Eastern Europe Under Communist Rule - Essay Example

Eastern Europe under communist rule Top of Form Bottom of Form The organizational strategies of the communist parties during the era of socialism (1945-1989) are among the lesser-documented aspects of the parties’ rule. Yet these strategies, consisting of the means of party control over society and internal personnel policies within the party, there was underlying of the communist parties’ ability to reform and negotiate under communism. The less the parties relied on the loyalty of party members and extensive organizational networks as a way to control society, and the more practical and skilled their leaders, the more ability the communist parties to innovate and implement policy reforms which was done through managers, and to negotiate with the anti-communist disagreement. Furthermore, the strategies used also influenced politics after the downfall of communism in 1989(Krygier and Czarnota, 2009).They formed the collective historical record and the leaders’ skills which brought out how the communist parties would continue and prosper after the regime collapse in 1989. The more the parties had stimulated pluralism in and outside their administrations, they more likely they were to improvementa relatively satisfactory historical record and to familiarizesuccessfully to democracy. There are two main aspects that were used in the rulings. In the first strategy, there was use of the parties’ organization to maintain and come up with more authority over the society. In the ruling, there was punishment given to those that defied the rules. The relationship that occurred between the party and society in terms of power ranged from East Germany saturation of the society. The second strategy that was used was practices inside the organization. The practices that were used include advancement and turnover, elite recruitment and internal party pluralism. The main aim of the strategy was to assert control over the makeup of the party and promote partners with specific outlooks and skills. In implementation, there was variation which ranged from recruitment exclusively from inside the party ranks and promotions with basing mainly on ideological loyalty. Since 1968 there was a reform that began within the party, no further political or economic reforms were considered by the party, for fear of a similarly disastrous loss of control over society. In contrast, even the shock that followed 1953 in East Germany, producing the enormous purges that it did, did not prevent some few future policy alterations. As brought out, it is clear that despite some regions of Eastern Europe having communist influence prior to the Second World War, such as Poland, Eastern Europe would not have become communist without the interference of the Soviet Union in the post-war years(Krygier and Czarnota, 2009). This is inferred by the fact that following the War, Stalin was forced to bring about communists into the governments of the popular of Eastern-European states to make sure that only countries that implemented communist governments surrounded the USSR, introducing communism upon these states in spite of his promises of free elections. It can also be seen that in the post-war years soviet intervention in elections was current, suggesting that maybe without this intervention results would have been different from those which were obtained, and many states in Eastern Europe would not have become communist (Vinen, 2003). This is clear in the case of Poland, which did actually have a communist party, however this was dissolved by Stalin in 1941 as it was a potential threat, and then reformed under Stalin’s main concern as he developed Polish communists in Moscow. After the War, Stalin recognized a Soviet government in Poland as through the Nazi occupation the former government had been expatriated to London. The events in Poland in the post-war years show clear Soviet interference as Stalin was quick to establish a communist government in order to protect the USSR. Gomulka, the forerunner of the Polish Communist Party was in discussions with the London Poles;though Stalin sent one of his Moscow Poles Beirut to witness. Beirut was made of the Lublin Committee, which was known by Stalin as the Provisional administration of Poland(Krygier and Czarnota, 2009). A ruthless takeover followed, in which a huge number of leaders from the Polish Home Army were imprisoned as these were a threat to Stalin’s new communist government, clear indication of Stalin impressive communism upon Poland by removing threats. Despite agreeing at Yalta to free elections within Poland when a referendum was held in 1946 and the communists won, it was later revealed that they had actually lost and similar manipulation of votes occurred again in the 1947 elections (Torbioni, 2003). This then paved the way for the communists under Stalin to take control of internal security and police to persecute any opposition. Clearly within Poland in the post-war years a large amount of Soviet interference occurred as Stalin was quick to establish a soviet government within Poland and then manipulate the votes in communist favor paving the way for all opposition to communist rule to be eliminated, giving the people little choice. In examination of the parties after World War II and the specific ways that they used in capturing of their power translated to the strategies that they used in the organization(Saueauk, 2014). The initial differences that were in their strategies were small especially with consideration of Stalinist brutality that followed that who took over. The strategies were reinforced both by those who were deliberate replication and regime crises. One may also cite Hungary as an example of how communist rule was forcefully imposed on eastern European states in the post-war years(Krygier and Czarnota, 2009). Prior to the War, the Hungarian Communist Party was small, and most importantly, illegal. During the war years, following the Nazi occupation of Hungary a left wing front developed and gained some small popularity however they still performed poorly in the 1945 elections(Saueauk, 2014). A communist government in Hungary seemed unlikely after this, until Soviet interference occurred, suggesting that without interference from Stalin, Hungary would not have become a communist state. Stalin ordered ‘salami tactics’ in order to get communists in government, and they soon gained control of the Ministry of the Interior, this combined with the rigged 1947 elections saw the communists gain 45% of the vote and 15 government posts. Similarly to the course of events in Poland, the communists began to eliminate any potential opposition, ensuring that the public had no choice but to vote communist, clearly suggesting that communism was forced upon Hungary and perhaps would not have occurred without Soviet interference (Judt and Tony, 2005). The communist captures of power after World War II led the parties to reach distinct conclusions regarding the kind of party organization that would best establish their authority, and thus, to adopt different organizational strategies. Specifically, the more the party came to power faced with powerful domestic or external opponents it was uncertain of defeating, the more it tended to view its organization as a means of establishing and retaining power. Thus, in Czechoslovakia, where the free elections of 1946 called into question communist legitimacy, the party attempted to saturate society with its organizations and membership networks, making many aspects of daily life dependent on party loyalty (Webb, 2002). Communist government was also forcefully imposed by Stalin in Romania, which had a communist party, however it was small and unorganized. Stalin imposed Gheorghiu-Dej on the communist party to assert his control over this party. The new government of December 1944 had a communist deputy, however insufficient for Stalin, who then ordered the Red Army to ensure that a new, firmly communist government was appointed again showing the importance of Soviet interference in the establishment of communist governments within eastern European states. From this point all opposition was crushed and persecuted as the Red Army was the police force. Gheorghiu-Dej also began purging anyone who was seen as disloyal, indicating that the soviets were not afraid to use terror in establishing eastern European states as communist and once again inferring that many eastern European states were forced into communism as they were afraid of the consequences or simply had no choice in who was governing their country (Smith, 2005). Perhaps the strongest case for this side of the argument is the events that took place in Bulgaria in the post-war years. In 1944 Stalin declared war on Bulgaria, and as the Red Army invaded a Communist Coup was staged in Sofia. The ‘Fatherland Front’ was established which was dominated by communists on Stalin’s orders to keep Bulgaria firmly under Soviet communist command. In February 1945 100 leading right-wing Bulgarian politicians including the main opposition leader, Petkov, were shot in show executions to establish terror and present to the public what would happen if communist rule was resisted, effectively quieting any opposition and forcing communist rule upon the people of Bulgaria. The final move towards complete imposed communism upon Bulgaria came in 1947 when all other parties were outlawed, making Bulgaria a communist country not by the choice of the people voting for what they wanted, but by Soviet intervention (Rubistein, 2006). However, one must acknowledge that there is evidence that some states within Eastern Europe may have become communist without the intervention of the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia, for example, was the only Eastern European country to have a well-established Communist party prior to the War, which gave Stalin a powerbase to work with. In 1956, without Soviet interference, the Communists won 39% of the vote and dominated the government with their socialist allies. Despite the West seeing the events taking place in Czechoslovakia as sinister intervention on Stalin’s part, realistically the Czech non-communists political failings, combined with widespread support for the communists were the real reasons for the communist takeover here (Hitchcock, 2003). Concerned with the purity of party ranks as a mainstay of its organizational saturation and control,the Czech communist leaders purged their membership regularly, and at higher rates than any other party. In the 1948-51 periods, two purges cast out 750,000 members, or 32% of the party membership.Purges of the state administration sent over 150,000 people from white-collar to factory jobs in the three-year period after the takeover.After the Prague Spring, an estimated 70,000 to 100,000 were fired from their jobs,and denied all but menial employment. 75% of the expelled communist party members were sent to perform manual labor. Moreover, the Czech and East German parties were perhaps the most persistent and successful in making society dependent on the party, in areas as basic as education and employment. Membership in the conventional Communist Youth Union was a prerequisite for higher education throughout the period, and political criteria always applied in selection for both high school and university. Moreover, 550,000 jobs were directly vetted by Czechoslovak party organs in the mid-1980s, in contrast with 270,000 in Poland or the even smaller number in Hungary during the same time period (Buchnan, 2005). References Buchnan, T., Europe's Troubled Peace, 1945-2000, Oxford, Blackwell, 2005, chapter 6, 940.55-BUC; Hitchcock, W., the Struggle for Europe: the History of the Continent since 1945, Profile Books, 2003, 940.55-HIT - Chapters 7 and 11; Krygier, M. and Czarnota, A. (2009). The rule of law after communism. Aldershot: Ashgate. Rubinstein, A. (2006). Communist political systems. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Saueauk, M. (2014). Historical memory versus communist identity. Tartu: University of Tartu Press. Smith, C. (2005). Vladivostok under Red and White rule. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Webb, A. (2002). The Longman companion to Central and Eastern Europe since 1919. London: Longman. Judt, Tony, Postwar: A History since 1945, London, Heinemann, 2005, 940.55-JUD - Chapter 13; Torbiorn, Kjell M., Destination Europe: the political and economic growth of a continent, Manchester University Press, 2003, 940.55-DES - Chapter 4; Vinen, R., A History in Fragments: Europe in the Twentieth Century, London, Abacus Books, 2002 (Part III, Chapter 4) 940.5-VIN; Read More