The Yom Kippur War - Essay Example

The Yom Kippur War I. Overview As part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Yom Kippur War was a battle in continuation from the 1948 war. Israel captured Egypt's Sinai Peninsula to the Suez Canal, which were the cease-fire line and some parts of the Golan Heights of Syria. Lines of defense were built in both Sinai and the Golan Heights. Israel spent $500 million strengthening its positions on the Suez Canal. Their massive earthworks and defense named after Israeli General Chaim Bar-lev - the Bar-Lev line. (1) The decision of Israel was to be handed over by the U.S, government to the Arab states. The U.S. was informed about the decision but not to hand it over to the Arabs. There was no evidence of receipt neither Egypt nor Syria, who in fact never received the offer. It was kept closely guarded within the government of Israel, which was withdrawn in October 1967. Like anyone who lost a property, Egypt and Syria craved to regain the land they lost during the Six-Day War. Nevertheless, a summit issued the "three no's" resolving there will be "NO peace, NO recognition and NO negotiation with Israel." This is the Khartoum Arab Summit. (2) Convincing allies and non-allies to join you in war is not an easy thing to do not to mention the consequences these entail. The Iraqis turned down the idea of joining the preliminary attack. Syria had a tensed relationship with Iraq, so getting Iraq's aid was unsuccessful. Lebanon was not expected to join the war since they share a border with Israel, not to mention the small army they had. (3) But nevertheless, Sadat did not lose hopes in getting aid from other countries. A few months before the war, Sadat was engaged in a tactful, diplomatic, and suave offensive to try to win support for war. He claimed the support of more than a hundred states. These countries were mostly of the Arab League, Non-Aligned Movement, and Organization of African Unity. He also got the support of Europe and for the first time, Britain and France sided with the Arabs against Israel on the UN Security Council. II. Pre-Event Actions The suave offensive of Sadat, which won the aid of other countries, materialized. Long before the war broke out, the Iraqis transferred a squadron of hunter jets to Egypt. A division of 18,000 men and hundreds of tanks were deployed in the central Golan. Their MiGs began operating on the third day of the war. (4) Kuwait and Saudi Arabia committed their men to battle aside from serving as financial underwriters. A brigade from Saudi of approximately 3000 troops was sent off to Syria where it engaged in fighting to Damascus. Libya sent Egypt a number of Mirage fighters and from 1971-1973, President Muammar Qadaffi gave Cairo more than $1 billion to support their thirst for regaining Egypt and for payment to the weapons delivered by the Soviets. (5) Support came so overwhelmingly. North African countries responded to the thirst of Egypt. Soviet commanded an aid for the frontline states. An armored brigade and 150 tanks were sent by Algeria together with three aircraft squadrons of bombers and fighters. Almost 2000 Tunisian soldiers were deployed along the Nile Delta, 3500 troops from Sudan in southern Egypt and 3 brigades to the front lines from Morocco including 2500 men to Syria. III. The Event On the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria opened a coordinated surprise attack against Israel, which was named "The Yom Kippur War." The warships at par with those of NATO's in Europe were mobilized on the borders of Israel. Israel with approximately 180 tanks surprisingly faced an onslaught of 1400 tanks from Syria and their almost 500 defenders were attacked by 80,000 Egyptians. (6) The Israeli Intelligence, known as one of the most aggressive and successful intelligence networks in history seemed to fail this time. The Arabs had more time in planning the war against Israel. They incorporated a fine use of deception and disinformation to disguise their furiously deadly intent. On the other hand, Israel had been careless on security. They became too confident about themselves thinking that Arabs will not attack because they were not prepared for war, and in case they were, Israelis will definitely defeat them just like before. But their focus on their future opponent was troubled caused by problems in their intelligence network and the urgent need to react to war. Aside from those, they had limited time to prepare since war caught them by surprise right under their very nose. The Arabs' surprise attacks, aside from their flawless use of deception were the factors of their preliminary success. The Israelis, on the other hand, were surprised due to their prevalent issues with the intelligence networks and the lack of observation on the Arab's objective. Their being distracted which took them away from their real enemy and their high regard for their own military capacity was surely their downfall in the attacks of the enemy. With the aid that Egypt received from the other countries helped them a lot in succeeding. Their allies were so passionate at aiding them in battle. Just Jordan's King Hussein was the only one who was not that keen in participating in the battle, though he sent his two best groups on the field - the 40th and the 60th armored brigades to Syria. (7) These units positioned themselves in the southern sector, defending the Amman-Damascus' main route. They attacked Israeli units along the Kuneitra-Sassa road on the 16th of the war month. Artillery batteries form Jordan also took part in the attack. They were carried out by almost 100 war tanks. IV. Missed Indicators Most students of the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 concluded that intelligence failure was the reason that Arabs caught Israel by surprise which led the victory of Arabs. (8) The fact that Israel had limited time to mobilize its troops, it was difficult fro them to conduct a defense tactic when they had the war right under their nose. Being way ahead Israelis gave a great advantage to Arabs. The concept of military intelligence on this war was before war could start, the Arabs must unite, and Egypt would not attack without air dominance. Israel was not aware of the political motives of Sadat. They were too focused on the indicators leading to war. Evidence was noted that Israel was aware of the problems raised by the Agranat Commision. The great dependence they placed on their intelligence network led to their downfall. They were not able to employ curative procedures. You will find reasons in a breakdown of their system and a failure to lead which started a decade ago. V. Lessons Learned One lesson in military tactics is the awareness of the advantage a surprise attack gives. Basing on the Arab-Israel war, Israel was caught by surprise by the Arabs, which gave them limited time to mobilize their defense. As it turned out, the Arabs gained a distinguished military success as they took advantage of the lack of preparedness of Israel. (9) Be prepared. Another lesson here is not to overlook on issues due to high regard of oneself. Superpower countries like U.S., Russia and others, with their highly sophisticated intelligence networks, at times may still have a breakdown in intellectual reasoning. There may be a lot of causes but the principal among them are; the massive volume of information available by the statesman, the number of issues simultaneously before a statesman and the finite amount of time in one statesman's day. These causes played a major part in hiding the truth that Egypt and Syria were preparing attacks in Israel a few hours before the 6th of the war-month, 1973. Do not ignore important issues. One last lesson on this issue is the importance of a good leader. In formulating a National security, a good leader is needed to plan and execute strategically. Sadat on this matter knew what he wanted to do. Considering his country's obvious low capability, he proclaimed his intentions well with diplomatic and suave offensive to win the aid of other nations. This resulted to them acting as one. It was very clear when he stated that he did not want to disarm Israel, but just to get what they once owned. By this, he obtained a consensus, not just within Egypt, not just within Arab community, but the entire world. The fact that he regained his country's dignity and honor makes him a legend today. End Notes (1) K. F Kopets. 2003. "Breaching the Bar-Lev Line". PROCEEDINGS- UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE. 129, no. 1208: 92-95. (2) 2006. "MIDDLE EAST: Arab League Summit, (Khartoum)". Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series. 43, no. 4: 16630A-16630C. 61-66 (3) 2006. "MIDDLE EAST: Arab League Summit, (Khartoum)". Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series. 43, no. 4: 16630A-16630C. 52-54 (4) Wilborn Hampton. War in the Middle East: A Reporter's Story : Black September and the Yom Kippur War. Cambridge, Mass: Candlewick Press, 2007. 109-117 (5) Wilborn Hampton. War in the Middle East: A Reporter's Story : Black September and the Yom Kippur War. Cambridge, Mass: Candlewick Press, 2007. 86-88 (6) Peter Allen. The Yom Kippur War. New York: Scribner, 1982. 14-17 (7) Wilborn Hampton. War in the Middle East: A Reporter's Story : Black September and the Yom Kippur War. Cambridge, Mass: Candlewick Press, 2007. 104-108 (8) Richard H. Gribling. Yom Kippur War: Insights into Operational Theory. School of Advanced Military Studies Monographs. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1988. 32-35 (9) Charles E. Bills Sadat - Interviewed and Analyzed. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 1994. . Bibliography Allen, Peter. The Yom Kippur War. New York: Scribner, 1982. Kopets, K. F. 2003. "Breaching the Bar-Lev Line". PROCEEDINGS- UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE. 129, no. 1208: 92-95. 2006. "MIDDLE EAST: Arab League Summit, (Khartoum)". Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series. 43, no. 4: 16630A-16630C. Hampton, Wilborn. War in the Middle East: A Reporter's Story : Black September and the Yom Kippur War. Cambridge, Mass: Candlewick Press, 2007. Gribling, Richard H. Yom Kippur War: Insights into Operational Theory. School of Advanced Military Studies Monographs. Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College, 1988. Bills, Charles E. Sadat - Interviewed and Analyzed. Ft. Belvoir: Defense Technical Information Center, 1994. . Read More