The Cuban Missile Crisis - Research Paper Example

The Cuban Missile Crisis Today when we see a screen filled with the image of a mushroom cloud reaching from the earth, we know it is simply historical footage or a special effects preamble to a new apocalyptic science-fiction film. We really do not perceive the image as a threat. However, that was not always the case. In the 1950s and the early 1960s, it was a very real, unimaginably frightening, possibility. The sale of gas masks, bomb shelters, and radiation detectors became encouraged supplies in the event of a nuclear attack. The thirteen days, from October 14th to October 27th, in 1962, were the closest that the United States has ever came to actual and potentially imminent nuclear war, and this is what we call the Cuban Missile Crisis (Brager, 2011) It is important to understand this pivotal moment in history for a number of reasons: How did we get so close to nuclear war? What can be learned from what happened that October in 1962? If and how do those lessons still apply to the world today? In order to understand the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is imperative to understand more about the Cold War, in general, and how it led to the 13 day crisis that nearly destroyed the world as we know it. In the simplest terms, the Cold War was a competition between the Western World, the United States and its NATO allies versus the Easter Bloc, the USSR and its allies to prove their superiority of the political and economic systems that they each celebrated; democracy and capitalism versus authoritarianism and communism. This contest had been going on since the conclusion of World War II in 1945 (The Belfer Center, 2012). This variable game of “one- upsmanship” continued, resulting in the Soviet government successfully launching Sputnik into space and being the first to put a man into orbit. This outcome terrified Americans. They feared that the Soviets had gained the advantage in technological advancements and that the Russians were winning the Cold War. This only heightened the United States’, nearly, universal fears concerning communism (Thompson, 2010). Tensions were already high when John F. Kennedy came to office of President of the United States in 1961 and would soon find himself in a crucial position while nuclear war hung in the preverbal balance. In early October 1962, an American U-2 spy plane was able to capture photographs showing a potential Soviet missile base on the island of Cuba. To date, there had been no known military installations in this rather remote and sparsely populated area – an area where the Cuban citizens had been evacuated and the area labeled “restricted” (Yale Law School, 2008). The President opted to keep this knowledge quiet while he conferred with his select group of advisors, who would be called ExComm, the Executive Committee. The decision made was to place a blockade of ships, ringing the Cuban island, which would prevent the Soviets from reaching their military site. This “quarantine” came with the demands for the removal of the missiles and the destruction of the base. This did not happen immediately. In fact, the Soviets had been working very hard to keep the location of the Cuban base a secret, even from its own lower ranking officers. The secret project had been titled ANADYR, which also happened to be the name of a river near the Bering Sea where a known Soviet bomber base was located. Even after the pictures were presented, they continued a volley of denials and misinformation, which is referred to as “disgenuous diplomacy” (Hansen, 2008). The President then alerted the American people, in a public broadcast, detailing the presence of the missile site in Cuba, the blockade that had been implemented, and that, as of that moment, no resolution had been reached (John F. Kennedy, 2012). President Kennedy rejected the option of attacking and being the one to begin a war, but he was not willing to simply accept the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles so close to the American shores either. Despite conversations with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, neither side was backing down. Kennedy presented an alternative comprised of three key elements: he publicly pledged that the United States would not invade Cuba once the missiles were removed, the military base closed entirely, and the Soviets had vacated the island; however, if they did not accept this offer, then American forces would invade Cuba within 24 hours, and , lastly, a “sweetener,” as incentive which came in the form of a guarantee that the United States would remove their missiles from their base in Turkey within 6 months (The Belfer Center, 2012) The stand-off was holding firm, and one can only imagine the tension in waiting for the outcome. The 13 day crisis came to a sudden and positive end when, at the last minute, Khrushchev accepted the offer. The imminent danger and climactic conclusion have helped the Cuban Missile Crisis remain the most studied moment in the entire nuclear age (Scott & Smith, 1994). Communities of historians, political scientists, and policy-makers still research this brief, but pivotal, period of time for the lessons that can be learned, both positive and negative ones, and how interpretations and perceptions of the crisis have changed in the fifty years after the fact. Some researchers firmly believe that the Cuban Missile Crisis was only brought to its conclusion by the actions and great leadership of John F. Kennedy and his “small group” dynamic that allowed him to address the issue decisively and maintain control of the situation. This is a common and traditional line of thinking among many Cold War historians – that the entire crisis was finally concluded as an American victory of the Cold War and over communism (Gopalan, 2010). However, some believe that it is not just the overall success, that being that nuclear war did not occur cannot just be looked at for positive lessons, but, also, from the mistakes that had been made, including those that contributed to causing the situation to begin with. Michael Dobbs (2008) in his article, “Why Should We Still Study the Cuban Missile Crisis,” explains that Kennedy’s decision to initiate the Bay of Pigs and Operation Mongoose, both of which are marked as historical military failures, against Cuba, gave the clear impression that America wanted to overthrow Fidel Castro. This may have been what triggered the Soviets to feel the need to send the missiles there as a show of potential protection for their Cuban allies. This means that without obvious intent, America may have been not only a part of the solution but part of the initial cause as well. Prior to this Cuba had remained, essentially, impartial to the interactions of the superpowers. After the two failed military endeavors friendly relations between America and Cuba became unlikely and helped cement the alliance with the Soviet Union. This speaks heavily – some may say – to the concept of “cause and effect” as well as the unforeseen consequences of one’s actions. Looking at this small, but important, historical moment in time with modern eyes, free of the Cold War fears and bias, we can look at it differently. One such viewpoint is provided by Jonathan Renshon (2009) in his article titled “Mirroring Risk: The Cuban Missile Estimation,” which explores the idea that the Crisis was due, partly, to the United States underestimating the Soviets. They felt that the USSR would never take the risk to deploy missile and military personal to a location so close to America. If they had, then it was very possible that America would have considered Cuba a potential location and been more aware of what was happening there. Dobbs also suggests that there are many things that can be learned and applied to current politics and foreign affairs; however, he says many of those lessons should be viewed as warnings as what not to do, as opposed to an instruction manual. He suggests a number of strong lessons that can be learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis. The most important of which are that “…the verdict of history can shift over time, beware of hubris born of past diplomatic success, and the first drafts of history are almost always unreliable” (2008). The second of the three is a hard lesson that America learned in its dealings with both Vietnam and Iraq. Although the different opinions and issues of the Cuban Missile Crisis can be argued from differing perspectives and will likely continue to be the topic of research and debate for years to come, it matters little whether you wholeheartedly believe that the “life-saving” outcomes of the Crisis was solely a victory of JFK and the United States or whether you feel it was a matter of luck that devastation was avoided. Ultimately, it was the wisdom of both Kennedy and Khrushchev realizing it was no longer about control and more about avoiding a destructive and devastating war that neither really wanted (Dobbs, 2008). In the end, it is wise to be grateful, regardless of what brought the superpowers to the pinnacle of nuclear war, that they chose as they did. Kennedy’s willingness to compromise and Khrushchev’s willingness to relent saved the world from the kind of war that would have killed hundreds of millions of innocent people. It was Khrushchev who told Kennedy that war only “…ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death and destruction” (as cited in Dobbs, 2008). This hardly sounds like a man eager to go to war, considering he had already seen the destructive outcomes of World War II. It is so very important to acknowledge that this crisis was entirely averted because these leaders involved were able to temper competition and political differences and make decisions that truly saved lives, American, Russian, and all who might have been caught in the midst alike. After the resolution, the world took a breath and began moving forward with less fear of imminent nuclear war. John F. Kennedy, sadly, was assassinated a year later in Dallas, Texas, and Nikita Khrushchev lived less than a decade after the fact. However, the Soviet government continued their goal of building superior nuclear arsenals. They pursued this action until the fall of the government in 1991. Fidel Castro, in truth, gained a great deal from the Cuban Missile Crisis in that America could never invade his country, via the promise made by Kennedy, so he was able to maintain power for nearly a half a century unmolested until he became ill and unable to continue to lead. The world is very different than it was in the 1960s. Since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet government, the risk of an “…all-out nuclear war…” has diminished dramatically. Although there will always be the possibility of nuclear disaster, along with all sorts of new modern threats, all over the world, but not quite to the degree experienced during that time in the 1960s (The Belfer Center, 2012). Regardless of all else, we should have immense respect for those who came before us. John F. Kennedy, in June of 1963, told Americans,”…For, in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s futures. And we are all mortal” (as cited in John f. kennedy, 2012). We have what we have today because of the wise restraint and sensible leadership of the superpowers involved. If things had resulted differently, we may not see the Cuban Missile Crisis as a pivotal historical moment of potential nuclear war, but as the 13 days in October that led to the end of the world that might have been. References Brager, B. L. (2011, January 30). Cuban missile crisis. MilitaryHistoryonline.com, 1. Retrieved from http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/cubanmissilecrisis.aspx. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs/Harvard Kennedy School-50th anniversary Cuban Missile Crisis. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/. Dobbs, M. (2008). Why should we still study the Cuban Missile Crisis. United States Institute of Peace: Special Report, 1–12. Retrieved fromhttp://www.usip.org/files/resources/sr205.pdf. Gopalan, K. (2010). Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Case-study of us foreign policy process. The Foreign Policy Journal, 1–7. Retrieved from http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/08/16/kennedy-and-the-cuban-missile-crisis/. Hansen, J. H., Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), & Center for the Study of Intelligence. (2008). Soviet deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis – learning from the past. Retrieved from website: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no1/article06.html. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum – Cuban Missile Crisis. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/Cuban-Missile-Crisis.aspx/. Renshon, J. (2009). Mirroring risk: The Cuban missile estimation. Intelligence and National Security, 24(3), 315–338. Retrieved from http://scholar.harvard.edu/renshon/files/Renshon-Mirroring_Risk_copy.pdf. Scott, L., & Smith, S. (1994). Lessons of October: Historians, political scientists, policy makers, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. International Affairs, 70(4), 659–684. Retrieved from http://www.pol.illinois.edu/alumni/XTRACLINE/ScottSnithCubaMiss[1].pdf. Thompson, J. T. (2010). The Cuban Missile Crisis in context. Rivier Academic Journal, 6(1), 1–12. Retrieved from http://www.rivier.edu/journal/ROAJ-Spring-2010/J389-Thompson.pdf. Yale Law School – the Avalon Project. (2008). Retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/msc_cubamenu.asp. Read More