The Procedural History of Yu Yu Kai Frank and Chan Chi Keung - Case Study Example

Procedural History: The procedural history of Yu Yu Kai Frank v Chan Chi Keung commenced with a claim in professional negligence in respect of serious nerve injury to the plaintiff’s left arm. The judge at first instance, while satisfied the injury occurred during the defendant’s care of the plaintiff, he was not prepared to find that there was professional negligence on the basis of the evidence proffered at the trial of first instance and it the injury complained of was not always preventable. The plaintiff appealed the trial judge’s decision to the Court of Appeal at which time the lower court’s decision was reversed on the basis that the injury was in fact preventable. The Court of Appeal also found that negligence could be inferred. The defendant then appealed to the HKC. Legal Issues The legal issue at the heart of this case was the extent to which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be successfully claimed in relation to the facts of the case and the trial judge’s ruling. Pursuant to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the defendant would be liable if upon the evidence presented, it was found that the injury complained of, was such that it would not have occurred but for the defendant’s negligence and injury itself was within the parameters of the defendant’s duty of care relative to the plaintiff. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is especially relevant in medical cases alleging negligence where the plaintiff is not conscious and the medical professional administers care that is presumably within his/her knowledge and outside of the plaintiff’s knowledge. The res ipsa loquitur operates to establish causation and was therefore the legal issue at the center of the case. Facts of the Case The plaintiff had surgery for prostate cancer on the lower part of his body and immediately after discovered that he had sustained a serious nerve injury to his left arm, an injury that he did not have prior to going into surgery. The injury was diagnoses as left radial nerve palsy. Since the injury was not associated with, nor in the vicinity of the surgery, the presumption was that the injury occurred during the anesthetist’s care. Moreover, the trial judge found that the injury was sustained while the plaintiff was under the effects of the anesthesia. It therefore followed that the injury occurred in circumstances where the patient/plaintiff was under the care of the anesthetist, albeit while in surgery. The factual issue in dispute was whether or not the injury occurred as a result of compression to the injury area and whether or not that compression could have been prevented. Legal Principle The legal principle of res ipsa loquitur in this case is based on professional medical negligence and the extent to which the anesthetist had a duty of carse either contractually or in tort in using reasonable care and skill for administering anesthesia and for protecting the patient from injury aside from any injury that may be inflicted by or caused by the surgeon’s own conduct or treatment. The anesthesia’s responsibility is obviously only relevant while the patient is under the effects of the anesthesia. Obviously, if the anesthetist failed to use reasonable care and skill and an injury occurred as a result of that negligence he would be liable for the damages associated with the injury under the legal principles of tort and contract. The legal principle involved in this case is therefore, determining whether there was a duty of care, whether that duty of care was breached and whether or not the breach of that duty caused the harm complained of. In other words, in the absence of a reasonable explanation as to how the injury was incurred, the defendant would be liable. The legal principle of res ipsa loquitur therefore functions to ensure that if there is sufficient facts upon which negligence can be inferred, there is a prima facie care requiring an explanation for the defendant wishing to escape liability. Ruling Judge at first instance ruled that although the injury was found to have been inflicted while under the anesthetist’s care by virtue of compression to the area, it was not an injury that was always preventable. Therefore the judge at first instance refused to infer that the anesthetist had been negligent. The Court of Appeal however, ruled that in the absence of a reasonable explanation as to how the compression and the resulting injury was not preventable, negligence was to be inferred. Essentially, the HKC agreed with the findings of the Court of Appeal and ruled that the defendant did not discharge the burden once a prima facie case was established under the res ipsa loquitur principle. The degree of the injury clearly suggest that the while compression and compression injuries might be unpreventable at times, this particular injury was serious enough to suggest that it was not unpreventable and required some explanation from the anesthetist who had primary care of the patient under anesthesia. The only evidence offered by the defendant was speculative in nature and was not supported by infinitive evidence. Specifically, the defendant’s expert offered that special risk factors associated with a patient could make the compression injury serious and unpreventable. However, the HKC found that none of the attending physicians found any special risk factors that could reasonably account for the plaintiff’s injury as a result of the compression. Reasoning The reasoning behind the ruling in this case is to ensure that in circumstances where a patient in incapacitated and is vulnerable to the care of medical professionals, justice will be done. This is entirely important where there is evidence that conduct during the course of treatment to an unconscious patient was serious enough to suggest negligence on the part of the caregiver and the patient cannot give direct evidence of how the injury was sustained. In this regard, the ruling was based on the res ipsa loquitur reasoning that the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to provide a reasonable explanation for how the injury occurred and could not have been prevented. Case Summary: X v Secretary for Justice [2009] HKCU 1039 Lexus Nexus Asia, Unreported Cases. Presiding Judges: Hon Gheugn, Yeun JJA and Wright J. Procedural History: A minor charged with murder made an initial appearance before a Magistrate sitting as a juvenile court. Having appeared several times, the defendant who was duly represented together with the prosecution made an application for the matter to be dealt with by “an adult court in the same magistracy” rather than by the Juvenile Court (X v Secretary for Justice [2009] HKCU 1039). The application was approved by the Permanent Magistrate and the committal proceedings were slated to be conducted by the Court of First Instance of the High Court. However, the presiding Principal Magistrate before the adult court was of the opinion that the committal proceedings ought to be conducted before the Juvenile Court and had the matter returned for that reason. The minor applied for judicial review with the support of the Secretary for Justice. The application for judicial relief asked for a declaration that the permanent magistrate of the Juvenile Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the committal proceedings relative to a minor charged with murder. The judicial review was denied and the Secretary for Justice appealed. Legal Issues There was only one legal issue in this case and it was whether or not the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction to “hear and determine a charge” against a minor (X v Secretary for Justice [2009] HKCU 1039). In this regard the appellant relied on the provisions of the Juvenile Offenders Ordinance 1933 Section 3A(3) which specifically provides that: A juvenile court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine a charge against a child or young person of any offence other than homicide (X v Secretary for Justice [2009] HKCU 1039). The issue was therefore whether or not committal proceedings can be characterized as falling under a hearing or determination of a charge and are therefore forbidden by Section 3A(3) cited above. Facts of the Case There are no historical facts provided in the record of the case aside from the procedural history. This is a trial of a technical point and therefore only the procedural history is relevant and accounts for why factual history is not provided for in the judgment. The only other facts provided for were contained in Writght J’s ruling but only to point out that the case against the defendant minor was not supported by evidence. The defendant was 14 years old when she was indicted for causing the death of her baby but there was no evidence to suggest that the baby was born alive. Legal Principles The legal principle in the case are related to the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts and its intended purpose for providing a separate forum for the adjudication of criminal claims against minors and young persons. There is only one proviso, and that is that the minor or young person is not charged with homicide. However, the legal principle giving rise to a separate court for juveniles engages the issue of whether or not the juvenile court can actually hear preliminary issues relative to a charge of homicide. Ruling Having determined that there is no ambiguity in the text of Section 3A(3) cited above and that it is clear that the juvenile court may not hear and determine a charge against a minor or young person, the court went on to determine whether or not a committal proceeding can be characterized as a hearing and determination of a charge. Having reviewed the literature and previous rulings on the issue the Court came to the conclusion that a committal proceeding did not rise to the level of a hearing or a determination of the charge. Ultimately, the court was of the opinion that Section 3A(3) above can only be interpreted to refer to the final determination of the charge. It would therefore follow that a full hearing on the issues ending with a finding of guilt or innocence is the intended aim of the phrases: “final determination of the charge” and a “hearing of the charge”. Certainly committal proceedings are only meant to determine whether or not there is enough evidence for which to try the defendant minor. Therefore the court ruled that the Juvenile Court did in fact have jurisdiction to conduct committal proceedings relative to a juvenile charged with homicide. Reasoning The court reasoned that committal proceedings were basically evidentiary fact finding missions and were not trials for the determination of guilt or innocence. The only purpose of the committal proceedings was to determine whether or not there was sufficient evidence to charge the defendant. In the case of the juvenile defendant there is no homicide charge for which to deny the juvenile jurisdiction until such time as committal proceedings were conducted. Therefore the prohibition against the Juvenile Court hearing or determining a homicide charge could not arise until such time as committal proceedings determined that there was sufficient evidence to indict the juvenile defendant. The court also reasoned that surely the legislators when implementing the Juvenile Offenders Ordinance did not intend to mandate that the juvenile court could not determine whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support an indictment against a minor or a young person. Read More