China: a democracy in ten to fifteen years - Essay Example

?China: A Democracy in Ten to Fifteen Years With its vast human and natural resources, China’s integration in the world trade (Rumbaugh and Blancher 2004, 3) since 1978, which has resulted to its unprecedented fast rising economy, has demonstrated the great impact it can effect on the world economy (Chuang 2010, 3) and has triggered speculations and wanting of its democratization, specifically by the US (Ma 2007, 3). However with the Chinese Communist Party still in power, Friedman (1989, 171) argues that China’s democratization is highly impossible as it is against the very nature of a totalitarian state. Similarly, Yongnian (2010, 36) observed that despite China’s political reforms, nothing indicates that it is transitioning towards democracy, just like the way other communist states did. The overwhelming doubt over China’s democratization is quite understandable, considering the antidemocratic actions it had shown the modern world – most prominent of which are the SARS crisis (Clark 2003), the Beijing Massacre of June 4, 1989 (Brook 1998), and China’s unfair international trade practices (Mann 2007). Given these conflicting circumstances, determining China’s prospects for democracy is truly something that cannot be easily agreed upon, that it requires deeper thought. The path that China is taking may not be similar with the European communist states- turned democratic states (Perry 2007). But, it does not also mean that China is not democratizing or cannot be democratized, because China, just like any other country for that matter, has its own context of development (He 1996: 220). And though it may be true that China’s transition to democracy is filled with uncertainties, it does not necessarily eliminate its prospects for democracy. On the contrary these uncertainties indicate that there exists in China a struggle between anti-democratic and pro-democratic forces, because if not, then, there is nothing to debate upon today. “Every democratization usually faces some countermovement in which remnant hardliners and neo-authoritarians seek to derail the slide to change” (Gilley 2006, 344). Hence analysis of these uncertainties shows irreversible trends of China’s democratization in the next 10 to 15 years. 1. There emerges a pro-democracy civil society within China, which although being criticized as weak could be easily consolidated and strengthened, is nonetheless compelling China to democratize. Thus once strengthened this could be a powerful force to push for China’s democratization. China’s subsequent efforts to quell opposition and free expression – some features of democracy – most prominently the June Fourth Beijing Massacre, which despite its bloody suppression did not end popular protest in China (Perry 2007, 1), but instead has inadvertently created one of the important seeds of democracy, which is the civil society (Hong 1992, 252). As Marshall (2011, 98) explains, “Democratization… is the process by which civil society asserts popular authority over the institutions of the state…” The ironic result of CCP’s anti-democratic actions Gilley (2006, 343) explains, though not a prerequisite, must have been necessitated by China’s unique historical context in order to begin the democratization process. Though critics belittle China’s civil society, the fact remains that there exists an opposition which could be readily consolidated to push for China’s democratization. In fact, from the 1978 Democracy Wall Movement to the 1989 Tiananmen Square Movement, the Chinese civil society have illustrated its power to pressure the government for reforms and most importantly have exemplified to the Chinese people better democratic ideals and values as opposed to the reigning CCP ideals. (Tong 1992, 146) As He (1996, 225) states, “this newly emergent civil society provides a fertile bed in which political liberalism can thrive.” 2. Although, it is true that the CCP remains the single political party running the PRC; the CCP which appears organizationally and ideologically strong is in fact weakening. The weakening of the CCP is manifested in its leadership, membership and territorial controls. CCP’s weakening leadership can be seen in two ways: factionalism within its rank and the aging of its most ardent leaders without having developed their similarly zealous replenishment. Today, CCP’s current Politburo standing committee is divided into four main groups: ‘the pragmatic (Wen Jiabao, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun), the Leninist romantic (Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo), the politically ambitious (Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Jia Qinglin), and the hardline (Luo Can)’ – the only one resistant to change. (Gilley 2006, 343) In fact, Tong (1992, 147) noted that internal power struggle of two generally erring factions: the hardline conservatives and the reformers has been a constant character of the CCP with the latter gaining the popular support. Furthermore, with the hardliners at the top level of the central government and with the reformers in constant contact with the people, makes it even more favorable for reformers to pursue their aspirations as they are in direct contact with the people to whom the benefits of change would fall. More alarmingly, even in China’s military – the force that which communist ideological control is strongly assured (Tong 1992, 142) – a ‘de-partyization’(Gilley 2006, 343) is on-going due primarily to the high-ranking officers’ dissatisfaction over Deng’s demobilization of one million soldiers in 1985 in the guise of military modernization, yet had become the means for Deng’s faction to control the military (Tong 1992, 142). These disgruntled military officers believe that what threatens China’s stability lies within CPP itself; thus they are calling for political reforms (Gilley 2006, 343). Much more, Deng’s desire to modernize the military has set aside the prime interest of the party to control the military (Tong 1992, 142). This would later impact on the military’s ideological weakening as its loyalty has been subtly transferred from the party to the party’s faction. Another factor that should be considered in the CCP’s weakening leadership is the dying out of its top old-guard hardliners (one of the vital element of CCP’s power structure), who are now in their later life with some of them already ill (Tong 1992, 147). This means that the tough defenders of CPP’s traditional view are diminishing, especially so that revolutionary ferment is no longer apparent in this age of globalization that replenishment for these communist die-hards could hardly be developed, while the advocates for democratic change is growing within China as being fomented by overwhelming democratic forces outside China. The weakening of CPP’s political control can also be seen in the widespread dissatisfaction among the Chinese people and rank-in-file party members. Chinese intellectuals, workers, peasants and reform-minded officials have similarly expressed their desire for democracy, with the majority of the peasantry having participated in village elections. To Gore’s (2011, 4) description, “the fading, almost into irrelevance, of the communist ideology not only in the general population but also among the Party members.” Furthermore, although the membership of CCP has dramatically increased, the majority of them are recruited under the influence of the ideology of market economy, thus democratization is something that they can easily understand and accept. Lastly, the decentralization of power from Beijing to the central and provincial government has in a way created the spirit and desire for autonomy of CCP’s local territories, especially so that their economies have increased dramatically, which consequentially has improved their standard of living. Resultantly, this ‘weakened the control of the central government and the power of its economic plan, and greatly strengthened the local powers.’ (Tong 1992, 143) These local powers could be forces for China’s democratization, as they have experience the freedom to carve their own future. 3. Privately-owned enterprises, which primarily have produced the unprecedented economic growth of China, have found its legitimacy and have established its own credibility (Tong 1992, 151) in a country that has been used to state-owned enterprises, awakening bourgeoisie values and strengthening private property, hence establishing the material forces for democracy. The implication to democracy of China’s unprecedented growth can be seen in three ways. First, a stable democracy almost always necessitates a high level of economic progress (Tong 1992, 150). In short, China is economically ready to democratize and this trend cannot be whimsically reversed by anti-democratic CCP leaders just to prevent China’s democratization because by doing so they might instead hasten China’s democratization, as the Chinese people have enjoyed this economic growth. Second, China’s economic development mainly an outgrowth of the private sector has consolidated the bourgeois class – the avid supporters of democracy (Huntington, cited in Tong 1992, 154), has proven to the Chinese people the efficiency of free-market economy compared with a centrally-planned economy, and has given the workers a better choice where to work with the privately owned enterprises offering better wages and working conditions. And third, it has created a snowballing effect with the China’s less developed regions aspiring for similar economic development (Tong 1992, 154). In effect, the benefits of economic growth primarily credited to private enterprises have unleashed the power of democratic forces. As Li (2009, 143) describes, the economic issues at play in China today are similarly found in developed democratic economies and favorably to China’s democratization, China’s interest groups rally around policy issues in the same way in a democracy. Most importantly Gore (2011, 2) explains that China’s market liberalization inevitably puts it in a position that requires political reform suitable to that market framework and that is democracy. In other words, China cannot have both worlds – the benefit of market economy and the convenience of CCP’s leadership, as these are two irreconcilable frameworks. And given the economic benefits Chinese people have enjoyed from market economy vis-a-vis their repressed experiences from the CCP, it would be most unlikely for them to throw away the benefits of market economy, thus the push for democratization is most likely. 4. China is undergoing cultural changes favorable to democracy. Since the CCP, the longest ruling party in the world, has efficiently controlled the Chinese people ideologically, inculcating democratic ideals in China’s culture is necessary. However, Lucian Pye holds that Chinese political culture in general and Confucianism in particular is incapable of accepting democratic ideals. In other words, there is no way that democratic ideals can be inculcated in the Chinese culture. If this is true, then democratization of China would almost be impossible. But, Shaohua Hu clarifies that although Chinese political culture in general and Confucianism in particular may not usher democratic ideals, neither do they obstruct democracy because Confucianism is ‘a-democratic’. Instead, he recommends that a universal doctrine of right based-morality be developed, as this would fit better in democratizing Chinese culture. (cited in Zhao 2000, 6-8) Rightly so, Christianity, which in principle values the pillars of democracy, has been spreading dramatically in China since after the CCP’s bloody repression on the 1989 pro-democracy movement. This could rather than could not usher the development of democratic culture in China. (Tong 1992, 149) 5. Global economic and political developments, which predominantly promote market economy, leave China no other choice but to deal with its democratization, especially so that it has opened its doors to international trading. The end of Cold War has left a negative impression that socialism is not a viable socio-economic order and on the other hand has indirectly affirmed the efficiency of market-economy. This consequently has impacted negatively on CCP’s leadership over China, which exposure to the outside world has given its people a point of comparison and choice, thus loosening their belief on CCP’s totalitarian rule and centralized economy. Furthermore, the democratization of the former socialist states in the Soviet Union, though marred with problems have not discouraged the reformers in China but instead made them more cautious in their pursuit of democratic change, because they are determined that their democratization efforts will not fail. In other words, the determination to democratize China is there. One more thing, the collapse of the soviet socialist bloc, has made it more difficult for China to defend its system. In addition Asian countries, especially Hongkong and Taiwan, which are under China’s rule, similarly hope for China’s democratization as this would benefit them (Tong 1992, 153). Thus, within and outside China, forces and elements for democratization are working together leaving China with no other way but to democratize. Given these democratic forces and favorable moral and socioeconomic conditions, Bruce (2006, 344) positively assures that “democracy in China will probably survive because most democracies these days do survive.” Reference List Brook, Timothy. Quelling the people: The military suppression of the Beijing democracy movement. Stanfod, California: Stanford University Press, 1998. Chuang, Yih-chyi. “The rise of China and its implications for world economy.” In China and the world economy: China’s economic rise after three decades of reform, edited by Yih-chyi Chuan and Simona Thomas, 2-21. London, UK: Transaction Publishers, 2010. 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