Hobbes and Internationalism - Essay Example

?Hobbes and Internationalism Introduction This paper will explore Hobbes’ theory of the of nature and assess whether it is applicable to nationalism and demonstrable in international relations. It will be argued that, although his initial concept of man in the state of nature corresponds with internationalism, that a more detailed application of his theory is difficult to reconcile with realistic principles. Hobbes’ State of Nature It would be taxing for anyone vaguely familiar with Hobbes to not be aware of his widely quoted vision of man’s brutal and short life in the state of nature. For Hobbes, man’s equality in the state of nature is the cause of his terrible existence in that every man has the right to everything, which causes conflict. Man possesses an inherent selfishness which causes him to strive constantly for self-preservation, and in turn is the cause of his suffering (or seeking) competition, glory, and distrust. Such a state is ultimately “no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death” (1996: xiii). This is not to say that man is a blundering, blind fool simply seeking to grab that which promises to bring greater comfort and success to his life. Rather, man is in possession of reason, which causes him to grasp an understanding of right and wrong conduct. Yet, because no formal standards of right and wrong exist in a state of nature, opinions and rights clash and differ. This is not to assume that Hobbes denies the universality of morality or natural law, rather man is governed by agreements and contracts. However, Hobbes’ contracts are a product of the selfishness of man, and hence are not based upon any form of honour or trust because they will be valid to the point that an individual believes that another will not fall foul of his promise. An example would be that Y does not punch Z because Y does not want Z to punch him. This ‘contract’ is formed on pure selfishness, and only extends to the point that Z complies with the agreement. If Y feels that Z’s agreement lacks strength, he will quickly feel free to break his part of the contract. Such contracts, because they are without honour and because they are a product of selfishness, are very likely to be breached. If we are to apply these points on an international scale, some contradictions emerge. While on the surface it would appear that each state has the right to do anything, the existence of equality is highly questionable. Hobbes evidently thinks that a “genuine condition of war” exists between states (Hokestra 2007: 118), though not their individuals; rather their sovereigns who are constantly “in the state and posture of gladiators” (1996: xiii, 12, 63/78). The lack of common power on an international level today is evident, yet could this be utilised to lead to the conclusion that each state is constantly read for, or under threat of war? The temptation to answer this query negatively is backed by the concept of equality. Indeed, there is a great deal of “radical uncertainty” surrounding the cooperation between states (Newey 2008: 161). Though Hobbes saw men as equal in a state of nature, it could not be said that all states are equal; the opposite is actually evident. America certainly does not feel the need to harbour pre-emptive aggression against countries such as Iceland, for example. This leads to the conclusion that internationally, states are in a state of war as man is in the state of nature (Bull 1977: 49). This concept can also be applied to Hobbes’ view of man in nature as essentially unsociable: states across the globe often enter into mutually beneficial agreements. Even larger states provide aid to third world countries, particularly after crises and where poverty is extreme. Although these distinctions may be rather primitive, they gather much ground in establishing weaknesses in Hobbes’ theory being applied on an international level. Man in the state of nature is certainly more equal than countries in the ‘state of war’, and this initial divergence alone is enough to greatly weaken the international application of Hobbes’ theory. Hobbes and the Social Contract Hobbes’ notion of the state existing as a product of a social contract is the core theme of his theory (Sorell 2006). It is the very selfishness of man that requires him to enter into the social contract and thereby assign his rights to a sovereign entity who will ensure peace and promote order in the society. Of course, this has not happened on an international level, and can be concluded that Hobbes sees international countries in a constant state of (potential) war against one another. Fundamentally, Hobbes claims that “natural law teaches us the need for self-preservation: law and government are required if we are to protect order and security” (Wacks 2005: 21). For Hobbes, the state of nature causes man to progress to a societal state through the social contract; beyond this natural law does not exist in the state of nature (1969: I.4 10I, 15). It could be argued that the very existence of the fact that man is free to act as he pleases in the state of nature is definitive as a natural law in itself (1969: I.10). Yet Hobbes does not suggest that natural law does not exist in the general sense; rather he states that natural law is observable only within a societal structure, within man as part of society, applicable to all (Rogers 1994; Thomas 1995: 25-28). Natural law does exist in the state of nature, though it is limited to each individual, and is thus not exactly natural per se. Natural law in the state of nature exists in the individual, on a severely subjective level and hence applied only as far as the individual seeks survival (Hobbes 1996: xiv, 124-5). In the international realm, natural law can thus be interpreted as being possessed subjectively by each country. The sovereign is endowed with the primary purpose to preserve peace and order between men, though he does not require that the sovereign be accountable to its citizens. Alternatively, Hobbes states that individuals should be appreciative of their saviour from the horrors of natural life through the placing of “a moral obligation only in the first law of nature while men live outside the bounds of civil society” (Hancey 1996: 449). Hobbes is able to utilise the terrible state of man in nature in order to make the sovereign’s power legitimate, justifying any tyranny endured in society is better than the stark alternative. The constant existence of countries without a sovereign greatly reduces the convincing element of man’s avoidance of the terrible alternative. Countries of the world have existed without a sovereign until now – can the alternative (the world as it is) thus be so undesirable? More importantly, Hobbes’ claim that natural law can only exist subjectively in a state of nature is not applicable on an international level. Indeed, each country has its own set of laws, cultures, beliefs and opinions. Granted: these differences between countries are the cause of much conflict. Yet some forms of ‘natural law’ exist between groups of states in many instances and are certainly not confined to the subjective borders of individual countries. Perhaps the most prominent example here is the existence of European Law, which could be defined as a natural law which exists between a relatively large group of countries. If the world was in a constant state of war, and if the international application of Hobbes’ theory is a larger existence of the natural state of man, how can such broad reaching laws exist? Many different forms of laws exist which apply to several countries; this would not be possible if the world were in Hobbes’ view of the state of nature. These aforementioned forms of laws which reach beyond single countries could be defined as Hobbes’ contracts between men which apply only as far as they feel that the promise is valid. In the state of nature, if an individual were to feel that his neighbour would not honour his part of the contract, he would gladly breach the agreement. Can the same be said for international relations? If one is to look at the well-known tensioned situation between Greece and Turkey, this principle may well ring true. It could be argued that Greece and Turkey, in a state of nature, will not declare war on one another only to the extent that the other will refrain. The moment the agreement threatens to be breached by Turkey, for example, Greece will also erase the agreement as though it never existed. Yet can this be said for all countries, or is this example simply attributable to the turbulent history between the two countries? It has already been suggested that some countries may not feel in such a position, particularly if they are larger and hence do not feel under threat from smaller countries. It hence cannot be said that, internationally, states are in a constant state of war. Conclusion It can thus be concluded that there is little relevance in applying Hobbes’ theory to international relations. Many principles and examples exist to rebut this connection. Hobbes’ theory requires a great deal of restructuring if it is to apply effectively on an international level: such proposals are beyond the scope of this paper. It is evident that international relations do not correspond to man in a state of nature. Countries do not go to war as a result of competition or reputation (Hobbes 1996: xiii, 7, 62/76); the concept of war, when it does take place, is based on much more complex and profound principles than Hobbes suggests. There are, however, incidences of Hobbes’ theory which have shined through in international relations; Newey points out that the existence of international law has proven weak in the face of larger countries who “can impose their will through sheer force” (2008: 161). It can thus be concluded that, although internationalism does convey Hobbes’ state of nature due to the lack of dominating sovereign over all countries, this is as far as it can realistically progress. Beyond this point, his theory becomes weak in application and does not reflect the reality of internationalism. Bibliography Bull, H. 1977, The Anarchical Society: a study of order in world politics. New York: Columbia University Press. Hancey, J.O. 1976, ‘John Locke and the Law of Nature’, Political Theory, 4(4): 439-454. Hobbes, T. 1969, The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic. Oxon: Routledge. Hobbes, T. 1996, Leviathan, New York: Oxford University Press. Hokestra, K. 2007, ‘Hobbes on the Natural Condition of Mankind’, in Springborg, P. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes’s Leviathan. New York: Cambridge University Press. Newey, G. 2008, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hobbes and Leviathan. Oxon: Routledge. Rogers, G.A.J. 1994, Locke’s Philosophy: Content and Context. New York: Oxford University Press. Sorell, T. (ed). 1996, The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes. New York: Cambridge University Press. Thomas, L. 1995, Locke on Government. London: Routledge, London. Wacks, R. 2005, Understanding Jurisprudence: An Introduction to Legal Theory. New York: Oxford University Press. Read More