Political Objectives of the Principal Participants of the 1991 Gulf War - Assignment Example

YOUR COLLEGE COVER SHEET HERE To what extent did the outcome of 1991 gulf war serve the political objectives of the principal participants? BY YOU YOUR SCHOOL INFO HERE DATE HERE ABSTRACT The question has been raised as to whether the outcome of the 1991 gulf war managed to serve the political objectives of principal participants in the campaign. Research has identified that the United States was the largest victor toward satisfying its objectives, including enhancing stability in the Mid East region, guaranteeing the security for Saudi Arabia and Israel who were important allies to the country, ensuring that Iraq could not achieve hegemony in the Middle East, and ensuring that oil supply was not challenged for developed nations in the international community. Iraq was the largest victim as it pertained to achievement of its own objectives, including sanctions which led to significant economic problems in the country, citizen poverty and starvation, and virtually complete isolation from the international community. Kuwait achieved socio-political stability by driving out the massive population of Palestinians in a nation where there has been significant tensions and mistrust between domestic citizens, government and the Palestinians. This essay identifies all victories and detriments to fulfilment of principal partner political objectives as a consequence of the 1991 Gulf War. To what extent did the outcome of 1991 gulf war serve the political objectives of the principal participants? Introduction The 1991 Gulf War encompassed a six week confrontation against Iraq by US-led coalition forces as a response to Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait. In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait which brought rapid condemnation stemming from many member countries of the United Nations who feared that growing economic strength of Iraq would destabilise the balance of power in the Middle East. In total, 34 different nations from around the world joined the joint military operations of the Gulf War or provided economic support for defeating Iraq’s objectives. The United Nations was growing substantially concerned that a Kuwaiti-controlling Iraq which was now threatening and antagonizing Saudi Arabia, a nation with significant geopolitical importance for its international oil supply, would give Saddam Hussein control over nearly all oil reserves in the region. Kuwait represented a strategic environment by which Iraq’s Hussein could strike against Saudi oil fields, which would threaten oil procurement and pricing throughout the developed world. Between 1980 and 1988, one of the longest wars of the 20th Century, Iraq had been at war with Iran which was motivated by border-related disputes. Saudi Arabia, which feared a growing hegemony within Iran, had loaned approximately $26 billion USD to Iraq in an effort to prevent the Shia in Iran from gaining significant political control. Iraq, which faced substantial economic problems resulting from this war and an inability to diversify its economy, felt that loans from Saudi Arabia should simply be forgiven as the eight year Iraq-Iran war ultimately served the political objectives of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, however, disagreed and continued to place pressure on Iraq to make repayment. Saddam Hussein, realising the severity of his nation’s economic woes, invaded Kuwait in order to give Iraq economic advantages that would be procured as a result of the rich oil reserves and production capacity enjoyed by Kuwait. The political objectives that served as justification for the 1991 Gulf War, supported by 34 nations across the world, will be explored in this essay. Research identifies that the most primary objectives of the US-led coalition forces included exertion of military control over Iraq, an emerging power that sustained the ability to procure nuclear technologies, secure stability in the Persian Gulf, restore the legitimate government of Kuwait in an effort to promote Mid-East democracy, and ensure international access to affordable and accessible oil supply. This essay further examines whether the outcome of this six week Gulf War managed to successfully serve the political objectives of the principal participants in this war. Examining the political objectives of principal participants For Iraq, strained political relationships between Hussein’s nation and Kuwait served as the foundation for building tensions that occurred prior to the 1991 war. Alongside Saudi Arabia, Kuwait had loaned Iraq billions of dollars in an effort to prevent Iran from becoming the hegemonic leader in the Middle East. Iraq, convinced that the Iraq-Iran war had achieved this objective, was adamant that Kuwait completely forgive this debt. However, Kuwait would not pardon the $14 billion USD that had been loaned to finance this long war (Watson et al. 1991). Additionally, over-production of oil in Kuwait served as the most significant threat to Iraq’s economy. Throughout the majority of the 1980s, Kuwait maintained a production strategy that was substantially higher than the quotas established by OPEC which created a situation where crude oil prices would not increase. It was estimated that as a result of Kuwait’s oil production strategy, Iraq was losing approximately $14 billion USD each year. With Kuwait refusing to adjust its over-production ideology, Iraq was facing enormous national economic problems. With an inability to utilise diplomacy as a means of finding a mutually-rewarding compromise that would serve both Iraqi and Kuwaiti interests, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait after deploying approximately 100,000 military troops on the Iraq-Kuwait border (Friedman 1990). The 1991 Gulf War led by the United States ultimately deposed Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. However, in the seven month period where Iraq maintained dominance over the Kuwaiti government, Saddam Hussein was able to plunder substantial wealth held by the Kuwaiti royal family who had been forced out of the nation as a result of Hussein’s successful annexation campaign. During the period where Iraq controlled Kuwait, Hussein had implemented his scorched earth campaign which managed to destroy 70 percent of Kuwaiti oil wells in the nation. Hence, as a principal participant in the 1991 Gulf War, the outcome of this conflict managed to serve Hussein’s political objectives. Even as late as 2010, Kuwait, which was liberated by the coalition forces in 1991, was still having problems rehabilitating the regions where Hussein’s forces had caused massive environmental damage in the scorched earth campaign (Calderwood 2010). Even though Hussein was ultimately driven out of Kuwait through the 1991 campaign against his nation, the damage caused to production capacity in Kuwait managed to insulate Iraq against the competitive petroleum industry in Kuwait which served his long-run political objectives that had induced the invasion of Kuwait. However, United Nations’ responses to Iraq after being deposed from Kuwait by the Gulf War coalition involved severe economic sanctions to ensure that Iraq would not become a hegemonic regime in the Middle East. These sanctions, underpinned by United Nations Resolution 661, included massive trade embargos, which included food and other important humanitarian supplies needed by the country’s population. Throughout the 1990s, the long-term effects of these sanctions created a situation of hyper-inflation in Iraq that put many of its citizens into poverty and hunger (Weiss et al. 1997). Resolution 661 restricted Iraq from exporting its domestic products to many UN member nations and prevented the sale of weaponry to the Iraqi government; as well as ensuring that the availability of finance to Iraq was severely restricted. When considering Iraq as a principal participant in the 1991 Gulf War, it should be recognised that Iraq’s political objectives were achieved in the short-term. However, the long-term strategies of United Nations member nations in an effort to punish and control Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait managed to severely cripple the Iraqi economy and opportunities to become a hegemonic force in the Middle East. Furthermore, Iraq’s destitution led to further aggressive behaviours in an effort to restore Iraq to global prominence and improve its severe economic woes which led to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in order to, once and for all, expel Saddam Hussein from the Iraqi government. Hence, in virtually every dimension, save for short-term economic gains as a result of restricting Kuwaiti oil production capability, Iraq’s political objectives were unsuccessful in reaching their fruition. The political objectives of the United States, however, were quite justified as a result of the 1991 Gulf War. The United States, as an ally to Israel, was growing increasingly concerned that a new and emerging Iraqi hegemony in the region threatened this alliance and the stability of Israel. Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, disputes over the legitimacy of Israel and Palestine creating conflicts and tensions in the Middle East. In fact, this sentiment was uttered by Saddam Hussein during his December 2006 execution when the ex-Iraqi dictator shouted, “Death to America! Death of Israel! Long live Palestine!” (Algemeiner 2013). During the dictator’s 2005 trial for his alleged crimes against humanity, archival tapes procured from Hussein’s archives provided proof that he was willing to order chemical attacks against Tel Aviv in the event of a threat or collapse of his regime. Hussein (and many other Arab leaders) maintained aggressive opinion about the United States and publicly chastised those nations who supported American ideologies. In 1990, prior to the invasion of Kuwait, Hussein stated, “The policies of some Arab rulers are American. They are inspired by America to undermine Arab security” (Ibrahim 1990). The close alliance and political ties between the United States and Israel underpinned Saddam’s hatred against Israel. Hence, as Saddam began to illustrate aggressive and threatening posture against Israel in 1990, slowing the military-based and economic-based enhancement of Iraq served as a threat to both the United States and its potent Israeli ally which maintained nuclear capability and economic advantages to the United States. Hence, removing Iraq from Kuwait substantially deconstructed the nation’s then-current and future military strength and economic power, hence allegedly stabilizing tensions in the Middle East. By ensuring that the economic and military powers in Iraq were restricted through this deposition effort, it guaranteed more control over Iraq as an aggressor toward Israel and, potentially, even the United States. In terms of guaranteeing more Mid-East security which protected the interests of the U.S. government, America’s political objectives toward this end were successfully met in the 1991 Gulf War. The long-run likelihood that Iraq, if left capable of becoming a hegemonic entity in the Middle East, would support the Palestinian movement would disrupt the integrity and security of the American-Israeli alliance. When considering the completeness of ensuring achievement of U.S. political objectives, there has been considerable debate about whether the U.S. was successful in allowing Hussein to survive the 1991 Gulf War. Shortly after being driven out of Kuwait, the United Nations had passed several resolutions which put pressure on Iraq to comply with weapons inspectors granted UN authority to ensure that Iraq was not developing weapons of mass destruction. Hussein, who was now crippled as a result of the outcomes of the 1991 Gulf War, accepted new UN Security Council resolution 687 which was designed to enforce destruction of all biological and chemical weapons in Iraq. Iraq was mandated to provide a report which declared all existing locations of biological and chemical weapons and illustrate routine willingness to submit to on-site UN inspections toward this end. These obligations were further secured by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The insinuation of UN Resolution 687 was that compliance to the agreement would be adopted by Iraq or that the nation would be compelled to obey by whatever force was necessary. Iraq, however, failed to comply with this agreement, leading to considerable speculation that Iraq was still actively pursuing technologies supportive of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the political objectives of the United States for ensuring that Iraq was not a continuing threat to Middle Eastern security were ineffectively met by the methodologies chosen in the Gulf War. By allowing Saddam Hussein to survive the coalition attacks, this dictator was allowed opportunities to, potentially and covertly, procure materials needed to produce further biological, nuclear and chemical weapons. Hussein did not fear chastisement or reprisal stemming from the United States or the United Nations for non-compliance to UN resolutions. Hence, in order to curb this alleged threat, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was mandated as a means of finally removing Hussein from power in the nation. This could have been accomplished with a more elongated campaign by coalition forces in the 1991 war, bringing more stability and security to the region. A reporter from The New York Times reported many U.S. soldiers who had been exposed to nerve gases and sulphur mustard that had been unleashed by Hussein in the 2003 campaign to remove him from power. Reports identified that over 5,000 chemical warheads had been found scattered throughout Iraq in this campaign (Scott 2014). By allowing Hussein to remain in power, it gave the leader nearly 13 years to continue developing biological and chemical weapons that ultimately caused health problems with American troops who were eventually exposed to these weapons in 2003. From a different perspective, it should be recognised that Saudi Arabia, prior to the 1991 war, had maintained a resistance for the United States maintaining a military presence on its soils (Sciolino 1991). However, after witnessing an uncertain build-up of Iraqi forces on the Saudi border, Saudi Arabia relented and gave the U.S. access to its many air bases, ports and other logistical infrastructure facilities. Without this access, the coalition forces would have likely been coerced to seek a different course of action than the one chosen for the Gulf War that could have allowed partial annexation of Kuwait to occur. Hence, by coalition Gulf War participants strengthening trust and diplomacy between coalition nations and Saudi Arabia, the outcomes of the war provided opportunities to enhance diplomatic relationships with this important geopolitical partner. Concern still lingered that Saudi Arabia could potentially be at-risk for future aggression from Iraq in an effort to control Mid East oil reserves. The Gulf War opened the proverbial doors for future alliances between the U.S., Saudi Arabia and other coalition nations involved in the war in an effort to maintain long-term stability in this region. It is likely, today, that the Saudi government would still be resistant to having U.S. forces (or other coalition forces) on its soil. As a consequence of this trust-building and enhanced diplomatic effectiveness between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, today, the two nations actively share information about global terrorism and other relevant global threats to security that would likely have not been achieved without the coalition built between the two nations in 1991. Kuwait, though its main political objective was to restore the legitimate government of the country and depose Iraqi forces, experienced satisfaction of one particular political objective as a result of the 1991 Gulf War. During the war and immediately afterward, over 400,000 Palestinians fled from the country as a result of ongoing Iraqi military force intimidations. Palestinians, during the conflict, were forced to exit their career positions by Iraqi forces or were victimized by ongoing food shortages in Kuwait. Prior to the Gulf War, Palestinians in Kuwait represented 20 percent of the total population. Tensions between domestically-borne Kuwaiti citizens and Palestinian citizens had always been troubled at best with hostilities often directed toward Palestinians in the country. Trust and misgivings with Palestinians were often dismissed as, once, the high volume of Palestinians in the country were strong economic contributors to Kuwaiti GDP, serving as a vital force in the service industries in the nation. However, after the Gulf War, the mass exodus of Palestinians allowed domestic Kuwait citizens to fill roles in the service industry, thus providing new career and business opportunities to Kuwaitis. The post-war atmosphere as Kuwait attempted to rebuild its economy increased hostility toward Palestinians who remained in the country after the war, intimidating them to leave the nation. Hence, a long-standing political objective of the Kuwaitis to remove Palestinian influence in the country was satisfied by the Gulf War. Offered one respected, retired member of the Kuwaiti Defence Ministry, “I think we should abolish this business of permanent residence for Palestinians. The only Palestinians who can stay here are the ones that are absolutely necessary” (Ibrahim 1991). After seven months of occupation by Iraq, and with Iraq serving as the driving force behind coercing mass exodus of Palestinians, Kuwait maintained an opportunity to improve the socio-political environment in the country and allow its own citizens new opportunities to sustain the services industries that drove economic strength in the country. A mass exodus of 20 percent of its previous population seems to have improved internal security as it pertains to tensions between Kuwait’s citizenry while also breaking down years of political suspicion against Palestinians that prevented the establishment of a cohesive social culture in the nation. In most developed nations, this type of social unity is paramount to the establishment of a national culture that works together for the common good of a country. Hence, even though the country faced short- and long-term problems that stemmed from Hussein’s annexation of Kuwait, socio-political objectives in the country were served effectively by driving out Palestinian influence in the country. When considering further political objectives in the United States, it should be recognised that there was some detriment to the successful fulfilment of such objectives pertaining to the Gulf War. Internally, from a social perspective, the United States government faced considerable chastisement and backlash for its use of force in the war and the expenditures for the campaign. The United States, a democratic nation state, often attempts to exert this ideology on other nations in its self-proclaimed efforts to promote liberty and peace. However, after the 1991 conflict, values and beliefs about the appropriateness of foreign wars divided the nation’s citizenry at the internal level. According to theorists, when there is not a consensus within a society, it becomes more and more difficult to achieve peaceful resolutions of differences in political ideology that is mandated by a true democratic process (Weingast 1997). Citizens in the United States who maintain legislative control over the democratic process staged many politically-motivated protests resultant of the Gulf War and challenged the effectiveness of wartime ideologies and objectives. When the U.S. announced military action against Iraq in 2003, the United States experienced significant citizen protests in major urban cities that openly and publicly challenged the George Bush administration who had declared war on Iraq in the final objective of removing Hussein from power in the country. These protests led to skirmishes with policing agencies and developed new anti-war organisations in the United States. Whilst the government of the U.S. attempted to illustrate that wartime actions against Iraq were designed to ultimately protect the American people, lingering consequences of the 1991 war continued to drive wedges that threatened the stability of the country’s democratic systems. Furthermore, NATO partners with close ties to the United States, such as Canada, Germany, France and Norway, vehemently opposed U.S. force in the 2003 campaign against Hussein, believing that significant achievements had already been accomplished in reducing the threat of hegemonic development in Iraq. The United Nations, as well, did not support the second Gulf War. The general international consensus as it pertained to the 2003 invasion of Iraq was that Iraq no longer posed a threat to international security and that international law could be enforced through the construction of continuing UN resolutions. Essentially, the 1991 Gulf War built the foundation for international community beliefs that future incursions into Iraqi territory would no longer be necessary utilising military actions, which threatened gaining positive ally sentiment about hegemonic ideologies and aggression that challenged foreign leadership. Hence, whilst many aforementioned political objectives had been served as a result of the 1991 Gulf War, the second war declared on Iraq in 2003 was challenged by the nation’s citizens and its many partners who had been instrumental in applying force on Hussein in 1991. Whilst the threat to oil supply and Mid East security had been blatant in 1991, which would have had consequences for virtually all developed nations with a vested interest in oil procurement from the Mid East, the second campaign was believed by many to be a wasteful and dangerous campaign. With all of the UN resolutions and sanctions imposed on Iraq as a direct outcome of the 1991 Gulf War developed to prevent further threat from Iraq, the general belief of many American citizens and international partners was that further wartime activity against Iraq was a violation of the peaceful agenda encompassing the core values of the United Nations. Hence, the 1991 Gulf War established a framework for controlling foreign national threats effectively which created socio-political dogma that challenged aggressive behaviours of the hegemonic United States. Backlash for engaging in the 2003 invasion in Iraq was met with considerable chastisement and anger, hence impacting diplomatic relationships with foreign partners and with citizens who control the democratic system in the United States. Conclusion As indicated by the research, whilst many principal participants in the 1991 Gulf War witnessed successful fulfilment of their political objectives, there were some drawbacks and detriments serving as consequences of the Gulf War. This essay explored many complex dimensions and outcomes of the Gulf War to examine the potential gains or disadvantages created as being principal participants in the 1991 Gulf War. In most instances, the political objectives of the United States were served effectively, ensuring greater Middle Eastern stability and security for the U.S. and many Arab states, controlling the threats that a strong Iraq could impose on the rest of the international community, and strengthening some diplomatic relationships in the process. However, the socio-political divisions created as a result of engagement with Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War disrupted the stability of the democratic society in the country and created challenge toward any future foreign war that would require taxpayer resources and human capital to wage successfully. Kuwait, as identified, secured an improvement of the socio-political condition in the nation as a result of driving out enormous numbers of Palestinians who were once instrumental to Kuwait’s service economy. In an environment where long-standing tensions between domestic citizens and Palestinians had built mistrust and lack of cohesion as a national culture, Kuwaiti resistance and influence in the Gulf War laid the foundation for restructuring the nation’s service economy and better servicing the social and cultural demands of the nation’s citizenry. Iraq, however, was the principal loser toward fulfilment of its political objectives as a result of setting the framework for war by annexing Kuwait and refusing to relinquish this hostile hold over the country. This principal participant, though able to achieve some economic improvements during its seven month occupation of Kuwait, managed to severely isolate itself from the rest of the international community, gained a series of economic sanctions that severely crippled financial stability in the country, and essentially made enemies of UN member nations who continued to exert pressure on Iraq for its alleged human rights violations and aggressive behaviours against Kuwait who was instrumental in maintaining fair and balanced oil prices for many developed nations that relied on oil imports to secure their own economic positions. Iraq, additionally, failed to intimidate Israel, Saudi Arabia or the United States through the invasion of Kuwait and resisting international pressure to make swift exit out of Kuwait. By challenging hostile forces intent on driving Iraq out of Kuwait, this country experienced hyperinflation that ultimately led to the starvation and poverty of its own citizens. Any nation that maintains a labour force that cannot afford quality of lifestyle and face recurring hunger and destitution cannot hope to establish a labour economy that provides economic benefit to the country. Furthermore, with an inability to export products, Iraq’s position as a global trade partner was destroyed as a result of initiating the foundation for the 1991 Gulf War, permanently crippling the nation’s ability to sustain its own interests and people. The 1991 Gulf War served to successfully liberate Kuwait from a hostile invasion force and, for Saudi Arabia, secured the stability of its oil production and export economy. By being a partner that allowed coalition forces to utilise its internal infrastructure to wage war on Iraq, its own political objectives were served in relation to ensuring national security and enhanced diplomatic relationships with the United States. 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Weiss, David Cortright, George Lopez and Larry Minear, Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions (UK: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997). Read More