Did the Treaty of Versailles make World War II Inevitable - Essay Example

Did the Treaty of Versailles make World War II inevitable? The Treaty of Versailles continues to be regarded to this day by scholars and laymen alike as a highly vindictive and humiliating peace agreement, imposed on a protesting, helpless and a weakened German nation. Assigning complete responsibility for the war on German actions alone is found to be incorrect by historians. Its punitive economic terms coupled with extensive territorial losses, especially in the East, only served to arouse in the German people an enduring bitterness against the Treaty and a fierce sense of nationalism that paved the way for National Socialism (Nazi) and for the outbreak of a second major war within 20 years. Essay: In 1919, at the end of the First World War, leaders from the coalition of England, France, Italy and the United States decided that they need a treaty to set right the damages caused by Germany and its allies. The treaty would be based on Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Point plan that was proposed in order to bring lasting peace to Europe. The culmination of these discussions and negotiations was the treaty signed by all participant countries in the French city of Versailles. While closing a curtain over the most brutal war till then, the Treaty of Versailles sowed the seeds for a bloodier war two decades later (Barnhart, 2002). While most leaders agreed that imposition of reparations on Germany was justified, there was controversy over some other terms of the Treaty. The first of these is pertaining to who should bear responsibility for the just concluded war. It is not surprising that the leaders of the allied powers chose to place the blame on Germany alone. But in truth, the causes of the war were much more complicated than that. Hence it was unjust to single out Germany to assume guilt and pay reparations. Secondly, the reparations that Germany was expected to pay was unreasonable. For example, in the year following the war the amount paid by Germany crossed 6,000 million pounds. It was close to impossible for any country to meet such a steep demand. Even if the reparations were paid, it would completely deplete the resources and destroy existing economic structures of the country subject to it. Hence, it could be asserted, that Germany was “set-up” to fail as a result of unreasonable demands imposed on it (Henig 2002). On top of the above conditions, Germany was prevented from building a sizeable army and navy. The limited army that it was allowed is useless in a situation that calls for national self-defence. And most importantly, the previously annexed lands of Germany were restored to its neighbouring countries. Such harsh conditions not only depleted Germany materially, but also psychologically. There was widespread sentiment among its general populace that the Treaty of Versailles was unfair, unjust and unreasonable. This public grievance provided the substrate upon which Hitler built support for World War Two. In this sense, it could be reasoned that the Treaty of Versailles, by virtue of its unpopularity with the German citizenry, had made events leading up to the Second World War almost inevitable (Barnhart, 2002). The most unfair of the violations was the label of guilt assigned to Germany. The argument that Germany was the prime instigator of the First World War, which began to gain currency after the Treaty of Versailles, would prove to be one of the significant causes of the Second World War. Article-231 of the treaty states that the aggressive military actions by Germany and its allies were basically responsible for the subsequent European conflict. This viewpoint became less credible in the subsequent years as the diplomatic records of the countries involved in the First World War were made accessible for publication, framing the notion that it was a collective responsibility (Morgan, 2002). The large-scale destruction of the war was rightly attributed to mistakes made by the all the great powers, to their preference for forceful confrontation as against tactful diplomacy as well as the strategic partnerships between the participating countries. Looking in retrospect, historians have come to see the war as an outcome of accident rather than design. History was to witness how grave a mistake this would prove to be. As Graham Goodlad explains in his article for Modern History Review: “It should, however, be noted that other powers played important parts in the unfolding events of 1914. It was Austria-Hungary that initiated the quarrel with Serbia after the archdukes murder. Austria delivered its ultimatum to Serbia, in spite of the fact that it could not prove that Serbias government was implicated in the assassination, and opened hostilities, even though Serbia had accepted all but one of its demands. Austria faced considerable difficulties in holding together its multi-racial empire in south-eastern Europe, and was disturbed by the growth of Russian and Serbian power following the wars of 1912-13. It was determined to crush Serbia, which it feared as the potential leader of a Balkan federation linked to Russia” (Goodlad 2005). There were other grievances held by German leaders who were signatories to the treaty. For example, immediately after the surrender of its troops, the German leadership sent a plea to the Government of the United States suggesting that Germany would agree to President Wilson’s fourteen point plan. From de-classified records of the time, it could be learnt that President Wilson received this offer quite favourably. Nevertheless, he has to gain the consent of his allied partners before sending his approval to German leaders. Unfortunately, for Germany in particular and world peace in general, the political systems within the country took a radical turn. The Kaiser was driven into exile and a socialism-based government was established, putting an end to the long history of German monarchy. Woodrow Wilson’s initial negotiations with Kaiser’s cabinet were on the verge of bringing a peaceful and mutually agreeable conclusion to the war. But the new set of leaders who came to power, were more concerned with holding power than with the details of the Treaty (Henig 2002). In an act of panic, they signed the Treaty of Versailles out of fear of an allied invasion of Germany (which would have cost them their new found power and privilege within the country). What the new German leadership overlooked was the fact that many of the broad principles of the Fourteen Point plan were not followed while drawing the final treaty document. With the fateful signing of the Treaty on May of 1919, the foundations for another major war were laid. References: Goodlad, G. (April 2005). German was guilt re-examined; the victorious allies blamed Germany for starting the First World War. Were they right?, Modern History Review, 16, 4., p.28(4). Henig, R. (April 2002). The Treaty of Versailles 80 years on: how vindictive was the peace treaty?, Modern History Review, 13, 4. p.2.  Morgan, K O (June 2002). Lloyd George and the Lost Peace: from Versailles to Hitler, 1919-1940., The English Historical Review, 117, 472., p.745(2). Barnhart, M A (June 2002). From Versailles to Pearl Harbor: The Origins of the Second World War in Europe and Asia., The English Historical Review, 117, 472., p.758(2). Read More