Custer's Death Wish at the Battle of Little Bighorn - Essay Example

Custer's Death Wish at the Battle of Little Bighorn Custer's Death Wish at the Battle of Little Bighorn Mention General George Custer and it will conjure up images of a buckskin clad Indian fighter, guns blazing, courageously protecting the good people of the Missouri Territory. This picture of the American frontier and its fierce independence has endured for over a century. Yet, revisiting the Battle of Little Bighorn and a rational evaluation of the event reveals Custer to be more reckless than courageous, and more interested in glory than victory. Though Army preparation was less than adequate, Custer failed in his position to compensate and allow for the disadvantages that he had going into the Battle of Little Bighorn on June 25, 1876. His over-zealous approach, arrogant attitude, and egotistical need for glory led an inexperienced and exhausted 7th Cavalry onto a battlefield of unknown terrain to fight an enemy of unknown size. As the sun set, Little Bighorn was littered with the remains of 220 under-equipped and unsupplied soldiers that Custer led to their death. The Battle of Little Bighorn may not have been winnable, but under Custer's command it was a certain death sentence and a complete failure. The preparation for the Battle of the Little Bighorn began at Fort Abraham Lincoln as early as the Fall of 1875. Here, the Army made two errors that would later prove fatal. The troops provided were inexperienced and had reportedly had been in only one previous Indian skirmish. Though the choice of soldiers may not have been Custer's, their mental and physical preparation was the ultimate responsibility of the field commander. According to a 1909 interview with Second Lieutenant Winfield S. Edgerly, "...[N]o one expected the Indians would make a stand anywhere and fight." (as cited in Hammer, 1990, p. 53). He further illuminates Custer's attitude toward the ensuing battle when he contends, "Custer's idea was that Indians would scatter and run in all directions" (as cited in Hammer, 1990, p. 53). Custer failed to instil a realistic sense of battle into his men by glorifying and trivialising the task at hand. The second Army blunder was to underestimate the strength of the Indian force, causing Custer to make hasty battle movements without proper anticipation of the danger that he was riding into. The final estimation places the Indian force at between 5000 and 8000 warriors. Due to Indian agents' desire to inflate reservation populations and maximise government-sponsored goods, the Army initially estimated that there were only about 1000 Indians off the reservation (Fox, 1993, p. 233). Yet, once again, it was Custer who failed to adjust and conceive the most rudimentary battlefield planning. Though the Army had miscalculated the Indian force, Custer was warned of the impending size of the opposition as estimates began to rise when Custer's scouts reported a larger force as early as June 22 (Fox, 1993, p. 233). The reconnaissance issue also includes a failure to adequately scout the terrain on which the regiment was planning on waging their attack. Three hours before the battle, Benteen reported that there were "hills on all sides" (as cited in Sklenar, 2000, p. 115). Yet, Custer pressed on not only into unfavourable, but also unknown terrain. The area where Custer died provided a poor defensive position and gave the adversary a distinct advantage (Fox, 1993, p. 231). The hills where Custer's men were situated were sloping and cut with deep ravines, forcing the men to dismount and take up defensive positions (Bereit, 2000). The overwhelming strength of the Indians allowed them to repeatedly stampede Custer's position. When Custer reached within 15 miles of the Little Bighorn, Mitch Bouyer, the mixed-blood scout, reported to Custer that the force was the largest he had ever seen assembled (Fox, 1993, p. 233). Bloody Knife, an Ankara scout, agreed. However, Custer berated Bouyer for his cowardice and ignored his scouts' intelligence. At this point, Custer makes one of the greatest battlefield errors in history. In a misguided attempt to encircle the Indians, he divides his battalions. Custer turned a difficult and outnumbered situation into a hopelessly defensive handicap. According to Bereit, "Most analysts, whether Custer fans or critics, agree that the principal cause of the defeat was Custer's dividing of his force in the face of an enemy of unknown size..." The division of the battalions has long been considered as a crucial factor in Custer's failure. The main force was divided once into the three columns for advance, and then again into three battalions for the final attack. The Sioux concentrated their main forces, once against Crook's column, sending it into retreat, and then again against Custer's. Custer also miscalculated the timing. At the campaign level, Custer's obsession with speed caused him to arrive two days before Terry at the decisive point, and then took the alternative to attack immediately. At the battalion level, Benteen's initial sweep to the south brought his 120 men to the battlefield too late to have any impact on the outcome of the battle. There is much controversy surrounding the issue of whether or not Custer disobeyed Terry's orders. The issue is ambiguous due to the mixed signals in Terry's written commands and the uncertainty of any verbal exchanges. On the one hand he gives Custer very specific suggestions, but stops short of issuing it as an order. He signals to Custer that he (Custer) is in charge and able to make his own decisions when he says, "It is, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, [...] the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders..." (General Terry's written orders). Even given the benefit of the doubt that Custer had followed orders, it would in no way lessen the bad judgement and disregard for his men that Custer exhibited before and on the battlefield. Custer failed his men by taking an overly optimistic approach to the battle and lulling them into a sense of false confidence. He failed to properly account for their inexperience and Custer offered them no helpful leadership. Custer had arrived in the area of the Little Bighorn two days ahead of schedule by tiring and overextending his unit. Bereit, 2000, gives this account of Custer's gruelling schedule; Based on Custer's own estimate of distance and speed of 25-30 miles per day, the rendezvous was to be made on 26 June. However, on the 24th, Custer increased the normal rate to 40 miles by travelling well into the night. This was for no tactical purpose as he was already ahead of schedule. It merely gave Custer the opportunity to enter the battle without the presence of the ranking General Terry. This accelerated schedule left the men weary and hungry. The horses were exhausted, yet Custer chose to travel an additional 12 miles after only a short rest (Bereit, 2000). By this time, Bouyer and Bloody Knife had reported seeing campfires from a large Indian village on the west bank of the Little Bighorn River. Logistics, or lack of it, was another error that Custer invoked upon his helpless unit. Some factors were out of the control of Custer. Smith cites an article in the July 6, 1876 New York Times that says the The US Congress's failure to provide money to build permanent forts on the Yellowstone river were part of the cause of Custer's failure. Permanent posts would have greatly improved the supply capabilities of the campaign by extending the reach some 400 miles (as cited in Smith, 2004). One decision that was Custer's was his order to box all of the sabres and leave them aboard the supply ship, the Far West (Bereit, 2000). Custer was obsessed with pursuit and as Custer increased the speed of his march, he left the baggage train and reserve ammunition far to the rear. In Custer's haste to get to the battlefield, he made yet one more crucial error in judgement. In Terry's report to General Sheridan, July 1876, Terry recounts, "I offered Custer the battery of Gatling guns but he declined it saying that it might embarrass him: that he was strong enough without it" (as cited in Spartacus, 2006). He further reported that he offered to bring Gibbon's Cavalry and go with Custer. However, the over-confident Custer once again declined, as Terry recounts," ...he would prefer his own regiment alone. [...] [H]e expressed the utmost confidence that he had all the force that he could need" (as cited in Spartacus, 2006). The lack of manpower, weapons, and supplies left to the rear were things directly attributable to Custer and his hasty lack of preparation. The stories of Custer as the great Indian fighter have been retold over the years and have become legend. Indian accounts of the battle help confirm that Custer and his men fought bravely and with honour. Sitting Bull, in later years, would still maintain, "Those men who came with 'Long Hair' were as good men as ever fought" (as cited in Debo, 1970, p. 238). Yet, many of these stories were woven as a way for the Indians to show respect for their enemy and to assert that they had beaten a worthy opponent. Curry, 2000, further contends that, "... [T]ribal leaders were likely trying to salve white pride during sensitive treaty negotiations". Americans also had a self-interest in protecting the honour and dignity of their dead. Recent studies, however, may refute some of these age-old myths and cast a truer light on the events that took place on that ill-fated battlefield. Anticipating an easy victory, Custer was caught off guard and placed on the defensive. Fox argues that his command completely collapsed. "I have no doubt they fought, but it was total chaos, no organisation. I'm sure some didn't fight. There was no organisation, and that's disintegration in military terms. Everyone was acting on their own behalf" (as cited in Curry, 2000). In the end, confusion replaced the gallantry and we are left with a battlefield of panic with nowhere to run and nowhere to hide. The myth of the Boy General George Custer as a courageous Indian fighter and Civil War hero will live on as the legends are told and retold. However, modern social and political thinking have demanded a more critical and objective examination of the Battle of Little Bighorn and the events that led up to it. At every turn we see Custer squandering the opportunity to face reality. He fails to adjust for the Army's inaccurate estimation of the Indian force. He fails to compensate for his men's inexperience and leads them into battle exhausted and over-confident. He rejects Terry's offer of manpower and Gatling guns as "an embarrassment". He outpaces his necessary supply wagons in an over eager attempt to engage the Indians. His battlefield strategy of dividing his strength was his final military debacle. Custer's Last Stand was not only Custer's death wish. It was also the Last Stand for the brave men of the 7th Cavalry that Custer blindly and needlessly led to their death. References Bereit, R. M. (2000). Light, lean, and lethal. Air Force Journal of Logistics, 24(3). Curry, A. (2000, July 24). Custer's bluster: His courageous last stand may be a figment. U.S. News and World Report. Retrieved August 24, 2006, from http://www.usnews.com/usnews/doubleissue/mysteries/custer.htm Debo, Angie. A history of the Indians of the United States. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970. Fox, R. A. (1993). Archaeology, History, and Custer's last battle: The Little Bighorn reexamined. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. General Terry's written orders to George Custer (n.d.). Retrieved August 23, 2006, from http://www.lbha.org/Research/terryord.htm Hammer, K. M. (1990). Custer in '76: Walter Camp's notes on the Custer fight. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Sklenar, L. (2000). To hell with honor: Custer and the Little Bighorn. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Smith, D. J. (2004). Military disasters. Retrieved August 23, 2006, from http://www.smithsrisca.demon.co.uk/HE1milit.html Spartacus Educational (2006). Retrieved August 23, 2006, from http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/WWterry.htm Read More