Mark Steinberg's Voices of Revolution - Essay Example

? Mark Steinberg’s Voices of Revolution Paul Lucas HIST314-B1: Russian and Soviet History 1855-present March 15, Mark Steinberg’s Voices of Revolution, 1917 Mark Steinberg’s 1917 book, Voices of Revolution, is a book that deals with the progression of communism in Russia. This book is laden with stimulating and insightful essays that let its readers “listen” to concerns, criticisms, demands and aspirations of everyday women and men in the annals of the Russian revolution. Steinberg, in his writing of this book, divides it into three sections, chronologically. There is, before each section, an exhaustive narrative explaining the historical elements of that section. Section 1 covers the period between February and June of 1917, the second between July and October 1917 and the third covers November 1917 to January 1918. Each section is further divided into the authors’ reputed origin that is described socially. These social origins are soldiers, workers and peasants. The book’s explanatory text includes “The Language of Popular Revolution”, where Steinberg attempts to explain the meaning of revolution to ordinary Russians. Section one, titled “Liberty, Desire and Frustration: The first Months of Revolution,” de-emphasizes the revolutionary politics of parties. Narratives preceding sections 2 and 3 have a heavier focus on high politics. This paper attempts to discuss and dissect section 2 of this book, titled “Crisis and Upheaval.” Steinberg re-hashes the demonstrations of June and the days of July giving extra-special detail to top-level political decisions and machinations. In analyzing the activity of the lower class, he highlights looting and violence, that he refers to as protests of the lower class. He concludes that this “gave expression to a good deal of clearly directed anger and hatred” (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2003 p270). Steinberg points out in this section that moderate socialists, the far left, Kerensky and the re-energized right were of the opinion that only firm order would halt the further disintegration of Russia (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2003 p273). Steinberg continues to put emphasis on an effort, born of his own consciousness, to veer Bolshevism away from the center of this narrative. He does this by devoting more attention to the creation of Kerensky’s directory, for example, as well as the democratic conference and Moscow State Conference (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2003 p275). He does this instead of dwelling on the Bolshevik emergence in a majority of the soviets and the power seizure in October. Steinberg in this section explains the crisis and social breakdown that plagued Russia in this period by using the October revolution. The October revolution was about every-day people claiming power over their daily lives and the circumstances governing that life they held dear. Worth noting, however, is that Steinberg’s analysis, especially as laid down in this section, gives decreased attention to the rational approach of their efforts. The decreased attention to this is at the expense of their expressive and emotional intent, in particular the desire for retribution by the lower class on the social elites (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2003 p277). On July 1, there were demands of “all power to the soviets” by the second Gun regiment, as the third infantry regiment declined to send companies as a replacement to the front. Immediately after reception of orders to send help to the front, machine gunners in their thousands held an impromptu meeting to plan artillery backed insurrection. As the Bolsheviks attempted to calm things down, anarchists added more wood to the fire. The soldiers, fully armed took a decision to march while sending delegates from factories that, as workers, had to drop everything and join in the march. Soon, over 50,000 of them went marching all the while demanding All Power to the people (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2003 p279). The Bolsheviks at this point had no choice but to support the masses as long as they were peaceful in their March and election of delegates. The SR’s and the Mensheviks having lost their majority power to the Bolsheviks walked out of the Petrograd Soviet. On July 3 at 11am, workers took over at the forefront of the protests due to their sheer numbers. In fact, even in factories where SR’s and Mensheviks were influential, four out of five workers joined the strike (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2003 p279). Lenin spoke and encouraged the slogan “all power to the soviets”. Soldiers supporting the government arrived and, frightened that a revolution was about to happen, launched ambushes on the masses killing approximately 400. The offensive by the government started at about 6am, beginning with the destruction of printing presses and offices at Pravda. Agents of the government sacked the palace at Kshenshikaya, the Bolshevik Central Committee headquarters with Soviet and Union workers being arrested en-masse. The city was gripped by fear as the presence of police increased almost to a status of martial law (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2003 p281). However, some Kronstadt sailors did not give in and accompanied by the Red Guards retreated to Peter and Paul fortress. This led to a siege against them, which was broken via the mediation of Stalin. At this point, the strike ended, and the provisional government ordered for Lenin’s arrest on charges of spying for Germany. On July 8, Lvov resigned, leaving Kerensky to take over power with General Kornilov becoming Commander in chief. Lenin had already gone into hiding before all this. With Kerensky as president, the second coalition was formed, with the Mensheviks and cadets joining in (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2003 p283). As all this was happening, in the background, things were getting hot. Over 104,000 workers had been laid off, coupled with a 248%-836% increase in prices of essential commodities. Wages fell by 57.4% with bread rations at their most severe (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2003 p284). As this was happening, Stalin was elected to the Bolshevik Central Committee. Over the period of 12th to 15th of august, the interim government held a conference out in Moscow. Workers soviets voted to strike as a show of opposition to the congress, but Petrograd Soviet voted not to strike. Workers accepted this partially and went on strike for a day, with 400,000 the total number of strikers. On August 19, Kerensky refused Kornilov’s Demands to allow him reassign a part of his army to Petrograd. During this time, the Germans captured Riga without any attempt at defense by the Russians. Kornilov, who had foretold this, summoned 4000 of his most loyal soldiers, having agreed on a military dictatorship with Kerensky. However, his plan was to ditch Kerensky. Kerensky was also unsure of Kornilov and began to plot against him. On August 27, Kerensky tried to relieve Kornilov of his command while Kornilov spreads rumors that the interim government was full of German spies and was hostage to soviets and Bolsheviks (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2003 p285). Soon, workers sensing the discord in the interim government organized Red Guards, about 40,000 of them, with rail workers derailing trains to halt Kornilov’s entry. Bolshevik soldiers from Vyborg and Kronstadt arrived in Petrograd. Kerensky tried to seize the moment, capturing Kornilov and declaring Russia a Republic (Steinberg & Schwartz, 2003 p286). Sailors in the Baltic Sea in their stead declared they would not take any order from the interim government. During this period, Lenin published The State and Revolution. It was in October when The Petrograd soldiers declared their refusal to report to the interim government. This ensured a pressure cooker atmosphere that fermented the October revolution. In conclusion, Mark Steinberg, in the second section of his book Voices of Revolution, deals with the period between July 1917 and October 1917 in the premise that this was the age of the workers. It is impossible not to note how much emphasis Steinberg gives to this point. The workers, organized in soviets are able to mobilize huge masses that the oppressive interim government, plotting a military dictatorship, cannot overcome. The fleeing of Kerensky was a significant turning point since it energized the soviets, making them feel invincible and in control of their own destiny. References Steinberg M. D, Schwartz M. Voices of Revolution, 1917. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. Read More