Americas Involvement in Vietnam - Assignment Example

 America’s Involvement in Vietnam The war in Vietnam demonstrated that there are limitations to a military superpower’s capabilities. This is a lesson the defunct Roman Empire never learned and a similar fate waits America if it continues to repeat the same mistake that was Vietnam. A product of justifications stemming from Cold War and anti-communism sentiments, the Vietnam War became the benchmark by which American military limitations can be measured. From the end of the Cold War in 1989, as symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall, to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.S. was undoubtedly the world’s greatest power militarily, economically and therefore politically. However, this time in which the U.S. operates as the only superpower and therefore the world’s dominant force, known as the ‘unipolar moment’ was first, superficial to begin with and second, fleeting. The Soviet Union’s collapse left the U.S. as the lone superpower and it quickly showed a willingness to operate unilaterally when pursuing its interests. “Those in Washington who believed that superpower status was equal to a unipolar international system justified making decisions without the cumbersome involvement of allies.” (Hogan, 2004 p.2) This unipolar moment was, of course, a myth because a gap has always existed between the U.S.’s military capacity and its capability to control world events to its liking. The U.S. certainly enjoyed and took full political advantage of the widely accepted perception of its unipolar status following the Cold War’s end. It is this perception, this myth that should be examined when attempting to understand the concept of a world superpower and its limitations in an era of globalization. A unipolar world never existed, it was a term made up by observers that only saw the surface effects of the Cold War’s end. The U.S. was also referred to as the first hyperpower by the French but both of these terms are misleading at best and if believed, especially by the U.S., dangerous, as has been shown by the arrogance displayed in the invasion of Iraq. There are other descriptions of the supposed power wielded by the U.S. including ‘leader of the free world’ and ‘indispensable power’ that should be re-thought when defining America’s political position in the world community today. A vast disparity exists between America’s perceived capacity to wage war and its actual capability to twist events in accordance with its ambitions. The potential military power and technological edge the U.S. has over all other nations is not in dispute, however, because it spends more for defense than nearly all of the other nations of the world combined. “An $11 trillion economy that facilitates enormous technological prowess and a defense budget that exceeds the combined total of the next 25 powers should leave no doubt about the potential of the United States.” (Olney, 1990 p.78) The Vietnam War divided the nation along ideological battle lines. The older generation, the ‘establishment’, was of the WWII period and operated under a nationalistic perspective. They believed that to be a true patriot was to blindly follow the authority of the governmental powers that be, to support your ‘country’ even when you thought it was wrong. The young college protesters, the ‘new generation’, the counter-culture redefined this notion of patriotism. They believed that to be truly patriotic was to question the decisions of government and openly dissent when it was judged to be wrong. The philosophical chasm was wide and emotions ran deep on both sides. The protesters and draft-dodgers were thought of as anti-American by the mainstream citizenry who regarded their actions as nothing short of treasonous. This attitude makes one wonder what the ‘greatest generation’ thought they were fighting for during WWII. They fought to defend freedom on foreign soil but were very much opposed to the constitutionally guaranteed right to peacefully assemble in their own country (Bexte, 2002). During the Vietnam era, the neo-conservatism movement expanded due to the political polarization occurring in the country between the anti-war, anti-American sentiments of the counterculture and neo-cons who championed blind patriotism. Neoconservatives were not collectively for the expansion or continuance of the war but they were united in their fear that communism would spread. The term ‘domino theory’ was used quite often by the neo-cons to justify America’s military involvement in Southeast Asia. If Vietnam fell to the communists, they reasoned, the remainder of the region would be systematically consumed by the ‘Red Menace.’ Some of the Vietnam era neo-cons, such as Vice President Dick Cheney, went to the right opposing domestic spending; advocating tax reductions for the wealthy and an attack-first, ask questions later mentality. Though domestic issues were once a rallying point then abandoned by contemporary neo-cons, foreign-policy matters invoked the most emotion therefore attention from this group. They reasoned then, as they do now, that foreign affairs were a more important consideration for national discussion because the very survival of the nation was at stake. “If a domestic policy fails, you can try another. If a foreign policy fails, you may find yourself at war” (Muravchik, 2007). The Vietnam War sharply divided the country but neo-cons, even the ones who were less than hawkish, were always on the defensive regarding the consequences of losing to communism. When war opponents voiced the opinion that communism wasn’t the most imperative concern, that American imperialism and expansionistic tendencies were the big issue, neo-cons were quick to rebuke what they thought was unpatriotic rhetoric. They feared the proliferation of communism and argued this fear was not unfounded. Following the American victory over Japan in 1945, the U.S. and the Soviet Union became engaged in a battle over political ideology and power that played out on a world-wide scale, the Cold War. Communism was America’s enemy and after witnessing the Soviets build a wall in Berlin and continue to aspire to conquer other Eastern European nations, which came to be known as ‘satellite countries’ of the Soviet Union, the U.S. drew a metaphorical line in the sand in Vietnam. Many thousands of ground troops were deployed during the decade-long war despite claims by some, after the atomic bomb destroyed two Japanese cities, that boots on the ground would only be necessary in a clean-up role after ‘the bomb’ was dropped. The debacle of Vietnam was the cause for an anti-military sentiment among the majority of Americans which contributed to the Cold War’s demise. Vietnam also caused America to redefine the purpose of the military and question the extent of its ability to force it’s will in foreign lands such as the jungles of Southeast Asia. America was also forced to question its overall foreign policy philosophy and subsequent strategies. (Hogan, 2006) “U.S. foreign policy, from its abandonment of isolationism at the ending of the 19th century to its status as the sole remaining superpower, has always been centered on the promotion and conservation of its own interests and ‘the advancement of civilization,’ the exercise of power to assert itself beyond the bounds of the American continents in ‘the interest of civilization and of humanity’ and its own selfish interests.” (Olney, 1990 p.86) This re-evaluation period lasted from the mid-1970’s until March of 2003. The hard lesson learned, seemingly, from America’s involvement in Vietnam was that possessing an overwhelming military force does not guarantee victory. Though three million enemies were killed compared to 58,000 on the American side, the ‘big dog’ in the fight eventually had to run home with its tail between its legs, beaten and humiliated. Thanks to the unprecedented media covering the truth of the war, the U.S. rapidly lost credibility worldwide including within the borders of its own country. The war in Iraq has only exacerbated this loss of credibility and has reproved that the belief that a technologically advanced military machine combined with the world’s mightiest economic power is adequate to conquer any enemy is only a dangerous delusion. It was widely assumed following the end of the Cold War that the U.S could act without the approval or cooperation of other nations if it desired when taking any military actions for any reason and that no nation or coalition of nations could effectively intervene. This assumption was, is and always will be incorrect. The U.S. cannot be involved in a unilateral conflict without operating under the constraints of its limited resources and range or without the support of the people in the region it intends to occupy. “In that fictional world, the sole superpower might be tempted to act as if others didn’t matter, while regional powers would strive toward multipolarity but the world can be stable only to the extent that these conflicting tendencies can be balanced.” (Adhikari, 2004) Vietnam was a lesson learned until President Bush and a rubber-stamp congress took office. Had this lesson, that because America is the lone superpower, it is not all- powerful, been learned, the 58,000 American lives lost in Vietnam would not have been a total waste. The war in Vietnam could not have produced a more poignant or pronounced message but has been ignored to the peril of American prestige and respect throughout the world and to its military, economy, security and young soldiers lives. ‘Never again’ was the national mantra following the Vietnam War. It’s shamefully ironic that the generation that lived through the Cold War, even the neo-cons, should have understood this sentiment the most but is the ones that are repeating the same mistake. Works Cited Adhikari, Gautam. “American Power: The End of the Unipolar Myth.” International Herald Tribune / YaleGlobal. (September 27, 2004). December 8, 2007 Bexte, Martina. “The Vietnam War Protests.” Essortment. (2002). December 8, 2007 http://ohoh.essortment.com/vietnamwarprot_rlcz.htm Hogan, David W. Jr. “The Cold War Army.” Centuries of Service The U.S. Army 1775-2004. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, (September 7, 2006). Muravchik, Joshua. “The Past, Present, and Future of Neoconservatism.” Commentary Magazine. (October, 2007). December 8, 2007 Olney, Richard. “Growth of Our Foreign Policy.” The Atlantic Monthly. Vol. 85, N. 509, (March 1990) cited in Niall Ferguson Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire. New York: The Penguin Press, 2004. Read More