Permanent Solution Democratic Republic of Congo - Essay Example

Permanent Solution Democratic Republic of Congo Permanent solution Democratic Republic of Congo: Autesserre (2008)’s recommendations Introduction The struggles to find regional peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been without significant success. Playing the major role, the regional politics, characterized by local antagonisms, opportunistic politicians and apparently unending local grievances, has presumably blinded all the efforts to bring peace especially in the Eastern provinces of DRC. Auteserre (2008), however, blames the strategies that have been in use by the various administrative regimes, international humanitarian observers, the Western governments and the local solution strategists. Instead of seeking long term solutions, Autesserre (2008) argues, these peace finders have only been making temporary peace trials after which conflicts emerge again. Their role has been to treat the wounds but not focusing on terminating the causative agents once and for all. Autesserre (2008), after providing a comprehensive history of wars and conflicts in the Eastern Provinces of Congo, suggests that permanent solutions can only be found if local antagonisms and grievances are addressed. Autesserre brings forward the view that those intervening have mistaken locally triggered turbulence as a national and or international issue whereof only humanitarian interventions for temporary healing of the casualties have been imposed. This paper attempts to argue in line Autesserre’s standing. The discussion critically addresses the nature of the problem in Congo – as explained by various authors – to estimate the truth in Autesserre’s suggestions. Later, the study defines what exactly the government of Congo needs to ensure local issues – as raised by Autesserre (2008) – are successful tools in pacifying Eastern Congo. The arguments are made in realization that, anyhow, there must be some solution, a unique solution (Yenyi, 2010). In the previous efforts to bring peace in the Congo, there have been various challenges and mammoth spending but in the end, the war starts all over again. It is obvious there are roots to the intermittent animosity that keeps recurring, much to the loss of many lives on a daily basis, loss of properties, misappropriation of natural resources, and the general deterioration of humanity. Therefore, all indications point to the prevalence of specific causes of violence that have never been addressed, or at least the wrong approaches have been in use. So the problem is extraordinary and as so, it will call for extraordinary measures as suggested in Autesserre findings (2008). Certainly, Autesserre’s idea is appealing, in this context. But one question stands stiff: are Autesserre’s suggestions practical, applicable and potentially effective? A comprehensive comparative analysis of the problems in Congo and the solutions thereof comprises this study, which helps to conclude on the effectiveness and feasibility of addressing local antagonism and local grievances as a measure to bring a long lasting peace in Eastern Congo. The nature of the conflicts in Eastern Congo The problems in Congo are complex: they are partially local and partially national. In other words, there are two perspectives; the regional and the national perspective. The problems also have the historical dimension making them more complex. The regional perspective It goes without saying that the major problem in Congo is and has been recurrent intertribal wars that have led to deaths of thousands of people. However, many nations of the world, international humanitarian organizations and other volunteer supranational bodies mistakenly believe that the whole of Congo is under siege. The fact is that it is only in the eastern Congo, specifically in large parts of four provinces – Katanga, Nord-Kivu, Orientale and Sud-Kivu provinces (the eastern provinces). The war has been a result of fight over ownership of land and other natural resources – in particular, minerals – in the eastern parts of Orientale province, large parts of northern Katanga province and in the whole of the two Kivu provinces. Land is the main source of livelihood as perceived by the tribes in these areas, besides sitting on huge mineral resources. Almost all the tribes in the eastern Congo are involved in these wars, or at least become casualties. However, the major battling group formations are defined by three categories: the Tutsi militias led by Laurent Nkunda, the Hutu militias and the Mai Mai militias. The Tutsi militias are unofficially supported by the Kagame’s Rwandan government and have been fighting both the Hutu and the Mai Mai militias. The Hutu militias began to fight the Tutsis in eastern Congo over ownership of land resources. The other tribe groupings organized themselves into a militia, the Mai Mai, who fight Nkunda’s Tutsi renegades. As Autesserre (2008) informs further, the three militias are not coherent either – there are constant intra-militia fights over mineral resources and provincial leadership. A good example is the Nord-Kivu’s Hutus and Nandes who have fought each other over provincial leadership. The national perspective According to International Business Publications (IBP, 2011), at the national arena, it is the kind of the prevalent political landscape that determines the solutions attainability. The image of the current President Joseph Kabila’s government, regionally and internationally, is defined by the efforts the government puts to alleviate the tension in the eastern Congo. Kabila’s government currently sides with a combination of the Mai Mai and the Hutu militias who fight against the Nkunda’s Tutsi renegades (Tull, 2007; Autesserre, 2008). Similarly, the Ugandan, Rwandan and Burundi governments reportedly support Nkunda’s group, a group seen as a thorn by the Congolese government (Autesserre, 2008). The result of this concoction is more and more heated battles whereof the casualties’ numbers keep rising (Yenyi, 2010). While thousands of people die per every warring season, their properties destroyed, scores displaced and huge chunks of resources are lost, it is the national image that suffers. The international community perceives Congo as a failed state already and while the eastern parts of Congo keep fighting, the rest of the country becomes thus polarized. The historical dimension The tensions so described above, of land ownership, political regional leadership and the control over various resources, have had its roots in history. The local grievances and the root causes of the recurrent wars over these resources are based on historical injustices. For example, the origin of the so stubborn ethnic clashes began by the relocation of the Hutus and the Tutsis from Rwanda to the eastern parts of today Congo in the early years of the 20th century (Tull, 2007; Autesserre, 2008). Again, at around the middle of the 20th century, the political turbulences that were hitting on Rwanda led to additional Tutsi Fleeing from Rwanda into the eastern Congo. The Tutsi in the eastern part of Congo now own huge chunks of land (Oppong & Woodruff, 2007; Dagne, 2011). Local tribes began complaining that these land resources, currently owned by the Tutsi were their ancestors’ and that they had all ancestral rights to inherit the lands. They claim that, at least, no one among the Tutsis that bought land in this region, nor was there anyone who sold the land to the Tutsis (Autesserre, 2008). The entrenchment of historical injustices in the war tensions in the eastern part of Congo makes the situation complex such that there has not been easy, quick and effective solution (Hammerstad, 2003). As described here, first, there are intra-militia wars, second, there are inter-militia wars, third, the Congo government takes sides, fourth, there are issues of historical injustices to address, and fifth, the image of the Congolese government is tainted internationally and the eastern neighbors support the Tutsi renegades (Autesserre, 2008). At this score, Autesserre (2008) promotes a long term solution as indicated above. The following will be a discussion of the possibility of what Autesserre proposes, plus some of the recommendations he (Autesserre) puts across. Discussing key suggestions by Autesserre (2008) Autesserrre (2008) believes in the remedy beginning from the ground then up the ladder to the national and international level. Remedying from the ground means addressing local issues that have led to the bloated tension between the fighting militias. Tull (2007), Autesserre (2008) and Dagne (2011) suggest that it is a mistake to solve regional matters from a national level or vantage point. There are a lot of small issues and details that breed the low level fights. Low level fights; for example, between clans or as few as two differing neighbors is the one that grows into inter-tribal, into inter-militia, and later into a regional or international war. In his suggestions, Autesserre (2008) identifies the roles of the local politicians, the public, government and the international humanitarian agents such as NGOs and other supranational bodies. The role of NGOs The role of NGOs has for long focused on healing the wounds rather than the causes. According to Hammerstad (2003) and Autesserre (2008), NGOs have only focused on short term solutions that have only led to temporary ceasefire after which the wars begin again. At the same time, these NGOs have little funds and, in the meantime, they are minimally funded by the various donors or financiers. Otero (2010) gives a similar mistake that occurred in Niger around 2005 when Niger was hunger stricken. Numerous NGOs including the UN and its subgroups and the World Bank offered help late enough that the famine killed a good number of people. When the hunger was alleviated, the NGOs left without establishing long term solutions. The same Niger was to be struck more severely in 2010, just five years down the line. For Congo, Autesserre suggests that the UN troops must be allowed to cool down the situation, the NGOs must offer comprehensive healthcare to the local people among other necessary funding so that they (local people) can trust them. They should also help in building numerous socially linking institutions such as schools, medical facilities and sports. The NGO experts may also engage in educating the public on the importance of solving problems without fighting (Autesserre, S. 2008). That said, one thing makes this suggestion difficult: the government of DRC may not likely allow kind treatment especially on the Tutsis. Similarly, the NGOs may lack enough funding for the suggested call. Centralizing local groups – Hutu militias, Tutsi sympathizers, the Mai Mai The task of finding a long lasting solution, as stated above, is one that starts at the lowest level; for example, campaigning for the unitization of the different militias into distinct units so the small dangerous intra-militia wars are arrested. In such a way each of the Hutu, Tutsi and the Mai Mai can develop one spokesperson (Yenyi, 2010) or a leader who can be peacefully engaged into peaceful negotiations. This can be enhanced by creations of panels of local elders, the leaders of each tribe who can express their grievances comprehensively. Then the second thing to integrate is the politicians in the eastern Congo (Hammerstad, 2003; Autesserre, 2008). According to Otero (2010), giving the close neighbor Kenya as an example, says politicians, in most cases, determine the motives of their followers. Hand in hand with educating the public about how to constitutionally fight for their rights (IBP, 2011); local politicians must refrain from being opportunistic for the betterment of their selfish political ends (Autesserre, 2008). If it does not work this way, the government must keep them out of the way by reporting clearly to the public that local politicians cannot at all solve their problems. But then, there must be another alternative, creation of land acquisition legislature (Autesserre, 2008). Land acquisition legislature Land is particularly an emotive issue especially where associated historical injustices are a factor. The dispute in the eastern Congo is primarily caused by the tensions over the ownership of life. Whereof the main goal is to find a permanent solution, in this context, a comprehensive land acquisition review, as Autesserre suggests has to be crafted with close consultation land experts, the fighting communities and the judiciary (Oppong & Woodruff, 2007; Autesserre, 2008; Yenyi, 2010). Land issues experts include lawyers and other participants carefully selected from the countries which have had similar epitomes such as Tajikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Autesserre, 2008), and Sierra Leone (Otero, 2010). The fighting communities’ grievances have to be listened to one at a time but in a fair manner. Starting with a crucial centralizing role as stipulated above, in this case, the end results are the Tutsi renegades and a combination of the Hutu and the other local merger communities forming the Mai Mai militia (Autesserre, 2008). Although there are issues of the resources on which specific land patches sit, in a completely humanitarian approach, the respective communities representatives must agree to the call of constitutionalism, that all minerals belong to the government no matter where they are (Dagne, 2011). Indeed, with the aforementioned frameworks to teach the public the limits of their legal rights and the best approaches to demand them, it will be easy to clinch an amicable agreement. To this end, fairness is absolutely important utility (Autesserre, 2008; IBP, 2011). For example, a comprehensive compensation plan must be in place and this means that every party must benefit in the pacifying program established (the land acquisition legislation), even if it means giving out the government land to the communities that worsen off in the specific land bargains in the Eastern Congo region. Compensatory parameters such as value equivalence must be adhered to; for example, a person may not leave a fertile land only to be relocated to an infertile land (Autesserre, 2008). Similarly, pastoralists will require lands in which they can continue with their traditional activities and so on (Autesserre, 2008). In a perfect society where people are engaged into the judicial system as the best means to a solution, the fighting communities are easy to manipulate. But can Congo be such a perfect country? What is the nature of the judiciary, a body that has the role to ensure fairness in its roles (Yenyi, 2010)? Reforming the judiciary Addressing the wars in the eastern Congo is as complicated as Congo’s judicial system. The Judicial system in Congo has been described as ineffective as the government officials and politicians invest in getting favoritism from the judicial system. According to Tull (2007) and Autesserre (2008), even the local politicians bend the law at their pleasure; for example, local politicians are involved in the illegal trafficking of the mineral resources. This makes them work to ensure the wars keep igniting time after the other – these wars destabilize the country allowing free space to do their illegal businesses. As impunity hits the climax, the rogue politicians are never arrested and if they are arrested, they easily bribe their way out. Therefore, the question of fairness in the land dispensation policy so explained above calls for comprehensive judicial reforms in Congo. As Oppong and Woodruff (2007), Tull (2007), and Autesserre (2008) indicate, the current regime has indicated feeble attempts to redress Congo’s judicial system as they refer to it as a failed one. In fact, it is easy to link the failure of the various agreements signed to end war with the failed judicial system: the fighting militias do not trust the judicial system in Congo (Tull, 2007; Autesserre, 2008). While reforming the judicial system may be the only key to the other suggested strategic undertakings towards bringing the fights to a stop, it is such a complex process in Congo. The fundamental importance of a good judicial system is to derive trust between the government and the warring parties. Unreasoned for favoritism could result in the worst of the turmoil as has happened before as the government sides with Hutus and the Mai Mai militias. International political control Autesserre almost points out that the Tutsis are the disastrous lot in the problems in Congo. He suggests US’s imposition of sanctions on Rwandan government to bombard it towards refraining from offering assistance to the Tutsis (Autesserre, 2008). However, that is yet another complex political process that is not aimed at getting to short term solutions. From the discussion above, it is possible to attain a permanent solution in Congo through addressing local antagonism and local grievances. However, the means required in doing this comes in an intertwined mix of complex processes that calls for a long time, which is a luxury the current situation in Congo cannot entertain. Conclusion The constantly recurring wars among the communities and the militias in the provinces in eastern Congo are complex. The warring communities or rather parties are not coherent. For example, the Tutsi renegades fight a combination of the Hutu and the Mai Mai militias which sides with the Congo’s government. At the same time there are fights within specific militia; for example, the Hutus and the Nandes which are two large tribes of Nord-Kivu province often engage in fight with each other but both, together with the Mai Mai militia fight the Tutsis. The complexity of the tensions in Congo, arguably, is magnified when a keener focus is cast from three different vantage points: the regional; the national; and the historical. The three foci reflect different problems in the attempts to finding a lasting solution in Congo. Some take the problem as regional and others as national, while the historical injustices add to the complexity matrix. Autesserre (2008) suggested that Congo’s problem can only be successfully tackled from the ground up. That is, addressing the local grievances and local antagonism in a comprehensive manner that specifically guarantees long lasting solution. However, Autesserre’s suggestions are met with various complex controversies within the Congo’s government machinery. He recommends that the role of the NGOs must be pointed to the region affected and not the whole of Congo and they should extend specific services and funding needed at the very local level. Similarly, Autesserre says that NGOs should work towards bringing peace as well and not only to heal the wounds each time they offer help. But this meets the first barriers: lack of cooperation of the Congo government; and the militias’ incoherence. Thus Autesserre embarks on first centralizing the fighting groups so that their grievances would be heard easily and help distributed with ease. In the meantime, the government has to come up with a comprehensively reviewed land acquisition legislature that will guide the rights and the procedures to acquire land and too, to fairly compensate those whose land has to be taken. But then the above chain of processes requires a refined and fully functional judiciary. Congo is marked as having the worst of the judiciary characterized by favoritism and corruption and not by justice. So reforming the judiciary, another complex and time consuming process, becomes a vital requirement. In the long run, the process of addressing local issues becomes so long but if it is possible in Congo, a long lasting solution is attainable. In essence, it can taken the longest of the time but it is possible to find a long lasting solution as it has happened elsewhere – in Sierra Leone, Tajikistan and Bosnia and Herzegovina. References Autesserre, S. 2008. The Trouble With Congo: How Local Disputes Fuel Regional Conflict. Foreign Affairs, 87: 3, pp.93-108. Dagne, T. 2011. Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and Current Developments. Darby, Pennsylvania: DIANE Publishing. Hammerstad, A. 2003. Refugees and Conflict in the Great Lakes Region: a Vicious Cycle. Johannesburg: SAIIA. International Business Publications. 2011. Congo Democratic Republic Foreign Policy and Government Guide, Volume 1. 6th Ed. USA: Intl Business Publications. Oppong, J.R. & Woodruff, T. 2007. Democratic Republic of the Congo – Modern World Nations. New York, NY: Infobase Publishing. Otero, S. 2010. Narrating War and Peace in Africa. Rochester, NY: University Rochester Press. Tull, D.M. 2007. The Democratic republic of Congo: Militarized Politics in a “Failed State”. In Morten, B. & Dunn, K.C. (Eds). 2007. African Guerillas: Raging Against the Machine. London: Lynne Rienner. Yenyi, T. 2010. Journey to the Heart of Darkness: Remembering Congos Forgotten. Bloomington, Indiana: iUniverse Publishing. Read More