Pearl Harbor Bombing - Coursework Example

Pearl Harbor Bombing Introduction On the fateful day of 7th December, 1941, the Japanese Imperial Navy launched an unexpected blitzkrieg on the Pearl Harbor, leaving American 2403 soldiers dead and 1,178 wounded. 68 civilians, too, were killed in the attack. The attack began at 7.55 AM in the morning and was over by 1.00 PM. Pearl Harbor bombing was the first attack of its magnitude after the initial years of the formation of the US. The initial reaction of the Americans to the traumatic defeat of the US hovered around anger and incredulity (Slackman, 1990). A day after the attack, the US declared war on Japan. Due to its massive impact on the foreign and war policy, the attack is also considered a defining moment in the US history. Rightly, President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared December 7, 1941 as the date, country would live in ‘infamy.’ Later ‘Remember Pearl Harbor’ became a universal theme in the wartime propaganda (Slackman, 1990). The Pearl Harbor Pearl Harbor is 10 square miles of navigable water located on the southern coast of Oahu island in Hawaii. It had capacity to hold large warships and submarines. Even prior to the transfer of Pacific Fleet from San Diego on the west coast in 1940, Pearl Harbor was under development as a major naval base. The revamping of the Pearl Harbor had begun in 1936. At the time of attack, the Pearl Harbor was equipped with an industrial plant for repair and maintenance of warships and oil tanks for fuelling purposes. Central to the Harbor was a Naval Air Station for fighter planes. However, facilities Pearl Harbor were grossly inadequate to meet the needs of Fleet and its large manpower. The housing and recreational facilities were grossly inadequate for thousands of sailors, marines, and soldiers even though a massive project was underway for proper accommodation of the Pacific Fleet and thousands of its marines and sailors. The inadequacy of facilities had rendered the Fleet handicapped and vulnerable to attack. As a result, the morale of the forces was on the low ebb. Roosevelt too was convinced of the vulnerability of the Pearl Harbor, but the White House repeatedly ignored warnings and intercepted messages of an impending attack. The Attack The attack was master-minded by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet. The attacking force was immediately commanded by Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. Senior officers ensured that planning was text-book perfect, but Japans limited energy resources was the weakest link in the plan (Maechling, 2000). Consequently, the attack plan was complex and it made little allowance for unexpected developments or errors (Slackman, 1990). On the appointed date, Japan moved six aircraft carriers Akagi, Hiryu,Kaga, Shokaku, Soryu, and Zuikaku, to a position 275 miles north of Hawaii by stealth. They were accompanied by 3 cruisers, 11 destroyers, and 2 battleships. In order to avoid detection and carry out the operation in total secrecy, radio silence was imposed on the ships and only communications was through signal flags (Slackman, 1990). 350 fighter aircraft were pressed into service for the bombings. The first wave of 200 aircraft consisting of torpedo planes, bombers, and fighters began the attack at 7.55 AM. Since it was Sunday, most of the American ships were unmanned and the anchored ships proved to be sitting ducks for the bombers. The raid was carried out in two waves. The first wave, carried out by slow and vulnerable torpedo bombers, was intended to disseminate the American prowess. During the first wave none of the American aircrafts were in a position to take off to defend the Pearl Harbor. The second wave, carried out by 171 bombers, was intended to finish whatever tasks remained unaccomplished in the first wave. Lessons learnt from the first wave were incorporated into the second round, thus, inflicting a greater damage to the American defense assets (Slackman, 1990). On the other hand, by the time the second wave of attacks was carried out, the American anti-aircraft machinery had sprung into action. Almost two-thirds of the Japanese losses were incurred during the second wave of the air raids. The Japanese forces were not in a position to carry out the third attack. The third wave of the air strike would have, after replenishing the bombers, taken a lot of turnaround time. The returning aircraft also would have had to land only at night and the Japanese navy was not equipped with technology to handle operations without daylight. Soon differences emerged amongst senior Japanese officers to continue or discontinue the air raids. But Admiral Yamamoto was prevailed upon to discontinue the operations, a mistake, he is said to have later repented. The Japanese lost between 29 to 60 planes, a few midget submarines and less than 100 men. The total number of US casualties was not known immediately. There was a dispute regarding the total number of navy, marine, and army casualties (Slackman, 1990). Damage to the US armed forces The American losses in bombing were colossal. A total of 18 US ships were hit. Eight battle ships were damaged and destroyed, thus, crippling the Pacific Fleet. 188 planes were destroyed, 159 aircrafts were badly damaged. Five of the battleships—Arizona, West Virginia, Nevada, Oklahoma, and California—were sunk (Slackman, 1990). Three battle ships were badly damaged. California, Utah, West Virginia, and Maryland, though badly damaged, escaped destruction. USS Pennsylvania, and USS Tennessee, less seriously damaged, was rendered temporarily useless. The destruction of USS Arizona accounted for most of navy men and marines dead (Slackman, 1990). The numbers of US planes lost were 162, a figure that differs from often cited 188 (Slackman, 1990). The retaliatory fire by the US forces, brought down many of their own aircraft, including the five trying to land on the USS Enterprise. Significantly, a large number of destroyers of the Pacific Fleet escaped damage as they had been transferred to the Atlantic to protect large American ships from German submarines. Pacific Fleet’s air craft carriers were elsewhere on December 7th. The power stations, maintenance station, submarines, fuel storage tanks and headquarters buildings also remained intact during the attack. The geo-political and economic reasons behind the Pearl Harbor attack Pearl Harbor attack was a decisive blow that plunged the United States into the World War II (Slackman, 1990). The attack marked a climax in a decade long of worsening US-Japan relations. Due to its limited resources, Japan was heavily dependent on minerals, ores and petroleum from the outside world. Tensions were brewing between Japan and the US for some time. The Japanese alliance with Germany and Italy and its occupation of French Indo-China made Roosevelt freeze the Japanese assets in the US and place an embargo on petroleum shipments to the country. By late 1941, America had drawn curtains over all financial and commercial relations with Japan. Japan had interpreted the move as the American preparation for war in the Pacific. President Roosevelt had ordered the transfer of Pacific Fleet to curb a presumed aggression by the Japanese forces. Japan had, in 1937 declared an all out war on China and was rapidly making onslaughts into the Chinese territory. It had also subjugated the Dutch East Indies and had landed up in Malaya. It had throttled supplies to China. Ever since the beginning of the war, China was being supplied essential goods by the US, which was not liked by Japan. Pearl Harbor attack was also aimed at restricting US involvement in the Japanese’s Pacific war theater. Under the Export Control Act, US had halted supply of gasoline, machine tools, etc. to Japan. Yet, another aim of the Japanese attack was to garner, as much as possible, the oil and fuel resources in the Pacific. The Act gave the President enough powers to place an embargo on Japanese supplies without seeming punitive (Maechling, 2000). The attack was also intended to cripple the morale of the US, possibly thwarting its objective of interfering in south-east Asia. The armed forces high command had played a vital role in Japanese moves towards south and a foreign policy orientation toward Germany and Italy. By 1940, Japan had become a member of the Axis powers. Thus, it as the belief of Admiral Yamamoto that the Pacific Fleet had to be destroyed before the Japanese could carry on its adventures in Asia-Pacific. Japan had, for long, held the view that US Navy was the only force in the world that could check or impede its progress. War or no War Pearl Harbor put to rest the debate of the US joining or not joining the war. U. S. military intelligence officers seriously underestimated the skill and training of Japanese pilots as well as the quality and capability of Japanese military equipment (Slackman, 1990). The isolationist movement was on the wane throughout 1941. Whereas majority held the view in the beginning of the year that the US should provide all aid to Great Britain short of war, but by the end of the year 70 percent believed that defeating Nazis was more important than avoiding war (Warren, 1991). The peace negotiations with Japan had nearly ended by November 1941. However, a day prior to the attack, in a communication sent to the President, Japan had expressed its willingness to resume talks. The Aftermath In the aftermath of the attack, it was found that U. S. military intelligence officers seriously underestimated the skill and training of Japanese pilots as well as the quality and capability of Japanese military equipment (Slackman, 1990). Roosevelt appointed a commission of inquiry, to answer the public call for investigation, headed by the Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts. Others in the commission were Major General Frank McCoy, Brigadier General Joseph McNarney, Admiral William Stanley, and Rear Admiral Joseph Reeves. They conducted their investigation by taking testimony from witnesses and principals during December and January in both Washington and Hawaii. Roberts Commission, while censuring the Washington central command, reserved its most damning condemnation for Adm. Husband Kimmel and Gen. Walter Short, the Navy and the Army commanders on Oahu. They were served marching orders. Conclusion Neither can the military and political establishment of the day be held totally responsible for the attack nor can the responsibility of such a massive blunder be laid on a few individuals. Now it may seem that there was a tangible evidence to suggest of the impending attack. But prior to the day of the attack such evidence was shrouded in many layers of information. There was nothing to suggest that out that Pearl Harbor would be singled as a target. The rest, as they say, is history. References Maechling, C. (2000). Pearl Harbor the first energy war. History Today, Vol. 50. Slackman, M. (1990). Target—Pearl Harbor. University of Hawaii Press. Honolulu (US) Warren, S. (1991). Why America slept. National Review, Vol.43. Read More