AWACS in Saudi Arabia - Term Paper Example

The Israeli Lobby and the AWACS Sale to Saudi Arabia in 1981 The United s president Ronald Reagan announced the saleof Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 21 April 1981. AWACS sale was part of advance air defence armament that would lead to Saud Arabia acquiring AIM-9L air-to-air missiles, improved F-l 5 and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). The deal generated widespread opposition both within and outside the United States with Israel being one of the countries that felt the deal would have a negative impact on United states-Israel association. The arms deal that had began during the later stages of president Carter’s term in office was the largest in history up to the period. Due to the potential impact of the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia, the deal generated widespread debate in the united congress as members aligned in opposing sides to either reject or accept the proposed sale. This essay highlights efforts by Israel lobby to block the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia because it posed a threat to security of Israel while also being seen as rewarding Saudi Arabia for opposing the Camp David process. To highlight the level of influence possessed by the Israel lobby, the essay majorly focuses on the role it played based on pressure exerted on Congress, Senate and the executive. Lastly, there is an assessment of areas of success and failure that contributed to some accomplishments and defeat during Senate vote respectively. Apart from the United States’ gesture that indicated the country’s willingness to deal with other powers in the Middle East apart from Israel, the specifics of the arms deal was also a contributor to its opposition. Among the features of AWACS plane is the capability to detect and track potential air threat emanating from aircrafts within a range of 175,000 square miles (450,000 km2) (Foxman 127). AWACS plane is a remodelled Boeing 707 jetliner that is fitted with a rotating antenna, which is the component, used in detection of potential threat especially those invisible ton ground radar. This capabilities make AWACS plane ideal for airborne early warning systems as it can be deployed within a short time interval even in high intensity conflicts (Smith 217). Israel lobby against the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia was fronted by American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), which had forged its reputation as being among the three most most powerful lobbies in the United States’ capital. AIPAC had been formed in 1951 under the name American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs as a body that could help members circumvent the State Department to have their perspectives on issues affecting the Jewish community discussed directly by Congress. AIPAC’ s power as the main lobby for Israel aid was enhanced by the later part of 1960’s as ties between the united states and Arab nationalism began to deteriorate. AIPAC’s status was further enhanced by the emergence of Israel as the regional proxy for United States military power in the Middle East (Mearsheimer and Walt 32). However, the Israel lobby enhanced their powers during the Reagan regime as it grew in terms of membership and financial capabilities. During the circumstances surrounding sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia the Israel lobby already had a financial muscle of over one million dollars and over 8,000 members with the figures rising to over 55, 000 members by mid 1980s. To ensure increased influence in Congress, AIPAC financed electoral campaigns for willing politicians with a view of creating a majority that could be relied to pass polices favorable to Israel (American Jewish Committee 20; Sorenson 336). Although opposition to the sale of AWACS was fronted by AIPAC, analysts have noted the role of a broad conglomerate of organisations working under National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NCRAC) as the mastermind of the opposition. The NCRAC working with the Conference of Presidents was therefore the main power behind the push against the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia with AIPAC acting as a public front for the national campaign (Goldberg J. 198). Seliktar also note AIPAC was fronted as the main Israel lobby but with background support from virtually all the major Jewish organizations with the fight against AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia being used as a linchpin to unify the community, which over the years expressed divergent positions when assessing potential threat to Israel security (Seliktar 68). According to Jonathan Goldberg NJCRAC established a well-maintained system that also included the use of local community leaders who were tasked with exerting pressure on representatives through calls and talking tough. For AIPAC, their main responsibility was to deliver success based on well researched facts and figures presented to lawmakers. AIPAC also identified lawmakers who did not have strong support for either side promising them different rewards or delivering threats on behalf of the Jewish community (Goldberg J. 198). Therefore, AIPAC become the public front for Israel lobby as their activities were more pronounced with greater presence in media and representatives offices. The Israel lobby launched two campaigns to voice opposition against AWACS sales to Saudi Arabia with active action against the proposed sale lasting between April and October. The lobby focused pressure directly on the administration while also running a parallel campaign targeting legislators to make public declaration their support for the lobby against AWACS sale even prior to the administration introducing the policy before Congress. Given the extensive support generated by the Israel lobby, many expected both Congress and Senate would vote to their favour. Led by Clarence Long, the campaign against sale of AWACS was seen as a success by mid 1981. Long represented an embodiment of AIPAC influence over Congress with significant funding for his re-election coming from pro-Israel interest groups (Findley 42). Therefore voting in favour of the Israel lobby and creation of support of opposition to AWACS as chair of the House Appropriations Subcommittee was a sure way of avoiding confrontation with the interest groups (Findley 41). Given the widespread support, that Israel lobby had generated Long was assured of success as he launched resolution objecting to the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia on 27 April 1981. The resolution was based on threat posed by the sale to the Israeli security with the resolution generating 232 supports of co-sponsors in the House by 1 July. Further, the success was seen in the fact that the support was largely bipartisan based on pledged support from 61 of 192 Republicans and 161 of 242 Democrats. In a meeting with the president, Long informed him of the development noting that an additional 75 representatives had privately communicated to him their opposition to AWACS sale and were ready to vote against it. This numbers meant about 300 representatives were ready to oppose the program making it necessary for the president to focus his attention on senate as it represented significant hope of support (Laham 28-33). Senate was still not an easy option for the president as evident from Senator Bob Packwood of Oregon’s letter to the president on 24 June indicating opposition to AWACS sale was at 34 Senators of 47 Democrats and 20 Senators of 53 Republicans this also represented a bipartisan senate majority reedy to oppose the sale (Laham 25-26). A number of senators including Barry Goldwater voiced their frustration to the president noting the pressure exerted on them to oppose the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia. In a letter to the president, Barry Goldwater claimed about one third of the senators going for re-election were going through a period of immense pressure exerted by the Israel lobby. However, Laham argue that these was an exaggeration on the part of the senator as the many of them who were on the opposing side were not up for re-election and could not claim representation of states with substantial Jewish voters (Laham 12,16). The Growth and Goals of the Israel Lobby The Israel lobby is not an all-powerful body in the Capitol Hill but is historically perceived as the most powerful politically organized interest group operating in the United States capital (Usa 19). The Israel lobby stood as the greatest obstacle to the approval of the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia with the chances of the sale sailing through smoothly being high without interests from the Israel lobby, which launched an intense and vocal opposition on the proposed sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia (Eizenstat 272). A number of factors worked to the advantage of the group especially the political instability faced by Saudi Arabia during the later part of 1970s and early 1980s (Laham 89). However, what worked against the success for the lobby group seemed to be the strident opposition to AWACS sale without considering a possible trade-off that would ensure greater return. The Israeli lobby against the AWACS Sale to Saudi Arabia in 1981 was developed based on the historical growth of Jewish community in the United States. Critics have often portrayed the pro-Israel lobby in the United States as being highly organized and wielding colossal powers capable of subverting democratic processes within the United States through diverse methods including intimidating members of Congress. Majority of the congress members of the Congress are not willing to disregard the political stand of this group for fear that they might not be re-elected during the next election due to existence of powerful Jewish community ready to finance their competitors (Findley 42). Consequently, there was a perception before and during the process of debate on AWACS Sale to Saudi Arabia that the United States policy on Middle East was not guided by national interest but was based on special interest of the Jewish community. Subsequent support for policies favourable to Israel was therefore not seen as a matter of principle but as expression of fear towards a lobby group that had the capacity to end careers of any member of Congress critical of Israel action (Laham 71). However, what tipped the balance of power in favour of the United States president and other supporter of the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia were the constitutional powers of the presidency (Mann 50; Laham 72). Although the Israel lobby has been seen as being powerful enough to determine the career success of many politicians, this limited by the extent to which the constitution allows the president to outline national interests especially when dealing with security interests of the United States. Therefore many commentators of the relationship between United States and the pro-Israel lobby have noted national security as being an area where the political influence of the lobby group is greatly constrained. Given that, the president is the commander-in-chief of the country, he is able to make unilateral decisions that define and preserve national interests on matters surrounding Middle East countries. AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia was one of the instances that the president was able to pass the arms deal based on the argument that it was meant to protect national interests. Affirmations by both Reagan and his predecessor Carter that the deal would strengthen national interest ensured Senate resisted influence from pro-Israel lobby to vote in favour of the sale (Laham 72). The Israel lobby developed two grounds that would support their opposition to the AWACS sale. Firstly, it was argued that the 1979 civil uprising in Mecca signified instability of the Saudi regime, which meant there was increased risk that the weapons might end up in the wrong hands in the event that such rebellions were left to mutate. Such possibility meant the United States was putting neighbouring countries at risk by increasing the military strengths of a country that had not shown minimal cooperation with other Western countries (Goldberg D. 76-78). This was also against past reassurance that the United States would not arm or enhance the capabilities of Saudi Arabian F-15s. This security concerns by Israel was also linked to reservations that the foreign policy adopted by President Reagan had the potential of encouraging build-up of military arsenal by moderate Arab states as the United States attempted to end soviet incursion into the Middle East (Seliktar 67). Secondly, the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia indicated a drastic spin in relations between the kingdom and United States. The Israel lobby argued that this turn of events as signified a rewarding Saudi Arabia for its opposition to the Camp David peace process (Rubenberg 258). Saudi Arabia had opposed the peace deal even when the process was seen as the best chance chance for the Middle East region to achieve sustainable peace. Therefore, apart from Saudi Arabia gaining technological capability that could potentially spell future disaster for other countries including the United States, the is Israel lobby not approve the decision based on Saudis’ lack of cooperation in important efforts to bring peace in the area (Ahrari 56). While the Israel lobby pointed out the negative implications of AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia, those in support especially in Senate pointed out the benefits that the United States, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the Middle East in general would gain from the sale. While giving his testimony in Senate, the Secretary of state Alexander Haig noted the contribution of the sale towards peace process in the Middle East. The Secretary of state argued that the sale was a strategic move that would protect United States’ interest in the Middle East especially since the Israeli-Arab rivalry had continued to escalate over the years while the Soviet Union had continued with its charm offensive aimed at reducing United States’ influence in the area (Mann 163). The administration also promised to explore security measures that would introduce checks to safeguard the equipment from falling into the hands of other political elements in Saudi Arabia or to be used against the overall intentions (Ahrari 57). Two events also worked against the success of the Israel lobby: the assassination of Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat and the Iranian attack on Kuwaiti oilfields. The assassination of the Egyptian president acted as a reminder that the united states should not rely in establishing relations with specific leaders but to have a strategic foreign affairs policy that favour mutuality of interests. Given the importance of oil imports to the economy of the United States, the administration argued that the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia was an important step in protecting the country’s oil facilities from such attacks (Ahrari 57). Notable Success and Failures of the Israel Lobby The greatest area of success for the Israel lobby was recorded in the stance adopted Congress where the proposed sale was defeated by a wide margin. The sale was also to fail in Senate but extensive pressure from the administration ensured majority of the Senators changed their minds and voted for the sale. The lobby had until October 23 succeeded in convincing over 50 Senators to oppose the sale with only 40 maintaining their support for the sale. The range of voting also signified considerable support in Senate with the vote going 52 supporting to the 48 Senators who opposed the sale. This shift of fortune can be accounted for by the change of heart expressed by Roger Jepsen, who had until a day before voting been amongst the original sponsors of the the resolution of disapproval. However, Jepsen changed his support for the Israel lobby with eight more Senators declaring they were also going to support the sale (Ahrari 58). The influence of Israel lobby inside Congress and United states foreign policy in general was seen in the circumstances prior and after the vote authorizing AWACS sale. While it took a lot of persuasion and coercion for the president to convince majority of members of Senate to approve the sale, there was reassurances over the use of AWACS to ensure it does not compromise Israel’s security. Due to the existence of some genuine concern by those in opposition to the sale, President Reagan had to send a letter to Congress expressing his administration’s commitment continued positive relationship with Israel. The president promised to ensure a binding agreement was signed with the Saudi authority to guarantee that the planes would never be used to target Israel or to undertake any mission that would compromise its security. Additionally, the president indicated the deal with Saudi Arabia would provide a platform for the United States to pursue substantial assistance from the Saudi regime to ensure peace process in Middle East is fast tracked (Ahrari 59. Further, the influence of Israel lobby was apparent in the controversies and uncertainty surrounding the process. Although the sale went through, the lobby recorded success in some aspects of the deal, as they were able to force modification in proposed sale while also pressuring the United States administration to offer Israel compensatory aid (Ahrari 61). Although Congress appeared to be the greatest critic of the pro-Israel lobby, there were significant opposition to their ideas generated from outside parliament. Among such reservations was on presented by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, George Brown who argued that the United States was in danger of being caught in a new Arab oil embargo. The lobby was therefore unable to provide convincing alternative to reassure many who feared the consequence of United States government backtracking and possible oil embargo. This reflects continued perception of the role played by Israel in retaliation by Arab countries that refused to supply oil to the United States due to the country’s support of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Consequently, the failure of the lobby can also be attributed to its inability to deal with the perception that pro-Israel lobby was an obstacle to United States efforts to develop a more enhanced policy in the Middle East (Laham 69-70). The Israel lobby was successful in convincing members of the Congress to vote against the the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia; however, there influence could not penetrate into the Senate. The influence of Israel lobby on members of Congress was largely because the legislators were heading to the end of their term with many still seeking re-elections (Findley 41-42). This group did not perceive opposition to Israel lobby has having any meaningful contribution their re-election bid. However, were the lobby failed to exert its influence is in Senate, which had less re-election pressure therefore members did not experience any pressure to support particular interest group. Additionally, President Reagan had a majority support in the Senate, which was further enhanced by the election of twelve freshman republican senators with many of them winning their seats courtesy of the president’s support. Further, the lobby did not enhance its stand through winning majority approval from members of the public. President Reagan was assured of his position on the issue based on persistent public rating that indicated a more than 50 percent support of AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia (Ahrari 61). From the foregoing, the opposition to AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia waged by Israel lobby is arguably one of the most intense petitions in the United States history. The Israel lobby was able to launch a major opposition to the proposed sales following pressure that resulted in a win in Congress. However, the lobby was only defeated in Senate following personal intervention by President Reagan, which made it difficult for the lawmakers to maintain their support to block the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia. The Israel lobby used its influence in the Congress to persuade members to reject the sale with funding and support from Jewish community during the upcoming re-election noted as the main reason for extensive support in the Congress. However, the Israel lobby did not achieve its greater objective of blocking the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia due to a minority support in Senate during voting. Considering that the Israel lobby only failed due to last day interventions by the president that forced most of the Senators to reconsider their stand, it is safe to argue that the Israel lobby wielded considerable influence in the foreign policy of the United States during the historical moment. Works Cited Ahrari, Mohammed E., ed. Ethnic groups and US foreign policy. Vol. 186. Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1987. Print. American Jewish Committee. Present Tense, Volumes 14-15. New York, NY: American Jewish Committee, 1986. Print. Eizenstat, Stuart. The future of the Jews: how global forces are impacting the Jewish people, Israel, and its relationship with the United States. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. Print. Findley, Paul. They dare to speak out, 3rd Edition. 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