No State Sponsors, No Terror argument - Research Paper Example

Introduction Jasper’s article No Sponsors, No Terror argues that terrorism thrives only with the aid of sponsorship and support. Terrorism is by nature a clandestine operation and as such, states will not overtly admit complicity in terrorist activities. In this regard, terrorism represents the epitome of irregular warfare and confirms 6th century B.C. Chinese military general Sun Tzu’s contention that “all warfare is based on deception.”1 This essay analyses Jasper’s No State Sponsors, No Terror and argues that while the most successful international terrorists have thrived with the aid of material state-sponsorship, terrorism can succeed without state-sponsorship. However, when the international legal definition of state-sponsorship of terrorism is used, it is difficult to anticipate terrorism thriving without state-sponsorship. Therefore, Jasper’s argument that terrorism will fade away without state-sponsorship is correct when the international legal definition of state-sponsorship of terrorism is applied. Summary Jasper starts out by introducing the reader to Sun Tzu’s The Art of War philosophy which hinges on the concept that “all warfare is based on deception.”2 Jasper then moves on to describe the clandestine and secret operations of international terrorism. He describes the work of Hezbollah’s “terror master,” Imad Fayez Mugniyeh, who happened to operate clandestinely since the early 1980s at the age of 20.3 Throughout his terrorist career, Mugniyeh was among the world’s “most hunted” terrorists and yet managed to plan and carry out attacks for decades.4 Mugniyeh’s murder in 2008 was just as deceptive and clandestine as his life’s work. While no state claimed to be affiliated with him, no state would claim responsibility for his death, yet there is significant evidence that Mugniyeh’s ability to evade detection, to move at will and to plan and carry out terrorist attacks was both supported and opposed by several states. Jasper argues that although Iran, Lebanon and Syria would not claim affiliation with or support for Mugniyeh, leaders from each country played homage to the terrorist after his death. According to Jasper, each of these states could have wanted Mugniyeh dead as a means of severing ties with the terrorists. There was also reason to believe the Arab states, Israel and the U.S. had reason to want Mugniyeh dead.5 Jasper argues that attacking the terrorists however, does not rid the world of terrorism. The terrorist is only the tip of the iceberg. Terrorists cannot move around secretly, plan attacks and carry them out without the aid of a higher power. This higher power is invariably a state which makes it possible for the terrorist to gain access to training grounds, weapons, travel documents, identities and accommodations. According to Jasper, attacking a terrorist is akin to attacking a “tree” and leaving the “root (s)” intact and free to grow and spread indiscriminately.6 To demonstrate the manner in which state-sponsorship enables terrorism to thrive, Jasper uses several examples. Jasper’s first example is the Hezbollah which originated with the assistance of Ayatollah Khomeini’s factions during the 1980s in order to support the Islamic revolution. Hezbollah is used by both Iran and Syria and on its face it is a charitable, political and military organization with significant influence on the government. However, beneath the surface, Hezbollah is a terrorist organization.7 Another example used by Jasper is the “PLO-Fatah and Hamas” who many publically claim are “no longer terrorists” or “never were”.8 According to Jasper: ...they have transformed (or are in the process of transforming) into legitimate political groups. Any terrorist acts attributed to them, say the apologists, are actually the work of ‘rogue elements’, shadowy ‘splinter groups’, or mysterious groups of unknown origin and makeup.9 Jasper refers to this kind of deceptive facades as “plausible deniability”.10 According to Jasper, plausible deniability is neither unique nor new. In fact, Yasser Arafat, whom Jasper characterizes as the “Crown Prince of modern terrorism”, mastered this art of deception with the Black September terrorist organization responsible for the terrorist attacks at the Munich Olympics in 1972.11 Black September was not only “created” by Arafat, but also “controlled” by Arafat “as a deniable asset to perform dirty deeds for which he did not want to be held accountable”.12 While Black September launched terrorist attacks, Arafat publically condemned their actions and disassociated himself from the terrorist group. According to Jasper, Arafat congratulated Black September in public, maintaining his deniable assets. Arafat was not alone in the art of war’s deception. The Soviet Union, according to Jasper is perhaps the greatest secret state sponsor of terrorism.13 The Soviet Union’s “deception and deniability” can be traced back to the 1960s and through the 1970s. According to Jasper: The Kremlin’s hands were usually hidden, its KGB and GRU handlers working through their subsidiary Czech, East German, Bulgarian, or Romanian intelligence serves, which in turn operated through Libya, Yemen, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea, whose agents, in turn, interfaced directly with the terrorists: the Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinfof, the PLO, PFLP, IRA, FMLN, etc.14 Jasper therefore maintains that terrorist factions can be tied either directly or indirectly to a state. According to Jasper, Syria and Iran are the “evil twins” of state sponsorship of terrorism.15 What is often overlooked, however, is the role that Russia plays in Syria and Iran’s state-sponsorship of terrorism. The reality is, Syria and Iran are mere puppets in Russia’s support and sponsorship of terrorism. In the meantime, Russia plays the international game of opposition to terrorism. Jasper therefore goes back to Sun Tzu’s statement that cautions states to “know your enemies and know yourself” otherwise, “you will be imperilled in every single battle.”16 This is a particularly important caution for the U.S. in its optimistic relationship with China and Russia while they openly court the U.S. while working in secret with several rogue states that support terrorism.17 Analysis Byman describes state-sponsorship of terrorism in a way that agrees with Jasper’s conceptualization of deniable assets. According to Byman, the U.S. maintains a list of state sponsors of terrorism and that list is typically confined to states that actively support and maintain terrorist groups, or sit by and permit terrorist groups to train, meet and plan terrorist attacks on their soil. Therefore this list includes North Korea, Cuba, Sudan, Iran and Syria. However, upon a closer examination, Syria and Iran are arguably the only states that should concern the U.S. In the meantime, other states such as Venezuela, Pakistan, Jordan and Yemen should be states that concern the U.S. For example, Yemen has demonstrated “wilful inaction” to terrorists cells in its territory.18 In the meantime, Jordan while implementing stringent anti-terrorism policies and outwardly supporting the U.S. in its war against terror all the while terrorist cells operate freely within its borders. Meanwhile, Pakistan supports terrorist targeting India and Taliban factions that are fighting the U.S. in Afghanistan. Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, supports the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).19 Other states such as Yemen, Iraq and Palestinians have also demonstrated a willingness to look “the other way when their citizens back terrorist groups”.20 In this regard, the U.S. has a difficulty identifying its enemies and according to Jasper has falling into the trap created by states’ cultivation of deniable assets. It would appear that as long as states outwardly pay lip service to the U.S. and its war against terrorism, the U.S. is deceived by this support despite the passive support of terrorism. The U.S. recognizes the importance of state-sponsorship to the success of terrorist activities. This recognition is reflected in its National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. In this regard, the U.S. pledges to attack and prevent terrorism by “attacking their sanctuaries, leadership, command, control, and communications; material support; and finance”.21 Implicitly, the U.S. recognizes that sanctuaries are only possible where states permit terrorists to operate with impunity. Therefore, as the U.S. fails to recognize the sanctuaries provided by allies, the U.S. is falling ever deeper into the trap set by the creation and maintenance of deniable assets and therefore, does not know its enemies. Knowing the enemy in the context of state-sponsored terrorism is particularly important. As Tiefenbrun cautions, unlike individual terrorists who depend on publicity to promote their causes, state-sponsored terrorists typically shun publicity.22 It will be recalled that Jasper pointed out the difference between Mugniyeh who was obviously sponsored by several states and Osama bin Laden who was exiled to Afghanistan and later Pakistan. Mugniyeh shunned publicity while bin Laden thrived on publicity.23 It therefore follows that while the U.S. affiliates itself with its allies and trusts that they are equally committed to fighting terrorism, there must be an awareness of the existence of deniable assets and the secret and deceptive state-sponsored terrorists. Aside from knowing the enemy and remaining vigilant for the possibility that state-sponsored terrorism can evade detection, it is difficult to tie the clandestine terrorist to a state. In the meantime, terrorism has thrived without state-sponsorship and there is no reason to believe that in the absence of state-sponsorship, terrorism would simply fade into oblivion as Jasper claims. For example, Ensalaco points out that Al Qaeda is unique in that it was able to acquire “a global reach without a state sponsor”.24 Initially, Al Qaeda maintained a sanctuary in Sudan. However, when Al Qaeda attempted tan attack on the life of Egypt’s President in 1995, they were ousted from Sudan and their assets were frozen. Although, Al Qaeda was permitted to organize and run terrorist camps in Afghanistan, the Taliban did not provide support to Al Qaeda.25 Under the definition of state-sponsored terrorism under international law, however, Al Qaeda was actually sponsored by the Taliban. According to international law, states currently have a duty to conduct “due diligence” in preventing terrorism and this invariably means “that all reasonable measures under the circumstances must be taken to prevent terrorist acts”.26 As Cohan states, regarding international law, when a state tolerates “the use of its resources for terrorist activity against foreigners” this will serve “as a basis for liability under state responsibility principles”.27 It therefore follows that the mere fact that the Taliban permitted Al Qaeda to set up and operate terrorist training camps in Afghanistan brings the Taliban within the international legal definition of state-sponsorship of terrorism. In fact, by virtue of the Declaration of Friendly Relations, the United Nations (U.N.) implicitly outlawed state acquiescence of terrorist operations within its territory. The Declaration of Friendly Relations expands the reach of the U.N. Charter.28 The Declaration was passed by the U.N. General Assembly under Resolution 2625 in 1970 and the relevant part of the Resolution reads as follows: Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.29 The prohibition of state-sponsorship of terrorism is therefore not a new or separate arm of international law. In fact, the prohibition of state-sponsorship of terrorism has an easy co-existence with the U.N. Charter and its goal of regulating peace and security and friendly relations between member states. The only difficulty with applying the U.N. Charter and the Declaration of Friendly Relations is that the U.N. failed to define what amounts to terrorism and states have different definitions of terrorism.30 This is where Jasper’s argument relative to deniable assets that allow states to facilitate and support terrorist factions arises. As Jasper demonstrated in his article, states, the media and support groups have consistently denied that some terrorist groups are, in fact, terrorists. Thus, a state may be deceptive or maintain deniable assets in the support of terrorist groups. Even so, there may be instances in which a state will not be able to deny that a specific act was an act of terrorism. For example, the attack on the U.S. on September 11, 2001 was undeniably a terrorist attack. As Shimko argues, although states may differ in their definition of terrorism there is a general consensus with respect to the “basic components of terrorism”.31 All states will agree that terrorism involves either the use of violence or the threat of the use of violence. Secondly, it is largely agreed that terrorism is used to pursue a political or social goal. Thirdly, it is largely agreed that terrorism has no regard for “who is harmed” since terrorism is “specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victims or objects” in an attack.32 Given the generally accepted components of terrorism, it is difficult for states to deny complicity in supporting terrorism when these components are obviously present and the terrorist groups organized those operations within their territory. Yet, as Jasper indicates, it is always possible for states to deny complicity and to outwardly profess opposition to the terrorist attacks, while privately acquiescing in and supporting the terrorist operations by providing terrorists with a safe haven. As Jasper demonstrated, a state like Russia could support and sponsor terrorist groups which are present in another state, thereby avoiding suspicion and complicity. Moreover, states which permit terrorists to operate within their territory can hide behind claims that they did all that they could to prevent the operations or that they were unaware that terrorist operations were being conducted within their territory. As Bassiouni argues, states can always hide behind the shield of state sovereignty to bar investigations and prosecution of terrorists within their territory.33 Therefore the opportunities for terrorists to seek and find safe havens for organizing, planning and training for terrorist attacks will always present itself. At the same time there are always opportunities for states to escape complicity and responsibility for providing safe havens for terrorists or for providing more material support for terrorists. Giving the prohibition against state sponsorship of terrorism under international law, states who sympathize with terrorists organizations will be more aggressive in publically denying support while privately lending support. States will be motivated to support and/or sponsor terrorism for a number of reasons. Most of the time, state-sponsorship of terrorism is for political gains either at home or abroad. In this regard, when examining state-sponsorship of terrorism, it is best to remember that while one state might regard the activities and motivations of one group as terrorism another state may regard the group as freedom fighters.34 It would therefore appear that there will always be states willing to sponsor terrorism. The main question is however, whether or not terrorists can survive without state-sponsorship within the meaning of international law. Hamilton and Gray argue that with the current global war on terrorism, terrorist groups have become far more fragmented and as a result the relationships between states and terrorist are more difficult to maintain.35 It therefore follows that states are having a far more difficult time supporting and sponsoring terrorists organizations. It can be argued, that given the current fragmentation of terrorist groups, states are forced to limit, if not give up their support and sponsorship of terrorism. The impact of the loosening ties between states and terrorist groups also indicate that terrorism will die out in the absence of state support and sponsorship. Hamilton and Gray argue that with states aligning resources and cooperating with one another in the international war against terrorists, terrorists groups are forced “to decentralize” and to “sever direct operational coordination with lower echelons”.36 As a result, it is becoming increasingly difficult to organize terrorist activities and even more difficult to afford the increased costs of carrying out terrorists attacks.37 These difficulties arise because of state cooperation and therefore demonstrate the significance of state-sponsorship for the success of terrorism. Obviously, terrorists’ organizations require safe havens in which they can coordinate with other cells within a single network. In light of the international war on terror, states that are sympathetic to the terrorists’ cause are more reluctant to provide safe havens and when they do, they are careful to safeguard against the risk of exposure. This makes it more difficult for terrorist organizations to congregate in one location. This is significant because terrorist organizations need a central location in which to train and plan a terrorist attack. As Hamilton and Gray argue, the relationships between states and terrorists have always been tenuous. Terrorists can always expect that a state’s support will depend only on whether that support can provide it with a political gain. Once there is pressure from the outside that threatens the political goals of the state or once those political goals change, states withdraw their support and/or sponsorship of terrorist groups.38 With international pressure on states to withdraw support and sponsorship of terrorism, the space for operating and training is consistently narrowing. It is therefore anticipated that, in the absence of state sponsorship, terrorist organizations will continue to become diffused and disorganization until eventually the threat will be minimized.39 Summary Jasper argues that states have always been motivated to sponsor and support terrorism either directly or indirectly. The main state sponsors usually employ deceptive tactics using other smaller and less powerful states as proxies under the concept of deniable assets. However, if states withdraw their support of terrorism, the latter will eventually die out. Given the legal definition of state-sponsored terrorism regarding international law, Jasper’s argument reveals that, if state-sponsorship were to be withdrawn altogether, then indeed, terrorism would therefore die out. This is because based on the legal definition of state-sponsored terrorism, the state need only to permit a terrorist organization to operate within its territory or fail to prevent their operating within its territory to be liable for any terrorist attacks on foreign soil by that organization. Therefore should states comply with the international prohibition against state-sponsored terrorism, terrorists will find it difficult to find a safe haven abroad. Without a safe haven to operate in planning and preparing for a terrorist attack becomes virtually impossible. Bibliography Baseren, H. “Terrorism With Its Differentiating Aspects.” Defense Against Terrorism Review 1, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 1-11. Bassiouni, M. Cherif. Legal Responses to International Terrorism: United States Procedural Aspects. The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988. Byman, D. L. “The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism.” The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper no. 16 (May 2008): 1-58. Cohan, John, Alan. “Formulation of a State’s Response to Terrorism and State-Sponsored Terrorism.” PACE International Law Review 14, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 77-119. Ensalaco, Mark. Middle Eastern Terrorism: From Black September to September 11. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008. Hamilton, Nathan Brant and David H. Gray “Decentralized Terrorism: Ramifications for a Centralized International System.” Global Security Studies 3, no. 2 (Spring 2012): 24-42. Jasper, William F. “No State Sponsors, No Terror.” In Violence and Terrorism 12/13. Edited by Thomas J. Badey, 42-46. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2013. New York Times. “Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).” Updated Nov. 19, 2012, Times Topics. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/r/revolutionary_armed_forces_of_colombia/index.html (23 February 2013). Rosenstock, Robert. “At the United Nations.” American Bar Association Journal 59 (April 1973): 412-414. Shimko, Keith, L. International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies. Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 2010. Tiefenbrun, Susan. “A Semiotic Approach to A Legal Definition of Terrorism.” ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 9 (2003): 357-402. Trapp, Kimberley, N. State Responsibility for International Terrorism. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011. UN General Assembly Resolution 2625/1970. United States Department of State. “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003.” April 2004. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31912.pdf (23 February 2013). Read More