Impact of TET Offensive on American Politics - Essay Example

RUNNING HEAD: THE TET OFFENSIVE: VICTORY AND DEFEAT The TET Offensive: A Military Victory in Vietnam and a Political Defeat at Home Name School The Tet Offensive: A Military Victory in Vietnam and a Political Defeat at Home "I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President"1 These words spoken by then President Lyndon Baines Johnson on March 31, 1968, exactly two months after the North Vietnamese launched their boldest campaign of the Vietnam Conflict exemplify how significantly the TET Offensive impacted American politics. The TET offensive was unquestionably a military victory for the United States; however, it also marked the political downfall for Lyndon Johnson causing deep division within the Democratic Party and eliminating all hope for his political victory in the ensuing Presidential election. Johnson, upon assuming the Presidency after the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963, inherited not only Kennedy's social reform policies but also the United States' involvement in Vietnam. He had never wanted to become a 'war president'. His primary objective had been to ensure a legacy of a president who gave his country social reform policies and programs devoted to establishing the 'Great Society' and first three years saw him work almost exclusively towards achieving it.2 This solitary concentration cost him conscientiousness with regard to the Vietnam Conflict. During the first three years Johnson was responsible for establishing groundbreaking strides in the Civil Rights Movement, development of programs to provide training for the poor, such as Job Corps and VISTA, establishment of the Medicare/Medicaid Programs, and creation of educational enrichment programs for disadvantaged children such as Head Start, to name just a few3; Ironically, however, these programs which would come to become an intrinsic part of American society, is not what Johnson is remembered for. He as a President is responsible for leading the United States into the longest period of continuous armed battle in its history - The Vietnam Conflict. His major downfall was caused by the very social programs he was passionate about, which left him little time to assume the active role of Commander in Chief. In simpler words, he underestimated the commitment and investment that were necessary for launching a sustained Vietnam Conflict.4 Although the TET offensive is hailed by many as the turning point of the war, its political ramifications were laid years earlier. During an address at John Hopkins University in 1965, LBJ stated "We fight because we must fight it [the Vietnam Conflict] if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny. And only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure".5 In fact, the United States' entry into Vietnam was anything but altruistic in nature. America involved itself for purely political motives, and in Johnson's defense the events leading up to it did predate his presidency. However, he escalated the political stakes and ultimately lost. The war in Vietnam was not a war of major battle engagements, although at times there were some. Vietnam was more of guerrilla warfare. There were neither defined battle lines nor set plans. With the Vietcong's endless manpower supply, they were able; it seemed, to hold America, the 'super power' at bay indefinitely. By February of 1966 General Westmoreland asked for a significant increase in manpower. What had begun as several thousand American soldiers had by this time escalated to over 400,000 combatants in Vietnam with no end in sight. Johnson, at this point, began to see his folly. He was stuck. On one hand he had to finance an ever increasing international war and on the other, his domestic commitment to social reform program, the Great Society. With no scope to compromise, he was trying to balance between the American public's acceptance and his power to exert his will upon them. Although he had avowed that no tax increase would be necessitated by his social reforms during his 1967 State of the Union Address, LBJ did just that; a six percent tax surcharge. Almost simultaneously Johnson and his cabinet members came to the realization that the war in Vietnam could not be won by 'staying the course'. They could withdraw and attempt to find a settlement as best they could or boldly push forward knowing the victory was not assured even with a phenomenal increase in manpower and dollars. Johnson could not accept either, as he was concerned about the world's perception of him as a strong leader. Acknowledging the risks involved, financially and human resources wise, he decided to continue with the war effort and kept in blind the American public of its the true cost, both in dollars and in lives. By 1968 America was growing tired of the Vietnam Conflict. The Vietcong matched the American buildup man for man. At this point, there were half million soldiers in Vietnam and had been countless deaths without reporting. Public support was waning; polls were showing the growing displeasure of the American populous. Privately, the Secretary of Defense Clifford revealed to the president that he foresaw no end to the war or to the continued loss of American soldiers if they continued fighting in the manner they were.6 Johnson knew finally at this point that something had to be done and quickly. The year 1968 saw elections and he needed to shore up support. He gathered his advisors and top military leaders and they devised a concerted effort to assure the American public that they had gained the upper hand and were in control of South Vietnam. Victory was in sight was their domestic battle cry. Unfortunately for Johnson, the North Vietnamese government had other plans in mind. At approximately 3:00 am January 31, 1968 the Vietcong launched simultaneous attacks on all major cities in the north portion of South Vietnam. This strategic plan, which came to be known as the TET Offensive, set the tone for American politics for years to follow.7 The simultaneous attack on the embassy and other major cities and towns throughout northern South Vietnam should not have come as a shock to American military personnel. Rumors had long been circulating that North Vietnam was planning an attack. Although warned, no one seemed to heed the warning. Capitalizing on this surprise tactic and having been planning the offensive since 1967, the North Vietnamese efficiently and effectively stunned the world.8 The Americans and South Vietnamese quickly regained control of the cities within days and their casualties were few in comparison to the losses suffered by the Vietcong.9 The military victory of the United States in the Tet Offensive was displayed in the speed with which all the captured cities were regained within a matter of days and the Vietcong army was decimated with a ratio of death of 30 to 40 Vietcong killed for every American soldier killed.10 The key factor that made the Tet Offensive political death for Johnson was the fabrication he built to mislead the American public on the true cost of the war both in lives and in dollars and he had purposeful deceit time and again. The TET Offensive almost immediately preceded his most recent campaign of misrepresentation. Furthermore, days after the Tet Offensive it was leaked to the media that another 200,000 troops had been requested for deployment to Vietnam. Johnson had just told the public that the end of the war was in sight and it became evident to all that this was not the case. Furthermore, it was even more evident to the American public that Johnson had known that all along. In an attempt to preserve his social programs which had he had been forced to neglect because of the Vietnam Conflict and still justify that the tax increases he had promised would never occur, Johnson was once again underestimating that he was politically decimated by the Tet Offensive. Although the Vietnam War would rage on for more than 5 years, the Tet Offensive was the turning point of the war. The bloody attack televised live while Americans watched in horror changed the course of history and Johnson's hope for reelection. With the words of Johnson still reverberating in the American public's ears that victory was eminent and that the North Vietnamese had been virtually annihilated, the Tet Offensive proved to be his political demise while at the same timing being a major military victory for the United States.11 Even though militarily defeated in the Tet Offensive, the Vietcong, themselves, viewed the Tet Offensive as a victory. The United States had never bothered to understand the psyche of these people. If they had, perhaps Johnson's political and military advisors would have been better able to advise him. Ho Chi Minh when asked about TET and the conflict in general said "the Americans can pour in 1 million troops, that the war can last 20 years, that many enterprises in Hanoi and Haiphong can be destroyed--but there's no reason to be afraid. He mobilized the country around his saying that nothing is more precious than independence and freedom. The Tet Offensive was key to our victory. The attack was meant to get the Americans to the negotiating table. Ho was always fighting with the goal of negotiating an American withdrawal. In 1966, Ho told me that only when we can defeat the B-52 bombers over Hanoi will the U.S. withdraw"12 Johnson had been politically out-maneuvered and the result was his political demise. The North Vietnamese government and Ho Chi Minh, in particular, had understood that American politics do not always end at the shoreline of the country and he successfully orchestrated the political fall of the leader of one of the world's super powers.13 Vietnam was the first war brought home to the American public on a daily basis. Journalist were everywhere throughout the country, television crews filmed battles, Photojournalists snapped pictures that will forever stay etched in the psyche of the American people. Often the media has been blamed, at least in part, for the loss in Vietnam. Although reporting was not always accurate or even fair perhaps, the media was not responsible for the Vietnam Conflict or for the demise of Johnson's political career, as some would argue. One of the most poignant moments of the war however was captured soon after the Tet Offensive was launched: The images of the American embassy under seize and the stark contrast between the fierce fighting during TET and the optimistic estimates and reports emanating from Washington in the period just prior to the attacks led to the interpretation of the TET offensives as a political and moral defeat for the United States. Although there was much confusion in the first few hours after the Tet Offensive was launched by the North Vietnamese, the media 'got it mostly right' in the reporting of the events surrounding the Vietnam Conflict and we would be remiss in blaming the media for the demise of Lyndon Johnson. He himself set the stage for that. He misled the public, withheld from the American citizens over and over what was truly required to successfully defeat the North Vietnamese, and under estimated the will and resilience of the Vietnamese people. No one thing in life is independent of the world surrounding it. Such is the case with the Vietnam Conflict. As tumultuous as the 1960's were in Vietnam, so was the conflict and cultural upheaval occurring in the United States during the same time period. The Civil Rights Movement was in full swing. Dr Martin Luther King while the battle was raging 10,000 miles away was calling for a peaceful solution at home for the racial inequality prevalent at the time. Women's Liberation was also at the forefront on the domestic front. Bra burnings were a woman's call for equality and liberation from her seeming "oppression". As the 1960's progressed so did the war in Vietnam, both with equally devastating consequences. In March of 1968 Dr. Martin Luther King, orator of the famous 'I have a Dream Speech' was shot and killed in Memphis. It seems the upheavals caused by the growing dissatisfaction with the Vietnam Conflict were spilling into the streets of America. The same week Johnson announced to the world that he would not seek reelection. Several months later Robert Kennedy was murdered by Sirhan, Sirhan. Barely two months apart had the two of the major spokemen for the Democratic Party been silenced forever.14 Although their deaths can not be attributed directly to the Tet Offensive, the void left in the Democratic Party by Johnson succumbing to the fallout of the Tet Offensive shattered whatever hope the Democratic Party had of maintain control of the White House in the 1968 Presidential Elections. Not only had the TET Offensive virtually sealed the fate of Lyndon Johnson, but it had more far reaching implications for the entire Democratic Political Party. There was so much derision during this tumultuous period of American History. Social upheaval and protest were appearing to become the norm as opposed to the exception it once was. An example of how far reaching the political defeat of not just Johnson but for his entire party was, as exemplified through the Democratic National Convention held in 1968 months after the TET Offensive. The view was one of disarray; there was widespread protesting in the street while police made innumerable arrests. The Democratic Party made a spectacle of itself on nationwide television only further convincing the public that the division in party left no room for election of a Democratic hopeful in 1968. So out of array was the party at this point that during the course of the convention a delegate even nominated a live pig for the Democratic candidate.15 The entire convention was a travesty. The party was in a complete shambles. Not only had TET devastated Johnson's chance for reelection it almost destroyed an entire party with the infighting and petty rivalries that resulted from the lack of a strong and upright leadership. Throughout the entire upheaval caused by Johnson's political demise and the splintering of the Democratic Party, if any American group could have been seen to have benefited from the aftermath of the Tet Offensive it would be the Republican Party and in particular Richard Nixon, the Republican candidate for President. In the days and months following the Tet Offensive and again after Johnson's Renunciation speech in March of 1968, the Republican Party made every attempt to take full advantage of the political disarray of the Democrats. To capitalize on Johnson's political fall caused by the Tet Offensive McCarthy made reference to Johnson's inability to assure the public that the American Embassy in Saigon was secure let alone assure them that victory had been at hand. Johnson had, after publicly stating he would not seek re-election, worked steadfastly at trying to secure a peaceful resolution to the Vietnam Conflict. He had come to terms with the fact that his political career had come to an end, but in his defense Johnson work steadfastly, albeit late, to end the war that most Americans at this point felt should never had begun. The North Vietnamese government, as they had displayed throughout the conflict, was well aware of the political implications of each and every one of their actions. Throughout the negotiations process, they utilized public relations and delay tactics in an attempt to time any proposed peace settlement to their advantage. North Vietnam understood much more than America saw how they were able to influence American politics. This was shown first in their strategic implementation of the Tet Offensive, but was also exemplified in their later negotiations with Johnson to establish a potential peace dialogue process. At all costs, North Vietnam did not want Richard Nixon elected president. They understood that his staunch anti communist stance would be detrimental to their cause. However, even with their delays in negotiating for peace talks, even the Vietnamese had underestimated how all encompassing the political defeat of Johnson and the Democratic Party had been. Even with their indirect assistance, the damage was too great. No Democrat would come close to the White House in 1968. LBJ's departure from the 1968 election had left a void that needed to be filled. Vice-president Humphrey would become the party's candidate, but what a tumultuous road to get there. Robert Kennedy at this time was observing the political division. Whether to run or not, he vacillated back and forth. On one hand he felt he could fill the shoes of his brother John F. Kennedy, but again he would, if he ran, almost have to speak out against his early policies which had lead Johnson down the road to political defeat. The problem became moot when Sirhan shot Robert Kennedy June 5, 1968. Two powerful American leaders had been killed within a few months of each other - King and Kennedy. The political unrest did not end at the party lines. Unrest was felt at every facet of American lives during this time. Riots on campus protesting the war; movie stars flying to North Vietnam to have the pictures taken; burning draft cards; race riots; the sexual revolution; so much was happening so fast within the United States. Change was being called for. A change in the policy on the war and a change in the way we viewed each other. The Tet Offensive was the cumulative effect of years of political maneuvering and planning on the part of the North Vietnamese. Victory was assured militarily, but just as assuredly that single event forever changed Lyndon Baines Johnson's political aspirations and, more far reaching, the TET Offensive nearly destroyed an entire political party. "In a war of pacification, winning battles was not enough; you also had to win the population's hearts and minds. If you did not, each victory in battle would only be the prelude to further battles, and at the end, when you left, all your work would be washed away by the contrary will of the local people, as happened in Vietnam".16 And if I may add, here at home as well. Word count: 2995 References Berman, L. (1993). Coming to Grips with Lyndon Johnson's War. Diplomatic History, 17:4, 519 - 538. Retrieved November 24, 2005, from Academic Search Premier Database. DeMailo, A. S. (1993). Tet: First in.. American Heritage, 44:4, 32. Retrieved November 24, 2005, from Academic Search Premier Database. Giap, V. N. (1999). Ho, the Communist in Chief. Newsweek, 133:10, 60. Retrieved November 24, 2005, from Academic Search Premier Database. Goldman, P. (1998). The Year it all fell apart. Newsweek, 131:23, 51. Retrieved November 24, 2005, from Academic Search Premier Database. The Great Society Holds Promise for America. (n.d.). Social Studies Help Center. Retrieved November 25, 2005, from http://www.socialstudieshelp.com/Lesson_104_LBJ.htm Hanson, V. D. (2001). The Meaning of Tet. American Heritage, 52:3, 44 - 56. Retrieved November 24, 2005, from Academic Search Premier Database Johnson, L. B. (1964). The Great Society Speech. Address to University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Accessed from americanrheteric.com Retrieved November 26, 2005 from http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/lbjthegreatsociety.htm Johnson, L. B. (1968). Renunciation Speech. Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1968-69, I:170, 469 - 476. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1970. Accessed November 24, 2005 University of Texas Library. Last updated February 18, 2002. Retrieved November 24, 2005 from http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/680331.asp Johnson, L. B. (1965). Why are we at War. Address to John Hopkins University Series "Peace without Conquest" from Department of State Bulletin. Michigan State University. Retrieved November 16, 2005, from http://coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/hst306/documents/johnson.html Kimball, W. F. (2004). All Politics is International. Diplomatic History. Blackwell Publishing Limited, 575 - 580. Retrieved November 24, 2005, from Academic Search Premier Database. Oberdorfer, D. (2004). Tet: Who won Smithsonian, 35:8, 117 - 123. Retrieved November 24, 2005, from Academic Search Premier Database. Schell, J. (2003). Learning the Obvious. Nation, 277:10, 8. Retrieved November 14, 2005, From Academic Search Premier Database. Small, M. (2004). The Election of 1968. Diplomatic History, 511 - 528. Blackwell Publishing Limited. Retrieved November 24, 2005, from Academic Search Premier Database. Walton, J. (2004). The Tet Offensive: The Turning Point of the Vietnam War. OAH Magazine of History, 18:5, 45 - 51. 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