Lincoln and His Generals - Coursework Example

Lincoln and his Generals Harry T. Williams (2001) views Abraham Lincoln as a man who was a genius, since he came into office with no military knowledge, yet was possessed of an extraordinary flexibility and strategic ability to learn from mistakes and guide the country through the Civil War1. His generals were comprised of brilliant men such as Thomas and Sherman as well as ineffectual commanders like Fremont and Banks. The President’s relationships with the former were characterized by a policy of minimum interference while his relationships with the latter were the source of headaches for him. General McClellan and Grant were among two of the most talented and powerful strategists and Generals, but while McClellan was ultimately a failure and a great disappointment to Lincoln, Grant was one of the greatest of his generals and was responsible for the brilliant planning and implementation of the winning war strategy of the North from 1864. Lincoln’s relationship with McClellan: General William B McClellan was the first commander of the Army of the Potomac, a superb general and strategist in the Napoleonic tradition. He was a graduate from Westpoint who was working as a railroad executive when he was called back into active military duty. He was able to collect an army together and train it well, organizing its logistics with equal skill; however he was a man who tended towards extremes of caution and exhibited a general reluctance to take to battle quickly, which was one of Lincoln’s greatest grouses against him. Lincoln’s relationship with General McClellan started off with a period of initial support and enthusiasm for the abilities of the General. They established a fine, working relationship that was devoted to the common purpose of ensuring a Union victory.2 Lincoln deferred to the superior knowledge of military strategy of the general and was content to let him guide the course of the war. But with subsequent disputes that resulted, the relationship became a generally contentious one and Lincoln assumed a more active role in leadership of the war effort. The first battle of the Civil War was the First Battle of the Bull Run which took place on July 21, 1861, where the Union forces numbering about 28,500 had some early successes but were soon forced back to Washington D.C (Livermore 77). It was after this ignominious defeat that General McClellan took over. Lincoln was relatively inexperienced in military affairs but wanted to play an active role in directing the war effort and determining the strategy that was to be used. He had two major objectives in mind – (a) that of winning the war quickly and (b) ensuring that Washington D.C. the home base was well protected. However, the need to protect Washington D.C. was one area where Lincoln and McClellan disagreed, as they disagreed on the speed with which battle moves were to be executed. McClellan planned to use the Army of the Potomac to capture Richmond, the Confederate capital, by moving his troops on boats to the peninsula between the James and the York rivers (www.peninsulacampaign.org). However, in order to execute this battle move, which was called the Peninsula Campaign, McClellan took several months, carefully planning and predicting each strategic move. Moreover, McClellan was distrustful of some administration officials and other civilians and as a result, began to keep his battle plans a secret, without even divulging his reasons for the delays to the President3. The Peninsula Campaign was a well planned and executed war effort, with the use of the James and York rivers serving to protect the army’s flanks as it advanced towards Richmond – set to succeed from all viewpoints, yet failing to achieve the desired objective. McClellan was also a General who enjoyed considerable clout and respect among other generals in the army of the Potomac, and the dominant number of them shared his political and military outlook, as opposed to those who were Lincoln supporters and a third group of opportunists, who held themselves out as an alternative to the supporters of McClellan, known as McClellanites. (Taffe 5) Lincoln was at first patient with McClellan and continued to reiterate his support for the General and his willingness to support his position as far as the war effort was concerned. However, the delays caused by McClellan were occurring in the aftermath of the failure at the First Battle of the Bull Run, and there was public pressure upon the Union to achieve a fast and decisive victory over the Confederates. Since General McClellan had been specifically warned by the President of the need to execute a fast strategy, Lincoln was irritated at the length of time that General McClellan took to execute his campaign, especially since McClelland did not care to communicate his concerns to the President.4 The two also disagreed on troops to defend Washington. While Lincoln insisted it was necessary that some troops stay behind to defend the capital, McClellan insisted equally firmly that it was not necessary. However, Lincoln’s decision prevailed ultimately and he refused to release troops from General Irwin McDowell’s I Corps of Northern Virginia, in order that they could be used in a flanking movement against Confederate forces at Gloucester Point in the Peninsula Campaign. This factor was later cited by McClellan as being the reason for the failure of the Peninsula Campaign, which could have swiftly and decisively provided a victory to the Union forces – the Confederate forces outnumbered them.(www.peninsulacampaign.org). Lincoln however, viewed McClellan’s leadership during the Peninsular campaign from a different perspective. He was aware of the continued reports of McClelland’s illness during the battle plans and while he did not interfere unduly at first, the long delays and pressures from the public for war forced him to play a more active part in the war effort5. On the decisive day of battle – May 5, when fighting was raging at Fort Magruder until dark, McClellan was away in Yorktown supervising another division’s transportation. President Lincoln’s perspective of this was that it demonstrated McClellan’s lack of initiative, as a result of which he arrived personally at the battlefield on May 6 in order to supervise further progress of the battle and the unsuccessful naval attacks that followed. The Confederate forces launched a heavy offensive which pushed the Union advantage, carefully marshaled by McClellan, into a humiliating defeat. But the matter of the exposed flank that resulted from the retaining of General McDowell’s troops was a sore point with McClellan, which he cited as the reason for the Union defeat. Lincoln and McClellan had also clashed earlier on the question of whether the Union army was to advance into East Tennessee or Nashville. While Lincoln favored the move into east Tennessee to support the Unionists in that area, McClellan disagreed and favored a move into Nashville. The long delays and inactivity were a source of unease not only to Lincoln but also to many members of the Joint Committee on the conduct of the war. McClellan’s inactivity was one of the reasons why Lincoln began to take an active approach in the war effort and his new assertiveness was the source of conflict between the general and the President. As Rafuse (1997) points out, Lincoln began to directly challenge the General’s authority through the issue of such orders as the President’s War Order on January 27, which set a specific date for the advance of the war effort and this caused deterioration in the relationship between the two. McClellan’s attitude towards the President was one of superiority because he himself was a West Point graduate, while he viewed Lincoln as a man inexperienced in war strategy. He was a democrat who sometimes espoused Conservative views and his attitude towards the President is reflected in the letter he wrote to him, which has become known as the Harrison’s Landing letter. He offered his political views to the President and urged caution in the war effort, despite the fact that they “did not strictly come within the scope” of his official duties.(www.amerciancivilwar.com). In this letter, McClellan offered his unsolicited political advice on pursuing a cautious strategy in the civil war - to the President of the United States, from his perspective of the President as a man who was unacquainted with war strategy. It was this very cautious attitude however that was the source of irritation to President Abraham Lincoln, because he believed the old Napoleonic strategies of war needed modifications in order to be applicable during the Civil War. For one, Lincoln favored a policy of crushing the Confederate forces rather than merely seeking to grab Confederate territory. He also had his own ideas about moving swiftly and decisively in the war, and taking the offensive where necessary – a policy that was in direct opposition to the more cautious approach adopted by his general McClellan.(www.jsonline.com). The loss in the Peninsula Campaign despite the availability of superior numbers was a cause Lincoln attributed to be the direct result of McClellan’s reluctance to go on the offensive. Upon receipt of McClellan’s unsolicited letter, he fired him, stating that he was “tired of trying to bore with an augur too dull to take hold.” (www.jsonline.com). McClellan was replaced by General John Pope, who was a Republican, unlike McClellan. However Pope was also defeated at the Second Battle of the Run and the Army of the Potomac had to defend Washington yet again. With Pope’s failure, Lincoln once again solicited the services of General McClellan to command the Washington forces. In the ensuing Battle of Antietam that was fought in September 1862, the Union was able to gain a victory and Lincoln issued his Emancipation Proclamation. But McClellan’s excessive caution in taking the offensive was still a bone of contention between the two men. Since McClellan had a large number of fresh troops at hand on the day the Battle of Antietam was won, he could have crushed the war weary Confederate forces. Instead, he chose to let them retreat, thus making himself a source of deep disappointment to Lincoln who was able to see the opportunity that existed for a decisive win for the Union forces, which had been compromised by McClellan.6 The relationship between the two men had deteriorated to one of an uneasy truce. By this time, Lincoln, being a man of vision, was learning from the failures of the Union Army and sought a General who would be able to put into action, his vision of a strategic war offensive against the Generals of the Confederate Army. But McClellan and Lincoln were fundamentally opposed on war strategy, with McClellan’s caution colliding with Lincoln’s desire to see swift and offensive battle action. Therefore, McClellan may be characterized as one of the generals with whom Lincoln communicated often and intensively, however this was because of the drawbacks that he perceived, which undermined his confidence in his General, while McClellan had a similar distrust of what he saw as Lincoln’s inexperienced interference into his domain. Burnside and Hooker were the two generals who succeeded McClellan, but both of them were defeated in subsequent battles and were unable to carry out Lincoln’s strong vision for a swift and decisive victory against the South by taking up a strong offensive drive against them. General Meade was able to bring a victory at Gettysberg, but again this General also failed to pursue General Lee and kept the Army of the Potomac in a state of inactivity for several months. The need for decisive action prompted Lincoln to bring in General Ulysses S. Grant as the Commander of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln’s relationship with Grant: General Ulysses S Grant started off the war as a minor Commander in the mid-west, but was able to quickly grasp the intricacies of modern warfare. Unlike McClellan, his military strategy was more attuned to Lincoln’s, and he was able to devise effective tactical plans to execute Lincoln’s strategy. Grant and Lincoln saw eye to eye on the need to overpower the Confederate forces and not rest content with capturing their territory. They felt that in order to win a decisive victory, it was necessary to destroy the economy and the resources base that supported them. (www.jsonline.com). As opposed to McClellan’s failure during the Peninsula Campaign, General Grant was able to capture the entire Confederate army at Vicksburg, prompting Lincoln to state: “Grant is my man and I am his for the rest of the war.” (www.jsonline.com). In Grant, President Lincoln was able to find a man who was attuned to his own strategy and vision for the war. Lincoln’s relationship with Grant was completely different from that with McClellan. While the latter was characterized by differing ideologies and beliefs regarding the execution of the war effort, in the former, the President had found a close ally who was able to prepare battle plans to execute his vision. Whereas Lincoln extended a low level of support to McClellan and did not hesitate finally to supersede his authority in the face of his inaction, he extended a very high level of support to General Grant. Williams et al7 point out how the course of history could well have been changed, because at one point after the battle of Shiloh, other generals came to Lincoln, demanding Grant’s removal and alleging that the General had lost the war because he had been drunk. McClure reports that after he had made his case against Grant, the President remained silent for a long time, then “said in a tone of earnestness……I can’t spare this man. He fights.” (Williams et al, 111). While he might have entertained his doubts about Grant, nevertheless after the Vickersberg victory, the President stood solidly behind Grant and continued to empower him. As opposed to McClellan, he had an unswerving confidence in Grant, however this confidence may not have always existed, it was a product of Grant’s accomplishments (Williams et al, 114) During McClellan’s tenure, Lincoln had started to play an active role in the conduct of the war and this was something all his generals had to face. Some historians have claimed that the President’s constant meddling in war affairs in fact handicapped his Generals in their execution of the war effort. (Williams et al, 114). Lincoln therefore continued to supervise the war operations even after Grant had assumed command and had demonstrated his mettle through the victory in Vickersberg. The final strategy that was instrumental in winning the war for the Union forces was in mounting simultaneous attacks and placing pressure from several different points at once. This was in accordance with the common perception of both Grant and Lincoln that only such a combined attack from various points could overcome the Southern strategic strength in being able to marshal resources quickly using their interior lines and shift large numbers of forces to areas that were under attack.(www.jsonline.com) However when the attacks were mounted simultaneously from several different fronts, this advantage was lost. Part of the success of the relationship between Lincoln and Grant may be attributed to the General’s understanding of the complex interplay between politics and war. The President’s policy on slavery was one that was dear to him and other Generals tried to usurp this prerogative; however Grant understood his own mission and his relationship to Government and did not take the same stand. Williams et al8 have clearly pointed out this difference between McClellan and Grant, by drawing a comparison between their correspondences with President Lincoln before major war offensives. While the battle was going on in 1862, McClellan sent a telegraph to the President which stated: “If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or any other persons in Washington – you have done your best to sacrifice this army.” As opposed to this, Grant’s letter to Lincoln before the 1864 offensive stated: “Should my success be less than I desire and expect, the least I can say is, the fault is not with you.” The tenor of the communications and Grant’s respectful attitude was one of the reasons why Lincoln had such a high level of confidence and trust in him.(Williams et al, 116). In the case of McClellan and other generals such as Winfield Scott, the high ranking Generals held an exalted title but were unable to exercise authority and decisiveness in accordance with that authority, neither were they able to advise the President on the best course of action so that he could exercise it. While Lincoln was comfortable with the parameters of the power that existed in his own post, he was uncomfortable with the failure of his generals to exercise authority corresponding to their posts. This was why he was finally able to feel comfortable only with Ulysses Grant, because Grant was able to understand the need for success in the war, even at the risk of Lincoln appearing to be dictatorial in achieving his anti-slavery purpose. In a letter to General Hooker, President Lincoln stated unequivocally, “What I ask of you is military success and I will risk the dictatorship.” (Basler, 78-79). While Hooker was uncomfortable with this policy, Grant was not. He was able to understand the President’s position on the destruction of the infrastructure of the South, in order to destroy its morale and weaken its economic ability and availability of resources to continue fighting the war. While McClellan had started off on the Peninsula Campaign in a position of considerable clout and authority, he failed to maintain this position as his conflicts with Lincoln increased. As opposed to this however, Grant was a much shrewder General, realizing that his position and authority would largely depend upon the relationship he was able to maintain with his President and with his subordinates. His principal field Commanders – Sherman and Meade reposed the highest confidence and trust in him, since they had full confidence in his military judgment.(www.historynet.com). However, while he enjoyed the support of his subordinates, Grant was fully aware that Lincoln would not accord him the unquestioning trust that he had first accorded McClellan and that he would have to earn the President’s approval, a feat that could only be accomplished when they matched Lincoln’s own manner of thinking. Grant had also been forewarned by Halleck not to suggest any move that would involve the removal of significant forces from Washington, since this had been one of the primary areas of discord between McClellan and the President. Therefore Grant was shrewd enough to shelve his initial plan for a multi pronged attack on the South in favor of Lincoln’s wish that the army of General Robert Lee in north Virginia was to be made the target of attack. Grant was later able to achieve his goal of a multi level attack after proving himself and his abilities through the winning of some battles. He was shrewd enough to realize that out on the field he could exercise a free hand, however he was not to come in conflict with Lincoln in Washington. He was able to establish a good relationship with Lincoln by accepting his political suggestions and implementing his choices for command in army positions; moreover he always listened respectfully to Lincoln’s suggestions, made the President feel welcome whenever he visited headquarters and included Lincoln’s son Robert on his staff.(www.historynet.com) Another significant reason for Grant’s good relationship with Lincoln was his ability to maintain good relations with Stanton, Lincoln’s war Secretary, against whom McClellan had come up in dispute. Therefore Grant was able to succeed where McClellan had failed in establishing a good relationship with Lincoln, because he was able to understand the subtle underplay of power and the interrelationship between the civil and military worlds; he was able to align his military policy successfully with the President’s instead of rising in opposition against him. Other Generals: One of the Generals who was initially successful in maintaining a successful relationship with Lincoln was Halleck, who functioned well in the role of military advisor to a President who was eager to find a man who could translate Presidential wishes into military orders, and Halleck was able to accomplish this.(www.historynet.com), Since Lincoln was emerging with a much greater knowledge of military affairs than he had initially when McClellan was General, he was not anxious to defer to his Generals and wanted to be an active Commander in Chief. However, Halleck’s success was undermined by his role as the scapegoat who was often blamed when things went wrong. General Meade was able to enjoy a temporarily good relationship with Lincoln by virtue of his victory at Gettysburg, however this victory was short lived for the same reason as McClellan – he was unable to align himself with Presidential prerogatives for a fast victory through offensive follow-up attacks. Conclusions: In conclusion, it may be noted that Lincoln’s relationship with his generals evolved in accordance with the degree to which they were able to respect his vision for the war. While his relative inexperience allowed McClellan an initially wide range of control, his increasing knowledge of war strategy and his driving mission to achieve emancipation from slavery pushed him to participate actively in war strategy. While General Halleck was weak enough to allow himself to be pushed around into the position of the President’s stooge, it was only General Grant who was able to achieve that delicate balance between retaining military command on the battlefield and not allowing his personal ego to interfere with Presidential prerogatives. He was able to align his own military strategy with that of the President, working on gaining Lincoln’s trust through a succession of victories before venturing to put forth and execute his bold plans for a multi pronged attack on the South that was finally responsible for the Union victory. The relationships of McClellan and Grant represent two polar opposites in many ways. While Lincoln started out giving McClellan a wide scope of authority which he later clamped down on, Grant had to earn the President’s respect as a result of which his power base was widened later. While McClellan followed an over cautious policy, Grant proposed bold and audacious war strategic moves. While McClellan failed to understand the delicate balance between political and war affairs and as a result came up in conflict with the President on many occasions. Grant was able to understand the subtle power play in politics and utilize it to his advantage. To a great extent, Grant’s humble attitude and ability to incorporate Lincoln’s vision into battle tactics was responsible for the excellent relationship he had with the President. Bibliography * Basler, Roy P (edn), 1860. “Collected works of Abraham Lincoln” (Vol IV) * “General George B McClellan to President Abraham Lincoln” [online] available at: http://americancivilwar.com/documents/mcclellan_lincoln.html * “Lincoln’s war strategy still a winner.” [online] available at: http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=400725 * Livermore, Thomas L., 1986. “Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America 1861-65” Morninside House (reprint) * Murfin, James V, 1982. “The Gleam of Bayonets:The Battle of Antietam and Robert E Lee’s Maryland Campaign.” Louisiana State University Press * Rafuse, Ethan S, 1997. “Typhoid and Tumult: Lincoln’s response to General McClellan’s bout with typhoid fever during the winter of 1861-62” Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association, 18 (2) [online] available at: http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jala/18.2/rafuse.html * Taffe, Stephen R, 2006. “Commanding the Army of the Potomac.” Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. * “The 1862 Peninsula Campaign” [online] available at: http://www.peninsulacampaign.org/ * “Ulysses S. Grant: America’s Second Three Star General.” [online] available at: http://www.historynet.com/magazines/civil_war_times/3026221.html?page=2&c=y * Williams, Harry T, 2001. “Lincoln and his Generals” Gramercy * Williams, Frank J, Pederson, William D and Marsala, Vincent John, 1994. “Abraham Lincoln” Praeger/Greenwood. Read More