Review of 1776, by David McCullough - Book Report/Review Example

Continual defeats and retreats was a crushing blow that all of the generals in charge necessitated addressing. In short, McCullough presents this as a situation which is nothing short of a miracle that the Continental Army was able to survive and function at all. Once again, another interesting compliment of this particular approach is the understanding that any single change with regards to the ratio of defeats two victories that were experienced could have fundamentally alter the overall level of morale that existed within the army and could have easily lead to a quick and determine defeats of the American revolutionary movement.

One of the most interesting aspects of the book was with regards to the newfound understanding that this reader was able to integrate with concerning the fact that so many of George Washington’s troops were not only ill equipped but ill trained. For many years, parts and a social understanding of the fact that America’s Revolution was performed by something of a hodgepodge of different age groups, ethnicities, and classes has been a tacit understanding. However, that being said, McCullough made it abundantly clear that the mere fact that organization was able to be achieved within the Continental Army was nothing short of miraculous.

Moreover, the discipline and coordination that was achieved was only overshadowed by the fact that somehow this disjunct and seemingly untrained militia was somehow able to achieve victory after victory. Whereas it is oftentimes been assumed that revolutionary fervor in and of itself was enough to ensure military superiority, a military historian of any worse would understand that an ill-equipped and untrained army would stand little if any chance against a far better trained, better disciplined, and better equipped floe.

In this way, McCullough works to bring about the understanding that it was the tactics mixed with the revolutionary fervor that ultimately contributed to Continental victory after Continental victory. Another interesting understanding that McCullough relates to the reader is with regards to the overall level of respect that the British paid to the colonists. Whereas it is oftentimes understood that the British Army had little if any use for the colonists, McCullough underscores the fact that this is not entirely true.

Whereas it is oftentimes the case during the course of the revolutionary war the British discounted the threat or capabilities of Washington’s army, much to his benefit, the British did not entirely discount the colonists as useless and/or inferior. For instance, the use of loyalist troops in helping the British defeat the colonialists in Boston is evidence of the fact that the British did not entirely discount the overall worth or usefulness that these individuals could bring to bear. Similarly, with regards to whether or not this particular reviewer would recommend David McCullough’s 1776, the answer to this would have to be resounding yes.

Although there is a litany of reasons behind this, the main reason for such a recommendation has to do with the fact that McCullough approaches the issue of the revolution from a multifaceted standpoint. Whereas many other historical texts choose to focus upon the military aspects of the battles,