Maos Cult of Personality - Essay Example

Section/# Mao’s Cult of Personality To many Western observers, a cult of personality, akin to the way in which certain dictators have been viewed within nations such as the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, and others, is a distinctly foreign and curious situation/activity. Nevertheless, these cults of personality have a definitive impact on the way in which individuals view their leadership and ultimately come to define themselves based upon the norms of behavior, action, and thought that these cults of personality represents. Although it might be tempting to understand that a cult of personality is ultimately perpetrated by a single individual and focused solely upon their own representation, it is more likely and often the case that cults of personality are indicative of an entire structure and therefore involve many more individuals than a single leader. As a function of this particular analysis, the following discussion will be concentric upon the cult of personality surrounding Mao Tse Tung and the means by which this cult of personality was able to assist the People’s Republic of China, and specifically the Chinese Communist Party, in solidifying their grip on power during the period of the cultural Revolution (approximately 1966 to 1976). Further, it is the distinct hope of this student that the following analysis will be beneficial in discussing how the Cultural Revolution was able to take place and the means by which identity was formulated through this particular cult of personality. As a means of framing this particular issue, it must be understood that Mao Tse Tung’s cult of personality was not something that was evident from the time he came into power as the Chairmen of the People’s Republic of China. Although doubtless revered within the Communist Party, and amongst the people of China, there did not exist a mechanism or state-sponsored cult of personality for the leader up until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Essentially, this cult of personality was born out of a direct need. As a direct result of the Great Leap Forward, Chinese industry, the row, and communist identity had been significantly reduced (Márquez, 2010). Whereas the Great Leap Forward had been designed as a means of rapidly transforming the People’s Republic of China into a modern industrialized society, the ultimate end result of this failed policy was mass starvation, economic difficulty, and disastrous collectivized nation that failed to produce the required quotas of goods that leadership demanded. For instance, realizing that the Soviet Union was able to successfully implement five-year plans and rapidly develop their infrastructure and industrial base, the People’s Republic of China, under the leadership of Chairman Mao, believed that it could perform the very same tasks (Aijmer, 1996). Therefore, within a very limited timeframe, Chairman Mao indicated that the Great Leap Forward would be used as a means of doubling or even tripling the output of industry that existed within the nation. Naturally, these were lofty goals; however, the overall potential of the existence of skilled workers, existing infrastructure, and the sourcing of raw materials to make this a reality was immediately an impediment to achieving these goals. In many cases, unskilled laborers, oftentimes farmers, were collectivized and expected to produce hundreds of thousands of tons of steel per year. This obviously disastrous policy resulted in a situation in which many individuals resorted to backyard steel manufacturing as a means of fulfilling the quotas (Parker, 2010). As can obviously be seen, the lack of collectivized nation, even within the planet collectivized nation, caused an inherent loss of efficiency and produced extraordinarily low-quality goods. As a direct result of the forced collectivized nation that was occurring all around the nation, the overall potential for the existing economy to continue to provide for its inherent needs, specifically the need for food, was realized (Schram, 1967). Not surprisingly, famine and hardship soon came to be experienced within the People’s Republic of China; due as a direct result to the failed policy of the greatly forward. As any scholar of government or international relations will be quick to point out, period of extraordinary economic hardship are those in which a given leader or political structure is at its most vulnerable. Recognizing this, Chairman Mao directed the Communist Party to establish a new series of reforms that would solidify his power and continue the development of China; albeit on a slightly different path. As the hardships of the great leap forward that impact upon the outlook for the individual Chinese peasant, Chairman Mao was in a distinctly difficult situation (Paltiel, 1983). Firstly, the great leap forward had to be ended so that economic recovery and development within the Chinese economy could take place. Secondly, it was necessary not to stipulate that the great leap forward had been a failure; as this might necessarily will that Chairman Mao and the Communist Party were doing the right thing for the People’s Republic of China. Thirdly, it was necessary to solidify the base of support that the Chinese Communist Party, and Chairman Mao, could draw upon. Essentially, a dictatorship, such as was exhibited within the People’s Republic of China, was only as effective as it held on to the belief and will of the populace that their leader, and leadership, were ultimately making the right decisions and moving China into the future. It is within this particular paradigm of understanding that the cult of personality was affected. Beginning soon after the failure of the great leap forward, Chairman Mao’s cult of personality came to reach astronomical levels. However, rather than describing and defining this cult of personality is nothing more than egoism or arrogance, the analyst should instead understand that the cult of personality was built upon the fundamental need to consolidate power – rather than fulfilling the abject desire of a selfish leadership structure that wish to see its image and missives represented at all levels of society (Leese, 2007). Accordingly, the actual goal of this cult of personality was to create a connection or a symbol of relevance to the individual worker and stakeholder within the Chinese society. Essentially, the Communist Party, and Chairman Mao, came to understand that the connection between the individual worker and the party itself was coming undone. As a direct result of economic hardships, famines, deaths, and consternation, the will of the Chinese populace to continue to support further changes was significantly reduced; at least as compared to the willingness that might have been exhibited prior to the Great Leap Forward. Further, it should not be understood that Chairman Mao’s cult of personality was directed towards each demographic equally. Although in a perfect world the framers of Chairman Mao’s cult of personality would have desired it to have impacted upon each and every stakeholder within China equally, it ultimately was directed most specifically to the youth. Realizing the fact that the use of the nation had the potential to carry on the revolution and further Chairman Mao’s goals to a more specific degree, at least as compared to the older generation, the Red Guards and other organizations wholeheartedly engaged with the cult of personality that was provided to them at the behest of the communist power. Within this cult of personality, massive displays, sculptures, photos, and quotations of Chairman Mao were represented to the populace in a variety of different formats (Barme, 1996). Motion pictures utilize this cult of personality as a means of informing the individual and making them grateful for all of the “abundance” that Chairman Mao had been able to bring to the nation. Placards and posters were provided ad nauseum to individuals within more rural regions and displayed prominently on the bus terminals, public buildings, and nearly every other imaginable location. Newspapers, and even periodicals and magazines that were directly control or sponsored by the People’s Republic of China or the Chinese Communist Party also prominently displayed statements and propaganda that directed the nation to be appreciative to “the great leader, the great supreme commander, the great teacher, and/or the great helmsman” (Landsberger, 1996). Furthermore, the youth were further engaged via the educational process; utilizing books and core curriculum as a means of turning the devotion and cult of personality even further towards Chairman Mao. Even entertainment that had no political focus, such as dances or traditional singing, were prefaced by individuals holding massive quotes on stage illustrating Mao’s words with respect to the importance of continuing the communist struggle and/or extolling him as some certain superlative (Cheek, 2002). The inherent and continual focus upon the youth of the nation is an element of Chairman Mao’s cult of personality that bears further consideration (Lago, 1999). Unrealistic and unimaginable feats of endurance and physical prowess were represented cheap to use, both within school and in terms of entertainment that was directed at them, that extolled the virtue and exceptional nature of Chairman Mao. One such story told of a 72-year-old Chairman Mao swimming 9 miles along the Yangtze River; both in terms of an enjoyable activity and in terms of exhibiting the greatness and power that communism and Chairman Mao was able to exhibit amongst his own people (Barme, 1993). Another directional focus of the cult of personality necessarily had is in terms of the full mobilization of society. Recognizing the damage that had been done in the overall potential for lack of trust that existed within Chinese society, the need for full mobilization and increasing the opportunity for full inefficiency in production was an essential element that the cult of personality had at its root core (Buck, 2013). Furthermore, extolling the virtues of Mao also serves to solidify what helps to define Chinese communism as compared to the way in which communism was defined elsewhere throughout the world. In building a model communist society, founded upon Leninist doctrine and ideology, Mao, and the Chinese Communist Party for that matter, faced an uphill struggle in defining the People’s Republic of China as compared to many other regions throughout the world (Kusnetzky, 2013). Accordingly, by eliciting and encouraging a cult of personality amongst the populace, the means by which Chairman Mao could be defined in tandem with Chinese communism serve as a powerful tool and model by which the nation was encouraged to develop (Bendix, 1967). Naturally, many of these developmental determinations and definitions of communism faded soon after the death of Chairman Mao; however, the cult of personality that endured was partially captured and continually promoted up until the mid-1980s (Walden, 2012). From the information that is thus far been provided, it is clear and apparent that the cult of personality exhibited around Chairman Mao was much more than a lust and desire for emulation and hero worship. Although it is doubtless true that the overall level of power that Chairman Mao, and those within Chinese leadership, exhibited served as a means of corrupting the ultimate message that they hoped to provide to the people, the true nature of Mao cult of personality that has been the focus of this particular analysis is in attempting to reestablish the legitimacy and trust of the people after the horrendous failures that were exhibited in terms of the great leap forward other failed policies of development during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Furthermore, it should also be understood that even though the cult of personality which has been the focus of this brief essay was intended to engage each and every stakeholder within China, the specific focus that it had was on the youth. This was of course done in the understanding that the youth of the nation were those that were most likely to carry on the communist struggle and encourage older individuals to have faith in the process and to promote the ideology and approach that Chairman Mao most wish to have affected. Without the participation and engagement of the youth, is doubtful that the Cultural Revolution, or indeed the cult of personality, could ever have become as powerful determinants in Chinese history as they have become. Bibliography Aijmer, G 1996, Political Ritual Aspects of the Mao Cult During the Cultural" Revolution". China Information, 11(2-3), 215-231. Barmé, G. (1993). History for the Masses. Using the Past to Serve the Present, 260-285. Barmé, G 1996, Shades of Mao: the posthumous cult of the great leader. ME Sharpe. Bendix, R 1967, Reflections on charismatic leadership. Asian Survey, 341-352. Buck, D 2013, How Could the Great Helmsman Hope to Steer with a Broken Rudder?, H-Net Reviews In The Humanities & Social Sciences, pp. 1-3, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost, viewed 7 November 2014. Cheek, T 2002, Mao Zedong and Chinas revolutions: a brief history with documents. Macmillan. Kusnetzky, L 2013, Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in Chinas Cultural Revolution, Journal Of Asian Studies, 72, 1, pp. 179-180, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost, viewed 7 November 2014. Lago, FD 1999, Personal Mao: Reshaping an icon in contemporary Chinese art. Art Journal, 58(2), 46-59. Landsberger, S 1996, Mao as the Kitchen God Religious Aspects of the Mao Cult During the Cultural Revolution. China Information, 11(2-3), 196-214. Leese, D 2007, The Mao Cult as Communicative Space, Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions, 8, 3/4, pp. 623-639, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost, viewed 7 November 2014. Márquez, X 2010, A Model of Cults of Personality, Conference Papers -- American Political Science Association, pp. 1-33, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost, viewed 7 November 2014. Paltiel, J 1983, The cult of personality: Some comparative reflections on political culture in leninist regimes. Studies in comparative communism, 16(1), 49-64. Parker, S 2010, MAOS LAST COLLECTOR, Quadrant Magazine, 54, 4, pp. 46-49, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost, viewed 7 November 2014. Schram, SR 1967, Mao Tse-tung as a charismatic leader. Asian Survey, 383-388. Walden, G 2012, Deadly dances, Tls, 5700, p. 12, Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost, viewed 7 November 2014. Read More