Water wars the Middle East - Essay Example

Water wars the Middle East Introduction Over the recent decades, concerns over future water wars have become widespread in reports of environmental groups and NGOs, research studies, and policymakers. Boutrous Ghali, former UN Secretary General and former Egyptian Foreign Minister, believes that “the next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics”.1 The major assumption of the ‘water wars hypothesis’ is that growing competition among countries with rapidly increasing populations for nonrenewable or even diminishing water resources will inevitably result in war. However, in spite of the remarkable attention it has received over the years, both the empirical and theoretical bases of the water war hypothesis have been severely questioned.2 The Middle East, a region with inadequate supply of water resources and unstable and hostile political relations, has been the major target of the water wars hypothesis. Unfortunately, the notion of water wars is evidently not justified in the Middle East. The Weaknesses of the Water Wars Hypothesis in the Middle East Fresh water is a very important resource that is in short supply and continuously diminishing in numerous regions across the globe. In barren, semi-arid, and desert regions, like the Middle East, water shortages are a serious problem. Regions lacking access to adequate supply of water resources had witnessed vicious competitions for fresh water supplies since ancient times.3 The likelihood of conflict is aggravated by the fact that numerous major rivers extend to the territories of various nations, and political boundaries partition underground water tables. Proponents of the water wars hypothesis cite numerous subjective proofs to substantiate their assumption that conflicts over access to water resources will lead to wars, like the statement of former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat that Egypt will soon fight over water resources, or the warnings of Turkey to discontinue water supply from Euphrates to the detriment of Iraq.4 However, these predictions are not actually backed up by evidence, and are filled with methodological weaknesses. Declaring a trend, like what Peter Gleick, a well-known environmental security scholar, did is unjustifiable because Gleick and others do not take into consideration the earlier prevalence of conflicts over water, which requires a comparison between the prevalence of actual instances of conflict and the number of such instances across the globe.5 The examination of present and future situations is also subjective and unreliable, and the affirmation of a trend is not supported by a comparison between the actual conflicts over water and the likelihood of the occurrence of such conflicts. For example, Leng (1980) reported that there was no correlation between the incidence of war threats and the outbreak of war.6 Yoffe and colleagues (2003) examined the cooperation and conflict over access to water resources from 1948 to 1992. They discovered that more than 400 episodes of verbal interactions by public officials from 1948 to 1999 were generally confrontational, but merely 37 cases of serious conflict, mainly from the Middle East, but no outbreak of war.7 In spite of the increasing popularity of the water wars hypothesis, numerous research studies show that the actual possibility of the occurrence of water conflict may be negligible, especially in the Middle East. Apparently, assertions that the “next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics” have long been debunked.8 Moreover, research studies have demonstrated that even the broader predictions of impending water wars derived from statements of political figures may be unreliable. There is a usual structure to the water wars hypothesis: the geographic incompatibility between territorial borders and water is examined; afterward is a thorough presentation of geopolitical arguments; then, there is often a concise presentation of counteractive steps.9 The typical example is the Middle East, a region where political, ethnic, and religious conflicts are widespread. For numerous scholars water shortage will be the catalyst of war in the Middle East. A major weakness of the water wars hypothesis is the difficulty of accurately identifying which among the numerous factors promote conflict or warfare. Thus it appears that not many wars have been provoked by water scarcity alone. It appears that the wider political environment is more important than the particular case of water shortage. However, there seems to be adequate proof that water is an integral factor in violent conflict. Moreover, as regards conflict in the Middle East, statements by political figures in the Middle East pinpointing water as a root of conflict indicate that the possibility of water wars must be considered.10 Still, the water wars arguments are exaggerated, a clear outcome of strategic wisdom, and underestimates past and current proofs that water is as likely to foster cooperation as it is to raise conflict. Scholars interested in water wars have greatly given credence to statement of Boutros Boutros-Ghali that “the next war in our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics”.11 However, if the argument of Clausewitz that “war is the continuation of politics by other means”12 remains applicable the conflict over the Nile is a political war. In other words, the presence of water conflict implies that the political sphere failed to settle an agreement over water access. The assumption that water conflict is not a political war is doubtful. That a great deal of the literature on water wars is produced by Western scholars concentrating on the Middle East is suggestive. It indicates that the subject matter is vital not because of a theoretical focus on those who might endure the harmful outcomes of violent conflict, but because of the crises warfare in the Middle East may generate for Western involvement in the region.13 The Middle East is definitely at risk of water scarcities, but other regions, especially Southern and Central Africa, have the same, or even worse, water shortages and ongoing social and political conflicts.14 Thorough geographic studies of the problem of water shortage in the Middle East demonstrated that it is completely unjustifiable to expect water conflict in the region in the near future. Generally, the overstated water wars hypothesis in the Middle East appears driven by Western motives rather than a consideration for the region’s inhabitants and environment. More specifically, any assertion from Western security scholars which hypothesizes disorder and insecurity in the Middle East can be interpreted as a way to defend a Western military involvement which arises under the guise of diplomacy but is in fact driven by interest in oil. Deudney argues that the more probable result of water shortage is collaboration and joint management of water resources.15 Libiszewski (1997) provided empirical support for this; he claims that water has functioned as a focal point for discussion and cooperation in the Middle East, a major if detested countercharge to the water wars hypothesis. This argument is also substantiated by strategic premises: the utilization of water resources necessitates costly and risky engineering mechanisms, generating a common security or safety condition and thus weakening the motivation for the state to exercise aggression to settle conflict.16 In other words, water could not be the likely cause of warfare because it is hard to usurp and defend firmly. Water was mostly collaboratively managed up until beginning of industrialization, which disproves the deterministic premise of violent conflict over resources, especially water. 17 Undoubtedly, right to access water resources has consistently been a major means of dealing with water shortage. This is also relevant to the situation in the Middle East, where there exists an intricate structure of water rights, and where water resources have been an important element of customary practices.18 Before the emergence of the modern state, water resources were a source of compromise and collaboration, which indicates that, in spite of the barriers enforced by the state structure, the nonviolent and joint management of water shortage remains a possibility. Singer (2000), in an analysis of the field of war research, stressed that usually the initial phase in research is guesswork, where in researchers “invent some plausible explanations, and then ransack history for those causes that seem to support our hypotheses”.19 The widely used research by supporters of the water wars theory is the violent water conflict that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s between Israel and neighboring states. Some of them rashly generalized that the war was obviously a conflict over water resources. Yet, since the moment of these occurrences, the warring states have suffered the war in 1973, two Palestinian revolts, and two wars between Lebanon and Israel, but no hostilities mainly over water resources; this in spite of the dramatic growth in the region’s population and the consequent reduction in water supply.20 In contrast, the region has seen negotiations over water management as a component of the 1993 Israel-PLO and 1994 Israel-Jordan treaties. If earlier episodes of water conflict were efforts by the Arabs to stop the growing Israeli state from securing or strengthening itself, now that the Israeli state is secured, the possibility of water conflict in the region could be deteriorating, instead of escalating as assumed by supporters of the water wars theory.21 Case studies have also been discredited due to methodological flaws. In their analyses of the literature on environmental security, scholars have emphasized that because cases are selected purposely where in both conflict and resource shortage are present, the dependent variable does not vary, and hence, assumptions on the impact of shortage on the emergence of conflict are still unverifiable. Current statistical research tried to resolve this. Unfortunately, they are weighed down by their own weaknesses. The major limitation is that they establish links between conflict and water-related variables, but were largely unable to determine reliably any causal connections.22 Hauge and Ellingsen (1998), in their investigation of the spate of domestic conflict from 1980 to 1992, reported a significant correlation between water shortage and conflict. Yet, because they were only able to gather information about water shortage for only a single period, hardly any findings can be made as regards causal relations.23 The findings may only demonstrate the fact that the Middle East and other regions riddled with conflict merely happen to be more barren than areas that have been politically stronger in recent times, like Europe. Conclusions The water wars hypothesis is unjustifiable in the Middle East because of two major reasons. First, the water wars hypothesis is theoretically, empirically, and methodologically weak. It greatly relies on anecdotal evidence like statements of political figures in the Middle East, and fails to make a comparison between the actual incidence of water conflict in the Middle East and the possibility of an outbreak of water conflict in the region. Second, the water wars hypothesis in the Middle East has been largely based on isolated cases, like the war between Israel and neighboring countries in the 1950s and the 1960s. Works Cited Barnett, Jon. The Meaning of Environmental Security: Ecological Politics and Policy in the New Security Era. London: Zed Books, 2001. Print. Collins, Alan. Contemporary Security Studies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Print. Kamieniecki, Sheldon, George Gonzalez, & Robert Vos. Flashpoints in Environmental Policymaking: Controversies in Achieving Sustainability. New York: SUNY Press, 1997. Print. Katz, David. Water, Economic Growth, and Conflict: Three Studies. Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest, 2008. Print. Selby, Jan. Water, Power and Politics in the Middle East: The Other Israeli-Palestine Conflict. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2003. Print. Read More