Ernesto Che Guevara, Latin America - Essay Example

Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, Latin America Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara was one of the outstanding political and social figures in the history of Latin America. During his short lifetime, Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara fought battles on three continents, but he always considered the U.S. government and the economic oligarchy he believed supported it to be his principal enemy. There are different views and opinions on his role and importance in history of Bolivia and Latin America but all historians agree that ‘Che’ Guevara was a real leader, a cult figure and a devoted revolutionist. Near the end of the century, under very different geopolitical circumstances, the United States still ponders the dilemma of armed intervention overseas, something it is now more reluctant to undertake than in the 1960s, when U.S. interests seemed more clearly at stake. Still, as policymakers look at today's military options, the Latin American experience of the 1960s provides important lessons and examples, as we shall see. It also demonstrates the ways the U.S. government operates abroad, even today, and the sometimes conflicting roles of its soldiers, spies, and diplomats. In the 1960s, Guevara was one of the most renowned of guerrilla leaders in an age when they loomed like giants on the world political stage. His ongoing war with Washington pitted U.S. theories of counterinsurgency against Cuba's unique theories of revolution. It also represented a clash of fundamental beliefs (Anderson 161). Cuba's efforts to "export revolution," as U.S. officials put it, threatened U.S. interests and influence, especially in Latin America, and largely accounted for Washington's energetic response. It would be a mistake, however, to assume, as is often done when his story is told, that ideological motivation existed only on ‘Che’ Guevara’s side (Anderson 461). Unquestionably, few, if any, historical figures have displayed more loyal adherence to an ideology than ‘Che’ Guevara, whose dedication to principal is inspirational, regardless of what one feels about his beliefs. He brings to mind early reformers of the Christian church, with his extensive learning, his disregard of worldly rewards, his devotion to an ideal, his despair over the imperfect commitment of colleagues, and his certainty that he would someday become a martyr for the faith, as indeed he did. On the other side, most representatives of the U.S. government overseas have always displayed a powerful ideological commitment, and never more so than during the Cold War years of the 1960s. They are often criticized, in fact, for taking a messianic approach to diplomacy. Their ideology encompasses individualism, personal rights, equal opportunity, popular democracy, and free-enterprise economics, despite whatever gaps may exist at home between ideals and reality (Llosa 45). In Cuba, ‘Che’ Guevara’s legacy is found in spying and high number of suicides among young people, revolutionary ideas of workers and peasants, and their fighting against the government. Today, many young people in Latin America follow his ideas and ideology believing in the guerilla struggle and strike actions. In Cuba, ‘Che’ Guevara’s ideology is still valued and followed by young people who struggle for social transformations and democratic freedoms (Anderson 161). Che’ Guevara’s ideology determines the social processes by which citizens and elites construct democratic state institutional structures through collective forms of organization (political parties, civic associations, social movements). Given the historical, centralized executive control over elections and the checking of the legitimacy of electoral outcomes in single-party regimes. Following Anderson (1998), the most important was “his literary legacy to Cub and a means to ensure that revolutionary principles he stood for survived on the island” (653). Guevara not only had challenged the orthodox communists' attitude toward revolution for nearly a decade but also in the process had incurred widespread hostility. The Congo expedition might have provided Cuba with the revolutionary success it sought, but it had clearly failed. When it did, Havana returned its focus to its home turf (Skoller 13). The Cubans had long made efforts throughout Latin America to create a sustainable revolution, doing so with relatively minor investments of men, training guerrillas from abroad, sending arms overseas, dispatching advisers to nascent rebellions. Nothing had prevailed. Revolutions had been contained and snuffed out by local governments with U.S. assistance, and Castro's efforts seemed, if anything, to prove that the orthodox communists were right (Anderson 399). The Marxist ideals in which ‘Che’ Guevara had such a profound belief were nearly swept off the world scene in 1989 when the Soviet Union and its hegemony in Eastern Europe began to disintegrate. He wrote in The Bolivian Diary (1994): In publicly announcing the first battle of the war, we are establishing what will be our norm: revolutionary truth. Our actions have demonstrated the integrity of our words. We regret the shedding of innocent blood by those who died; but peace cannot be built with mortars and machine guns, as those clowns in braided uniforms would have us believe (34). China remained communist but with a powerful free-enterprise dimension to its economy that would have appalled ‘Che’ Guevara. Cuba generally kept the faith under Castro's rule, but having lost Soviet support, even it began encouraging market capitalism and foreign investment. In much of Latin America, despite considerable improvements, many of the problems that distressed ‘Che’ Guevara remains, extreme poverty, dreadful living conditions, lack of education, enormously inequitable income distribution. Violence has occurred in a number of places, sometimes with revolutionary intent but often mixed heavily with banditry and drug trafficking (Anderson 335). ‘Che’ Guevara’s ideology is followed in Latin America but it is not relevant today. ‘Che’ Guevara was far from a pacifist. But many of the acts required by revolution and counterrevolution should from time to time be recognized as the desperate measures they are and that killing another human being should be understood clearly as an act of great moment. In The Motorcycle Diaries (2003) he rote: “Man, the measure of all things, speaks here through my mouth and narrates in my own language that which my eyes have seen” (23). In this case, American determination to control brushfire wars confronted ‘Che’ Guevara’s determination to create a continental revolution, and in this ‘Che’ Guevara’s represented a distinctly Cuban point of view, one that caused enormous concern not just in Washington but also in Moscow. At a time when the Kremlin looked to "peaceful coexistence" as the best and certainly the safest means of spreading Marxism (Che Guevara (b) 36-37). Havana insisted that violent revolution was the only means of breaking the influence of the "neoimperialist" powers, especially the United States. Guevara, a principal theoretician for the Havana viewpoint, propounded ideas that essentially reflected the actual Cuban revolutionary experience of 1956-59. They believed the imperatives of Marxist revolution to be so strong and so obvious that populations living in difficult circumstances would flock readily to the banner of rebellion. They failed in both places for very different reasons, but in both cases they were blinded to local conditions by their own faith and dogma. In both the cities and the countryside, the rebels enjoyed widespread support that increased as the war continued. Indeed, by the time ‘Che’ Guevara began his march up-country, arms, men, and money were pouring into the rebel command from inside and outside Cuba. Although he faced thousands of soldiers and police in his march, they by then had become highly demoralized. Furthermore, although the mountain rebels often scorned and suspected their colleagues in the far-off cities, the urban allies not only harassed Batista's forces themselves, providing important diversions, but also formed a crucial part of the chain that kept the mountain guerrillas supplied (Anderson 178). Meanwhile, the communists stood aloof until victory was in sight, constantly urging caution and believing the conditions not right for successful revolution. They had counseled prudence even before the rebel force sailed from Mexico, and therein lay a continuing irritant in the relationship between Castro and orthodox communists around the world. The duty of revolutionaries was to make revolution, said the Cubans, not to stand and wait. The communists' calls for careful preparation before attempting armed action seemed to the Cubans to be little more than a mask for timidity. On the other hand, the communists, especially the Kremlin, considered the Cubans impetuous and naive. They thought that Castro and his aides constantly failed to understand the degree of groundwork successful revolution requires and were consequently a danger to the cause--loose cannons, in short (Skoller 16). Also, ‘Che’ Guevara believed that a successful revolution must begin in the countryside, the mountains if possible, not in the cities. Any number, no matter how small, could begin it, keeping a low profile while they accumulated recruits, then increasing their daring and their numbers as the movement gained notoriety through its exploits. Along with Castro and all of the leading Cuban revolutionaries, ‘Che’ Guevara’s believed that even after victory the guerrilla army must dominate the revolution and control the political party, not vice versa. These views are not relevant for modern n world transformed and reshaped by new industrial relations and globalization. He wrote in The Bolivian Diary (1994): In future communiqués we will set forth our revolutionary positions clearly. Today we make an appeal to workers, peasants, intellectuals, to everyone who feels the time has come to confront violence with violence and rescue a country being sold off in great slabs to Yankee monopolies, and raise the standard of living of our people, who grow hungrier every day.(35). ‘Che’ Guevara's literary remains created as much turmoil as his physical ones, causing the declaration of a state of emergency in Bolivia and nearly bringing down the government. The diary found in his rucksack received enormous publicity, especially because the Bolivians used parts of it at once as evidence in the trials of Debray and Bustos, making it clear that they were more than journalists coveting a story. Besides the rugged topography of the steep, deeply cut mountain slopes that drop precipitately to mid-continental plains, the nation borders Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile, and Paraguay, where new insurrections could be kindled. Many observers believe further that the guerrilla camp's proximity to Argentina made the Bolivian location especially attractive to ‘Che’ Guevara because he wanted particularly to see the revolution spread there. Furthermore, Havana believed the Barrientos regime, with its flimsy armed forces and its internal tensions, would be unable to cope with the insurgency. But ‘Che’ Guevara never shared that opinion; to him, the party remained "two-faced and hesitant, to say the least." And indeed, by May 1967 he had heard nothing from it except, he told Castro, that it had expelled from its ranks those youths who had joined his band. Nor would he hear from it further. Finally, after ‘Che’ Guevara’s death and far from Castro, Kolle became bolder, telling the press in February 1968 that "we did not invite Guevara; we did not suggest Bolivian territory as a field for his revolutionary operations; nor did we make any commitment except to express our solidarity when the movement had already broken out” (Anderson 234). I suppose that personal example and charismatic abilities possessed by ‘Che’ Guevara are the main features of his personality appealing to millions of people today. His personal example is still relevant today because it demonstrates courage and heroism, unique way of thinking and political leadership. he valued discipline most of all explaining in his Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War (1998): “The enormous difference between the two groups was clear: ours was disciplined, compact, war-practiced; that of the raw recruits was still suffering the sickness of the first days” (76). It is possible to say that ‘Che’ Guevara is a cult figure for millions of people around the world. His behavior as a cult leader is determined by many factors. Under authoritarian conditions, ‘Che’ Guevara determines the group's goals and gives step-by-step orders so that members are certain about their future. There is evidence that leaders who enjoy the unanimous support of their followers make risker decisions for their group than those who lack such support. Then, this kind of cult leadership has a marked effect on the behavior of the group's members. Millions of people joined ‘Che’ Guevara out of a strong desire to become part of their leader's plan. They fought for freedom and independence, new way of life and political rights. ‘Che’ Guevara is a cult leader because personal judgments of millions of followers became subjected to the ‘Che’ Guevara’s ability to sway and persuade them to give up on their family and belongings with the promise of eventually reaching social improvements. Obviously, then, the absolute power of ‘Che’ Guevara was an important factor that needs consideration. The utopia was an attempt to construct an ideal society and it was the product of the leader’s ideology. The supporting beliefs of cult members for this view provides further confirming evidence for the cult leader's teachings. With the victory won in Cuba, ‘Che’ Guevara wrote a guerrilla manual, La guerra de guerrillas, published in July 1960 with an English version, Guerrilla Warfare, appearing the following year (Anderson 405). A discussion of guerrilla tactics and objectives, the book clearly reflected the views and methods of the Sierra Maestra leadership, putting its thoughts about revolution into a theoretical package. It quickly became prominent in a burgeoning contemporary literature on the subject of guerrilla war that included works by Mao Tse-Tung and Vo Nguyên Giap plus scores of volumes on the techniques of counterinsurgency (Anderson 339). One of ‘Che’ Guevara's most serious problems was political. The uneasy alliance between the Americans and Bolivians was idyllic compared to Guevara's relationship with the Bolivian Communist Party and, indirectly, with Moscow. The Kremlin had long entertained misgivings about Havana's strident views of revolution, its determination that the job of revolutionaries was to make revolution and not wait for favorable conditions. Furthermore, Soviet leaders were certainly not looking for confrontations with the United States in Latin America, a potential result of Havana's constant effort to export revolution to the rest of the hemisphere. In addition, the Cuban implication that the Soviets and their affiliates worldwide lacked revolutionary zeal was extremely annoying (Anderson 128-129). A Soviet official and scholar who has spent a lifetime working on Latin American affairs said that the Communist Party leaders in the Soviet Union and in parties around the world were used to being attacked from (Castaсeda 1997). ‘Che’ Guevara was (is) a real hero and a cult leader promulgating ideas of equality and revolution. Implicit in the leader's dogma is the view that workers and peasants can create a new and more rewarding society that does not make the same kind of demands as they experienced before ‘joining’ this ideology (Llosa 76). They believe that this is possible because they have severed themselves from mainstream religion. The ideology of ‘Che’ Guevara is so appealing to millions of people around the world because it represents a strong reaction against more established groups and regimes. This is why followers perceive themselves as unwilling to compromise their leader's beliefs. This is necessary in order to survive in a authoritarian setting. However, to the extent that the ‘Che’ Guevara beliefs are seemingly untestable, the challenge of a perfect life seems at least demonstrated in principle. There are good reasons for this because one of the most powerful agents of influence used by ‘Che’ Guevara is his focus on the possibility of a better life for all of his followers. Similar to other cult leaders, ‘Che’ Guevara requires sacrifices and commitment. For instance, ‘Che’ Guevara popularity with his men stemmed in part from his bravery verging on recklessness, which caused Castro to caution him more than once against taking too many risks. “Che seemed to be a man who sought death" (Anderson 219). Castro told a journalist years later. Indeed, some of the reports to the CIA remarked upon ‘Che’ Guevara’s courage and also noted his poise and high degree of education, one stating that ‘Che’ Guevara is fairly intellectual for a 'Latino. Many spoke of his omnipresent inhaler to combat asthma, and one described him as physically filthy, "even by the rather low standard of cleanliness prevailing among the Castro forces in the Sierra Maestra" (Anderson 220). ‘Che’ Guevara also fit the age in another way. Like many before it, that age looked forward but also back to times when things were simpler, less corrupted, nobler. Nothing could have been further from ‘Che’ Guevara’s views, dedicated as he was to rigorous personal discipline, which often made him seem dour, even in the eyes of admiring colleagues. The duty of a revolutionary was to create revolution. How it felt had little to do with anything; for the most part, it would probably hurt, and the final reward could easily be violent death. The only thing that would feel good would be the satisfaction of serving the cause. Furthermore, the fruit of the final victory would be a highly disciplined, powerful, centralized state that in fact would prohibit a very great deal. On November 3, less than a month after ‘Che’ Guevara’s death, Soviet Communist Party secretary general Leonid Brezhnev, clearly targeting Cuba's revolutionary theories and ‘Che’ Guevara’s failure, said a socialist revolution should be undertaken only where the necessary objective conditions existed and should be led only by a Marxist vanguard that had mastered all forms of revolutionary struggle (Skoller 16). The world of communist orthodoxy had been offered a perfect opportunity to hack away at the despised mystique of the Sierra Maestra, and it did not intend to miss it. The Soviets especially "were busy running an empire," as Helms put it. While they intended to maintain a base in Cuba, they also intended, if at all possible, to keep Castro in hand, which would certainly be easier after the failure in Bolivia (Tarica 96). The Cuban rebels had another serious disagreement with orthodox communists both in Cuba and abroad. It became dogma among the mountain rebels that the guerrilla army should lead the revolution both during the war and after the victory. Here, they directly contradicted communist theory that held that the army was the tool of the party, not its boss. Castro forced the communists at home to relent on this issue, but neither he nor ‘Che’ Guevara could force the major communist party in Bolivia to do so, thus creating a grave impediment to ‘Che’ Guevara’s insurgency there. ‘Che’ Guevara is so popular in Cube because he increased Cuba's prestige and tightened its relations with Third World nations, stabilized its alliances among Soviet-bloc countries, and improved strained relations with China. Frequently, however, his purpose was to make economic deals, especially with the more advanced communist countries, as relations with the United States, previously Cuba's main customer and supplier, deteriorated and finally collapsed in 1961 (Anderson 192). His diplomatic efforts secured new markets for Cuban sugar, arranged capital and other assistance for new and existing Cuban industries, and established more liberal credit terms with the Soviet bloc than were granted to any other country in the "socialist world. That success would also establish the validity of the Cuban view of revolution, which held that insurgencies needed to be undertaken at once, without waiting indefinitely for proper conditions (Skoller 15). To many Americans, like many others throughout the world, ‘Che’ Guevara had become an icon of revolution. Millions in the West had come to believe that the condition of their society and their government called for revolution or something close to it. Not only was ‘Che’ Guevara’s a dedicated enemy of everything they considered wrong with the United States, the policies he and they believed exploited minorities at home and less developed nations abroad, he was also an itinerant revolutionary, infinitely appealing to a country that harbors a constant admiration, at least in part of its heart, for the unfettered rebel. And rarely did wanderlust and rebellion have stronger appeal in the United States than in the late 1960s, particularly among the country's youth (Anderson 465). This image, which had been around for some time, developed into the national stereotype in when the Revolution abandoned its socialistic pretenses and took a distinctly conservative turn (Tarica 97). In forty years from now ‘Che’ Guevara will be a national leader and hero for Latin American population, but will not have a great impact on the world history. His legacy will alive in guerrilla concepts and revolutionary struggle against the authority, against hatred and inequalities. It is possible to say that one neighbor spying on another will be a part of community life in many countries. The history will remember ‘Che’ Guevara as an example of courage, heroism and bravery. ‘Che’ Guevara will be remembered for his revolutionary ideals and political role in expanding Cuba's influence, which, although smaller than in Castro's dreams, became a reality for a number of years despite the audacity of the idea. For instance, the African connection especially appealed to Cuban leaders in the mid-1960s because they believed that communism could expand there relatively quickly and easily if only they and their African allies could outmaneuver the United States and its "neocolonialist" allies (Anderson 497-498). Furthermore, the enormous efforts that ‘Che’ Guevara, along with Fidel and Raúl Castro, had made to export revolution within their own continent had proved singularly unsuccessful, and although they did not give up on Latin America, Africa seemed to offer a chance to revitalize Cuba's position as a revolutionary force. The history will remember ‘Che’ Guevara for his unique leadership skills and abilities, power and charisma. For instance, ‘Che’ Guevara greatly reinforced the illusion of the power he commanded when, he staged the most spectacular action in the entire campaign; the capture of the town of Samaipata. The guerrillas carried it out with such elán and coordination that observers could not help but be impressed with their skill. Late in the evening, ‘Che’ Guevara blocked the road leading from a combination farm/sawmill to Samaipata, then commandeered a bus, loaded with students, and a truck that happened to pass by (Anderson 723). ‘Che’ Guevara’s figure will not be slipping away into the distance of time and the immediate political significance of the various ways of viewing him. ‘Che’ Guevara’s is not only a national hero, but he is a very great mind as well. Future generations will remember that ‘Che’ Guevara was ‘a ruler’ himself, a great writer because he was a great mind, inspired orator in his proclamations, a leader in his military dispatches, powerful exponent of policy in his innumerable letters, articles and so on. Rebellious feelings therefore will be manifested as alienation from politics and rejection of the father-figure of the revolutionary hero, who symbolized an impossible ideal as well as the forces that made that ideal impossible. The rebel against the authority and a model of a kind of manhood within the reach of most men, became the favored image of Latin American men. Works Cited 1. Anderson, J.L. Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life. Grove Press; 1st Pbk. Ed edition, 1998. 2. Castaсeda, J.G. Compaсero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara. 1997. 3. ’Che” Guevara, E. The Motorcycle Diaries Ocean Press, 2003. 4. “Che” Guevara, E. Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary War. Monthly Review Press, 1998. 5. “Che” Guevara, E. The Bolivian Diary. Pathfinder Press (NY); New Ed edition, 1994. 6. Llosa, A.V. The Che Guevara Myth and the Future of Liberty. Independent Institute, 2006. 7. Skoller, J. The Future's Past: Re-imaging the Cuban Revolution. Afterimage 26 (1999): 13-17. 8. Tarica, E. Fragments of a Dream: Che's Image in Contemporary Bolivian Narrative. Chasqui 32 (2003): 96-99. Read More