U.S. Policy regarding the South China Sea (SCS) - Essay Example

? MEMO Senior Director for Asia {insert South China Sea {SCS} Dispute Background The conflict risk within the Southern China Sea is crucial. China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Brunei, Philippines and Malaysia have jurisdictional and competing territorial claims, predominantly over privileges to exploit the expanse’s possibly extensive gas and oil reserves. Navigation freedom within the region is as well a contentious matter, particularly between China and United States over United States military vessels’ right to operate within China’s EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). The tensions are influencing – being influenced by- rising fears concerning China military power growth as well as its regional intents. China has engaged in an extensive upgrading of its forces of maritime paramilitary and naval aptitudes to impose jurisdiction and Sovereignty rights through force if the need arises. Simultaneously, China is developing capabilities, which would place US forces within the expanse in a conflict risk, and therefore, possibly refuting US Navy access in the west Pacific (Akande). In view of the growing prominence of China-U.S. affiliation as well as the Asia-Pacific expanse more largely, to the worldwide economy, the U.S. has a huge interest in inhibiting any of the numerous disputes within the South China Sea from intensifying militarily. U.S. policy goals include: I. Attainment of global norms and rules in the South China Sea, II. Attainment of regional stability and alliance security in the South China Sea, III. Attainment of economic interests and IV. Attaining a cooperative affiliation with China V. Promote Territorial Risk-reduction Measures Assessment of Current U.S. Policy Goals The U.S. has crucial interests for achieving a diplomatic resolution of disputes in South China Sea with respect to international law. With China’s exception, all South China Sea’s claimants have tried to validate their entitlements grounded on their coastlines as well as the UNCLOS’s provisions. China, on the other hand, depends on a combination of legal claims and historic rights, while remaining purposely indistinct about the implication of the ‘nine-dashed line’ all over the sea, which is drawn upon Chinese maps. The failure of the U.S. to maintain international norms and law could harm United States’ interests elsewhere within the region as well as beyond. Guaranteeing navigation freedom is another critical goal for the US as well as other regional states. As much as China maintains that, it advocates navigation freedom; its persistence that foreign forces seek advance authorization to cruise in its EEZ hurls doubt upon its stance. The China’s capabilities development to deny US’ naval entry to its waters in a dispute provides proof of likely Chinese intents to block navigation freedom in particular contingencies (Akande). Regional and alliance security: United States friends and allies around Southern China Sea depend on U.S. to sustain free trade, secure and safe sea communication lines and general stability and tranquility within the region. Non-claimants and claimants to marine waters and land features within the South China Sea take U.S. forces presence as essential to permit decision-formulating free of extortion. If states within the South China Sea lack self-assurance in the U.S. to aid as the major regional security underwriter, they could engage in costly and possibly threatening arms accumulations to reimburse or, otherwise, become more cooperative to the requests of an influential China. None would be within the United States’ policy goals. Failure to assure friends of U.S. responsibilities within the expanse could also weaken U.S. security assurances in the wider Asia-Pacific area, particularly with South Korea and Japan. Simultaneously, however, the US must elude being enticed into the regional dispute—and perhaps into a clash—by regional states who seek United States’ backing to legalize their claims (Nato). Economic interests: Every year, $5.4 trillion of trade goes through the Southern China Sea; United States trade makes up $1.3 trillion of the total. Supposed to a conflict occurred, the rerouting of cargo vessels to other courses would damage regional economies because of an upsurge in insurance tariffs and longer shipments. Clash of any degree within the Southern China Sea would impede the appellants from advancing from the Southern China Sea's established and probable resources (Akande). Attainment of Cooperative affiliation with China: The implications and stakes of any United States-China occurrence are far bigger than during other circumstances. The U.S. has a steadfast goal in preserving solidity in the United States-China affiliation so that it may continue to safeguard Beijing's cooperation upon an escalating list of global and regional issues as well as more tightly assimilate China into the prevalent global system (Lohman). Promote Territorial Risk-reduction Measures: The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and China settled upon joint risk-reduction as well as confidence-building actions in the 2002-DOC (Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea). However, none has abided by its provisions (for instance, to resolve jurisdictional and territorial clashes without opting to the use or threat of force) or even executed its suggestions to embark on accommodating trust-building actions. The continuation of talks between ASEAN and China after a break of an era holds out capacity for reviving cooperative undertakings under the ‘DOC’ (Lohman). Multilaterally, prevailing procedures and mechanisms presently exist to stimulate operational well-being among territorial navies; a novel arrangement is pointless. China, United States, and ASEAN associates except for Burma and Laos are associates of the WPNS (Western Pacific Naval Symposium). Established in the year 1988, WPNS unites regional naval frontrunners together twice yearly to debate maritime safety. In year 2000, it formed the CUES (Code for Un alerted Encounters at Sea) that include safety procedures and measures and way to aid communication when aircraft and ships make contact. Moreover, territorial fleets could collaborate in marine environment safety, scientific exploration at marine, search as well as rescue undertakings, and damage mitigation triggered by natural mishaps (Nato). Recommendations In contrast to the circumstantial of rebalancing United States’ assets and devotion towards the Asia-Pacific expanse, the U.S. should take actions to prevent a clash in the Southern China Sea as well as resolve a conflict should one happen. Although the likelihood of a huge military crisis is minimal, the prospective for a fierce clash within the Southern China Sea within the proximate future is great, given past actions of states within the region as well as the mounting stakes. For that reason, both United States as well as regional policy formulators should pursue to create devices to build conviction, prevent clash, and elude escalation (Lohman). Principally, the U.S. should approve UNCLOS; although it willingly abides by its doctrines and the Obama government has rendered a pledge to sanction the treaty, the datum that the U.S. has not so far sanctioned the treaty affords belief to the awareness that it merely adheres to international concords when ensuring so affiliates with its domestic interests. Sanctioning UNCLOS would place this assumption to rest. It may also boost the United States position in support of rules-based conduct, give the US a seat on the table as UNCLOS participants discuss such matters as EEZ privileges, and largely advance United States’ economic as well as strategic interests (Lohman). Secondly, countries with fleets active within the Southern China Sea—together with the China, United States, Vietnam, as well as the Philippines—must better exploit the CUES security measures as well as procedures to alleviate uncertainty as well as improve lines of communication during the occurrence of a naval incident. In current provisions, observing CUES processes is voluntary. Partaking countries must consider making acquiescence compulsory to assure standardized processes. Countries ought to engross in bilateral and multilateral maritime exercises as well to rehearse these processes in a regulated environment afore an incident unfolds (Nato). Thirdly, the US ought to define well its backing for risk-reduction methods as well as confidence-building instruments among claimants within the Southern China Sea. The U.S. has a duty to continue to voice its backing for full employment of the ‘China-ASEAN DOC’ together with ensuing agreement upon a binding canon of behavior. Beijing necessitates a promising regional security atmosphere, and consequently, has imperative inducements to figure out a modus vivendi through its neighbors, however, will not probably attain so in absent pressure. Settlement on an obliging code of behavior will need unity amid all associates of ASEAN as well as strong support from the U.S. In the interim, cooperation ought to be further established via expanded vessel visits, multilateral and bilateral exercise, as well as improved counter-piracy collaboration. Additionally, cooperation upon energy as well as fisheries ought to be further encouraged (Lohman). Fourth, the formation of new interchange instruments—for instance, a Southern China Sea Coast Safeguard Forum, a data-sharing center, as well as a combined fisheries board—would afford greater prospect for affected participants to communicate openly as well as offer prospects for greater synchronization (Cheng). Fifth, the US ought to appraise its reconnaissance and surveillance undertakings in the water and air neighboring China's twelve-mile regional sea as well as assess the possibility of decreasing their regularity or piloting the tasks at a far distance. Any adjustment of United States’ close-in reconnaissance and surveillance activities necessitates evaluation of whether those foundations are exclusively constructive or other information gathering platforms can afford adequate information concerning Chinese military advances. The US ought not to take such an action unilaterally; it must seek to acquire an acknowledgement from Beijing in response lest China deduce the deed as evidence of United States’ weakness and decline. Sixth, the MMCA (Military Maritime Consultative Agreement) procedure ought to be rendered effective or deserted. There is a persistent requirement for the China and the United States to decide on functioning safety regulations to diminish the likelihood of a crisis in the ages ahead. A new official "incidents at sea" contract should be reflected (Glaser). Seventh, Washington DC should elucidate in its corresponding dialogues with Hanoi and Manila the degree of the US commitments and obligations in addition to the restrictions of likely United States’ engagement in future clashes. Clarity is essential both to elude a situation in which territorial actors are encouraged to confront hostilely China as well as to avoid a holdup to United States affairs with territorial nations owing to views of unfulfilled anticipations (Cheng). Work Cited (Cheng) (Glaser) (Lohman) (Nato) Akande, Dapo. Philippines Initiates Arbitration against China over South China Seas Dispute. January 22, 2013. Web. 4 April 2012.        Cheng, Dean. Kerry, Hagel, and Brennan Senate Confirmation Hearings: U.S. Policy on Asia. Heritage Foundation. January 18, 2013. Web. 4 April 2012. Glaser, Bonnie S. Armed Clash in the South China Sea. Council on Foreign Relations August 2012. Web. 4 Apr. 2013. Lohman, Walter. The U.S. Cannot Rely On ASEAN in the South China Sea. Heritage Foundation September 2011. Web. 4 April 2012. Nato, Stop. South China Sea Dispute: U.S. Proxy Conflict with China. Global Research. March 31, 2013. Web. 4 April 2012. Read More