The Sovereign Territorial State - Essay Example

? “The notion that the sovereign territorial came to dominate international politics following the Peace of Westphalia is a myth.” Do you agree? Introduction Having begun in May 1618, the series of wars involving the Austrian Monarchy, the Holy Roman Empire and practically the whole Europe, which became known as the Thirty years’ War, was brought to an end by the Treaty of Westphalia, aka the Westphalian settlement – complex two-part parallel negotiations concluded in October 1648 (Williams, 1980; Watson, 1992). Osiander (2001) points out that, according to the standard view, the Thirty Years’ War had been a struggle between two main parties. On the one side there were the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire and the Spanish King, both being members of the Habsburg dynasty and loyal to the Pope and the Catholic Church (Osiander, 2001). On the other side there appeared the protestant kings of Denmark and Sweden, the King of France, Protestant German princes, the Dutch Republic etc., who presumably rejected the imperial power, along with the authority of the Pope, defending instead the sovereignty of all states (Osiander, 2001; Watson, 1992). The end of the Thirty Years’ War, as marked by the Peace Treaty of Westphalia, is widely regarded as the start point for of the international system (Osiander, 2001); Gross (1948), for example, writes that the Peace of Westphalia has had a lasting influence on international law and policy for over three centuries. In other words, as Watson (1992) points out, the Westphalian settlement not only legitimised “a commonwealth of sovereign states”, being a triumph of the state “in control of its internal affairs and independent externally”, but also was held to provide a fundamental and comprehensive charter for Europe. Nevertheless, there are rather different verdicts, like the one of Dame Veronica Wedgwood, stating that “the peace was totally ineffectual in settling the problems of Europe” (Watson, 1992). This paper reviews the achievements of the Treaty of Westphalia, which constituted the “Westphalian” system, or framework, with the concept of sovereignty at its core (Osiander, 2001), to establish whether it was so successful in bringing about a new world order that eventually brought about the birth of the United Nations. Historical Background The Holy Roman Empire was founded in the year 800 AD when the Frankish king, Charlemagne, was crowned by Pope Leo III (Wilson, 2011). Emperor Charlemagne greatly expanded the Empire’s territory to the east, especially along the Baltic shore; thus, by the late fifteenth century, the core area of the Empire covered that of modern Germany and Austria, as well as Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands (Wilson, 2011). The Empire formally included Switzerland – although its exact constitutional position had been a matter of certain controversy – as well as the kingdom of Bohemia (the territory of present-day Czech Republic) with its dependencies of Moravia, Lusatia and Silesia; along with Lorraine, Alsace and other areas to the west (Wilson, 2011). Additionally, the cities and principalities of Northern Italy constituted a region known as Imperial Italy, which was formally part of the Empire (Wilson, 2011). The Catholic Church and the Pope had played a vital role in the Holy Roman Empire from its very inception, being the supreme authority in religious matters (Wilson, 2011; Munck, 2005). After the death of Emperor Charlemagne, the vast territory of the Holy Roman Empire had been divided into separate regions, namely Germany, France, and Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands (Wilson, 2011; Munck, 2005). During the following centuries, the composition of the Holy Roman Empire had been a loose configuration of more than three hundred principalities, alongside nearly one thousand political units with quasi-autonomous power, including free imperial cities (Munck, 2005). Thus constituted, the Holy Roman Empire is described by some historians as an “anomaly, since the Empire did not fit any recognized pattern,” being neither a kingdom nor a republic and embracing – before the outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War – more than 680,000 square kilometres of Europe (Wilson, 2011). In 1618, the religious tensions within the Empire are believed to have reached a breaking point and Europe was plunged into series of destructive wars, which involved nearly every major nation on the continent, and lasted for thirty years, namely from 1618 to 1648 (Gordon, 2008). Although the war began as a conflict between Protestants and Catholics, Catholic France took the side of the German Protestants against the Catholic Habsburg Monarchy (Gordon, 2008). Being ruled by a member of the Habsburg dynasty, Spain joined the war not only to defend the Catholic cause, but also to protect its interest in the Netherlands (Osiander, 2001; Gordon, 2008). The fighting consisted of the Bohemian War (1618-1620), the Palatinate War (1621-1623), the Danish War (1624-1629), the Swedish War (1630-1635), as well as the Franco-Habsburg War (1635-1648), which included the French war on Spain in Northern Italy, the Dutch war on Spain in the South Netherlands, and many other bigger or smaller campaigns (Williams, 1980). Much of the fighting took place within the territory of the Holy Roman Empire and left destruction, starvation, and depopulation across the empire, being the most destructive of the religious conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Munck, 2005; Williams, 1980; Wilson, 2011). The War ended with the two-part Treaty of Westphalia, as consisted of the Treaty of Osnabruck between the Holy Roman Empire and Sweden and the Treaty of Munster between the Holy Roman Empire and France (Munck, 2005). Results and Consequences By and large, the Westphalian settlement of 1648 is thought to have registered the achievements of the victorious Franco-Protestant coalition, redrawing the political borders of Europe and providing a precedent for religious tolerance (Watson, 1992; Munck, 2005). The peace imposed territorial settlements that were mainly in favour of France and Sweden, having legitimised the French control over the bishops of Metz, Toul and Verdun, and secured the fundamental territorial objective of Sweden – a position on the southern shore of the Baltic (Krasner, 1993). Sweden had also received the islands of Rugen, Usedom, the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, as well as Eastern Pomerania, and Willin (Krasner, 1993). Williams (1992), in turn, emphasise the failure of the Emperor to turn Germany into an absolute monarchy; which, however, had been accomplished by the German princes who turned it into “a collection of absolute monarchies” (Williams, 1992). According to Boucher (1998), the settlement “was designed to undermine the hegemonic aspirations of the Habsburgs”; while Bull (1977) says that it “marked the end of Habsburg pretensions to universal monarchy.” According to Evans and Newnham (1990), the Westphalian settlement “marked the culmination of the anti-hegemonic struggle against the Habsburg aspirations for a supranational empire”; and Sheehan (1996), states that the peace “refuted the aspirations of the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire to recreate a single Christian imperium.” Morgenthau (1985) asserts that certain “rules of international law were securely established in 1648”; more specifically, “the Treaty of Westphalia . . . made the territorial state the cornerstone of the modern state system (cited in Osiander, 2001). Osiander (2001) cites Zacher, who speaks of “the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 which recognized the state as the supreme of sovereign power within its boundaries and put to rest the church’s transnational claims to political authority”. All these verdicts on the Peace of Westphalia reflect the conventional view that the treaty marked a turning point in history (Krasner, 1993), having legitimized a commonwealth of sovereign states and formulated some general ideas that would become the foundation of the Paris settlement of 1919, the League of Nations and the United Nations (Gross, 1948). As mentioned earlier, however, there are differing views which see the treaty as not that successful, especially in achieving such a balance of power that had been necessary to maintain the conditions in which non-hegemonic rules and institutions could operate (Watson, 1992). In fact, as Osiander (2001) aptly points out, the Bohemian crisis broken out not because the Habsburg dynasty was powerful, but rather the opposite – in important respects they were weak. In the case of the Habsburg kingdoms of Bohemia and Hungary, the dualist system of government had increasingly come to favour the estates (Osiander, 2001); thus shifting the balance of power to the Protestant cause. Not surprisingly, the Habsburg position in central Europe during the war was on the brink of collapse and rebel troops reached the suburbs of Vienna twice in 1619 (Osiander, 2001). According to the Treaty of Westphalia, however, all concessions to the victors had been made from the Holy Roman Empire, but not from the Habsburg Monarchy, which lost only Breisach and some vague claims in Alsace (Williams, 1980). Moreover, the Austrian Habsburgs were to play an important role over the next two centuries, “in maintaining the balance which they had previously combated” (Watson, 1992). An undoubted success of the Westphalian settlement, in terms of the sovereignty issue, was the fact that the independent states – including those whose status was not affected by the treaty, like France, Spain, etc. and the independent de facto but not in juridical theory, like Bavaria, Saxony and Brandenburg – though not juridically equal, in practice recognised each other’s independence, thus dealing with each other on an equal basis (Watson, 1992). But what’s more important, under the Westphalian settlement such a practice became the customary rule in Europe (Watson, 1992). On the other hand, the actual concept of sovereignty, or the scope of authority that states could exercise, had always been contested by the new institutional forms that had been created (Krasner, 1993). Quite paradoxically indeed, the most dramatic challenge to the very concept of sovereignty originated in the efforts of external actors – in this case France, Denmark, Sweden, etc. – to control the way a state treats its own citizens or subjects – the Protestants in the Holy Roman empire, for example. While both French and Swedish emissaries were repeatedly warning the German princes of the Habsburg intentions for ‘universal monarchy and absolute dominion’ (Osiander, 1994), following the treaty, Germany was turned into a collection of absolute monarchies, the most powerful of which was the Austrian Monarchy, i.e. Austria, Bohemia and Hungary (Williams, 1980). In addition, the Thirty Years War, respectively the Westphalian settlement, had achieved “an anti-hegemonial solution” to the concentration of German power in a single state, but allowed a concentration of the French power (Watson, 1992). Implications and Lessons One of the important implications of the Westphalian settlement for the main European powers was that the Habsburgs preserved their position in Central Europe, although they emerged from the war a slightly diminished power (Osiander, 2001). The redistribution of territory, which appeared perhaps the most straightforward aspect of the Peace of Westphalia, had shown that not all provisions of the treaty were consistent with the concept of a world comprised of sovereign territorial states (Krasner, 1993). This was demonstrated by part of the settlement between the Empire and Sweden, based upon an older set of principles and understandings (Krasner, 1993). There were several provisions of the Peace treaty, which dealt with religion, trying to establish a set of commonly accepted principles regarding the practice of religion (Krasner, 1993). Thus, the existence of Protestantism had been legitimised within the boundaries of the empire, while the choice of religion was placed in the hands of the ruler; which, however, spelled troubles (Krasner, 1993). Not surprisingly in that regard, the powerful Protestant movements in the Austrian Habsburg monarchy, i.e. Austria, Bohemia and Hungary, were either eliminated or driven underground (Williams, 1980). In addition, the Westphalia Peace Treaty attempted to introduce the separation of religion and politics (Williams, 1980), with several of its provisions constraining the authority of the sovereign (Krasner, 1993). The most important of those provided that the ruler who had changed his religion cannot compel his subjects to do the same (Krasner, 1993). The Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists were given equal rights, in terms of practicing their religion, but religious tolerance was limited to these three groups only (Krasner, 1993). Despite all inadequacies, whether in political, religious or other sense, the Peace of Westphalia is largely understood as a critical turning point, marking the end of the unchallenged power and authority of the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy, both being the major universal institutions of the mediaeval world (Krasner, 1993). The Holy Roman Empire was formally abolished following the Napoleon’s conquest in 1806, i.e. some 150 years after the Treaty of Westphalia (Krasner, 1993). Major Definitions and Interpretations According to Caporaso, (2000, cited in Gordon, 2008), a Westphalian nation-state is the one that has two main characteristics: a particular area of land which is considered part of the nation, called territoriality, as well as a ruling structure that has the ultimate power to rule over the nation without yielding to any external agency. Thus, Caporaso considers the latter provision especially important – in order to be a sovereign nation, authority should come from outside (2000, cited in Gordon, 2008). Scholars, from both fields of history and international relations, have attempted to define the role of the Peace of Westphalia in relation to the origins of sovereignty (Gordon, 2008). Their interpretations vary widely, although the positions can be reduced to traditional and revisionist interpretations (Gordon, 2008). Additionally, Osiander (2001) points out that the Westphalian system, along with the concept of sovereignty at its core, has long been subject of debate, within which the standard view on the Peace of Westphalia “constitutes a taken-for-granted template against which current change should be judged”. The traditional view, according to Gordon (2008), states that Westphalian sovereignty appeared the direct result of the Peace of Westphalia, and that without it the modern nation-state would never have come into existence; while the revisionist interpretations, reject the traditional view, downplaying the importance of the Peace of Westphalia in the formation of the concept of sovereignty (Gordon, 2008). Revisionist approach to the Peace of Westphalia, however, consists in two seemingly irreconcilable views, as follows: first, Westphalian sovereignty had already existed prior to the Peace of Westphalia, and second, Westphalian sovereignty did not become the norm for international relations until well after the end of the Thirty Years. War (Gordon, 2008). Gross (1948) holds the traditional view of the Peace of Westphalia, that the Peace was the starting point in the nations’ development; thus, defending the thesis that the Peace of Westphalia did indeed ushered Europe in the age of nation-states. With the Pope’s power waning after 1648, the monarchs of Europe were forced to redefine their relationships with each other, and in recognizing sovereignty, each ruler agreed that if there were no equals to him inside the state, there wouldn’t be superior to him outside the state’s boundaries (Gross, 1948). Thus, Gross states that the Treaty of Westphalia is direct precursor of the doctrine of Westphalian sovereignty (Gordon, 2008). Conclusion The Thirty years War was definitely not fought because the Habsburg dynasty strained to expand their role, but because other actors were seeking to diminish it (Williams, 1980). The Habsburgs had been anything but eager to start a war with other powerful actors, for sure not with almost all of Europe; moreover, the Holy Roman Empire had become an object of expansionist aggression by other actors (Williams, 1980). Thus, the Danish, Swedish, and French rulers entered the conflict in order to obtain territorial gains for themselves. If the Thirty years War hadn’t denoted a threat to the independence of other European states posed by the Habsburgs, than the Peace of Westphalia would be subjected to different interpretation, namely as one of the many examples of secular rulers increasing their own strength. Nevertheless, the Treaty of Westphalia has had its considerable contribution to the establishment of the new European geopolitical reality. Osiander (2001), however, makes some interesting point, having stated that not the Peace of Westphalia, but the the French Revolution and the onset of Industrialisation brought about the most significant transition from mediaeval times to the modernity. Thus, according to Osiander (2001), with the nineteenth century’s major developments, the international system “owed less and less to its antecedents in the ‘ancient regime’ because industrialisation caused its ongoing and ever more radical transformation”. References Boucher, David, 1998, Political Theories of International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bull, Hedley, 1977, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan. Evans, G., and Newnham, J., 1990, The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas, and Institutions. Hemel, Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Gordon, Kelly, June 6, 2008, The origins of Westphalian Sovereignty. 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