The History of Arab-Israeli Conflict - Essay Example

The history of Arab-Israeli conflict Was the Oslo peace agreement failure Why Much has been said and discussed in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Much has also been written as for the Oslo Accord and their role in the resolution of the conflict. The aim of this work is to reflect upon the consequences and the reasons of failure of the Oslo agreement process. The main conclusion is that Oslo peaceful agreement has really become total failure, but its flaws should be taken as lessons to be accounted in the future peace processes. Introduction In order to understand the implications, which the Oslo process brought in it, it is necessary to give a short background for the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The 26 years of Israeli occupation were the period, preceding the signed Oslo agreement (usually called Oslo Accord). These 26 years are divided into the two different periods: the first period is called 'easy conquest'1. It was the period, during which Israel kept around 15,000 of military occupiers at the Palestinian territory. This number was drastically increased during the period of Intifada, and according to various estimates, the number of Israeli troops at that time was more than 180,000; but in the period of 1981-83, the new rules of governing Palestinian people were implemented, and the indirect ruling was replaced by the Israeli manpower, which had to govern Palestinians at each level. This was the beginning of perception, that Palestinians didn't feel free and safe on their territory anymore, and thus the need of peaceful resolution was becoming more and more evident. What we see at present - are the consequences of the flawed process of Oslo agreement, which has been built in the wrong direction from the very beginning. We have here to understand, what were the backgrounds of such agreement, and why Palestinians have not accepted it as the means of finding a common solution to their problem, as through the literary sources reviewed, Palestinians are depicted as the victims of the unfair attitudes, stated in Oslo Accord. The flaws of Oslo Accord and its failure as a means of finding peaceful agreement The consequences - violent confrontation, disproportionally massive Israeli repression and widespread Palestinian rebellion followed by the great loss of life, the majority of which is also Palestinian,2 are the examples of the situations witnessing the final stage of Oslo process failure. This process is stated to be flawed from the very beginning. 'Oslo was designed to segregate the Palestinians in non-contiguous enclaves, surrounded by Israeli-controlled borders, with settlements and settlement roads punctuating and essentially violating the territories' integrity, expropriations and house demolitions proceeding inexorably through the Rabin, Peres, Netanyahu and Barak administrations along with the expansion and multiplication of settlements (200,000 Israeli Jews added to Jerusalem, 200,000 more in Gaza and the West Bank), military occupation continuing, and every tiny step taken toward Palestinian sovereignty -- including agreements to withdraw in minuscule, agreed-upon phases -- stymied, delayed, cancelled at Israel's will'.3 I suppose that Oslo process has displayed a number of serious flaws, each of which has contributed into its failure, and thus is to be considered separately. The first flaw of the Oslo Accord and the peace process in general was in the fact that this very process has presupposed long period of 'mini-withdrawals' of the Israeli military occupiers, but only in exchange of Palestinian 'silence'.4 The core of this flaw is in the suggestion and unreal idea that Palestine would easily give up its attempts to win its territory and thus Israeli would have free opportunity to continue its occupation; but this belief was absolutely unreal. The second flaw was in the fact, that Oslo agreement implied Palestinians had to prove to the Israeli state, that they could be trusted, in exchange for certain small rewards. 5 This idea was stated by Aruri (2000)6 as simultaneously humiliating, illusory and patronizing, as the Palestinian citizens had to gain Israeli trust on a daily basis, without feeling absolutely safe, they had to be one-side responsible to Israel. Illusion lay in the false assumption that peace could exist between the occupiers and the people, which were occupied by them. The core proof of failure of the Oslo agreement was in the fact, that Palestine was not supposed to be the equal partner of Israel - the agreement has not changed the status of both countries, and Palestine still remained inferior. The handshake of Rabin and Arafat was the act of idealism, and in fact both of them have never believed that Oslo agreement would outbreak the harmony between the two nations; probably, this was another flaw of the peaceful process. Not only failed the Oslo Accord to restrain terrorism, but on the contrary, has become the driver of the new terrorist outburst. No one argues that Oslo process was a serious step forward in the attempt to set peace, but it had to be designed in the absolutely different way to bring success and benefits to both parties. This collapse may also be taken as the opportunity for re-assessment of the events which took place at that time and the re-assessment of the Oslo Accord itself through the prism of human rights and International Law. Peace agreements between Israel and Palestine were noted to 'neutralize international law'7. Both the agreements and the procedures of adopting these agreements were the signs of the negligence towards the main statutes of the international law. The main proof of this assumption is clearly seen through reading the Oslo Accord itself - 'The Fourth Geneva Convention, for example, forbids an occupying power from building settlements in territory it has conquered. Had international law been a basis for Oslo, the Palestinians could have insisted the settlements-all of them, including those in East Jerusalem-be dismantled. Yet Israel insisted that everything be negotiated.' 8 It was a serious mistake, and as it has been already stated, Israel in this process has been given a ruling and prevailing power, while any negotiations usually presuppose equality of parties. The Accord has not provided the clear method of resolving the disagreements between Israel and Palestine. It was stated, that the parties should have to resolve any arising disputes between themselves, which meant that with Palestine being the weaker party, it didn't have at least a chance to resolve the matter for its benefit, and even if it had one, the agreement completely neutralized it. There are the four main issues to be discussed and resolved by Israel and Palestine - security questions, Jerusalem status, the refugees' status and settlements' expansion. Of course, there are also other matters, among which are underwater resources and freedom of movement, but the first four are of extreme importance. In relation to these problems, another serious flaw was made - the discussion of them was postponed to the final stage of negotiations, and though stated to begin in March 1996, this final stage is yet to begin.9 On the other side of the problem, is the condition, that resolution of these matters if arising for Israeli, were left for its complete competence, while in case such problems were to solved for Palestine, this process was to be held through numerous joint committees, and the decisions had to be unanimous. It was another display of inequality between the parties. In fact, I should note, that the core of Oslo Agreement failure was in this inequality, though displayed in various separate aspects, which are described in this work. Israel was given a veto right in all the committees, which had to resolve various disputes for Palestine - this meant, that using this right Israel could block the adoption of any laws necessary for Palestine but non-beneficial for Israel. The fact that the discussion of the major issues has been left to be negotiated at the later stage, meant that Israel could exercise its unlimited power in relation to those issue through the indefinite period of time, which of course didn't satisfy the Palestinians. 'The agreements had no mechanism for enforcement or even monitoring of compliance. When Palestinians violated the agreements (for example, by not doing enough to prevent attacks by individuals within or coming from the areas under their control), Israel had a wide variety of sanctions to apply against them'.10 In fact, Palestine has been put into compromising position - as long as it acted against its own nation and according to the Israeli demands - it could have special rewards, privileges (financial, legislative, judicial, etc.), and this was another sign of Oslo peaceful process failure. Again, Palestine was admitted as an inferior party, which has to accept the conditions of Israel, and was not given any rights. The failure of Oslo agreement has also displayed itself through the following aspects: giving greater role to the real politics, than to the international law and human rights, it failed to adopt conditions, which are universal and are to be followed by all parties; it failed to reject the violence and actually imposed military means of influence on the side of the Israeli state; it failed to come down to the most serious issues, creating the agreement, which initially had not been perceived by Palestinians as the way to peace. The Oslo Accord failed to preserve the stated integrity of Gaza and the West Bank - while the negations were lasting till their break in 2001, Israel was able to expand its settlements, creating a picture of 'freezing' their building.11 Simultaneously, the euphoria, which took place immediately after 1993, was quickly destroyed by realization that Oslo agreement would not be able to lead to the economic stability of the Palestinian nation - not only was Palestinian people absolutely dependent on the Israeli job market, but their incomes have one quarter decreased since the Oslo agreement had been signed.12 Yes, Oslo agreement was complete failure, but as any notion, it should not be looked at as unilaterally negative. There are certain facts, which may smooth this negative impression, though it will hardly contribute into the welfare of Palestinian and Israeli people. First of all, though completely flawed from the very beginning, the mere fact that such step has been undertaken, after so many years of opposition, may be supposed to be a historical fact. This agreement has led to realization of the Palestinian state as the one, which strives for independence, and has led it onto the world arena with its requirements and suggestions for peace. Oslo peace process may be called failure to the extent, which led to the collapse of the general peace movement, but it has given a number of serious lessons to be accounted in the similar actions - the principal of which is that 'In protracted conflicts it is not sufficient to only detail the beginning of the process; it is important, and perhaps essential to reach agreement on at least the principles of longer-term final or permanent status issues. ...'13 This is why Oslo Accord is now supposed to be failure - not only for the reasons described, but for the fact that being so actively promoted at the very beginning, it has been left to operate independently from other world processes, coming to absolute disagreement between the two parties and thus causing collapse. It was a failure because it has not led to any improvements in the life of both countries, not only Palestinians. It is evident, that in any conflicts, especially those which last for decades, both parties search for the solution which would be beneficial for them, but Oslo Agreement has not become this mutually beneficial solution, and had to be re-directed or re-considered. It was a failure, as its statements could be interpreted in many different meanings, especially in the part related to the Jewish settlements.14 Moreover, aimed at ceasing violence in the East, the peace process has only caused more terrorist acts, the victims of which were common citizens. This may be supposed to be its main failure, as being connected to the life of general population. Conclusion The work has represented the opinion of the author, based on the literary sources related to the topic, as for why Oslo agreement process has become the failure to bring peace to Middle East. As it is widely admitted that Oslo process has been a failure from the very beginning, and the main its participants never believed in its success, it is also necessary to understand, that the failure of this peace process lay in the fact that the process, which had to be constantly controlled, was not led to the logical end, as well as the equality of both parties, as required for negotiations was not promoted. Thus, Oslo Accord has not only failed to create peace between Israel and Palestine, but has even worsened the situation - in economic, political and social aspects of the Palestinians' life. It failed to stop terrorism and has not given Palestine any hope for the solution which would be beneficial for the country - letting Israel have all powers to rule Palestinian people. The process has not been designed to work properly and despite all attempts has finally collapsed in 2001. The task is now to create other suggestions for the peace in the Middle East, not forgetting the lessons which Oslo peace process has given us. These lessons are not only valuable in acquired through the human lives' price, but being used correctly may save even more lives than it may be expected. The present task for both leaders of the conflicting countries is to understand that any peace process should go 'through people', which was not characteristic of the previous Oslo agreement process. People didn't take part in the implementation of the process as well as the decisions taken during it. Oslo Accord plays major historical role, and its meaning should never be underestimated in future similar processes. Bibliography Aruri, Naseer. "Oslo: Cover for Territorial Conquest". International Socialist Review 15 (2000): 29-39 Baskin, Gershon. The Oslo Peace Process - Lessons Learned. http://www.mideastweb.org/log/archives/00000017.htm (accessed 05 November, 2006) Ben-Efrat, Roni. "Oslo Accord Contains Only Cosmetic Changes". Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (1995): 85 Halper, Jeff. "No Return To Oslo". Information Brief (2001): 62-64 Hijab, Nadia. "Limitations to Oslo Accords". Socialism and Democracy (2002): 27-32 Klung, Tony. "Why Oslo Died". Jewish Chronicle (2001): 24-29 Kuttab, Jonathan and Ateek, Naim. "Land For Peace An Analysis of What Went Wrong". Witness (2000): 13-22 Rubner, Michael. "Review Essay: The Oslo Peace Process through Three Lenses". Middle East Policy Council Journal 6 (1998): 8 Said, Edward. "The End of Oslo". Al-Ahram Weekly 503 (2000): 12-15 Shanak, Israel. "Oslo Agreement Makes PLO Israel's Enforcer". Washington Report in Middle East Affairs (November 1993): 7-16 Read More