Guerilla insurency and insecurity in Colombia: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - Essay Example

? Guerrilla insurgency and insecurity in Colombia: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia al affiliation Guerrilla insurgency and insecurity in Colombia: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia The political scene in Colombia has over the years been marred by conflicts between the government and revolutionary guerrilla movements. Civil unrest in Colombia dates back to the 19th century, when the Colombians revolted against Spanish rule, thereby earning Colombia independence from Spain. After independence, major political parties in Colombia started conflicting over who would rule Colombia and under what ideology. In 1958, a party known as the “National Front” assumed power in Colombia and concentrated such power in the hands of the elites. This meant that other parties, particularly communist parties were locked out of power. Consequently, there emerged a number of guerrilla movements to challenge the position of the National Front and to supposedly champion for the rights of the peasants and the sidelined people in society (Hudson, 2010). One of the most notable movements to arise at this time was the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Since then, the FARC has grown to become a national movement that engages the government supremacy battles and the control of Colombia. This paper aims to discuss the activities of the FARC and analyze how such activities have affected Colombia politically, socially, and economically. In addition, the paper will examine how the subsequent regimes in Colombia have responded to the threat posed by the activities of the FARC. Historical background The FARC is an extremist group in Colombia that has threatened the stability of the Latin American country for decades. A Marxist-Leninist guerrilla movement, the FARC was formed in 1964, after the government sent troops to the southern regions of Colombia to regain control over the area that was under communist control. Rabasa & Chalk (2001) state that during this operation, several communist rebels escaped and resurfaced in 1966 under the FARC movement. The major leaders of the guerilla movement included Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo Arenas (Atkins, 2004). The purpose of the movement was to ostensibly represent the poor people in Colombia, particularly the peasants who had been neglected by the ruling bourgeoisie. In addition, the FARC wanted to liberate Colombia from the political influence of the United States that was increasingly meddling in the internal affairs of Colombia. As a communist organization, the main aim of the FARC was to overthrow the democratic government in Colombia and reinstate a communist government. This means that the FARC, in these formative years was the militant wing of the Communist Party in Colombia. At this time, the FARC carried out minor attacks in the southern and central regions of Colombia (Maddaloni, 2009). Years after the formation of the FARC, the movement was seen to deviate from its original Marxist ideologies and take on more violent and questionable approaches towards destabilizing the government. Nevertheless, some of the founders of the movement, such as Manuel Marulanda, before his death in 2008, were strong adherents of Marxist teachings and continued to uphold these values within the organization. However, some factions of the FARC have over the years been engaging in activities outside the scope and ideology of Marxism. For example, the FARC has continually engaged in trafficking cocaine, series of kidnaps, and engaging in talks with the Colombian government. Just as the ideologies within FARC have changed, so have the main goals of the movement. Due to an increase in the number of revolutionary movements, the FARC increasingly became involved in fighting troops and paramilitary groups, while also engaging in drug trafficking in the 1990s. Essentially, the primary goal among FARC followers today is concerned with the territorial control of Colombia. The FARC aims to gain territorial and financial control within Colombia and dethrone the Colombian government. The activities of the FARC are mainly limited to Colombia, although the militant wing also carries out its operations in neighboring countries, particularly Salvador, Venezuela, and Ecuador. Fundamentally, the FARC controls approximately 35 % of the whole of Colombia. Pre-dominantly, the FARC bases most of its activities in south-east Colombia, where there is little government control. This kind of control is fuelled by the large population of the FARC militants, which as of 2011 stood at approximately 8, 000 combatants. The FARC’s activities and techniques against the government Throughout the 1970’s up to the 1990s, the FARC grew in number and operations. Public sympathy According to Maddaloni (2009) the 1970s saw the FARC increase its guerrilla activities and take over the control of certain areas of Colombia, especially to the south. The FARC took advantage of the lack of a centralized administration in Colombia, to penetrate local towns and establish Marxist law and order. The FARC would play the public by purporting to help the latter in eradicating crime and lawlessness in society. As a result, the public would readily agree to the laws put in place by the FARC. Before the movement resolved to extremely violent measures to assert control over certain territories, the FARC used to appease the public by providing social services. For example, the movement built roads, schools, factories, healthcare facilities, and factories (Cook, 2011). This strategy earned the movement the much needed public support that saw the FARC expand its horizons. Involvement in drug trade The FARC was and has always been involved in the trafficking of cocaine, especially from Colombia to the United States. The FARC’s involvement in drug trade increased in the 1990s, especially after the death of Jacobo arenas. Since Jacobo was the intellectual force in the FARC, he had always resisted against too much involvement in drugs, lest the public doubted the intentions of the movement. Following his natural death, however, the FARC became greedy and increased operations related to the trafficking of narcotics. Targeting government officials By the 1980s, the FARC had grown from its initial 500 members to approximately 4,000 members. Consequently, the group could now take towns by force and even engage government troops in minor combat. The 1990s saw the FARC increase offensive against the government. By 1996, the FARC was openly attacking military bases, mainly using cylinder bombs. Rabasa & Chalk (2001) give the example of the FARC-led invasion of a military camp at Putumayo that killed 54 soldiers and wounded several others, while 60 others were captured. The most notable of the offenses was the attempt by the guerrillas to take over Mitu in November 1998, by engaging government troops in a 3 day battle (ibid). The disruption of the 1998 presidential elections was evidence of the increased violence on the part of the FARC and its clear shift from the Marxist ideologies. Kidnappings Another technique that the FARC has used to draw attention from the government is kidnapping people. Up until the 2000s, the FARC was specializing in kidnapping low-profile people who were inconsequential to the national politics. However, in 2002, the FARC kidnapped a congressman by hijacking a domestic flight. In a most daring incident, the FARC kidnapped Ingrid Betancourt, a presidential candidate in the same year. In addition, when President Alvaro Uribe was being sworn in, the FARC killed twenty people by shooting rockets into the palace. Weaponry In the period between 2005 and 2006, the guerrillas increased their armory power and used very sophisticated weaponry to conduct rural and urban terrorism. The FARC used cylinder and car bombs and landmines to bomb various locations in Colombia. At this time, the FARC was using the borders between Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador as a safe haven to retreat to, after carrying out attacks in the Colombian mainland. In order for the FARC to have survived this long, over five decades, it needs to have adequate capital to finance its activities. It is believed that the FARC is the largest, best-equipped, and wealthiest militant revolutionary movement in Latin America. This only means that the group has several sources of income to fund its activities. Who finances the FARC? The operations of the FARC are mainly funded by the movement’s involvement in kidnappings, extortions, drug trafficking, weaponry, and gold mining. Of these, taxes derived from trade in drugs have brought the FARC the most amounts of finances, according to (Atkins, 2004). Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that during its formative years, the FARC received financial aid from the communists in Colombia. According to Koonings & Kruijt (2005) finances also came through from the rural peasants and Russian and Cuban communist groups. In subsequent years, the FARC needed more resources to facilitate their increased presence in Colombia, meaning that the movement needed more revenue. As a result, the FARC cast its sights on the oil-rich areas of Arauca and Casanare (Holmes et al. 2009). The FARC would extort money from oil facilities and pipelines, with threats of bombing such facilities if they did not comply. The FARC also started engaging in kidnappings and taxation of gold, coffee, cattle, coffee, and drugs in the areas under the movement’s control. The 1970s saw coca become the major export product from Colombia, a factor that became instrumental for the growth of the FARC. Realizing the economic viability of coca, leaders within the FARC decided to support coca farming and trafficking. According to Cook (2011) the FARC held a secretariat conference in 1982 and passed a resolution to totally support coca cultivation and all related activities. This way, the FARC would be in a position to tax coca farmers, in exchange for protection. By the 1990s, the majority of finances for the FARC came from involvement in drug trade, as more people grew coca and demand for cocaine increased in the United States. Although the movement was receiving numerous profits from the sale of cocaine, they still needed other forms of revenue and this other share came from trade in illicit arms. The increase in finances translated to the strengthening of the FARC, such that by the mid 1990s, the movement had over 10, 000 members and controlled a wider territory in Colombia. The movement could now engage the government in combat on a large scale and it increased its offenses to cover areas where government control was established. For example, in 1988, the FARC was responsible for disrupting presidential elections in Colombia, through intimidation of voters and violence. Fundamentally, trade in narcotics has continued to be main source of revenue for the FARC to fund its operations. Dealings with drug trafficking have also led to the FARC’s involvement in money laundering activities in recent years. According to Cook (2011) Mexican drug traffickers engage in smuggling money from the United States to Colombian suppliers. With that much money falling into the hands of coca suppliers in Colombia, the FARC benefits directly from increased profits of coca trade. Measures taken to deal with the threat posed by the FARC The Colombian government has for the last five decades been trying to end the insurgency of the FARC to no avail. Since the 1970s, subsequent governments in Colombia have engaged in a series of measures to bring to an end the activities of the FARC. Deshazo, Mendelson, & Mclean (2009) give the example of 1978, when the Colombian president with the approval of security statute in Colombia gave the military the mandate to detain and interrogate guerrillas and other criminals. The result was widespread torture and murder of hundreds of guerrillas, all in the name of maintaining national security. Ironically, the widespread violation of human rights against the guerrilla fighters only served to earn the latter more public sympathy. Consequently, the FARC grew, as more people joined the movement to oppose the brutality of the government. A different approach was adopted in1981 by the president elect of Colombia, Belisario Betancourt, extended an invitation to members of FARC to surrender to the government peacefully Bouvier, 2009). The guerrillas would be granted amnesty and a peace process would begin. However, the insurgents failed to conduct a ceasefire and the talks failed. In the late 1990s, president Pastrana decided to give the FARC a demilitarized zone called the despeje, in order to convince the FARC to engage in peace talks (Maddaloni, 2009). The rationale behind this move was that the FARC would be too involved in administering the region that they would not invade other areas in Colombia. Additionally, the government would get enough time to regroup and come up with strategies to finish off the FARC. However, the government failed to follow through with its plan and the FARC maintained control of the region up until 2002. This is despite the fact that Colombia had received approximately 290 million dollars in aid from the United States to fight the insurgents. In the early 2000s, the United States again gave financial aid of about 1.3 billion dollars to Colombia dubbed “Plan Colombia” to fight insurgency. The plan was to stop violence against the insurgents and instead engage in peace talks. Yet again, the peace talks failed to materialize, since the FARC was still attacking localities and townships. Violence from the FARC escalated in 2002 in months leading to the presidential elections. In February 2002, the FARC kidnapped Ingrid Betancourt, a presidential candidate and in a separate incident a congressman. This was the last straw and the Colombian government ceased the peace talks to engage in militant combat with the FARC. Hudson (2010) states that with the funds from “Plan Colombia”, the government deployed forces to deal with the FARC, especially in matters relating to the trade in narcotics. Specially trained home guards were stationed in townships to fight against the insurgents. Under Uribe’s rule, the FARC continued to disintegrate and lose political power. Notably, the reelection of Uribe for a second term in 2006 dealt a huge blow to the FARC, since the government continued to wage war against the guerrillas. In 2007 and 2008, the Colombian government through a strategic offensive operation managed to push the insurgents into the most remote areas in Colombia, while killing several front leaders. This offensive saw many insurgents surrender to government forces and others become informants for the government. For example, Karina and Nelly Avila, tow high ranking officials within the FARC surrendered (ibid). The biggest blow to the leadership and activities of the FARC came in 2008, when Maralunda died of a heart attack. The FARC was, thus deprived of its longest-serving and capable leader, who had ensured that the movement never lost sight of its Marxist-Leninist ideologies. In the same year, Raul Reyes, a secretariat member of the FARC was killed in an attack in Ecuador. Another key leader, Ivan Rios was betrayed by his own bodyguard, the latter who shot him in reward for money. Many insurgents died, while key commanders within the organization surrendered and key hostages were rescued. The most significant rescue was that of Ingrid, who had been in FARC detention since 2002. Along with Ingrid, 14 other hostages were also rescued, thus depriving the insurgents of much needed bargaining power (Kline, 2012). The success of the government led operations against the FARC are evidenced by the fact that by the end of 2008, the movement had reduced to approximately 8, 000 members. Years after the failed 2002 peace talks, the incumbent president, Juan Manuel Santos announced in 2012 that the government would be restarting the negotiations with the FARC. According to Brodzinsky (2012) media reports suggest that the negotiation process could start in October or November. According to Santos, the government will be very careful not to repeat the slip-up made in the 1999-2002 peace talks that resulted in the strengthening of the FARC. The peace talks come in the dawn of increased terrorism attacks by the FARC members. On a positive note, however, the FARC has promised to end its culture of kidnappings for ransom. For example, in April 2012, the FARC released 10 members of the security forces that the group had been keeping hostage (ibid). The framework for the peace talks will include legal guarantees for the FARC members, as well as the movement’s association with drug trafficking. Additionally, the talks will cover issues relating to the participation of the FARC in the politics and governance of Colombia, using democratic means. The president was hopeful that the current talks will lead to the end of the five decades insurgency by the FARC. Prospects for the future It is evident that the FARC is a very strong and organized revolutionary group that has kept the Colombian government on its toes for the past five decades. Different regimes have tried to fight the insurgents using various strategies, yet the FARC has continued to expand its operations within and without Colombia. It appears that using force against the insurgents only serves to encourage more violence from the latter. Yet again, the government cannot afford to relax and give the insurgents control over some areas as it happened in the early 2000s. The appeasement policy only served to consolidate the position of the FARC in south eastern-regions of Colombia. Analytically, the move by president Santos to hold peace talks with the FARC while maintaining government control in all areas within the country is a smart strategy. The government is ready to employ both military and diplomatic strategies to win the war over the FARC. According to Cook (2012) the timing for the peace talks is perfect, considering that the group has been weakened and reduced in size in the past few years. Additionally, the talks are more likely to materialize owing to the killing of FARC’s commander, Alfonso Cano, who was a major hindrance to the peace talks. The peace talks also depend on the government’s willingness not to engage in violation of human rights against the insurgents and keeping its commitment not to extradite the drug traffickers. The anticipated success of the peace talks is also because another insurgent group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), has confirmed their participation in the peace talks (Padgett, 2012). The ELN is an equally strong and expansive movement that has caused restlessness and violence in Colombia, as much as the FARC. Essentially, the FARC and the ELN are the two most dangerous guerrilla movements in Colombia. It is, therefore, encouraging to see that the two groups are willing to end violence and come to a consensus with the government. In conclusion, the FARC is not to be underestimated. The movement has been revolutionizing and any relaxation from the government will have severe consequences for the ordinary Colombian citizen who has been caught up in this bloody and violent struggle. Although it is improbable that the FARC will ever overthrow the government, the increased insurgency will always undermine the political, cultural and economic sectors in Colombia. More people will continue to die from fighting and many youths will fall prey to drug abuse, and the economy will suffer major setbacks from increased government spending on military activities. The political arena will never achieve complete stability as long as the FARC continues operating using violent means. Nonetheless, there is hope that life in Colombia will have a more positive outlook, especially after the much anticipated peace talks. At the moment, the future is uncertain for Colombia. Whether the peace talks succeed or not remains to be seen. All that Colombia can do is hope that the fifty plus years of insurgency will come to an end and Colombia will be able to rebuild its political, social and economic life, thereby bringing elusive peace and development to Colombia. References Atkins, S. 2004. Encyclopedia of Modern Worldwide Extremists and Extremist Groups. Westport: Greenwood Publishing. Bouvier, V. 2009. Colombia: Building Peace in a Time of War. Washington D.C: US Institute of Peace Press. Brodzinsky, S. 2012. Colombia- FARC Peace Talks Being Arranged, Says President. Retrieved October 11, 2012 From Http://Www.Guardian.Co.Uk. Cook, T. 2011. The Financial Arm of the FARC: A Threat Finance Perspective. Journal of Strategic Security, Volume IV Issue 1, Pp. 19-36. Deshazo, P., Mendelson, J., & Mclean, F. 2009. Countering Threats to Security and Stability in a Failing State: Lessons from Colombia. Washington D.C: CSIS. Holmes, J., Amin, S., Pineres, G., & Curtin, K. 2009. Guns, Drugs, and Development in Colombia. Texas: University Of Texas Press. Hudson, R. 2010. Colombia: A Country Study. Washington D.C: Government Printing Office. Kline, H. 2012. Historical Dictionary of Colombia. Plymouth: Scarecrow Press. Koonings, K., & Kruijt, D. 2005. Armed Actors: Organized Violence And State Failure In Latin America. New York: Zed Books. Maj. Maddaloni, J. 2009. An Analysis of the FARC in Colombia: Breaking the Framework of FM 3-24. Retrieved October 11 2012 From Http://Usacac.Army.Mil. Padgett, T. 2012. Waiting For The FARC: Colombia’s President Santos Tells TIME He Wont Move Too Fast. Retrieved October 11, 2012 From Http://World.Time.Com. Rabasa, A., & Chalk, P. 2001. Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability. Pittsburgh: Rand Corporation. Read More