Consequences of Monroe Doctrine - Essay Example

MONROE DOCTRINE 2006 Introduction The Monroe Doctrine is probably one of most long-living political documents in history of world international politics. For more that 150 years it was the core of U.S. Foreign policy and analysts believe that is still has serious influence of international policies of the U.S. The Monroe doctrine and its various interpretations are the key to understanding contemporary political course of the U.S. not only in Western Hemisphere, but also in the entire world. The Monroe Doctrine was expressed by President James Monroe in 1823 within his annual address to the Congress. The main idea of Monroe's message was the following: until European powers doest not interfere with the U.S. interests in Western Hemisphere, the United States would not interfere with European spheres of interest in Eastern Hemisphere. In a nut shell the Doctrine stated that, "The United States would not interfere in European wars or internal affairs, and expected Europe to stay out of American affairs." (Monroe Doctrine, 1823). Authors of the Doctrine emphasized that the document must be viewed as anti-colonialist proclamation intended to prevent further colonization of South and Latin American countries by European states, such as Spain, France and Russian Empire. In its turn, the U.S. planned to maintain neutral position in any clash taking place in Europe or European colonies in Eastern Hemisphere. Consequently, any military conflict taking place between a European country and its former colony in Americas would be viewed as action hostile toward the U.S.: "But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintain it, and whose independence we have acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States" (Monroe Doctrine, 1823). Apparently, the Doctrine was an adequate response to the political situation in Western Hemisphere. In 1815 the Spanish Empire in the New World collapsed. During only 7 years, from 1815 to 1822, Chile, Peru, Colombia and Argentina fought their independence. These newly emerged states sought for the U.S. recognition of their independence, and public opinion in the U.S. was mainly positive on this issue (Dent, 1999). At the same time the U.S. had negotiations with Spain trying to purchase Florida. The negotiations were successful, and once Florida was purchased the Monroe administration recognized Chile, Argentina, Peru, Mexico and Colombia. Apparently, this step may be considered as the first sign of new U.S. policy in Western Hemisphere. Europe immediately reacted to the U.S. behaviour. France and Spain joined together in an effort to restore their lost influence on American colonies. This effort was opposed by the UK government which was not willing to allow France regain its former influence in America: "All the work of Wolfe, Chatham and other eighteenth-century British statesmen to get France out of the New World would be undone, and France would again be a power in the Americas"(Monroe Doctrine, 2005). Yet, support of the Holy Alliance (Prussia, Austria and Russia) was strong enough for the U.S. and UK to seriously consider the threat. Seeking support in its attempts to keep France out of Americas - the result of nearly century of UK efforts - British government proposed to the U.S to ally and warn off both Spain and France from new interventions in the New World. However, the attitude of U.S. government toward the UK proposal was ambiguous with T. Jefferson and J. Madison, Monroe's renowned predecessors, supporting it and John Q. Adams, Secretary of the State, opposing it mostly due to concern that Mexico intended to extend its influence to Oregon and also due to recent diplomatic conflict with the Russian Empire (over the northwest coast of North America). During the meeting of Cabinet that took place on November 7, 1823, Adams convinced the other statesmen to conduct independent policy in the region instead of allying with the UK (May, 1975). Consequently, on December 2, 1823, President Monroe expressed what became known as the Monroe Doctrine. Main Discussion The Monroe Doctrine did not pass any ratification of the Congress at the legislative level; nor did it obtain a place in international law. Even the term 'Monroe Doctrine' became widely used and recognized only 30 years after President Monroe's address in 1823. However, this fact did not prevent the Doctrine from becoming an exceptionally important factor in American foreign policy over the following three decades. The first use of the doctrine - still unnamed document - dates back to year 1836 when UK tried to ally with Texas. The U.S. objected this alliance citing the principles enunciated by President Monroe (Gilderus, 2002). The next occasion when the U.S. government referred to the Doctrine took place in 1845 when UK and France made attempts to stop U.S. annexation of Texas, while other European powers expressed certain plans for Yucatn. President's James Polk annual address to the Congress reasserted the main principles of Monroe Doctrine claiming that these principles had to be strictly enforced by the U.S. (Dent, 1999). Over the decades that followed Monroe Doctrine has been applied several times to prevent European intrusion into American affairs. In 1852 Monroe's principles were used to remove Spain from Cuban island, while in the middle of 1860's the Doctrine backed up American opposition against attempts of Napoleon III of France to extend French influence to Mexico. Subsequently Monroe Doctrine has been re-interpreted and extended to further reinforce political status of the U.S. in Western Hemisphere. One of the first serious extensions to the Doctrine dates back to the 1870's when President Ulysses S. Grant stated that the country would object any attempt of a European country to transfer its American colonies to another European country. Furthermore, in 1895 Richard Olney, U.S. Secretary of State added to the Monroe Doctrine the right to mediate any disputes over borders between South American states (Dent, 1999). In the beginning of 20th century Argentina became the first American country other than the U.S. to officially support major principles of Monroe Doctrine. D. Drago, the Foreign Minister of Argentina, denied the right of European states to use military power against American nations to collect debts (Dent, 1999). However, the most important interpretation of Monroe Doctrine was made in 1904 by President Theodore Roosevelt. The Roosevelt Corollary proclaimed the right of the U.S. to make interventions. In fact, the Corollary provided a license for the U.S. to practice its own form of colonialism (Collin, 1990). Consequences Apparently, Monroe Doctrine had a number of short-term consequences for both European and American nations. As for the nature of those consequences, they were mainly positive for American nations and mostly negative for European states. European states influenced by the Doctrine included Spain, France, Great Britain and Russia. At the time President Monroe expressed the U.S. attitude to European presence in Western Hemisphere, the country did not have any means to back it up. Obviously, the reasons for expressing such statement should have been deeper than anti-colonialist orientation of the U.S. Perhaps, the most important hidden reason was economic dominance in the region: "The Monroe Doctrine also served to express U.S. interest in increasing its trade with the other countries of the Western Hemisphere." (Gilderhus, 2002). Economic factors help understand why Monroe Doctrine was not opposed by Great Britain. With trade being the most important factor in Britain's international policy, Britain supporting independence of American nations was the most logical step of British government under that circumstances: "As free republics, the Spanish-American nations traded with the United Kingdom. If they became colonies again, whether of Spain or of France, their trade with the United Kingdom would certainly be cut down"( Gilderhus, 2002). Favourable position of the UK toward Monroe Doctrine was based protection of the country's own interests and was absolutely reasonable. Britain's support of the U.S. position is considered to be among the most important reasons the British Empire survived and flourished throughout the 19th century since "it met British interests as well as those of the United States and, for the next 100 years, it was secured by the backing of the Royal Navy." (Monroe Doctrine, 2005). Military support and several serious sacrifices (for example, refusal of alliance with then independent Texas in 1836 and staying out of Oregon in the late 1840th) made by Britain were intended to ensure observance of Monroe Doctrine by European nations. Numerous effects of the Monroe Doctrine on Latin American nations can hardly be overlooked. In the first quarter of 19th century Latin American colonies struggled for their independence from European monopolies. Despite their declarations of independence, these countries desperately lacked the military strength to support the declarations with effective actions. Although conjunctive mood can hardly apply to history, some of the newly proclaimed independent Latin American states would not protect their independence without Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. effort to keep European powers out of Americas seriously reduced the threat of military clash between the colonies and monopolies and made it possible for the new states to focus upon economic and political development (Dent, 1999). Although the outcomes of independence from European powers turned out to be different for Latin American nations (for example, while Argentina rapidly developed into a prosperous and stable state, Peru remained fragmented and poor over the next 150 years), the overall result of Monroe Doctrine still seemed to be positive. But for the Doctrine, the situation in Latin American might have been similar to the situation in Africa were the whole continent remained torn up between European nations up to the middle of 20th century. Although the U.S. often used the Doctrine to justify its own interventions in the region, those interventions were hardly as dangerous and damaging for Latin American countries as interventions of European states might have been. While the short-term consequences of Monroe Doctrine inspire little doubt, the long-term consequences of this document still have to be thoroughly analyzed and understood. The ways Monroe Doctrine has been applied and interpreted over the 20th century continue to cause intensive debates and disagreement. Many politicians, especially European and Soviet, labelled the policy conducted by the U.S. within the framework of Monroe Doctrine as isolationist claiming that the Doctrine turned into a declaration of hegemony of the U.S. in Western Hemisphere. This opinion was backed up with statistics: over the period from 1846 to the late 1980th the U.S. has undertaken around 30 military operations and 47 hidden interventions of various kinds in practically all Latin American states (Smith, 1994). Over the course of the Cold War, the Doctrine principles formed the core of U.S. policy in Latin America. However, while in the 19th century Monroe Doctrine was used to stop further colonization of the region and secure trades, in the 20th century the goal of U.S. government was entirely different: to prevent spread of Communism. President John F. Kennedy's statement pronounced on August 29, 1962 perfectly illustrated this goal: "The Monroe Doctrine means what it has meant since President Monroe and John Quincy Adams enunciated it, and that is that we would oppose a foreign power extending its power to the Western Hemisphere, and that is why we oppose what is happening in Cuba today. That is why we have cut off our trade. That is why we worked in the OAS and in other ways to isolate the Communist menace in Cuba. That is why we will continue to give a good deal of our effort and attention to it" (Kennedy, 1962). Using this approach the U.S. provided military support to American states trying to prevent Communism from taking root in Latin and South America. Chile, Dominican Republic and Nicaragua became the most known examples of the U.S. struggle against Communist threat in the region. With all adversities and controversies the Doctrine was arguably the major factor in turning the U.S. into the leading power at the international political scene. Since European countries were not allowed to exercise their influence in the Americas, the U.S. obtained a unique opportunity to play the role of the "big brother" for a wide range of Latin and South American nations. The U.S. took advantage of the opportunity: over the 19th - 20th century the country extended its influence to cover practically all American states, with the only exception of Cuba. Moreover, this extension of influence was gradual and reasonable enough for the U.S. not to be viewed as enemy by those states: although some Latin American countries labelled the U.S. as a bully interfering with their domestic affairs, the U.S. still remained the authority to be asked for mediation when any conflict occurred in Western Hemisphere (May, 1975). The U.S. obtained priceless experience of how to extend its influence to other states and only waited for a chance to apply the new knowledge. The chance came in the 20th century that became the turning point in the political history of the United States. Two World Wars and the Soviet revolution depleted economic and political strength of European countries, while the United States increased its economic potential and, as a result, political influence in both hemispheres. Consequently, by the end of World War II the United States turned out to be the leading power in the world: neither the Soviets that played the major role in Hitler's defeat but suffered unprecedented human and material losses, nor totally devastated Germany could compete American power. The disparity between the USSR and the United States was literally striking by the end of War. The mere fact that the United States had nuclear weapons was enough to implement any policy: aircraft-carriers and long-range attack bombers made it possible to destroy any country across the world while no one could reach the United States (Glynn, 1992). Evidently, the Soviets - second leading world power - could not accept the military and economic advantage of a capitalist state, especially after such difficult victory over Germany. As a result, the end of 1940s and the 1950s saw unmatched technological, economic and political competition between the two powers: communist and capitalist. And probably, it was the experience brought by decades of implementation of Monroe Doctrine that helped America win the Cold War by conducting craftier foreign policy: the experience and knowledge obtained while conquering Western Hemisphere - the experience that the Soviet's lacked - turned out to be effective in Eastern Hemisphere as well. As it has already been mentioned, Monroe Doctrine is a very controversial set of principles, especially when it is viewed from the European perspective. Some view it as the U.S. attempt to establish and justify its hegemony in the world, oppress other nations. However, from the U.S. perspective Monroe Doctrine is the set of principles that allowed the country to become the leading political and economic power in the world and successfully maintain its international positions up to date. REFERENCES Collin, Richard H. (1990). Theodore Roosevelt's Caribbean: The Panama Canal, The Monroe Doctrine, and the Latin American Context, Baton Rouge, Louisiana Dent, David W. (1999) The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine A Reference Guide to U.S. Involvement in Latin America and the Caribbean, Greenwood Press Glynn, Patrick (1992), Closing Pandora's Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War, Cleveland World Publishing Company Gilderhus, Mark T. (2002) Monroe Doctrine. World Book Multimedia Encyclopaedia JFK Press Conference, August 29, 1962, retrieved January 16, 2006 from http://www.jfklibrary.org/jfk_press_conference_620829.html May, Ernest R. (1975), The Making of the Monroe Doctrine, Harvard Univ. Press Monroe Doctrine; December 2, 1823 [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/monroe.htm] Monroe Doctrine. Wikipedia free encyclopedia [retrieved January 15, 2006 from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monroe_Doctrine ] Rappaport, Armin, ed. (1976) The Monroe Doctrine, Krieger Pub. Co. Smith, G. (1994) The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993, Read More