Abyssinian crisis 1935-1936 - Essay Example

appears here] appears here] appears here] appears here] Who benefited more from the Abyssinian Crisis 1935-1936, Fascist Italy or France Abyssinian Crisis 1935-1936: A Background Benito Mussolini, the fascist ruler of Italy, had a vision for Italian Empire, similar to the Roman Empire, to rule over the Mediterranean and to also take revenge of the Italian defeat at the Battle of Adwa which happened in Ethiopia on March 1, 1896. Mussolini pledged the Italian people "a place in the sun," as England and France who both had large empires at the time had colonial possessions. Ethiopia was a main candidate of this expansionist ambition for several reasons. Following the rush for Africa by the European imperialists it was one of the few remaining independent African nations, and it would serve to merge the Italian-held Eritrea to the north-west and Italian Somaliland to the east. It was thought to be militarily vulnerable, and abundant in resources. Britain's interest lay around Lake Tana and the headwaters of the Abay (Blue Nile). Italy's main interest was in linking Eritrea with Italian Somaliland. France's interest was the territory to be crossed by the railroad from Addis Ababa to Djibouti in French Somaliland. France and other Europeans were not much concerned at the thought of an Italian conquest of part of Abyssinia, given that their own interests were secured. Thus Italy eventually came out as a victor in the Abyssinian War with the major booty with other countries having their trivial share in the pursuit. Italian Invasion The Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928 that drew up the boundaries between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia stated the border was 21 leagues parallel to the Benadir coast. The Italians re-interpreted this to mean 21 nautical leagues, rather than 21 standard leagues, which then gave them greater territory. Acting on this, they built a fort at the Walwal oasis in the Ogaden desert in 1930. In 1934 Ethiopian territorial troops, along with the Anglo-Ethiopian boundary commission, disputed Italy's invasion. The British members of the commission soon withdrew to avoid an international incident. The tensions resulted in a clash that left 150 Ethiopian and 50 Italians dead. The issue was the Abyssinia Crisis tabled at the League of Nations. The League of Nations absolved both the warring parties in September 1935. Italy then started to build its forces on the borders of Ethiopia in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. With an eminent attack, the Emperor Haile Selassie ordered a general mobilization. His new recruits consisted of around 500,000 men, many of whom were armed with primeval weapons such as spears and bows. Others were equipped with more new weapons, including rifles, but many of these were from the late 19th century and as such were often obsolete (Pankhurst, 605-608)1. Abyssinian Crisis 1935-1936: An Introduction The Second Italo-Abyssinian War was a brief war between the Kingdom of Italy and Ethiopia in the early 1930s. It resulted in the occupation of Ethiopia into Italian East Africa. It resulted in the Abyssinia Crisis at the League of Nations, which is often seen as a manifestation of the incompetence of the organization. In 1935, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia while addressing the League of Nations attacked the Italian invasion. On October 3, 1935, Marshal Emilio De Bono moved into Ethiopia from Eritrea without declaration of War. He had 100,000 Italian soldiers and 25,000 Eritrean soldiers under his command. A smaller force, under the command of General Rodolfo Graziani, moved into Ethiopia from Italian Somaliland. By October 6, Adwa fell to De Bono's forces. By October 15, De Bono's forces moved on to capture the capital of Axum. The occupying Italians plundered the Obelisk of Axum after annexing the city. On October 7 although the League of Nations declared Italy as the aggressor however was unable with effective sanctions. The British and French drafted the Hoare-Laval Plan; it highly favored the Italians, and was thus rejected by the Ethiopians. By mid-December, De Bono was replaced by General Pietro. Haile Sellassie decided to try out this new general with an attack; nevertheless his forces were driven back as a result of the Italians' advantage of heavy weapons. On January 20, 1936, the Italians continued the attack at the first battle of Tembien between the Warieu Pass and Mek'ele. The fighting proved indecisive. As well as with modern weapons, Badoglio's troops also employed mustard gas, in both artillery and aerial bombardments. Overall, the Italians used between 300 and 500 tones of mustard gas during the war, in spite of having signed the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The deployment of gas was not limited to the battleground, on the other hand, as civilians were also under attack by the Italians, as part of their attempt to intimidate the local population. Besides, the Italians also used gas attacks on Red Cross camps and ambulances (Sbacchi, 37).2 The Italian armed forces dropped a vast battery of grenades and bombs loaded with mustard gas. The mustard gas was also sprayed directly from above like an "insecticide" onto enemy combatants and villages. Mussolini himself ordered the use of the weapons: "Rome, 27 October '35. A.S.E. Graziani. The use of gas as an ultima ratio to overwhelm enemy resistance and in case of counterattack is authorized. Mussolini." "Rome, 28 December '35. A.S.E. Badoglio. Given the enemy system I have authorized V.E. the use even on a vast scale of any gas and flamethrowers. Mussolini." Mussolini and his generals kept the use of chemical weapons in the maximum secrecy. The orders for the chemical weapons by Mussolini concerning against the Ethiopian population, were very clear: "Rome, 5 June 1936. A.S.E. Graziani. All rebels taken prisoner must be killed. Mussolini." "Rome, 8 July 1936. A.S.E. Graziani. I have authorized once again V.E. to begin and systematically conduct a politics of terror and extermination of the rebels and the complicit population. Without the lex talionis one cannot cure the infection in time. Await confirmation. Mussolini" (Candeloro, 1981).3 The principal part of the work of tyranny was performed by Italians who, in addition the bombs tied with mustard gas, set up forced labor camps, established public gallows, killed captives, and defaced the corpses of their enemies. Graziani ordered the decimation of captured guerrillas by throwing them out of airplanes in mid-flight. Many Italian troops took pleasure photographing next to dead bodies hanging from the gallows or hanging around chests full of detached heads. One incident in the Italian occupation of Ethiopia was the butchery of Ethiopians in February, 1937 which followed upon an attempt to kill Graziani, the Italian Viceroy. During an official ceremony a bomb exploded next to the general. The response from was as he said "Avenge me! Kill them all!" The Black Shirts of the Fascist Militia fired indiscriminately into the Ethiopians present at the ceremony killing large number of people, and immediately after that in the streets of Addis Ababa they killed large number of Ethiopian civilians they encountered. They also set ablaze homes so as to stop the people from leaving and organized the mass killings of groups of 50-100 people (Del Bocca and Rohat, 1996). 4 On March 29, Graziani ordered his forces to firebomb the city of Harar. Two days later, the Italians won the Battle of Maychew. Haile Selassie left the country, and Badoglio's forces took the capital, Addis Ababa, on May 5. Italy took control of Ethiopia on May 7, and the Italian king, Victor Emmanuel III, was declared emperor on May 9. Italy merged Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somaliland into a single state known as Italian East Africa. Abyssinian Crisis 1935-1936: A Background Analysis The history of modern Ethiopia includes the eras of two strong Emperors viz. Menelik II and Haile Selassie. Most analysts agree that "In its extent, its government and its problems, present-day Ethiopia is largely the creation of Emperor Menelik II"(Greenfield, 96).5 On the other hand, The Emperor, Haile Selassie, ruled the empire for about half a century. He centralized his government as well as modernizing. In fact these efforts ultimately instigated the forces required to ruin him and his imperial government. Taking note of the Italian expansionist designs, they made alliance with Menelik to arrive at the Treaty of Uccialli. The treaty was used also to make Menelik new crown more protected and to help his expansion to the south. The southern conquests provided as a means of coffee, gold, ivory and slaves which were sold to acquire more European arms. The treaty gave Eritrea to the Italians and made Ethiopia an Italian colony. When Menelik maintained his policies as to deal with other Europeans, the Italians disapproved. His position was that the treaty meant Ethiopia "may" use the offices of Italy. The Italian version stated that Ethiopia "shall" use those offices. This difference resulted in the battle of Adwa (Sherman, 32) 6 As the Italians moved into Ethiopia, they tried to get help from those local rulers that they had earlier dealings. All of Menelik's leaders except one had been helping the Italians as they advanced. The most important of theses, Duke Markonnen, in fact expressed regret to the Italians after his troops had attacked them since the troops had attacked them without orders. Markonnen and his forces however did join Menelik at Adwa (Greenfield, 120-122). As the battle progressed the Italians were much in disadvantageous position. Their army was greatly outnumbered and was far from its supply bases. They were unaware that Menekik had new French weapons or even how many troops are encountered. They had to attack uphill in a terrain country having very imprecise maps. Moreover, Menelik's agents had assured the Italians that many of the Emperor's troops would be away on 1 March for religious reasons. The Italians, much confident and conceivably relying in the ascendancy of Europeans over natives, attacked on 1 March. All three of their attacking ranks were encircled, the generals in charge of the columns were killed and the entire army was in flight (Greenfield, 123). The immediate impact of Adwa was that all the European powers were beating at the door of the Ethiopians so as to negotiate borders. Menelik now turned his attention to borders. The legalistic and often futile task of defining the borders was embarked on through endless negotiations with the governments that controlled neighboring territories namely Britain, France, Italy, and Egypt. Lines of a sort were drawn, however many of them were without survey and the territories they ran through uncharted (Dugan and Lafore, 30-31). 7 The first to bargain were the Italians who had just been defeated. In 1896, they signed the Addis Ababa Peace Treaty which unexpectedly, gave them an even larger colony in Eritrea. They abandoned the Treaty of Uccialli and paid damages. In 1897 and 1902, Menelik signed treaties with the British which defined borders with British Somaliland and Sudan (Dugan, 31). He also signed treaties with the Italians in 1897 and 1908 which evidently defined part of the border between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. The areas gained by Ethiopia hadn't usually been under Ethiopian control. Nevertheless, as a consequence of Adwa, the Europeans recognized Menelik's claim to them. All of the treaties were intentionally indistinct and conditional on varying interpretations. Differing treaty versions were the beginning for the next war between Ethiopia and Italy (Ottaway, 18). 8 French, British & Italian Interests in Ethiopian Crisis France encouraged Menelik to resist the Italian danger by defining the projected boundaries of his empire. France was anxious to advance her economic interests through the construction of a railroad from Addis Ababa to the city of Djibouti in French Somaliland; she consequently reduced the size of its territorial claims there and recognized Ethiopian sovereignty in the area. Besides attempts on the part of Britain, France, and Italy to gain influence within the empire, Menelik showed a great capacity to play one power off against another, the emperor was able to evade making any considerable concessions. In addition, whilst following his own territorial plans, Menelik joined with France in 1898 to infiltrate Sudan at Fashoda. After Menelik had a disabling stroke in May 1906, his personal control over the empire declined. In fact responding to that weakness Britain, France, and Italy signed the Tripartite Treaty, which declared that the common purpose of the three powers was to preserve the political status quo and to respect each other's interests. Britain's interest lay around Lake Tana and the headwaters of the Abay (Blue Nile). Italy's main interest was in linking Eritrea with Italian Somaliland. France's interest was the territory to be crossed by the railroad from Addis Ababa to Djibouti in French Somaliland. Conclusions Like Britain and France, Italy joined in the so-called "Scramble for Africa" in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the valued territories had been conquered by others and Italy was left with insignificant areas such as Eritrea and Somaliland. The Italians then tried to expand in eastern Africa by joining Abyssinia to her conquests, however in 1896; the Italians were greatly defeated by the Abyssinians at the Battle of Adwa. Nevertheless, this setback did not stop politicians in Italy planning for a new attempt to invade Abyssinia. The League of Nations in 1935 purposely voted to enforce weak sanctions against Fascist Italy for the invasion of Ethiopia. The incursion could've been stopped if the league had voted for an oil embargo on Italy and blocked access for Italian war ships to use the Suez Canal in Egypt. The Italians massacred Ethiopian civilians by using poisonous gas during the war and occupation that lasted until 1942. The weakness of the League of Nations to represent all nations regardless of the fact most member states protected their own national interests and were not committed to the League or its objectives. These failings among others were the reasons for the outbreak of the WW II. Bibliography Candeloro, Giorgio. Storia dell'Italia Moderna, 1981, Feltrinelli. Del Bocca, Angelo and Rohat, Giorgio. I gas di Mussolini, 1996, Editori Riuniti. Dugan, James and Lafore, Laurence. Days of Emperor and Clown: The Italo- Ethiopian War 1935-1936, 1973:10, New York: Doubleday & Co. Greenfield, Richard. Ethiopia: A New Political History, 1965, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers. Ottaway, Marina. Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa, 1982, New York: Praeger Publishers. Pankhurst, Richard. Economic History of Ethiopia, 1968:605-608, Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I University. Sbacchi, Alberto. "The Price of Empire: Towards an Enumeration of Italian Casualties in Ethiopia 1935-1940," in ed. Harold G. Marcus, Ethiopianist Notes, vol. II, No. 2, p.37. Sherman, Richard. Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, 1980, New York: Praeger Publishers. Read More