The Relationship between Campaign Contributions and Voting in Congress - Research Paper Example

? The relationship between campaign contributions and voting in congress Introduction Despite the various works on the influence of campaign donations to a politician’s behaviour, the nagging concern on whether contributions alter the way politicians vote or even the contributions amount to support of like-minded individuals still lingers unresolved. Regardless of the large number of studies regarding positive correlation between contributions and congressional voting behaviour the question on whether contributions “buy” votes in congress remain unanswered. Nevertheless, the paper tries to assess the causal link between contributions at the time of campaign and politicians’ voting behaviour; however, the correlations never characterize valuable estimates of the impact of the monetary gifts on polling trends because donations given at the time of campaign are internally determined by various factors like a legislator’s beliefs. Special interest contributions can flow to politicians who intrinsically value the same policy outcomes, but the contributions may have insignificant political behaviour once a politician is elected in office. One cornerstone of the argument presented in the various studies is the notion that campaign contributions are essentially concerned with affecting election outcomes and that donations are for the most part not meant to buy votes. However, donations are used by various groups in trying to influence ideological positions closer to congress regarding the ideal perception for the interest group (Bronars & Lott, 1995). According to Wawro (2001), efforts to reform campaign finance laws result from the belief that campaign contributions have pernicious effect on politician behaviour with a recent survey showing that 53% of individual believed campaign contributions influence policies of elected officials. Researchers commit many resources in an attempt to uncover the relationship between campaign donations and political decision making with some studies showing nor relationship while others find the sort of relationship that worry reformers. One vexing problem involves the difficulty of untangling the influence of donations from the effect of a politician’s tendency to vote in a certain way. Therefore, PAC (Political Action Committees) contribute to members of the congress in a way likely for the politicians to vote the way PACs favour even without contributions. PAC donation to friendly members may be construed as cause for the members to vote in a certain way when in fact the member would have voted the same way without the donation. The extensive research on the issues has not produced consistent results that indicate that campaign contributions influence congress members’ voting behaviour (Wawro, 2001). Despite the common knowledge that campaign contributions of interest groups have far less influence that commonly thought; systematic examination of literature reveals various studies that establish connection between monetary donations and votes. Findings from various studies indicate several significant qualifications to the common knowledge that monetary donations do in fact sway how elected representatives vote. The findings are however subject to variations in model specification because there is less significant link in certain research model specifications such results are nevertheless common in better models. Clearly, monetary donations are linked with voting that favour the donor’s interests; nevertheless, any attempt to conclude autonomous sway on legislators has to fully account for the complexities of the relationships involved. That of great importance is the propensity for PACs to give money to affiliates who are disposed to favour their position; for instance, liberal groups back their own associates who come from liberal constituencies resulting in them voting generously while the opposite applies to conservatives (Roscoe & Jenkins, 2005; US Congress votes on trade, 2011). The pattern suggest that it is the legislator’s belief, party membership and district and not the contributions that truly drive their voting behaviour; hence, to some extent the situation of “friendly giving” is true, contributions rarely have independent influence on voting. According to Roscoe and Jenkins (2005), contributions do not lead politicians to vote in a different way than they would without the contribution. However, it is argued that political donations are used in gaining, or maintaining access, or even mobilising friendly legislators to lobby colleagues, or change the language of a bill particularly at the committee stage (Roscoe & Jenkins, 2005). There are various reasons why it is hard to pin down the role of campaign contributions one being the connection between money and votes goes in both direction because contributors use money to influence votes as well as electoral outcomes. Through manipulating poll outcomes, special interest groups make it easy for lawmakers who have similar position as the groups on essential issues to be able to represent the positions in legislature. While some individuals may argue that votes are bought obliquely, the impact of monetary donations on votes is less direct and weak and does not lead representatives to poll in a different way than they would normally have polled. Therefore, disentangling the relation between donations and votes is complicated by the fact both variables are potentially internal. Another reason involves the difficulty of clarifying the relation between contribution and votes as well as the role the donations in establishing that votes hinge on the context where the voting occurs. Contributors never expect congresspersons to vote in favour of their position in every issue, but rather on those matters of great significance to them. However, the contributors require a legislator’s vote when the outcome of a bill hangs in the balance; moreover, in critical cases, a legislator vote depends not only on the received contributions, but also on contributions of various special interest collections and the likelihood of the legislator confronting an electoral repercussion should the individual vote against the constituents’ interests (Devault, 2010). According to Gordon (2005), it is proper to consider contributions as offerings that develop sense of obligation in the recipient instead of considering them asclearattemptsof buying congress votes. Therefore, when the time is right, the legislator who received the gifts reciprocate; however, the problem lies in identifying when the right time. Another challenge in establishing the relation between contribution and votes in congress involves identifying the individual offering the gift and for which purpose. In reality, voting positions of special interests are rarely monolithic and perhaps many special interests within a particular group may have no active position regarding the issue of concern. Therefore, while groups may have offered money to the candidate, the groups may have done so in an attempt to secure a candidate’s vote on a very different issue (Devault, 2010). According to Devault (2010), first stage of Grossman and Helpman model aims at the motives for PAC contributions and argues that the purpose of the contributions is to affect legislator votes. In this approach, legislators who are most vulnerable to persuasion represent areas where the social cost of deviating from the citizen’s optimal interests is small. Since the societal cost of voting contrary to the citizens’ interest is comparatively insignificant, the supply price for a legislator representing such areas is relatively small, which makes the legislators less expensive for special interest groups to target. According to Strattman (1992), legislators who are close to the median position in the legislature are prone to obtain contributions compared to legislators far away. Therefore, if the objective of a special society group is to purchase votes, it makes no sense to devote their energy in congress members who have decided to vote the position supported by the special interest group. Moreover, there is little sense in trying to campaign for legislators who strongly oppose the groups interests because if even though the votes of these congresspersons were to be different their supply price would be enormous. Hence, special interest groups are likely to target representatives with restrained opinions since the supply price for such legislators are low given the indecision of their position. Grossman and Helpman (1996) leave the possibility that campaign contributions be extended in trying to affect the electoral outcomes; in this case, the contributions never influence the legislator’s strategy stance, but the possibility that the legislator with a given stance being elected. Studies into the relation between PAC contributions and congressional voting fall into three categories that include studies that finds a relation between campaign contributions and legislative behaviour. There are also studies that find relation but conclude that the relationship is weak and that factors like party, ideology and constituency are essential in understanding legislative behaviour; and studies that find no relation between campaign contributions and legislative behaviour. When studies find a relationship between campaign contributions and congressional voting, the issue tended to be low-visibility, nonpartisan on which other voting cues lacked. Although these studies have clear limitations because they focus on the relation between PAC and contributions and votes on the house, the key actions in the chambers often occur elsewhere. Some studies find that the relation between campaign contributions and votes is that interest groups attempt to influence decisions within committees during committee mark-up sessions that involve small wording changes that favour certain interest. Undoubtedly, it is easy to convince members to support minor changes on a committee draft that attracts little publicity than it is to influence their public votes on amendment of major legislation. Considering that decisions regarding legislation are made beyond the public eye and off public record, there is simply no way to measure the influence of PAC contributions in legislator’s behaviour. Besides, the sort of votes where scholars find relations to PAC contribution involve matters that are less visible and less related to partisan, ideological or constituent concerns; hence, the relationship appears in matters that have little consequence to the broad national policy. Nevertheless, such votes may be the ones affected by PAC contributions but they make up a noteworthy fraction of what happens in Capitol Hill (Magleby & Nelson, 1990). Nearly all studies suggest that contributions ease access to congressional policymakers and the opportunity to present one’s views to members in legislative process that can shape the member’s predisposition toward an issue. Moreover, the necessity of raising money to run for office makes contributions from special interests an essential resource for congress members and although no amount of contributioncan be determinative, the usual pervasiveness of money in congress suggests that money may influence the legislative process. Therefore, from the various studies it appears that the linkage between contribution and vote is not always readily visible; however, there is a tacit understanding that if a candidate accepts donations and is elected will consider interests of the donor. Legislators who support or oppose legislation may be inclined to work actively on behalf of legislation that tie to the interests of strong campaign supporters. Moreover, the legislator may be active and can even author provisions in legislation and negotiate with other legislators in provisions favourable to the contributors (Magleby & Nelson, 1990). The absence of evidence on explicit actions that benefit contributor rarely result in prosecutions, because it remains unclear if the legislator acts to offer service based on sincere policy position or because of a financial incentive. Donors and legislators often argue that contributors receive access and not influence; however, influence can result from this access because listening to an advocate or an opponent of legislation can influence best-intentioned policymaker perception of the legislation’s merits. At the time an individual makes donation to he may not have the any certain request for a candidate; however, individuals may donate to a politician to act as an insurance in case of an issue arises in the future that influence the person’s interest knowing the contribution will buy access to argue for or against any proposed legislation. Therefore, by recognising that donations come with expectations, legislators concerned with raising money in future campaigns may fulfil part of the expectations or perhaps they may find policy requests from friends they often associate with to be persuasive (Powell, 2012). In conclusion, politicians would never want to be known to the public that their actions are influenced by financial contributions because they would rather keep such influence as a secret. It is clear from the studies that issue-related contributions are often offered to individuals who are likely to be sympathetic or neutral on an issue compared to a strong opponent. Indeed, this reciprocal relation bedevils most of the literature linking votes on bills to campaign donations. Nevertheless, owing to the complexity of the issues that determine voting in congress, it is never clear-cut that campaign donations definitely influence voting though there be a link. References Bronars, S. G., & Lott, J. R. (1995). Do campaign donations alter how a politician votes?. George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, University of Chicago. Devault, J. M. (2010). CAFTA, CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, AND THE ROLE OF SPECIAL INTERESTS. Economics & Politics, 22(3), 282-297. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0343.2009.00362.x Gordon, S. B. (2005). Campaign contributions and legislative voting: A new approach. New York: Routledge. Grossman, G. M. and Helpman E. (1996). 6, Electoral competition and special interest politics. Review of Economic Studies. 63, 265–286. Magleby, D. B., & Nelson, C. J. (1990). The money chase: Congressional campaign finance reform. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution. Powell, L. W. (2012). The influence of campaign contributions in state legislatures: The effects of institutions and politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Roscoe, D. D., & Jenkins, S. (2005). A Meta-Analysis of Campaign Contributions' Impact on Roll Call Voting. Social Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell), 86(1), 52-68. doi:10.1111/j.0038-4941.2005.00290.x Stratmann, T. (1992). Are contributors rational? Untangling strategies of political action committees. Journal of Political Economy. 100, 647–664. US Congress votes on trade, FTA, job bills [UPDATE]. (2011). Metal Bulletin Daily, (282), 223. Wawro, G. (2001). A Panel Probit Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Roll-Call Votes. American Journal Of Political Science, 45(3), 563. Read More