The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay Madison - Essay Example

Federalist Paper # 10 The Federalist Papers were a series of articles written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. Madison, widely recognized as the Father of the Constitution, would later go on to become President of the United States. Jay would become the first Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court. Hamilton would serve in the Cabinet and become a major force in setting economic policy for the US (The Federalist Papers 1997). Federalist Paper No. 10 is an essay by James Madison and the tenth of the Federalist Papers, a series arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. It was published on November 22, 1787, under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all the Federalist Papers were published. The essay is the most famous of the Federalist Papers and among the most highly regarded of all American political writings (qtd from Federalist No. 10 2005). Federalist Paper No. 10 addresses the question of how to guard against "factions," groups of citizens with interests contrary to the rights of others or the interests of the whole community (Federalist No. 10 2005). Madison defines "factions" as a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community (Madison 1787). Madison begins his essay by arguing that a well-constructed Union can have the tendency to break and control the violence of faction. Moreover, he continues that instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations (Madison 1787). Madison takes the position that there are two ways to limit the damage caused by faction: removing the causes of faction or controlling its effects. He contends that there are two ways to remove the causes that provoke the development of factions. One, the elimination of liberty, he rejects as unacceptable (Federalist No. 10 2005). The other, creating a society unified in view and interest, he sees as impractical because the causes of faction, among them variant economic interests, are inherent in a free society. Madison concludes that the damage caused by faction can be limited only by controlling its effects (Federalist No. 10 2005). He continues to argue that Liberty is necessary to its survival. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. However, it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it breeds faction, than it would be to wish the extinction of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency (Madison 1787). As long as the connection subsists between man's reason and man's self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a give-and-take influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will connect themselves. The variety in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an undefeatable barrier to an equality of interests (Madison 1787). By controlling its effects in order to secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed (Madison 1787). A republic, Madison writes, differs from a democracy in that its government is delegated to representatives, and because of this, it can be extended over a larger area. The fact that a republic can encompass larger areas and populations is strength of that form of government (Federal No. 10, 2005). Madison believes that larger societies will have a greater variety of diverse parties and interest groups, which in competition will be less likely to yield a majority faction. This is a general application of the checks and balances principle, which is central to the American constitutional system. In conclusion, Madison emphasizes that the greater size of the Union will allow for more successful governments than were the states to remain more independent (Federal No. 10, 2005). Madison was chiefly worried that interest groups and political parties would purposely force their political resolve on others. Concerns about the rich people taking manage of the interest groups and as a result spread their ideas leaving the poor unable to support the interest and concerns sufficiently and efficiently (Kehoe 2005). This also relates to current American politics, some influential factions are trying to force their political will on others indirectly by means of electioneering. Today, factions are referred to as interest or lobbying groups. Electing and Re-electing politicians, who embrace their cause, into public office is one of the important part of the modern day factions' goal. Many factions help candidates financially and get their members out to vote for them (Kehoe 2005). Lobbyist groups also try to pressure government policy by lobbying and filing court cases to pressure Congressmen to agree or disagree with a particular bill (Kehoe 2005). Another concern by Madison was that influential factions might not have bigger power on the community because of their failure to spread the ideas to people and eventually add more membership. James Madison felt that due to the huge size of the nation and the lack of obtainable long-distance communication, people will have difficulties to organize and make efforts to get heard (Kehoe 2005). This could hold true for quite some time since then, but with advent of mass transit, new technology in communications, people are able to spread their ideas quickly. More interest groups were able to organize than what the founding fathers might have thought. Consequently, these interest groups were able to form, organized with huge number of memberships, and therefore increase their financial backings. Madison was also concerned about the likelihood of disorder, ineffectiveness, and slow down of the government processes. The government process slow down due to varied reasons; one of which is partisan bickering, but on the other side of the coin, factions can contribute in expediting government process by providing congressmen with well-studied information, suggestions in laws, and a working relation with state and local public officials. Moreover, James Madison also believe that when factions kept each other's goals in check, political leaders would be able to follow common goal for the nation's good (Kehoe 2005). Despite of the problems that may be cause by factions, nevertheless, Madison recognizes the role of factions in connecting the citizens with the authority. Citizens will increase their interest on lobbying groups as their faith in the political parties diminishes due to too much political strife. Today both the political parties and interest groups are related to each other despite having to serve different goals (Kehoe 2005). References "Federalist No. 10." (2005). Wikipedia. Retrieved Nov. 14, 2005, from Wikimedia. Web site:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federalist_No._10. Kehoe, Michelle. (2005). Political Parties and Interest Groups. Retrieved Nov. 14, 2005, from Michelle Kehoe. Web site:http://virtual.yosemite.cc.ca.us/mkehoe.html. Madison, James. (1787, Nov. 23) The Federal Papers No.10. Daily Advertiser. "The Federalist Papers." (1997). Retrieved Nov. 14, 2005, from James P. Callison and The University of Oklahoma Law Center. Web site:http://www.law.ou. edu/hist/federalist/ Read More