The Influence Of The Mongol Rule On Russia In The 13-15th Centuries - Essay Example

The Influence Of The Mongol Rule On Russia In The 13-15th Centuries Introduction The Mongol expansion was one of the most important developments in the political, cultural and economic history of the 13th century. This essay deals with the impact of Mongol invasion on medieval Rus’ society and its far-reaching consequences for the further development of Russian economy and political system. It will be argued that the influences of Mongols on Russia were both positive and negative, and that the impact of Mongol rule to a certain extent still defines the basic features of Russian civilization. Russia before the Mongol invasion The 12th century became known as the peak of a period of feudal disunity in Russian and Soviet historiography. While there existed 15 quasi-independent principalities in the Russian lands of the mid-12th century, their numbers swelled to more than 50 on the eve of Mongol invasion (Vernadsky, 1973). The largest of these principalities included the Principality of Vladimir-Suzdal that dominated the North-East Rus, the mercantile Republic of Novgorod that was practically independent from the Riurikid dynasty due to its custom of electing its princes, and the Principality of Halych in the South-West that became a basis for Dual Principality of Halych-Volyn’ after the unification of Halych and Volyn’ under Volynian prince Roman Rostislavich (ruled 1189-1205) in 1199 (Martin, 2003, pp.97). The other principalities, including Ryazan, Smolensk, Chernigov and Polotsk, were generally weak and dependent on their larger neighbors. The political fragmentation of Kievan Rus was accompanied by bitter infighting between various principal cliques for the domination over Kiev, which, while having lost its previous political and economic importance, still remained a lucrative prize for an ambitious prince. The most important feudal wars in the 12th to 13th century included the warfare between princely clans of Monomashichi and Ol’govichi in 1146-1154, the raid of north-eastern princes led by Andrey Bogolubsky against Kiev in 1169, and the war between Roman of Volyn’ and Suzdalian Grand Prince Vsevolod the Big Nest (ruled in 1154-1212) in 1202-1203 (Martin 2003; Vernadsky 1973). While the separation of Rus’ lands into distinct polities allowed rapid economic development at the local level and facilitated the formation of cultural centers independent from Kiev, it undermined the potential for joint struggle of different principalities against the Great Steppe nomads. The failure of the raid of Igor Prince of Novgorod-Siversky against the Polovtsy (Cumans) in 1185 (Martin, 2003, p.146) and especially the first disastrous encounter between the united hosts of the Rus’ princes and the vanguard Mongol troops in the Battle of Kalka River in 1223 (Fennell, 1983, pp.66-68) showed that Kievan Rus’ was unprepared for the Mongol onslaught. Positive and negative influences on the development of Russia under Mongol rule After the subjugation of Volga Bulgarians in 1236, the Mongol armies led by Batu Khan and Subutai attacked the territories of Grand Principality of Vladimir-Suzdal in November 1237. The fall of Ryazan and Vladimir signified the end of organized resistance by north-eastern princes, while the death of grand prince Yuri Vsevolodovich in the Battle of the Sit River in March 1238 (Fennell, 1983, p.81) left the Rus’ princes without their formal sovereign, making any coordinated counterattack unlikely. The only territories of the North left independent were Novgorod and its vassal principality of Pskov. In 1239-1240 Batu Khan attacked the South-Western Rus, destroying Chernigov and taking Kiev in December 1240 (Fennell,1983, p.83). Finally, in 1241 the Mongols managed to capture and ransack Halych and Vladimir-in-Volyn’, the capital of Volynian lands. From that time on, the majority of Rus’ principalities was unable to resist the Mongols and reluctantly accepted their suzerainty. Even such polities as Novgorod, Smolensk and Polotsk, which were spared from invasion, were forced to pay tribute to the Mongols. The Mongol invasion led to the important changes in Rus’ society. First of all, the destruction of many population centers and the enslavement of many skilled artisans led to the decline in urban life in many territories of former Kievan Rus’, with the exception of Novgorod that continued to prosper. The decrease in quality of Rus’ artisan works undermined the competitiveness of Russian towns with regard to their West European counterparts and led to the reduction in Rus’ share in international trade. As Goldfrank (2000) observes, the economic recovery of the Northeastern Rus’ did not begin earlier than the late 1280s, while the secular economic growth was not recorded (2000, p.262). The rural economy was also deeply affected, and the peasantry seems to have been forced to pay excessive tributes to the Mongol nobility in addition to their own one. In the aftermath of the invasion, the Mongols took steps to implement their own administrative system in the Rus’ lands. The institution of baskaki (the tax collectors) served to subjugate local economy to the fiscal needs of the court of Sarai, the regional capital of the invaders. According to the 16th century Nikon chronicle, Batu Khan appointed his own civil and military officials to most important Rus’ towns so as to control the policies of local princes and clamp down on the possible unrest (Halperin, 1987, p. 34). The conscription for the Mongol armies also seemed to be instituted, and for both fiscal and military conscription purposes the systematic taking of the census (chislo), to be carried out by baskaki, was implemented (Halperin, 1987, p. 35). Especially in the first years of Mongol rule, the Mongol troops were frequently deployed in the Rus’ lands, and punitive expeditions may have been rather severe, as alluded to in the Laurentian chronicle’s tale about the brutal rule of baskak Akhmad in the southern Rus’ town of Kursk in the 1280s (Halperin, 1987, p. 36). The civil administration’s structures were also established. As Ostrowski (2002) claims, after the baskaki system was discontinued in early 14th century, their fiscal and military functions were assumed by the princes themselves, while daruγačis acted as their supervisors (2002, p. 43). The institution of Mongol dual administrative system, as well as the structures for military conscription, censuses and tax collections, proved to be a great influence on the political system of the Muscovite state in the 14th to 16th centuries. As the Muscovite princes came to fulfill the functions of baskaki in their own lands from the second quarter of the 14th century on (Vernadsky, 1969, p.179), they fashioned the new system of local bureaucracy that had little to do with early feudal structures of administration in the times of Kievan Rus’ (Ostrovski, 1990). Ostrowski (2002) believes that in the period of 1330 to 1350, during the reign of Ivan Kalita (1325-1340) and the early reign of Semen the Proud (from 1340), the process of “institutional borrowing” (2002, p.44) took place, with the Muscovite princes adopting the bureaucratic offices of the Golden Horde for their own aims. Accordingly, the princes themselves played the role of baskaki for the khan of the Golden Horde, while their civil officials, namestniki (“lieutenants”), were functional equivalents to the Mongol daruγačis. The officials responsible for fiscal and judicial functions in the counties (volost’) were known as volosteli (“counts”), and their responsibilities bore much resemblance to those of baskaki (Ostrowski, 2002, p.45). The military system of the Muscovite state was also greatly influenced by the Mongol practices. While the Kievan Rus’ military was based on the combination of prince’s retainers, the druzhyna, with the town militias and mercenaries, the Muscovites seemed to adopt the Muslim system of military liens, the iqţā, which was probably transferred to Rus’ through Mongols (Ostrowski, 2002, p. 49-50). In addition, the use of Mongol horse trappings and methods of archery came to distinguish the Muscovite armies from their counterparts in Eastern Europe. The adoption of Mongol military tactics would later allow the Muscovites to deal with the Steppe nomads on the equal footing. In the end, the Muscovite army up to the end of the 16th century was more Mongol/Tatar in its weapons and tactics than the Slavic one (Chancellor, 1968). The system of social classes in Muscovy also seemed to be affected by the Mongol influence. The institution of general taxation led to the need to provide the privileged strata of the Rus’ society with certain tax exemptions to ensure their cooperation. Such tax privileges were granted to the Russian Orthodox Church and the secular nobility alike, leading to emergence of darkhan system of tax exemption for the upper classes (Halperin, 1987, p.120). This helped consolidate the specific ideology of superiority of the elite of the Rus’ society to the taxed peasantry and artisans, solidifying class barriers. In the end, the integration of Mongol/Tatar elements of state administration and fiscal policies into the state structures of Muscovy fostered the development of the centralized government and the princely despotism, as opposed to earlier, more feudal system of relations between state and society. How Russia overthrew the Mongols After the reigns of Uzbeg Khan (1313-1341) and Janibeg Khan (1342-1357), which were marked by the greatest imperial consolidation in the history of the Horde, the separatist tendencies of the Horde princes and local governors started to undermine the governmental centralization and obedience of different tribes and clans to central authority. The Black Death of the 1340s and the wars over the succession after the murder of Berdibeg Khan in 1359 seriously weakened the Golden Horde, loosening its grip over its subject peoples. In North-Eastern Rus’ the Muscovite princes, who were previously most loyal vassals of the Horde, took the opportunity to assert themselves against their Tatar overlords. While Ivan Kalita directly aided the Tatars in 1327 against the rebellious Tver Principality (Martin 2003, p.390), the most serious competitor of Muscovy, his grandson Dmitry (1359-1389) started to take political steps completely independent from the Golden Horde. The Tatars attempted to master an anti-Muscovite coalition, with the help of the Lithuanians and the prince of Ryazan, but the efforts of the Tatar military leader Mamai came to nothing, after the united forces of the Muscovites and the other north-eastern principalities defeated the Horde in the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380. Even though the new Khan Tokhtamysh (ruled in 1380-1406) managed to take and pillage Moscow in 1382, it became increasingly clear that the Rus’ would no longer passively obey the Tatars (Morgan, 2007, p.128). The overthrow of Tokhtamysh in 1406 led to the new fracturing of the Golden Horde. Although the Muscovite princes in the 15th century formally recognized their dependence from the Horde, it no longer exerted any influence on their policies. The last khan of the Golden Horde proper, Akhmad, tried to reassert his mastery over North-Eastern Rus’ in 1474 to 1476, but his efforts finally failed in 1480, and Muscovy, which united all the lands of North-Eastern Rus’ to become a bulk of future Russia, became completely independent state. Impact on Russia today from the Mongol rule The Mongol rule left important imprint upon the future development of Russia. Their influence upon the development of administrative and military system of Russia would persist until the times of Peter the Great as the most important component of Russian political tradition (Ostrowski, 1990). The separation of North-Eastern Rus’ from the other East European nations due to the long rule of Mongols/Tatars created a distinct Russian political culture that is characterized by large degree of the influence of Oriental elements, including the reverence for bureaucratic authority and the great importance of the military elements in the state affairs. The modern systems of census and military conscription in Russia still bore resemblance to those instituted by the Muscovite princes on the model of their Mongol counterparts. At the same time, the Rus’ society on the eve of Mongol invasion was itself in deep crisis, and the countries of East Europe, which were left unconquered by the Mongols, also did not manage to catch up with the West, so that the theory of Mongol invasion as a main cause for Russian ‘backwardness’ can hardly be credible. On the positive side, the blending of Mongol and Russian culture in the late medieval period greatly enhanced Russian culture, both in linguistic and artistic sense (Vernadsky, 1969). In that way, the role of cultural contacts between the sedentary Russians and the nomadic Turks and Mongols was mainly beneficial one. References Chancellor, R. (1968). The first voyage to Russia. In: Berry, L. & Crummey, R. Rude and barbarous kingdom: Russia in the accounts of sixteenth-century English voyagers. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Fennell, J. (1983). The crisis of Medieval Russia, 1200-1304. London and New York: Longman. Goldfrank, D. (2000). Muscovy and the Mongols: what’s what and what’s maybe. Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 1(2), pp.259-266. Halperin, C. (1987). Russia and the Golden Horde: the Mongol impact on medieval Russian history. 2nd ed. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Martin, J. (2003). Medieval Russia, 980-1584. 4th ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Morgan, D. (2007). The Mongols. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Ostrowski, D. (1990). The Mongol origins of Muscovite political institutions. Slavic Review, 49 (4), pp.525-542. Ostrowski, D. (2002). Muscovy and the Mongols: cross-cultural influences on the Steppe frontier, 1304-1589. 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Vernadsky, G. (1969). The Mongol impact on Russia. In: Riha, T. Readings in Russian civilization. Vol. 1: Russia before Peter the Great, 900-1700. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Vernadsky, G. (1973). Kievan Russia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Read More