Azerbaijan's Evolution over the Past Half Century - Essay Example

Dear client, I’m just fixing the table of contents, in-text citations, and reference page. Thanks! Introduction In 1918, the first Republic of Azerbaijan came into being, and alongside it were strong leadership and ambitious goals for a Muslim state. But this independent republic ended because of the entrance of Bolshevism into the country. The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic replaced the first independent Republic of Azerbaijan, and, with this the important aspects that identify self-governing statehood started to be thoroughly abolished. In 1969, when Haydar Aliyev rose to power, the economic and political institutions of the republic started to change slowly. The main conditions, especially in terms of finances, needed for the future independence of Azerbaijan started to develop. The economic institutions needed for independence were reformed and made stronger. Focus was given on social, cultural, and economic institutions. Because of these facts, the foreign media during that time observed that Ukraine and Azerbaijan, two republics that aided in the formation of the Soviet Union, were ready to become economically independent. This discusses the development of Azerbaijan’s economic and political structure since1969. Particular emphasis is given on the role of Haydar Aliyev in the transformation of post-1969 Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan since 1969 Despite the differences between the Western European and the Soviet territories, the principles of the historical development were quite similar or common of decolonisation somewhere else. They involved various aspects, among them growing troubles for Russia, rather than benefits; strategic weaknesses during the Cold War; the shrinking possibility of the cultural integration of the people; and the development of educated national leaders, capable and eager to take on a bigger position in the country’s leadership. In the 1960s, when indications of an institutional problem in the Soviet colonies started to arise, these aspects were more obvious in the borders or fringes than in the centre. The oil and gas sector of Azerbaijan weakened in importance to the Soviet economy, in part because of the shift of attention to other provinces or territories, and in part because of the exhaustion of the readily available onshore oil grounds. The weakening of the petroleum industry resulted, in consequence, in decrease in the flow of investment to Azerbaijan from the Russian and Soviet centre, Moscow. During the 1960s, the country was the poorest of the entire Soviet empire in terms of economic performance and development, yet its population kept on increasing. The fast increasing population of ‘white-collar’ employees, or workers not involved in labour-intensive or blue-collar work, experienced hardly any opportunities for the realisation of their growing aspirations and hopes and, in the middle of a failing economy, ethnic conflict between indigenous Armenians and Azeris were returning. In an effort to solve the failing condition of Azerbaijan, Haydar Aliyev, an ex-General in the Committee for State Security or KGB, was assigned First Secretary of the CPA in 1969. Aliyev was successful in briefly reducing the economic crisis, and proposed other industries besides petroleum. Moreover, Aliyev brought together the leaders of the republic—the ‘nomenklatura’—which was at the moment mostly made up of indigenous Azeris. Aliyev was then assigned to the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1982, the grandest position in the Soviet empire ever to be given to an Azeri. By this time, Aliyev was already able to negotiate successfully a path between those demanding reforms and the elements of the status quo. A major political movement occurred in 1988, with an aggressive revival of ethnic conflict, which focused on petitions for the union of Nagornyi Karabakh—a non-coastal area in South Caucasus—with Armenia. The crisis exposed the limitations of the CPA, incapable of serving as the defender of national security, welfare, and interests and, at the same time, political and action groups, and an independent press started to form. The biggest of these groups was the Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA), which by 1989 had carried out a large-scale attack in Baku and appeared ready to seize control from the weakening Communist Party. Rather, though, the PFA suffered from conflict between its moderate and conservative-Islamic groups. This conflict came along with an eruption of anti-Armenian movement in Baku, and the consequent response of Soviet military in 1990. These occurrences increased the crisis in the PFA, particularly when several of its leaders were captured and imprisoned. In the meantime, the CPA seemed to be going through a renewal under Ayaz Niyaz oglu Mutalibov, its newly appointed First Secretary, and won roughly 80 per cent of the positions in the parliamentary elections. But for the very first time, these election outcomes resulted in public allegations of electoral misconduct. After the unsuccessful coup détat in Moscow in 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan, which was ruled by the ‘nomenklatura’, declared the republic’s independence, in spite of Mutalibov’s early proclamation of support for forces trying to unseat Mikhail Gorbachev—the Soviet President. The CPA was then disbanded after the granting of independence, even though most of the CPA members kept their jobs in the government offices. In spite of pressures to step down, Mutalibov remained unchallenged in the 1991 elections to the headship of the new Republic of Azerbaijan. Being the Head of State, he received numerous complaints for his inability to boost the national military, which was needed to fight Armenian raids or attacks to Azerbaijan lands throughout the Nagornyi Karabakh crisis. In a move that brought in a new phase in the political rise of the PFA, Mutalibov was pushed by the parliament to step down in 1992. After a short-lived and failed effort to regain power, Mutalibov transferred to Russia and began carrying out plans intended to regain his position. Abulfaz Elchibey replaced Mutalibov as PFA’s head, and became the first popularly or democratically elected President of Azerbaijan. A political advocate with no experience in running a government, Elchibey expressed more definitely than other public personalities of Azerbaijan the nation’s traditional interests and hopes, the major objectives of which were the building of connections with the Azeri people throughout the Iranian border; the creation of stronger relationship with the West, especially Turkey; and gaining freedom from the tight hold of Russia. Elchibey tried to achieve these goals, simply to discover that they come with huge difficulties and costs. The PFA regime failed to recover control in the Nagornyi Karabakh crisis, wherein Azerbaijan’s army sustained serious losses in 1993. Overall damages and costs would equal to a large portion of the country’s land, and the crisis severely affected a huge number of people. Also, the intelligentsia or educated elite from the PFA was also not able to govern the state while ignoring or disrespecting the ‘nomenklatura’. The PFA failed to achieve structural change, mostly due to inadequate manpower. The PFA and its partner, the modified Musavat party, could bring in only a handful of replacements for the 5,000 executive posts, often individuals with no sufficient administrative experience. The foreign policy of Elchibey placed emphasis on the reconciliation with Turkey and the pulling out of Azerbaijan from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1992, while his publicly expressed worries about the cultural privileges and liberties of ethnic Azeris stirred doubts in Iran. In an effort to restore the petroleum industry, the regime negotiated with Western businesses, finally agreeing on joint access to offshore resources and on foreign investments, a move that angered Russia. Rumours of a military coup détat in 1993, initiated by Col Surat Husseinov of Gyanja—commander of the Azerbaijani army in the Nagornyi Karabakh crisis—pushed Elchibey to abandon Baku, without officially resigning from his post. Afterwards the Milli Majlis—the current legislature—decided to bring the President to court and handover the authority of Elchibey to Haydar Aliyev, who was the parliamentary Chairman at the time. Husseinov’s army reached Baku after several days, expressing his support and loyalty to Aliyev, who was elected as Azerbaijan’s president in the 1993 election. Political disorder had become a central characteristic of post-Soviet Azerbaijan, and had already witnessed “three presidents, two acting Presidents and one successful coup détat” in its initial period of existence. A state of stability came back with the centralisation of power during Aliyev’s term, even though he, as well, would have to deal with several planned and unsuccessful coup détat. The Aliyev Regime: Renewing the Republic of Azerbaijan In 1993, the centralisation of power in the hands of Aliyev implies several points. Primarily, it implies reclaiming power over the state, and, thus, reclaiming a structure of control over the unofficial power structures—Azerbaijan’s established functional, regional, and economic interest groups. In addition, the centralisation implies the bringing back of a power imbalance or monopoly by getting rid of untrustworthy forces in the structure that could endanger the position of Aliyev. The next component was removing the biggest disruption to the process of state building, the conflict with Armenia, which had ended the rule of Mutalibov and Elchibey. Centralisation also implies creating an official power structure, namely, the constitutional bases of political authority such as political parties, a parliament, and a constitution. Ultimately, it means endorsing and establishing power overseas, or, gaining the approval of the West, the international community, and the country’s neighbours. John Willerton, talking about the appointment of Aliyev to rule Soviet Azerbaijan in 1969, argued that “Aliyev’s selection signalled the application of a particular set of solutions to the stagnating republic: a set of solutions grounded in the reestablishment of discipline within the hierarchy of party and state bodies.” If this statement had been about the 1993 return of Aliyev, it would have been just as factual. But in this case, the Soviet was absent and Aliyev was bound or obliged to no one for his authority. Yet if Aliyev emerged in a weakening Soviet state in 1969, he was ruling a failing newly independent republic in 1993. On these two instances, given the existing problems or weaknesses, Aliyev’s main concern was to restore an active republic that generates economic development and social order. The limitations on both instances were clear and, furthermore, similar: in the economic and political sector of Azerbaijan, influential informal structures, allegiances, and institutions were similarly important as formal economic and political institutions. This fact may be traced centuries ago—czarist authorities in the 19th century had experienced huge difficulties in their attempt to get rid of regionalism and hidden motives of opposing khanates; from 1980 to 1920, the First Republic had experienced the problem of dealing with the power and influence of the major landlords; Soviet Azerbaijan was given an unpleasant reputation, because of the strength of regional connections and informal kinship that were preserved during the communist regime and crept into the most important institutions of the Soviet society. By 1969, these ties had successfully stopped the growth and development of Azerbaijan. However, in 1969, Aliyev rose to power with a clear instruction to eliminate widespread negligence, malpractice, mismanagement, nepotism, and corruption that had reduced Azerbaijan into the poorest Soviet republic. Aliyev implemented these reforms by removing state institutions, occupying powerful positions with individuals whose allegiance he completely relies on. In numerous instances these were individuals with managerial knowledge and experience, or individuals he had personally managed in Nakhichevan, or, similar to him, individuals with background in security positions. Furthermore, individuals in powerful posts were often replaced operationally and geographically to discourage them from forming personal turfs that would defy or compete with the state’s effectiveness and established allegiance to Aliyev. Generally, Aliyev formed his own support system to replace the previous; yet he created a support system that is efficient and produced political order and economic growth. The system was surprisingly successful that Aliyev was appointed to the most powerful positions in the Soviet Union. In 1993, the mission was to revive the main functions of political institutions in a deteriorating republic where the arrival of market economics lacking institutional limits was quickly forming an uncontrollable corruption. This implied making the government responsible for the delivery of the main services of statehood to the people, and to claim power over state institutions. The economy was not performing well in 1993 compared to the economic performance in 1990, and government authorities were not well compensated. Such facts implied that the resources needed to create a productive, honest, and professional state were obviously missing, as was qualified personnel with updated skills and knowledge. Corruption was a reality and deeply rooted, and does not go away easily. It had to be controlled. Aliyev’s method was a modified form of his earlier, proven approach to authoritarian government, bringing together the demands of a modern state and the elements of informal power structures. This meant forming a support structure that truly strengthened the formation of a state, instead of weakening the state by promoting disorder. Simply put, corruption had to be accepted or even allowed but also regulated—chaotic and unmanageable corruption had to be eliminated and replaced by a type of regulated, organised, feudal-like ties. The most important idea at this point is control. In a weakened economy, corruption is a tool that the government cannot do without in terms of keeping the state in order. Without allegiances rooted in submission to the law or ideology, and with no funds or wealth to provide for the salary of officials they can get by on, corruption becomes an acceptable practice and a means to keep the loyalty of the power agencies and influential group, a need if the authority of the ruler is to be protected. In several regards, this pattern is similar to a feudal structure, wherein the ruler gives specific economic positions to a government official or elite in order to gain their allegiance and support. Obviously, the main task is how to transform a structure dominated by informal handovers of power and resources into a system in which such practices are formally established and guaranteed under the law. In 1993, Aliyev brought back the presently broken up power structure he had created in the 1970s, which rested in his personal influence and broad knowledge of the people, officials, and the country. Several measures were carried out on the path towards independence that contributed to the creation of the needed bases of sentiments and knowledge for the state. Azeri people who presently live in different countries and were strong defenders of the concept of independence were often asked to visit Azerbaijan. Certain value and attention was given to protecting the country’s culture and history. During this period, numerous literature and history written in Azeri quickly multiplied. The state gave prizes and recognition to these works and hence the national sentiment was raised and the citizens developed self-esteem and pride. In the 1970s, the Azeri people were once more capable of walking in the side streets of their cities with pride for the first time ever since Azerbaijan’s capital was recovered in 1918 from opponents by the Caucuses Muslim Army. All of these were important historical episodes for the citizens of the country. As declared by Aliyev, “It is true. 22 years ago we did not know that Azerbaijan was going to be an independent state. However at that very time, I was living with the idea of Azerbaijan’s freedom.” The promotion of Aliyev in 1982 to a high position in Moscow can be attributed to his important status with the Soviet Union in general, his amazing intellect, his abilities as a political ruler and his aspiration to witness Soviet rule all over the Muslim world. In contrast, as was reported in the foreign media, it may have been the plan of the Soviet to take Aliyev away from Azerbaijan and take him closer to Moscow, because throughout Aliyev’s term, the movement of Azerbaijan for total independence was sensed in Moscow. Making sure that he is kept under control will prevent the path to independence. With regard to the Azeri successors of Aliyev, they were not able to advance the country’s aspirations towards independence, and actually, Azerbaijan started to decline. Michael Gorbachev believed that the Soviet Union’s Muslim Turkish republics had attained too much independence under the leadership of Brezhnev, and hence made a decision to remove several of the leaders from their positions, hence disciplining the citizens of these republics. It was through this that Aliyev was taken out of his position. Azerbaijan plunged into a crisis after Aliyev left office. The unjustified land claims of Armenia resulted in military assaults, as well as intrusion in the local industry of Azerbaijan. Azeris who had inhabited their native lands in Armenia were banished and immigrated to other countries. This led to the anti-Turkish sentiment in Armenia. Azerbaijan lacked the superiority or power to surpass all of these forces. In these conditions, a country requires effective political and state rulers. *** foreign relations In terms of foreign policy, Azerbaijan carried on the Western-based approach of the Elchibey administration, somewhat in response to the military assistance provided by Russia to Armenia, and somewhat because of its ties with the global petroleum industry and evolving trade practices, which were backing off from total dependency on the Russian economy. This approach has been an issue of general agreement between the opposition groups and the government. In spite of expanding economic relations with the United States, mutual ties were hindered by the adoption implementation of the Freedom Support Act in 1993, which prohibited aid or support from American government, in reaction to the economic barrier initiated by Azerbaijan against Armenia. Yet, US President George W. Bush disapproved the policy in 2002, in recognition of the support of Azerbaijan for the attempts of the U.S. to fight global terrorism, after the far-reaching 9/11 terrorist attacks on two major U.S. cities. In relation to the Nagornyi Karabakh crisis, which, with its consequences, had become the main concern influencing the foreign policy of Azerbaijan, questionable peace discussions occurred under the supervision of the ‘Minsk Group’ of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and at conventions of the Armenian and Azerbaijani political leaders. Suggestions for a solution hesitated between giving back the territory to Azerbaijan, with greater self-government, or creating a ‘common state’ of Nagornyi Karabakh and Azerbaijan, a measure that the government of Azerbaijan did not agree on. Similarly, there was agreement on the importance of protecting Russia’s support, which was still the main geopolitical power in the region, an important trading ally and a source for the growing labour migration. The relationship of Azerbaijan with the Russian Federation strengthened under Vladimir Putin’s presidency. In 2002, Russia approved a bilateral demarcation treaty with Azerbaijan, and it also moderated its resistance to the building of the planned Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, alongside the unstated reinforcement of Western involvement in the region. Generally, the reformed political setting characterised by US-Russian reconciliation after 2001 produced conducive circumstances for the foreign policy of Azerbaijan, released from the need to sustain a delicate balance between Russia and the U.S.In the Middle East, the ties of Azerbaijan with its immediate neighbours, Turkey and Iran, was of special value. Ties with Turkey were always strong, whereas relations with Iran were more complicated; in fact, disagreement between Iran and Azerbaijan over the splitting up of the Caspian seabed nearly gave way to a fierce conflict in 2001. Nevertheless, a later progress in relations was verified by the long-anticipated state visit of President Aliyev to Iran in 2002, wherein the leaders of both countries decided that they must build stronger ties. Azerbaijan’s Economy since 1969 After 1991-- the year independence was restored-- Azerbaijan started to understand its independent liberties in the economic sector and to carry out autonomous programme. The primary goals of this programme are structuring of the economy according to various kinds of property, taking part in the global economy, and shifting to market economy. With regard to the economy, the period after independence can be categorised into two major stages: the years between 1991 and 1995 were marked by economic recession and disorder; 1996 onwards is characterised by active economic growth and macroeconomic strength. Compared to the Russian Federation and the other ex-Soviet states, Azerbaijan witnessed economic changes much later, and the speed of reform was quite gradual, hindered by resistance from vested interests and political limitations. Almost all prices were liberalized in 1992, even though prices of utility and energy stayed subsidised up to 1995. Except for housing, no privatisation plan was carried out during that period, when policy was approved allowing the selling of state-owned companies. In 1996, small businesses, like service companies and factories, were mostly bought by private entities. In 1997, a programme of mass distribution of coupons was initiated, to speed up the privatisation of medium-sized companies. In early 2000, majority of small businesses were found in the private sector, yet thousands of medium-sized and bigger state companies stayed in the state domain. These paved the way to the important portion of the subsequent stage of the privatisation agenda, which started in 2000, but there was intense debate over the process of privatisation for these companies, and additional phases in the programme were frequently postponed. At first, President Aliyev was doubtful of global financial organisations, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but was pressured to ask for their assistance to cope with the ‘hyperinflation’ and increasing fiscal deficits from 1993 to 1994. Aliyev entered into a contract with the IMF in 1994 that offered a US $170 million credit capacity and suggested a large-scale structural reform programme. The high capacity of Azerbaijan as a natural gas and petroleum exporter led to a somewhat relaxed or complacent approach to economic planning in the 1990s. Even though there was significant progress in the stabilisation of the monetary and fiscal sectors after 1996, there was almost no important structural change to the economy. Large industrial facilities stayed under the supervision and ownership of the state, and the economy was governed by a selected few with connections to political leadership. Azerbaijan was already regulating two different economies by 2002. Economic operations in relation to the petroleum industry were distinguished by sizeable foreign investment, and growing income. On the contrary, the non-petroleum sector was hardly lucrative, generated little or no profit and investment, and required financial support from the government. Consequently, there was pervasive unemployment, underemployment, and poverty in the non-petroleum arena, especially at the outer rim of Baku. If substantial petroleum exports were attained, Azerbaijan appeared likely to experience rapid growth in wealth as an outcome of progress in the exportation of natural resources. In 1995, the government proclaimed substantial cutbacks in public spending, as well as reductions in social expenditure, the removal of subsidies from inefficient industries, and stabilisation of wage rates in the public domain. Such macroeconomic policies were effective in reducing inflation: From an annual average rate of 1.664% in 1994 to 3.7% in 1997, and deflation of 0.8% and 8.5% was recorded in 1998 and 1999, respectively. The rate of inflation reached 1.8% in 2000 and 1.5% in 2001. Inflation was expected to increase in the short term, as the rapid development of the petroleum industry was expected to increase employment and, consequently, wage demand. As the outcome of visionary rule and thorough operations of Aliyev, major outcomes were attained in the areas of economic and social growth and integration into the global economy, despite adverse early situations. One of the primary objectives of Aliyev during the 1990s was productive utilisation and redistribution of the income from abundant oil and gas grants. In 1999, Aliyev implemented the policy encouraging partnership with global firms in this industry. Furthermore, so as to redirect the income from oil exports to the important economic sectors and vital economic and social programmes, the State Oil Fund was formed. At the time, international agencies assess favourably the operations of Oil Fund and its being transparent. At the start of economic revival, Azerbaijan did not have needed infrastructure for oil exportation. Thus in 1996 the country entered into a contract allowing its oil exports thru the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline. The oil and gas industry greatly contributed to the expansion of other economic sectors. Planned economic programme resulted in sustainable economic development and macroeconomic strength, which led to policies focusing on the improvement of social services. Azerbaijan had been accepted by almost all international agencies, such as the Asian Development Bank, Islam Development Bank, World Bank, and the IMF. The primary objectives and requirements of economic and social policy programme, which is carried on effectively and enhanced by Ilham Aliyev, current President of Azerbaijan, is to transition to market economy and to expand the national economy, which has the capacity to grow and become a major global economic player. The new phase tries to raise the competitive level of the national economy, guaranteeing a stable economic and social progress in the country, and successful integration into the global economic structures. Ilham Aliyev has explained the activities which are vital for the attainment of this objective in his economic strategy statements. These specifically involve the bolstering and effective use of the economic capacity of the country, as well as poverty alleviation, growth of oil-independent sectors, comprehensive and effective use of the capacity of every area in the country, the creation of favourable factors for the establishment of private businesses, upgrading social welfare, and so on. Ilham Aliyev effectively and positively carried it on, sped it up, and made it sustainable for the future of the Azerbaijani people. From 2004 to 2013, three 5-year plans on socioeconomic growth were completed in Azerbaijan so as to put into effect wide-ranging and sustainable processes focused on economic expansion. The State Programme on Reliable Food Supply to the Population in the Republic of Azerbaijan, the State Programme for Poverty Reduction and Economic Development in the Republic of Azerbaijan, the State Programme on Socioeconomic Development of the Regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and several local development plans have been supported and are productively and efficiently on-going. Conclusions Azerbaijan experienced a long, arduous struggle towards independence. The contemporary history of Azerbaijan comprises an important factor—the conflict between the country and Armenia. During the 1960s, the country was the poorest of the entire Soviet empire in terms of economic performance and development. Still, the country gained its independence in 1991. Under the presidency of Heydar Aliyev, the country’s economic and political institutions started to improve and thrive. Aliyev brought together the leaders of the republic—the ‘nomenklatura’—which was at the moment mostly made up of indigenous Azeris; an, additional oil and natural gas reservoirs were unearthed and building was initiated on the oil and gas pipelines which presently trade resources from Azerbaijan. Most importantly, in 1969, Aliyev rose to power with a clear instruction to eliminate widespread negligence, malpractice, mismanagement, nepotism, and corruption that had reduced Azerbaijan into the poorest Soviet republic. Aliyev formed his own support system to replace the previous; yet he created a support system that is efficient and produced political order and economic growth. The system was surprisingly successful that Aliyev was appointed to the most powerful positions in the Soviet Union. Because of these remarkable contributions, Aliyev is now considered one of the most important political icons in the history of Azerbaijan. Works Cited Read More