Cuban Missile Crisis - Research Paper Example

? Cuban Missile Crisis Joe A. Zelik DeVry Alison Rose 7/19 Cuban Missile Crisis The Cuban missilecrisis better known in Cuba as the October crisis, and the Caribbean crisis in USSR, occurred in October 1962 during the era of the cold war (Chayes, 1974). It was a serious confrontation between Cuba, America, and the Soviet Union that lasted for thirteen days. The missile station in Cuba got built by the USSR so that Cuba would be able to protect itself from the United States invasion (Cuban missile crisis, 2011). The Soviet Union plus the United States entered into an agreement through back channels of communication to withdraw the missiles. The United States withdrew it missiles from Turkey while the Soviet Union withdrew its missiles from Cuba (Chayes, 1974). After the communication between the two states, Cuba was not happy about it and considered it a betrayal by the soviet government. The relationship between Cuba and the Soviet Union deteriorated. This meant that mass destruction by nuclear weapons became abolished entirely (Cuban missile crisis, 2011). It ensured that there was diplomacy and bargaining power between the two super powers. The communication between the two made it clear that they could come to a compromise without necessarily going to war. They found a way of peaceful coexistence. The relationship between America and the Soviet Union did not remain cordial for a long time (Cuban missile crisis, 2011). The use of spy cameras and airplanes became predominant since the United States was following up the missiles on the bases of Cuba via satellite. The first telephone “hotline” became installed in order to offer direct communication between the two presidents. The negotiations were underway, and a compromise reached at (Chayes, 1974). Because of the great relationship, Kennedy got the public confidence after coming to an agreement with the Soviet Union since he became seen as a weak’ leader (Cuban missile crisis, 2011). After Kennedy, Reagan came to power and was able to overwhelm the USSR which brought about the downfall of this Soviet Bloc and also an end to the cold war (Cuban missile crisis, 2011). Events leading to the crisis The US spy planes U2 in October 1962 took pictures of Missile bases situated in Cuba (Chayes, 1974). The experts informed Kennedy that he has only 10 days before the missiles are operational (Allison, 1969). Kennedy sets up a committee of National Security Council members to give him advice. The President soon announces that he was putting up a number of naval blockades on Cuba (Chayes, 1974). A number of B52 nuclear bombs became deployed, ensuring an eighth of all of them was airborne every time. On the same night, a Western spy working in Russia got arrested. His last message was that the Soviet attack was imminent (Allison, 1969) On the 23rd of October, Khrushchev provided an explanation that these missile sites were purposefully meant for defending Cuba against external attack (Chayes, 1974). 20 Russian ships became spotted heading to Cuba (Pfiffner, n.d). He accused the United States of piracy, and warned that Russia was preparing a fitting reply to the oncoming aggressor. The first Russian ship docked on the naval blockade on the 25th of October 1962 (Allison, 1969). This was an oil ship, and it was allowed to pass. The other Russian ships carrying dangerous missiles turned back. The US government had secretly offered to remove its missiles located in Turkey. They were to exchange them for the ones in Cuba (Chayes, 1974). On 26th October Russia was still going ahead with building the missile bases (Chayes, 1974). Kennedy began planning a military strike on Cuba. Khrushev sent Kennedy a telegram offering to destroy all the nuclear sites if he would lift the blockade he had placed and to agree not to invade Cuba (Clearly, 2009). The Kennedys’ met with the Russian ambassador and mentioned removing all the missiles located in Turkey (Pfiffner, n.d). Before Kennedy could reply to his letter, Khrushchev sent a different letter demanding the America’s president to remove all their missile bases situated in Turkey (Chayes, 1974). A U2 plane was on the same day shot down in Cuba (Clearly, 2009). Historical and contemporary causes of the event The Cold War in 1962 was at its peak. The Russians had developed the Berlin Wall in 1961 (Chayes, 1974). Kennedy had become elected on the promise of getting tough with the communists; he felt that Khrushchev had advantageously gotten one over him during the 1961 Vienna Summit (Clearly, 2009). The US placed nuclear missiles in Turkey in 1962. Also, in 1959, Fidel Castro a rebel took over power in Cuba, a small island just 90 miles away from Florida (Pfiffner, n.d). Before he had taken over power, the government led by Colonel Batista, was a right wing military dictatorship and corrupt, but these had not stopped the Americans from owning a number of businesses in the region (Blight, Nye & Welch, 1987). When Fidel Castro assumed power, he nationalized all the American companies in Cuba. The Americans in retaliation stopped all aid to Cuba and also their import of Cuban sugar. This dealt Castro a massive blow since sugar was the livelihood of the economy of Cuba (Chayes, 1974). Fidel became forced to search for help from the USSR. In 1960, the USSR signed a pact to purchase million tons of sugar from Cuba every single year (Chayes, 1974). Castro, who was not a communist before, turned to one (Blight, Nye & Welch, 1987). America became shocked. In 1961, with the approval of Kennedy, the CIA provided funds, trained, armed and even transported close to 1300 Cuban exiles to invade their motherland and overthrow Fidel (Chayes, 1974). They arrived at the Bay of Pigs and tried to overthrow Fidel Castro. Their invasion was a disaster, and it ended up humiliating Kennedy instead of Castro. In September of 1961, Fidel Castro asked for weapons to defend his country form America’s invasion, and Russia publicly promised to provide them with the weapons (Chayes, 1974). This is the main reason as to why America discovered these missile sites in Cuba. These areas had brought each and every town within America at the range of the Soviet nuclear missiles (Blight, Nye & Welch, 1987). President Kennedy called for a meeting of all the Security Council, and subsequently, went on air in the National Television informing the Americans that they were under immense threat the crisis had begun (Blight, Nye & Welch, 1987) . Soviet Insecurity During Kennedy’s presidential campaign, he had often spoken about the large missile gap between America and the Soviet Union. Despite getting briefed by the entire pentagon that America had lot more nuclear missiles than the entire Soviet Union, Kennedy still insisted that the US had a few (Chayes, 1974). After the election, Khrushchev tactically began testing the new Commander in Chief. In 1961, Khrushchev pressurized Berlin and eventually a wall became constructed surrounding Western Berlin (Chayes, 1974). In response to this, the administration of Kennedy deemed it necessary to inform Khrushchev that there was indeed no missile gap. Khrushchev all along knew that America had lot more missiles than the Soviet Union, but now he understood that Americans knew (Blight, Nye & Welch, 1987). He had also known that the Soviet Union missiles were only powerful enough against the European nations, but the American’s missiles were powerful and could strike down the entire Soviet Union (Sekeris, 2006). Khrushchev also felt like a man surrounded by a lot of enemies. He claimed America had missiles in Turkey, which was just 150 miles from USSR (Chayes, 1974). Cuba was 90 miles off Florida’s coast, but the little 60 mile difference had no impact for a missile. Consequently, Khrushchev feared for a first strike by America (Clearly, 2009). He became worried that if the Soviet Union could lose the arms race, it would invite a nuclear fist strike from the US (Chayes, 1974). He started looking, for ways of countering this America’s lead (Sekeris, 2006). An Invasion of Cuba This was the second principal cause of the crisis. Cuba feared an invasion by the Americans. Since assuming power in 1959, Castro knew of a number of US attempts to remove him from power (Chayes, 1974). The first one was the failed invasion at the known Bay of Pigs through the CIA backed Cuban exiles back in 1961 (Clearly, 2009). The second attempt was a United States army drill in 1962. The military performed a mock invasion of an island in the Caribbean’s to oust a fictitious dictator by the name of Ortsac (Chayes, 1974). This was Castro’s name spelt backwards. In addition, America was plotting how to invade Cuba in an operation dubbed operation Mongoose (Blight, Nye & Welch, 1987). These plans ensured Castro was under pressure. The CIA was also running a number of covert missions all over Cuba in an attempt to damage Castro’s government (Chayes, 1974). Castro became convinced that America was serious in their attempt of invading Cuba. Different historical interpretations of the event A lot of the American public still holds vivid impressions of what looked like a poker game between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962 (Blight, 2004). Many historical accounts are similar to the events of this Cuban Missile Crisis. A group of scholars’ claim that President Kennedy’s handling of the looming crisis was extremely dangerous, provocative and moving both the USSR and the United States to the brink of a full thermonuclear war (Chayes, 1974). This crisis, however, brought these superpowers towards an onset of nuclear war. Nevertheless, the argument that these revisionists’ historians bring forward that the USSR missiles based in Cuba did not pose any serious threat, nor did it change the nuclear threat to America is utterly without merit (Clearly, 2009). Even though, the argument that these revisionist historians bring forward, that the Soviet nuclear missiles launched in Cuba posses the same devastating impacts, as if they became launched from the Soviet Union is true, the fact itself is inadequate to support the Soviet Union deployment of this nuclear weapons in Cuba, did not bring additional danger to America (Chayes, 1974). Nevertheless, the Soviet deployment of the missiles in Cuba brought about a change in the balance of power. On examining the historical records closely, the change of the balance of power was a key motivational factor in Khrushchev’s crucial decision of deploying the nuclear missiles (Chayes, 1974). Just like other political decisions, his decision to deploy the nuclear missiles had become multifaceted (Blight, 2004). Not only did the Premiere want to alter the set balance of power, but he wanted to destroy America’s policy of containment, specifically in Berlin and also Latin America (Chayes, 1974). Also, the deployment of Soviet’s nuclear missiles in Cuba, provided an opportunity for Khrushchev threaten US mainland in the same way, the American missiles located in Europe had threatened the Soviet Union (Chayes, 1974). Castro was willing to take in the Soviet missiles, even though not entirely on his terms. Just like Khrushchev, He was willing to accept the nuclear missiles for the sake of expanding communist ideologies (Chayes, 1974). However, the main reason for him to accept the deployment was to save Cuba from America (Blight, 2004). The positive outcomes of the event Assertion of United States Power Before the Crisis, Kennedy and the entire America was suffering from a credibility loss, due to the failure by President Kennedy to overthrow Castro in Cuba (Chayes, 1974). With America stepping back of Soviet in the Crisis, it managed to show once more that it would not back down from aggression (Sekeris, 2006). Removal of a global nuclear threat With the two superpowers agreeing to be less aggressive in waging a full scale nuclear war, the world became safer. After the United States had bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki back in 1945, a possibility of nuclear war was imminent (Bloom, 2006)/ Close ties between The US and the USSR The US and the Soviet Union agreed to establish a long lasting relationship by the establishment of a hot line. This was a line of communication between the two nations in case of future disputes (Bloom, 2006). Negative outcomes of the Crisis Instead of increasing international prestige of the USSR, Khrushchev did discredit Moscow’s ultimate commitment to their allies, most importantly China (Chayes, 1974). Although both China and Russia had a tepid relationship, the situation between the two nations deteriorated further. China’s press started to publish anti Soviet articles (Dobbs, 2008). According to a Russian historian, Peter Kenez, Khrushchev’s ultimate yield to America was downright humiliating for the entire Soviet Union (Chayes, 1974). This played a key role in Khrushchev’s downfall. A lot of people in the Soviet Union could not stand a leader who blinked when they were at war with the United States (Bloom, 2006). References (2011, M arch 6). Cuban Missile Crisis. Retrieved August 21, 2012, from Saylor.org: http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Cuban-Missile-Crisis.pdf Allison, G. T. (1969). Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The American Political Science Review, 63(3), 689-718. Blight, J.G., Nye, J., and Welch, D.A (1987). The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited. Foreign Affairs, 66(1), 170-188. Blight, J. (2004). The Cuban Missile Crisis: Considering its Place in Cold War History. Chacha: Choices for the 21st Century Education Program. Bloom, N. (2006). The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks: Firm Level Estimation and a 9/11 Simulation. CEP Discussion Papers dp0718. Centre for Economic Performance, 1-40. Chayes, A. (1974). The Cuban missile crisis: International crises and the role of law. London: Oxford University Press. Cleary, P. (2009). The Cuban Missile Crisis: How close were we to nuclear war? Epworth: Western Dubuque High School. Dobbs, M. (2008). Why We Should Still Study the Cuban Missile Crisis: Special Report. United States Institute of Peace, 1-11. Pfiffner, J. &. (n.d.). The Cuban Missile Crisis: Decision Making Under Pressure. Triumps and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency, 185-187. Sekeris, P. (2006). Compelling in the Shadow of Power. Working Papers halshs- 00081333, 1-16. Read More