Charles I and the English Civil War - Thesis Example

I. Introduction A minor member of the Long Parliament, Sir Henry Slingsby, revealed in his journal that the duty of the Long Parliament in mediatingand Anglo-Scottish agreement was “like tossing three balls in one hand, which requires both the eye and hand to be very steeddy, lest one ball do enterfore with another and all miscarry” (Parsons 1836, 65). This statement could have been created regarding any portion of the British predicament under Charles I, and what is relevant to the predicament should also be relevant to its historian; no matter what premise he assumes, he will be ignoring others. The narrative makes a highly disorderly tragedy, consistently confused by the existence of numerous actors on stage, and that perplexity, since it influenced the participants, was an important basis of the civil war (Newman 1998). The objective of this research is to elaborate how the British predicament and the English local religious crisis became united together in one similar predicament, and how the outcome of that confusion was to raise the concern which decisively proved powerless of negotiation; whether the kingdom had to be managed with the King’s approval. It is, as scholars may hope, useless to dwell on the transformations generated in the Church of England through the victory of the Arminians after York House. Nevertheless, what is important to the objective of the research is the consequence of that victory on the affairs between the three components of Britain (Carpenter 2005). The man who originally stressed out to Charles that he had not allowed his Irish hand be aware of what his English hand was committing seems to be Pym, who, during his attack on Richard Montague in 1626 in the Parliament, uttered that “he opposeth the Church of England to the Church of Ireland, and the articles of either to other in the poynte” (Gardiner 1873, 181). The indication was supported by a craftily drafter Parliamentary bill, which suggested to provide statutory verification to both English and the Irish Articles, and would in so doing have established it a lawful requirement to interpret them, such as two locations of Scripture, in order that they ought not be repulsive to each other. Pym, in 1628, broadened this approach to the concern of ceremonial compliance, on which there was as well an extensive discrepancy between the peaceful process of Usher and the new Laudian interest in England. He mentioned that Irish contribution to the Book of Common Prayer required a much less complete consent than English contribution, and that tradition should be homogeneous since “these islands are sisters” (Coltman 1962, 73). In the case of Scotland, disagreements under Charles were at the moment even wider, and it offered to protesters on both parties of the Border the essential quality of an alternative framework. In to the insignificant but drastically developing party of Scottish Arminians, whose vigour in Scottish universities was an issue of continuous disquiet to the Covenanters, what was occurring in England embodied an extremely observable utopia. Because Charles unavoidably favoured such men to the episcopate of Scotland, they were accountable to eventually become a power to pressure Scotland to be aligned with England (ibid). On the other wall of the structure, Sion’s Plea against Prelacy of Alexander Leighton, presented accurately that kind of Scottish defiance to the authority of the English church which James had placed too much attempt into avoiding the Melvilles from submission. In England, the canon of Durham Peter Smart, discovered that, despite the fact that he is incapable of attacking the idolization of his dean John Cosin in a work circulated in England, he may simply do so in one circulated in Edinburgh, where it did not violate any written law (Matthew 1955, 105). For numerous of Englishmen of well-built Calvinist predisposition, Scotland was turning out to be a treacherously striking option to England, and by 1638 Sir John Clotworthy had informed a Scottish writer that several important persons expected to stumble on an America in Scotland. Furthermore, as the Large Declaration of Charles protested in 1639, the Roman party was responsible to stress out these distinctions (ibid). II. Religion, Laud and Charles I Having demolished James’s agenda of British sameness through recognising the English settlement in the manner which made it generally isolated from Scottish and Irish churches, Charles and Laud had to raise a new agenda of British homogeny. Because their most important commitment was to those attributes of the English Church which were mainly obviously non-existent in Ireland and Scotland, this agenda for British uniformity inescapably transformed into one for English uniformity. Foreign diplomats, who were frequently more vigilant on British issues than the English, consider the point. Diplomats do not employ designations haphazardly. In 1640 the French diplomat mentioned that Morton and Traquair had attempted to carry the King of Great Britain to lodging with Scotland, yet the King of England responded that he would mislay England or penalize them (Newman 1998). Nothing more plainly proves that this was an agenda than the degree to which, prior to being tried in the complicated cases of Ireland and Scotland, it was practiced and enhanced among the entire insignificant authorities and communities under the King’s influence. In this agenda, as in somewhere else, Charles and Laud responded in close partnership, with Laud, in Gardiner’s statements, behaving as if he had been a secretary of the King (Yule 1958). Laud had no clerical power in Ireland or Scotland, and was responsive of the reality, yet it completely deserved for him, as for any other royal servant assigned with the mission, to express the King’s willpower. He was aware that he was taking peril in doing so. In 1634 he noted down to Wentworth that “I was fain to write nine letters yesterday into Scotland. I think you have a plot to see whether I will be universalis episcopus, that you and your brethren may take occasion to call me Antichrist” (Russell 1990, 171). The earliest case to which Laud spent most of his concentration was that of the Merchant Adventurers inhabiting the Netherlands, who, he claimed, did not obey the established structures of prayer and directed the sacraments in created structures of their own making. In obvious distinction to Grindal, he aimed to subject them under the Episcopal power of the English, so as to guarantee their absolute compliance to English tradition. He then shifted his focus to the troops in Dutch service, and the repercussions of the agenda were easy to observe when he claimed that nobody who did not make use of the English Book of Common Prayer should carry on as chaplain to whichever English or even Scottish troops (ibid). The French and Dutch Stranger religious organisations were the then to receive attention, and recurrently an obvious difference surfaces with Archbishop Grindal. Grindal believes that the Stranger churches were approved, and the overseas transformed churches emerged as “other churches of our profession” (Carpenter 2005, 125). For Laud, it seemed that they “live like an absolute divided body from the church of England established, which must needs work upon their affections, and alienate them from the state, or at least make them ready for any innovation that may sort better with their humour” (ibid, 126). As additional territories and communities were subjected to scrutiny, it became observable that the agenda, in its complete form, had a significant number of components, among which various components arrived first in various locations. The complete list was the “Royal Supremacy, episcopacy, the Thirty Nine Articles, a common liturgy, a body of canons, and a High Commission” (Russel 1990, 113). In Massachusetts, it appears to have been a bishop and a High Commission which were the initial components considered, and Governor Winthrop in response released commands to strengthen defence (ibid). In the Channel Islands, Laud and Charles donated several closed scholarships to Oxford, so as to educate and prepare preachers who understood the set of guidelines and regulation of the Church of England, and were designing schemes for an attack on the living Presbyterianism of Guernsey when the bigger problems of Scotland roused their attention. The only provinces which fortunately escaped attention appear to have been Virginia and the Isle of Man, most probably since they were not considered to be creating any problems (Fletcher 1981). In Ireland, Laud claimed with reprieve that there was no demand for a liturgy, since they had the English one previously. The foremost believed requirements in Ireland were actually for the English Thirty-Nine Articles and for a novel collection of laws, and these Laud established roughly in 1634, with the lively motivation of his adamant follower Bramhall Bishop of Derry. The agenda appears to have almost misplaced, and Wentworth was nearly deadly shocked by a working group of the Irish Convocation who drafted their own sets of guidelines, which, aside from verifying the English Articles, would have verified the Irish under misery of excommunication. Wentworth’s distress could be assessed through his bad humour; he claimed an Ananias had sat in the chair of that working group, “with all the fraternities and conventicles of Amsterdam” (ibid, 183) and protested “how unheard a part it was for a few petty clerks to presume to male articles of faith without the privity or consent of state or bishop” (Fletcher 1981, 184). He dreaded protest in England, and “how I shall be able to sustain myself against your Prynnes, Pimms and Bens, with all the rest of that generation of odd names and natures, the Lord knows” (ibid, 184). It was possibly in order to prevent being deadly shocked by Scottish opposition as they had nearly been by Irish that Charles and Laud generated though the Scottish doctrines and Scottish Prayer Book devoid of any Scottish discussion save for an inadequate number of the Scottish bishops. The Scottish doctrines, which were nearly a complete replica of the Irish doctrines, and hence significantly unrelated to the Scottish Church, were issued “by our prerogative royal and supreme authority in causes ecclesiastical,” (Kenyon et al. 1998, 135) and the ceremonial manuscript was issued through a decree. There was no reiteration of James’s intention to fulfil his Scottish techniques performed through a General Assembly and a Parliament (ibid). So as to Charles assumed he was capable to accomplish this was due to the thought that, as the Scottish doctrines say it, the Royal Supremacy bestowed upon him “the same authority in causes ecclesiastical, that the godly kings had among the Jews, and Christian emperors in the primitive church” (Aylmer 1961, 166). He had a number of English officials for this statement, which was derived from Canon II of 1604, yet its relevance to Scotland was unheard of. Charles’ insights regarding the Royal Supremacy guided him into a lot of problems both in Scotland and in England, and they are important to be aware of (ibid). They are summed up in a memorandum drafted by Lord Herbert of Cherbury, who was the chronicler of Henry VIII, dated at the time of the preparatory task on the Scottish doctrines, which has a message on the dorse that it is to be explained to the Archbishop through the King’s orders, which is a fascinating way round. This memorandum does not include passages from the statute law, neither English nor Scottish, and based the Royal Supremacy entirely on biblical passages, a greater part from the Old Testament. It is an assertion to ascendancy jure divino (Matthew 1995, 71). Regardless whether Charles was the absolute leader of the Church of Scotland through Scottish law was an indication open to disagreement; Charles had a number of justifications for assuming he was, yet several Scots had as an extent of justification for believing he was otherwise. It appears that to Charles, who understood the declaratory preamble of the English Act of Supremacy critically, it did not materialise whether he was the absolute head of the church through Scottish edict; the authorities were intrinsic in all kings whether Scottish commandment acknowledged them or otherwise (ibid). This, obviously, was a perspective which did not mention itself in Scotland. The King as well appear to have concurred with English Attorney-General that, in expressions secured to the Act in Restraint of Appeals, “the kingdom of England is an absolute empire and monarchie successive by inherent birthright, consisting of one head, which is the king, and of a bodye, which the law divideth into tow severall ptes, that is to say, the clergy and the laity: both of them next and immediately under God, subject and obedient to the head” (Matthew 1951, 5). Though Charles made use of these thoughts, they indicated the presence of two completely different subjects of temporal and religious influence. These were the concepts implied at in the Proclamation of 1626, which started the endeavour to broaden the English Articles to Ireland; it was released, not through recommendation of his Privy Council, however through the counsel of his reverend bishops. Charles considered that in ecclesiastical issues he was required only to seek advice from a restricted number of people whom he had selected, and could afterwards endorse (ibid). It was thus one of the magnetisms of bishops to Charles that they embodied a means for the successful and unrestricted implementation of his own resolve on his church. This, apparently, is a significant fraction of the rationales why, as his time in power advanced, the population of Scots and Englishmen who aspired to eradicate bishops intensified with such disturbing swiftness. The further Charles protected them as an important section of his power, the more roughly he highlighted the bases why other individuals thought they had to leave, or at any rate to be toughly suppressed. The Earl of Traquair Lord Treasurer of Scotland honestly informed Hamilton that the clergy people “are not fitting for such great and weighty employments, and asked ‘yt his matie may be pleased to hear some of the laytie” (Hibbard 1983, 97). Through challenging to modify Scottish law in what numerous Scots considered a worshipped direction, without using any of the mechanisms his father had reflected essential to Scottish lawmaking, Charles renewed all the Scottish terrors of 1604 simultaneously. Robert Baillie objected that in England the “leist ceremonie never appointed but in the convocation”, and also mentioned that, “had we been truly, as once we were falsely allegit, but a pendicle of the dioces of York, yet more than a missive letter would have been writ to have movit us imbrace a whole book of new canons, and more than an Act of Councell to have mad us recev a new form in the whol worship of God, prayer, sacraments, mariag, burial, preaching and All” (ibid, 99). He appealed to the messages lectured to the Melvilles at Hampton Court by Andrewes, “the semigod of the neu faction” (Fletcher 1981, 49), to demonstrate that church laws and doctrines had at all times been created in church assemblies. Baillie was not an individual who believed his religion without due consideration, yet it was not obligatory to share his religious beliefs to share his fright that foreword of the ceremonial book through proclamation was a menace to Scottish legislative self-government, and threatens reducing Scotland to colonial position (ibid). The Covenanter Earl of Rothes mentioned they were being requested to obtain a sample from those subordinate to them in reformation. The expert David Calderwood restored all his terrors of being pressured to compliance to England, whereas “they would not yield anything at all to us” (Coltman 1962, 9). The dread of advancing Arminianism was deafening and clears, and when Rothes was requested to defend his argument that the recent Prayer Book was doctrinally illogical; the blueprint which arrived straight away to his thinking was that it confirmed infants rejuvenate after christening. The possibility of erroneous doctrine and adulation caused several people who had previously been able to approve the Five Articles of Perth to die away to do so; Robert Baillie, for instance, determined that “I was not minded, on any hazard whatsomever, to practice kneeling, so long as the danger or feare of their late novations did remaine” (ibid,13). The hazard to Scottish legislative independence, specifically in the ecclesiastical setting where it had been for the most part resentfully protected, was a menace to Scotland’s character and identity, and one of the booklets of the Covenanter claimed, with an extent of certainty, that it endangered “no lesse than that wee should no more bee a kirk of a nation. Baillie thought it would reduce them ‘ane English province” (Kenyon et al. 1998, 166). These anxieties may influence those who did not worry for idolatry or false notion, and it is no revelation that Traquair eventually had to inform Charles that the authority plainly is not present in Scotland to put into effect this manuscript (ibid). Charles’s response to this information demonstrates features of him which are significant to his riches on both sections of the Border. He was only incapable of accepting the reality that his power, similar to that of every other leader in the history of civilisations, was restrained by the boundaries of the potential. He informed Hamilton that “I will rather dye, than yield to these impertinent and damnable demands” (Russell 1990, 116). He claimed he would be demoted to the rank of a Duke of Venice, which he would somehow depart this life than suffer; Hamilton was lessened to responding that they would somehow die too. Hamilton maintained calmly that “all that I shall say is humlie to intreat your mattie to take in consideration whatt the consequens of this may be” (ibid, 117). For Charles, this was in unacceptable question. If he withdrew, he thought, he will be disloyal to that confidence which “the King of kings hath reposed in us for the maintenance of religion and justice amongst all his people whom he hath committed to our charge” (Russell 1990, 117). It is the expression of one of nature’s sufferers for a cause. III. Charles I and his Intolerance of Religion An additional attribute from which Charles endured on both sections of the Border was his lack of ability to recognise that he could so much as emerge to be responsible of improvement or misconduct. He guaranteed the Covenanters several times that “we never intended the least alteration in Scottish religion” (Newman 1998, 93). The very first time he did this, one of the head of the Covenanters encouragingly understood it as an indication that he aimed to leave behind the ceremonial book. The Covenanters did not commit the same mistake again. He as well continually guaranteed them that nothing would be accomplished against the law, and that he would merely bear down on the ceremonial book in a reasonable and lawful manner (ibid). He anticipated the Covenanters’ resistance to disappear when they recognise that the ceremonial book was not revolutionary and demonstrated no indication of recognising the argument that even Hamilton promoted, that its preamble was not legitimised by the decrees of the kingdom. Charles, since he suffered from an antipathy to the form of religion the Covenanters espouse, appears to have been plainly sightless to any proof in their favour, even on technical aspects. He maintained that their declarations of religion were merely a deception, and hence was lethally unable to understand what he opposes. It is accurately the same error Pym was to commit in Ireland (Newman 1998). While they came to recognise these realities regarding Charles, the Covenanters gained knowledge that they may not win safety measures through Charles’s special considerations, not because they would be dishonest, but because he would keep hold of the interpretation of them. Baillie wisely evaluated Charles’s proclamations against improvement with his claim against intrigue following the 1629 Parliament in England: “the King’s declaration of his minde in religion was the stop of all process against those who were like to be censured for innovating therein” (Matthew 1995, 43). Rothes and his collaborators doubted how they may be safeguarded in time originating from the re-entry of these advancements (ibid). Bailie reminded that whatsoever the prince bestows upon them, he fears that they would have to press for further grants. This implied they had not simply to assure recognitions, but to obtain a permanent transition of power, in order for those recognitions not to be interpreted away. This was the reason they were transformed to the elimination of bishops, since, in Rothe’s enlightening statement, their conforming to the King was more suitable to the servants of an individual than of a state. This religious faction of an unfriendly State, wherein power was exercised in a collective manner, was one to wherein all Charles’s enemies were decisively motivated (Russell 1990). Several Covenanters appear to have been gradually and forcefully converted to Presbyterianism through the logic of the great effort with Charles, rather than embodying a persistent Presbyterian tradition enduring from the administration of James VI. One of the greatest exemplars is Robert Baillie. In 1637, when counselling an acquaintance to approve of a bishopric, he said, “bishops I love” (Hibbard 1983, 88), yet by 1641 he was eager to send away even clergymen trained to take into account the simplest form of adjusted episcopacy as ‘rabbies’. The Covenanters have to establish Charles’s recognitions permanent demonstrates simply in Rothes’s requirement to “have religion so established, as men might not alter it at their pleasure heirinafter, as they had done heirtofoir, and to enjoy the libertie of the laws of the kingdome” (ibid, 90). Eliminating Scottish bishops could aid them to regulate the Scottish state, yet from the latter part of 1638 onwards, the menace to the Covenanters was not Scottish; it was derived from the probability of conquest from England and Ireland. It hence became obligatory to them, so as to uphold the security of their Scottish structures, to bring about a permanent change of power in England and Ireland, in order that such a threat may not occur again. They at once recognise an English Parliament, to a certain extent than the English King, as that fraction of the English system where their sustenance was likely to be centralised, and as untimely as 1639 they were proclaiming that if an English Parliament could be summoned, it would be extremely far from criticising the Scots, that it would somehow lobby the King for them (Yule 1958). Subsequent to the Short Parliament, this justification was verified, and it is no astonishment that the English Triennial Act of 1641 launched its vocation as a Scottish mediating demand. The Scots declined to negotiate with Charles after Newburn unless Charles will be in agreement that the mediating faction should be charged of the mission by the English Parliament in addition to the English king, in so doing placing English diplomacy under Parliamentary regulation. Their frame of mind surfaces most obviously in their suggestion to designate a set of preservers of the peace to maintain the peace between England and Scotland and to be accountable, not to the King, but to the succeeding Parliament. It was a suggestion Simon de Montfort would have interpreted (ibid). The Scots were concerned from the very start in sending abroad their reformation to England, and anticipated that “our happines should emit the rayes of its example to our so nearlie intire and beloved neighbours” (Matthew 1955, 127). This, apparently, was accurately what Charles was worried about, and the reason he could not abandon the Covenanters protected in power. At the time their army crossed the threshold into England in 1640, their objective was affirmably to reform England, “the reformation of England, long prayed and pleaded for by the godly there, shall be according to their wished and desires perfected in doctrine, worship and discipline; papists, prelats and all the members of the antichristian hierarchy, with their idolatry, superstition and humane intervention shall pack them hence; the names of sects and separatists shall be no more mentioned, and the Lord shall be one, and his name one, throughout the whole iland” (ibid, 129). However, though fanatical the medium in which the Scots stated this objective, their fundamental concern was a stubborn aspiration for Scottish security. As they informed the English mediators in 1641, devoid of it peace would not be lasting, as they predicted it could be (Matthew 1955). Several of the English sincerely accepted such a potential, even to the point of defending the Scots against the King. The presence of this faction was one motive why the English was defeated in the Bishop Wars, because even those who had no compassion for the Scots considered it as foolish to fight blindly. The Countess of Westmorland in May 1639, in an extremely capable political evaluation, cautioned Secretary Windebank to shrink away from the war, since among other justifications, “they know our divisions and the strength of ther owne combination, and yt they have a party amongst us, and we have non amongst them” (ibid, 130). The type of problems this reality might result in were indicated by events such as the one that happened in the Green Dragon inn in Bishopgate Street during the summer of 1640, where two combatants who are about to set off to the war were trapped into a discussion with two clothiers in Essex. The clothiers conveyed compassion with the Scots, and one of the authorities, in reaction, referred to them as Puritans. One of the clothier afterwards inquired to the authority “if he could tell what a Puritan was, whereat he flew into such a rage he threw a trencher, and hit him on the head” (Russell 1990, 163). The time the matter was so directly troublesome, the Scottish party line being allocated in Essex, insisting on that “your grievances are ours: the preservation of religion and liberties is common to both nations: we must now stand of fall together,” (ibid, 163) was responsible to guarantee an investigation and to result in to trouble. The terror of a fifth column was hence at times likely to weaken English determination to fight. Force is a perilous sport and in the Army Plot of April and May 1641 Charles endeavoured to retaliate with force; if his enemies could force him through means of the Scottish army, perhaps he could force them by the English army. It appears to have been the Army Plot which persuaded Pym and his colleagues that they had underwent extremely far to recoil, that they, similar to the Covenanters, could merely acquire their own protection through a permanent change of power. It is subsequent to the Army Plot that, for the very first time, the junto displayed a dynamic and joint dedication to Root and Branch. In these instances, it was not merely a religious agenda; it was a constitutional issue, whose primary aim was to deny the King of power to regulate the church. They hence disputed Charles on the one aspect of all others where he was mainly effective; where his religious devotion and his wisdom of his own power met (Aylmer 1961). It is indicative that Williams, writer of an important programme to keep episcopacy through compromises, hoped to safeguard bishops through taking the authority to select them out of the King’s auspices, and returning it, in improved medieval fashion, to the cathedral chapters. For Charles, such an agenda was completely outside the point. From May 1641 frontwards, both factions in England bargained through methods of threats formulated to maintain conformity; the goal was to secure conformity, not to accomplish the threat, yet the goal was not attained (Hibbard 1983). The uncompromising conflict was between the resolve of Charles to rule, and his enemies’ willpower to evade him as successfully as Henry VI had been evaded at the time of his madness. This was the matter on which it turned out to be obligatory to fight (ibid). The junto’a plans to force Charles were at all times programmed to work through isolating him, abandoning him confronting a unified nation and if possible a joint Privy Council too. They fell short miserably in this goal, since, through dedicating themselves to the Scots’ agenda for a Presbyterian agreement, they, too, provided Charles the chance to assemble a party. Arminianism had not abandoned its origins, yet some of the Arminians’ anxiety for civility and order in the church hit a chord across a much broader scale than any of their religious principles. Primarily, all arrangements for a Scottish Reformation of England reduced to pollution of an overpowering hesitance to go through but another new agreement in religion, or to leap through but another chain of religious hoops; the effort to enforce a Scottish Reformation on England, though it had energetic followers, stimulated as expansive and as powerful an opposition as Laud himself had ever accomplished. It is not merely Charles’s stubbornness which made such an agreement unworkable; it is uncertain whether he could have made it effective even if he had attempted (Russell 1990). IV. Conclusion The pursuit for the causes of the outbreak of the English Civil War has carried historians into an exceptionally contrasting chronicles of times and places. However, the time is ripe for historians to ask what all these times and places had in common, and how they became capable of forming threads extending to the King’s raising of the standard at Nottingham in 1642 (ibid). One thing is certain, it is difficult to discover what all these aspects had in similarities, and except for the reality that Charles I had to manage them. Charles’s shortcomings as a ruler are a significant, and certainly an indispensable section of the narrative. Charles’s recurrent habit of mentioning he would rather breathe his last than do what obligation demanded of him was on wherein, at the last, made it essential to take his self at his own words, to which it must be uttered that he proved genuine. His intolerance to the controversial types of Calvinism frequently made it improbable for him to recognise what he was catering to, and so guided him to political estimations grounded on erratic premises. Nevertheless, if Charles’s shortcomings had been the entire story, historian would be elaborating a declaration and not a civil war. No extent of enumerating Charles’s shortcomings justifies the reason he established a party to defend and fight for him. The dilemma of multiple kingdoms was at all times a probable reason of insecurity from 1603 onwards. The enticement to push for greater unity was always present, and was always probable to generate critical problems. In 1603 England stumbled upon what Britain is to confront in the latter part of the twentieth century, the jolt of subjection to an overstated national power (Fletcher 1981). That jolt was not that much, but as well as not that much sufficiently addressed, since the English always attempted to make up it was non-existent, and aspired to treat both James and Charles as if they were merely rulers of a distinct nation-state, England. Because this was obviously not the case, and the rulers could not help being aware of it, the English were at all times likely to misinterpret royal decisions, and specifically to push their rulers to accomplish things which, in British concepts, they are unable to do. Hence, in 1637, a British king became victim to a related misinterpretation, and tried to rule all Britain as an English king, he discovered this was something he is incapable to do (ibid). Target Word Count: 5000 Actual Word Count: Main Content: 5235 Reference Page: 224 Total Word Count: 5459 References Aylmer, G.E. The Kings Servants: The Civil Service of Charles I, 1625-1642. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961. Carpenter, Stanley D.M. Military Leadership in the British Civil Wars, 1642-1651. London: Frank Cass, 2005. Coltman, Irene. Private Men and Public Causes: Philosophy and Politics in the English Civil War. London: Faber and Faber, 1962. Fletcher, Anthony. The Outbreak of the English Civil War. New York: New York University Press, 1981. Gardiner, S.R. "Debates in the House of Commons in 1625." (1873): 181. Gardiner, Samuel Rawson. The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution 1625-1660. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906. Hibbard, Caroline M. Charles I and the Popish Plot. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1983. Kenyon, John et al. The Civil Wars: A Military History of England, Scotland and Ireland 1638-1660. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Matthew, David. Scotland under Charles I. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1955. —. The Age of Charles I. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1951. Newman, P.R. Atlas of the English Civil War. London: Routledge, 1998. Parsons, Daniel. "Diary of Sir Henry Slingsby of Scriven." (1836): 65. Russell, Conrad. The Causes of the English Civil War. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990. Seel, Graham E. "Charles I in 1637-1649: Not a Bad King after All?" History Review (2000): 39. Yule, George. The Independents in the English Civil War. 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