The Nature of the Northern Ireland Conflict - Case Study Example

Critically analyze the argument that the nature of the Northern Ireland Conflict 1968-1998 was ethno-sectarian rather than political IntroductionThe long term crisis (lasted for about 30 years, from 1968 up to 1998) in Northern Ireland has been thoroughly examined in the literature as of its causal events. In many ways, this conflict has been considered as presenting the social and political differences between England and Ireland; in fact the reasons that led to this crisis are many including the differences in cultural characteristics of the above two nations; the co-existence of the citizens of these two countries should be expected to be difficult not only because of the differences in the political systems applied on each of these countries but mostly of the differences in the historical and cultural traditions of both nations. Under these terms, it could be stated that the Northern Ireland Conflict 1968-1998 should be characterized mostly as ethno-sectarian and not as political. The above argument will be supported with the appropriate arguments from the literature highlighting the consequences of the above crisis on the relationship of the above two countries. The development of the Conflict since its first appearance will be presented as analytically as possible trying to focus on the reasons of its beginning and criticize the events that led to its long term duration. Despite the fact that both countries were found to have taken specific initiatives for the establishment of peace in the area, no particular result seemed to exist; however, all these efforts led gradually to the termination of the Conflict even with a delay. It should be noticed that the role of citizens (of both countries) in the termination of the crisis proved to be equally valuable with the role of the governments of the two countries (England and Ireland). It is for this reason that the efforts made by the governments of both the above countries were successful. 2. Northern Ireland Conflict 1968-1998 – general aspects The conflict in Northern Ireland can be understood only if the events that led to this conflict are briefly presented. At a first level we should refer to the reasons that led the British government to follow a specific strategy when handling the specific issue (administration of the crisis between Britain and Ireland). In accordance with Hayward (2006, 265) ‘the British government had not envisaged partition to be anything other than a temporary solution to the problem they faced regarding unionist/nationalist tensions in the early twentieth century’. In other words, the intervention of Britain in Ireland can be explained referring to the political and social conditions of Ireland especially by the beginning of the twentieth century; it is in that period that the first events that led to the severe crisis of the period 1968-1998 were developed. Of course it cannot be stated that in case that these events had not taken place the relationship between Britain and Ireland could be good; other reasons also existed – especially the long term conflict between the catholics and the protestants across the country that were offered for the development of a severe crisis; in this way the conflict with Britain can be regarded as the expected outcome of a long term conflict between the members of the above two communities within the Irish territory. The appearance of the Conflict in Northern Ireland can be understood if considered the events that took place in the greater region from the beginning of the twentieth century. In accordance with the study of Pruitt (2007, 1521) ‘Britain governed Ireland as a whole for hundreds of years but was greatly resented by the native Irish population… the war between 1918 and 1921 culminated in negotiations that turned the southern 26 counties over to the Irish Free State, which later became the Republic of Ireland…the northern 6 counties – Northern Ireland – remained part of Britain.. two thirds of the population considered themselves British… this part of the population called ‘unionists’ (mainly Protestants)… the other part of the population, called nationalist, consider them Irish, are mainly Catholics’. The above information is necessary in order to evaluate the reasons for the appearance and the development of Conflict in Northern Ireland; the strong conflict (mainly based on religious differences) between the above two parts of the population in Northern Ireland has led to the military conflict that was expanded also in the British territory and lasted for about 30 years. Various political and social bodies were developed in order to support the limitation of the above Conflict. One of the most known is the Independent Commission on Policing (ICP) which ‘was established to “bring forward proposals for future policing structures and arrangements” in Northern Ireland’ (Ellison, 2007, 244). The above political body helped towards the realization of the targets set by the Belfast Agreement (signed in 1998), i.e. the Agreement that terminated the Conflict of Northern Ireland. It should be noticed that the consequences of the Northern Ireland conflict had been extremely severe for both sides (Britain and North Ireland); In accordance with the study of Gallagher (1989, 917) ‘between 1969 and 1988, 2724 people have died in the Northern Ireland conflict and thousands more have been injured’. The above study refers to a specific period of the Northern Ireland conflict, i.e. from 1969 to 1988 (the conflict ended in 1998, see also the date of publication of the study, 1989). For the years that followed, i.e. up to 1998, the losses in human lives have been continuous – the period after 1994 though a cease of fire by the Irish army was declared. The losses in human lives due to the above conflict are also noticed by McEvoy (1998) who supports that ‘from 1969 until the IRA cease-fire of 1994 saw more than 3,300 people killed; following the 1994 cease-fires, the release of politically motivated offenders became a key demand of both Loyalist and Republican groups (Bew & Gillespie, 1996, Mallie & McKittrick, 1996 in McEvoy, 1998, 40). In accordance with the above, the development of the Conflict in Northern Ireland had severe consequences for both parties (North Ireland and Britain). On the other hand, several attempts were made by both governments to end the crisis but because of the intervention of various political and religious teams all the relevant efforts were failed and only in 1998 an agreement between the two sides was achieved; however, not all governmental effort were appropriately planned; towards this direction it is noticed that ‘policymakers have overestimated the extent that the religious dimension of the conflict would simply wither away’ (Ganiel et al., 2008, 420). A brief reference to the historical events that led gradually to the development of the above Conflict should be presented in order to evaluate the decisions taken by the governments of both countries involved in the crisis. 3. Role of politics and of ethno-sectarian perceptions in the development of conflict in Northern Ireland The reasons for the development of the Conflict of Northern Ireland are many; as explained above the above Conflict was not based only on political oppositions but also on religious differentiations. In accordance with McGarry et al. (1995) ‘some declare it is caused by the Irish Republic, others by the Roman Catholic Church, and yet others by the political culture of nationalism…Then there are those who blame the British state or British imperialism in Ireland or British colonial settlement in Ireland or the Protestant religion’ (McGarry et al., 1995, 2, in Manktelow, 2007, 32). All the above factors have been considered as having a significant role in the development of the crisis in Northern Ireland. The explanation of the events can be based on one or more of the above mentioned criteria depending on the direction that will be followed for the presentation of the various aspects of the Conflict in the specific region. The identification of the nature of the Conflict of Northern Ireland can be achieved also by referring to the various initiatives of the participants; contests has been a method used by specific social parties in order to declare their opposition to the political status in Northern Ireland as developed under the influence of the British government. Ultras belonged to the above social teams; its mission was to participate actively in any effort supporting the independence of Northern Ireland from foreign political powers. Referring specifically to Ultras and their role in the Conflict of Northern Ireland Power (1972, 225) states that ‘largely composed of petit-bourgeois and proletariat defenders of fundamentalism versions of the Protestant Reformation, the ‘civilizing’ mission of the British in Ireland and majoritarian parliamentary government, the Ultras have operated chiefly through the Paisley’s Protestant Unionist Party and its less extreme successor, the Democratic Unionist Party’. In other words, the intervention of various social and religious parties in the development of the Conflict in Northern Ireland cannot be denied; more accurately, the lack of communication and cooperation among these parties seems to be the most significant criterion for the first appearance of the crisis and its continuation through the years; when the interests of these parties were differentiated (perhaps because the communication among all these parties was improved) the above Conflict was terminated. On the other hand, the response of governments of Britain and Ireland to the above conflict has not been consistent; however, specific guidelines should be followed by both the above governments in order for the above Conflict to be led in termination earlier. Indeed, the study of McAllister et al. (1983, 534) led to the assumption that ‘if social and economic conditions determine political events, then politicians and heads of government should concentrate more upon underlying social and economic problems, and less upon superstructural manifestations of these problems such as violent attacks upon the regime’. Towards the same direction, it is noticed by Gormley (2006, 54) that ‘political leadership during the Northern Ireland peace process was often necessarily contradictory in style and substance’. On the other hand, it is noticed by Byrne (2001, 331) that ‘relations between the British and Irish governments improved when they realized during the mid-1980s that they had to co-operate to prevent the rise in Nationalist electoral support for Sinn Fein’. In other words, the governments of both the countries have a significant responsibility for the development of the Conflict not so much as causing the Conflict but mostly because no appropriate measures were taken during the development of the Conflict towards its termination. Even under these terms the character of the above Conflict has not been differentiated; it is closely related with the social and religious trends of that specific period – as they were presented through the various social and political events across Ireland. Apart from the government, the country’s media had also a significant role in the development of the crisis. In the study of Rolston (2007, 346-347) it is noticed that ‘while ‘facts’ were in abundance, what was missing from media coverage was explanation, and the Irish conflict appeared as a series of decontextualized atrocities’. The participation of media in the development of the crisis was direct and continuous; the weakness of the governments of the two countries to reach a viable agreement earlier can be considered as a consequence of the intervention of media in the various aspects of the above Conflict. Through another point of view, it should be mentioned that the role of the international organizations in the termination of the crisis has been important but the relevant efforts were not developed up to the highest possible level. We can indicatively refer to the case of European Union. The promotion of cross-border cooperation as enhanced by the European Union has been found to be an effective solution towards the limitation of the crisis but its effects did not appear instantly but after a long term. In this context, it is noticed that ‘the reason cross-border cooperation is positively identified with conflict resolution in Northern Ireland is that the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland constitutes a barrier which insulated each jurisdiction from the other’ (Tannam, 2007, 337). In other words, the above plan of action – as suggested by the European Union – was effective towards the termination of the crisis even if it took a significant amount of time for this plan to be completed successfully. 4. Conclusion The limitation of the conflict in Northern Ireland should be considered as one of the major successes of the political powers that participated in the relevant effort. The above effort can be also evaluated using various criteria that have been developed in the literature regarding the establishment of successful peace processes in any political and social context. Towards this direction, it is suggested by Maney et al. (2006) that ‘a successful peace process also transforms perceptions from uncertainty into certainty; without trust and understanding, cooperation for mutual empowerment is unlikely to occur’ (Kelman, 1998, Ross, 2000, in Maney et al., 2006, 184). On the other hand, it is clear from the series of events presented in Figure 1 in the Appendix section that the termination of Conflict in Northern Ireland has been a challenging task for all parties involved; in the long term the development of communication and cooperation between the parties involved has led to the termination of the crisis and offered the chance for the improvement of the two countries’ relationship in a series of sectors (political, commercial, financial and social). It should be noticed that the examination of the various aspects of the above Conflict has led to the assumption that the specific Conflict was rather an ethno-sectarian than a political one. The intervention of various social teams in the country’s political decisions was the main reason for the development of the Conflict having also a catalytic role in its termination - when the relationships among these teams were differentiated and the progress of the Conflict did not serve any social or political interest. References Bloomfield, D. (1995) Towards Complementarity in Conflict Management: Resolution and Settlement in Northern Ireland. Journal of Peace Research, 32: 151-164 Byrne, S. (2001) Consociational and Civic Society Approaches to Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. Journal of Peace Research, 38: 327-352 Ellison, G. (2007) A Blueprint for Democratic Policing Anywhere in the World? Police Reform, Political Transition, and Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland. Police Quarterly, 10: 243-269 Gallagher, A. (1989) Social Identity and the Northern Ireland Conflict. Human Relations, 42: 917-935 Ganiel, G., Dixon, P. (2008) Religion, Pragmatic Fundamentalism and the Transformation of the Northern Ireland Conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 45: 419-436 Gormley-Heenan, C. (2006) Chameleonic Leadership: Towards a New Understanding of Political Leadership During the Northern Ireland Peace Process. Leadership, 2: 53-75 Hayward, K. (2006) Reiterating National Identities: The European Union Conception of Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland. Cooperation and Conflict, 41: 261-284 Lundy, P., McGovern, M. (2006) Participation,Truth and Partiality: Participatory Action Research, Community-based Truth-telling and Post-conflict Transition in Northern Ireland. Sociology, 40: 71-88 Maney, G., Ibtisam, I., Higgins, G. (2006) The Pasts Promise: Lessons from Peace Processes in Northern Ireland and the Middle East. Journal of Peace Research, 43: 181-200 Manktelow, R. (2007) The Needs of Victims of the Troubles in Northern Ireland: The Social Work Contribution. Journal of Social Work, 7: 31-50 McEvoy, K. (1998) Prisoner Release and Conflict Resolution: International Lessons for Northern Ireland. International Criminal Justice Review, 8: 33-60 McAllister, I., Rose, R. (1983) Can Political Conflict Be Resolved by Social Change? Northern Ireland as a Test Case. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27: 533-557 Power, P. (1972) Civil Protest in Northern Ireland. Journal of Peace Research, 9: 223-236 Pruitt, D. (2007) Readiness Theory and the Northern Ireland Conflict. American Behavioral Scientist, 50: 152091541 Rolston, B. (2007) Facing reality: The media, the past and conflict transformation in Northern Ireland. Crime, Media, Culture, 3: 345-364 Tam, T., Hewstone, M., Cairns, E. (2007) The Impact of Intergroup Emotions on Forgiveness in Northern Ireland. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 10: 119-136 Terchek, R. (1977) Conflict and Cleavage in Northern Ireland. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 433: 47-59 Appendix Figure 1 – Peace Process in Northern Ireland (source: Pruitt, 2007, 1521) Read More