The Peloponnesian War - Case Study Example

Did Athens compromise its effectiveness to develop the appropriate strategy necessary to defeat its enemies and achieve victory? Great wars and battles have been won with effective strategies and a nation’s inability to formulate appropriate strategy necessary to defeat its enemies and achieve victory can lead to its downfall. In this respect, Richard K. Betts stresses on the importance of having effective strategies to win wars and for him “without strategy, power is a loose cannon and war is mindless”. [1]. The author purports that only great strategists will be able to plan effective operations to accomplish the desired outcomes even though skeptics tend to view strategy as a mere illusion. The critique seeks to explore whether effective strategy is an illusion or a reality and Betts holds that “if effective military strategy is to be real rather than illusory, one must be able to devise a rational scheme to achieve an objective through combat or the threat of it; implement the scheme with forces; keep the plan working in the face of enemy reactions (which should be anticipated in the plan); and achieve something close to the objective”. [2]. For strategies to be effective, the military objective should be accompanied by well designed political motifs too, keeping in mind the fact that “strategy is a distinct plan between policy and operations, an idea for connecting the two rather than either of the two themselves”. [3]. Not withstanding the relation between military means and political ends, Bett argues that “Compromise between opposing preferences is the key to success in politics but to failure in military strategy. Political leaders have the last word on strategy in a democracy, so they tend to resolve political debates about whether to use force massively or not at all by choosing military half-measures, which serve no strategic objectives at all.” [4]. The author, citing a number of instances from history, argues that ‘unsettled objectives’ and ‘deep confusion about how military means could help’ leads the politicians to adopt to compromises which make such strategies weak. Very often, military forces are being employed by politicians in democracy without sensible strategic notions and for the author “policymakers overlook the gap between moral imperatives and material action, confuse the difference between policy and strategy, and take military half-measures that yield costs without benefits”. [5]. Thucydides’,The History of the Peloponnesian War is very often regarded as an influential strategic work that deals with the various strategic plans adopted by Sparta and Athens in their attempts to master dominion among the Greek states. This paper seeks to explore whether Athens compromised its effectiveness to develop the appropriate strategy necessary to defeat its enemies and achieve victory, with special reference to Thucydides’ account of the History of the Peloponnesian War. It is essential to have a thorough understanding of Thucydides’ account of the History of the Peloponnesian War and the various strategies employed by Peloponnesian League (led by Sparta) and the Delian League (led by Athens) during the various phases of the war. The Athenian strategy during the Peloponnesian War was mainly centered on its navel supremacy while Sparta followed the traditional strategy of Greek warfare; the war is regarded in history “as the archetypal war between a commercial democracy and an agricultural aristocracy and a war between a maritime superpower and a continental military machine”. [6]. During the initial stages of the war the Spartan strategy of annihilation was proved to be ineffective as Athens should not be starved to surrender or fight as its food supply was mainly from Egypt and Crimea via sea. On the other hand, the Periclean strategy of attrition also had its own flaws as the Athenians never thought of an aggressive combined land and military action whereby they could boost the morale of the Athenian people and as such it can be inferred that this Periclean compromise has affected the effectiveness in the making of strategy. Thucydides, Hammond & Rhodes (2009) offer fresh insights into the war time strategies adopted by both the Spartan and Athenian leagues. There is no doubt that Thucydides’ account of the history of the war commands credulousness as the author himself was a participant in the war and had first hand experience of the war strategies. For Thucydides, one of the dominant reasons for the war was Athens’ continuing expansion which alarmed Spartan dominance in the Greece and it was certain strategic flaws that the war culminated in the defeat of Athens. Reviewing Thucydides, Hammond & Rhodes’s account of the Athenian strategies in the war makes it clear that while Sparta wanted to have a positive victory to ‘liberate the Greeks from actual or threatened rule by Athens’, the Athenians wanted ‘only to survive unscathed’ [7]. Given the fact that the Athens had supremacy over maritime warfare while Sparta’s superiority lay in its heavy infantry, the Spartans followed “the traditional Greek strategy of invading the enemy’s territory with a large army in the hope that they would come outside their fortifications to fight and be beaten” [8]. Even though, the Spartan strategies were not successful in the initial phases of the war, it is commendable that the Spartans stuck on to their conventional warfare strategies. Similarly, the authors observe that the Athenians never tried to establish “a stronghold in Spartan territory, to interfere with Spartan agriculture and incite disaffection among the Spartans’ large subject population of Helots” whereby they could gain advantages in the war tactics. [9]. The authors also identify that Athens had a better claim to win the long war provided that it took some effective strategic stance either to obtain Persian support or to prevent Persia from offering support to its counterpart-the Spartans. A critical analysis of the factors that led to the defeat of Athens in the war shows that the allied forces of Sparta could not have conquered the Athens unless and until they were supported by the Persians and the Athenians had to pay heavily for this strategic flaw. It is also worthwhile to consider John Francis Lazenby’s views regarding the defeat of Athens in the war. For him, the war with Sicily had already shaken the Athenians and as Thucydides points out, “when the Athenian ships sent to aid Argos raided Epidauros Limera, Prasiai and other places in Spartan territory”, it not only offered a plausible reason for Sparta to defend its territories but it also made Athens’ condition more pathetic as they had to fights a double war-with the Spartans and the Sicilians. [10]. However, the heroic retaliation of Athens was quite unexpected for the Spartans and as the author observes, “the Spartans could not defeat Athens until they were able to match her at sea” [11] and that is why the war lasted for long twenty seven years as Spartans needed great help from its allies at sea towards the end of the war. It can be thus be inferred that all throughout the war, Athens had been heavily depending on its superior navel power and that the Athenians failed to get the Persian support which proved to be a crucial strategic compromise in the long run. To conclude, it can be stated that Athens had the potential power to defeat the Sparta led allies; however, its failure or compromise to develop appropriate strategies and rational schemes necessary to defeat its enemies and achieve victory led to its defeat and downfall. End Notes [1]. Richard K. Betts, ‘Is Strategy an Illusion?’. International Security. (Vol. 25, No. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 5–50), p. 5. [2]. Ibid, p. 6. [3]. Ibid, p. 7. [4]. Ibid, p. 43. [5]. Ibid, p. 44. [6]. Laconian Professionals. ‘The Peloponnesian war’, (AACTchJS, AAC Staff, 1998). Web. 23 September 2010 < http://www.laconia.org/gen_info_literature/Peloponnesian_war.htm>. [7]. Thucydides, Martin Hammond and Peter John Rhodes, The Peloponnesian War. Ed. Thucydides & Trans. Martin Hammond, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009), p. xv. [8]. Ibid. [9]. Ibid, p. xix. [10]. John Francis Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War: a military study, (Illustrated Edition: Routledge, 2004), p. 170. [11]. Ibid, p. 3. Works Cited Betts, Richard K. ‘Is Strategy an Illusion?’. International Security 25. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 5–50. Print. Lazenby, John Francis. The Peloponnesian War: a military study. Illustrated Edition: Routledge, 2004. Laconian Professionals. ‘The Peloponnesian war’. AACTchJS, AAC Staff, 1998. Web. 23 September 2010 < http://www.laconia.org/gen_info_literature/Peloponnesian_war.htm>. Thucydides., Hammond, Martin & Rhodes, Peter John. The Peloponnesian War. Ed. Thucydides & Trans. Martin Hammond. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009. Print. Read More