the battle by U.S. forces, and we took no action whatsoever that would have forced an immediate answer and cannot be properly considered. In addition, we limited our demands for the restoration of the status quo ante, meaning the removal of all Soviet nuclear capability in Cuba. There was no demand for a "total victory" or "unconditional surrender." These elections gave the Soviet government in both time and opportunity to respond with the same restraint. It is wrong in the relations between the superpowers, because each side to let another dead end, but the war or humiliation. Two points of particular interest to the Soviet government, we made sure he had the advantage of knowing the attitudes independently reached President Kennedy. A public safety and others were private. Public, which made clear that the U.S. not invade Cuba if the missiles were removed. The president does not share the view that the missile crisis would be "used" to choose a confrontation with Castro, who rightly insisted that the real problem was in crisis with the Soviet government, and that apple of discord secret life movement and Soviet missiles in Cuba covered deception. He acknowledged that the invasion by U.S. forces are bitter and bloody, and that would festering wounds in the body politic of the Western Hemisphere. Insurance not invasion was not a concession but a statement of our own preferences clear when the missiles were removed. The insurance and private-second opinion on the instructions of President Robert Kennedy to Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in the evening on October 27 was that the President had held that once the crisis was resolved would the missiles U.S. to Turkey then be withdrawn. (The essence of this insurance secret was revealed by Robert Kennedy in his 1969 book thirteen days, and a more detailed account, from many sources, but no discussion with each of us, was published by Arthur M . Schlesinger Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times in 1978. In these circumstances, we believe it is now appropriate for those of us aware of this decision to discuss the case.) This might not be a "deal "our missiles in Turkey for theirs in Cuba as the Soviet government had to offer. The case centered on the concerns of our allies, and we could not put ourselves in a situation that seems to meet their protection of our own. This assurance has been kept secret because few people were aware at the time were in full agreement that any other approach would have been explosive and destructive effects on the security of America and its allies. If it is done publicly in the Soviet proposal to create a "contract" the unilateral decision reached by the president would have been misinterpreted as a reluctant concession in fear at the expense of an ally. It seemed better to tell the Russians the real position in private and in a manner that would prevent such a misunderstanding. Robert Kennedy made it clear to Ambassador Dobrynin that any attempt to characterize the Presidents unilateral insurance as part of an agreement that would make insurance unavailable. Albeit for different reasons neither the public nor private insurance never became a formal commitment of the Government of the United States, the validity of both has been demonstrated by our actions, later, there was no invasion of Cuba and missiles of the People vulnerable to Turkey (and Italy) have been withdrawn, and the competition allies, to be replaced by Polaris submarines invulnerable. Both results were clear in our own interest, and the two insurance companies have been useful to make it easier for the Soviet government decided to withdraw its missiles. Part of it was secret diplomacy, including a Secret security. Failure to address this insurance will obviously have an adverse effect on US-Soviet relations. But it is essential here that the President has given assurances that exceeds his own presidential powers, in particular, it is not committed enough to require Congressional approval or support. The decision on the missiles in Turkey should be removed was one that the President had full and unchallenged authority to enter into and execute. When it will help you in your country for your opponent to know your real intentions, you should find effective ways to ensure that he does, and a secret security is justified when a) you can keep your word, and b ) nobody else can naturally avoid serious prejudice to the legitimate interests of your country The gravest danger in this crisis was not the government wanted to undertake a major escalation, but that events occurring actions, reactions or miscalculations carry the conflict is not master of one or other or both. In retrospect, we tend to believe that both men have taken all possible measures to prevent such an outcome, but back then no one near the summit is that the government could have that certainty on the other side. In any crisis with the superpowers, the strict control of the leaders of both governments essential to prevent an escalation of conflict unpredictable. The successful solution of the Cuban missile crisis was fundamentally requires that the two men, John F. Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev. We know that in this anniversary year, John Kennedy would have us focus on the contribution of Khrushchev, the fact that more rapid and less prudent decision by the Soviet leader made the inevitable crisis does not affect the statesman of his execution. We can be forgiven, but if we give the last word and more honor to our President, if the preliminary determination, calm stable, deep compassion and above all, constant attention to control of our stock options and excellent service to his country and all mankind. -It also shows the crucial role of conventional forces available. But in fact, President Kennedy had long since concluded that the missiles obsolete and vulnerable to Turkey should be removed. In the spring of 1961, Secretary Rusk had begun the necessary discussions with senior Turkish officials. These officials asked for a delay until at least the Polaris submarines could be deployed in the Mediterranean. While the case was in no hurry to conclude the following year and a half, the missile crisis even stronger presidential persuasion. It was quite true that the Soviet government should understand this reality. References British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011, Causes of Cuban Missile Crisis, http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/history/mwh/ir2/causesofthecubacrisisrev1.shtml Library Think Quest, 2011, Causes of the crisis, http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/causes.html Times, 2011 Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,925769-5,00.html Read More