Why did the U.S. government target Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 - Research Paper Example

? Why did the United s government target Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? Jonathan M. Cebuhar International Relations Outline Introduction 3 How are nuclear weapons currently perceived? 3 Why did the United States develop and deploy atomic weapons? 5 Were the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 justified? 6 Killing citizens, an acceptable loss? 7 The selection of targets 8 Limitations 10 Conclusion 11 References 11 Introduction In August 1945 two atomic bombs were dropped on Japan by the United States, killing at least 115,000 people with another 100,000 being injured (Bernstein 1995, 135). The targets for these bombs were Hiroshima and Nagasaki rather than more military targets such as Tokyo. Why did the United States choose to bomb Japan, and what factors led to the targeting of these particular cities, and the consequential high loss of human life? One argument for this use of deadly force is that the United States wanted to end the war with Japan quickly, before the planned invasion which was to occur a few months later. The bombs acted as a show of strength, as well as devastating the resources of the cities that were targeting and dealing a severe blow to the morale of the Japanese people. Understanding the factors that influenced the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is important, as the world is currently in a nuclear age, where many countries have nuclear capability but other countries do not. Additionally, understanding the behavior of the United States, and what influenced the decisions that occurred during this period is crucial, as the United States currently exists as the primary world superpower. This essay discusses the factors that drove the United States to use nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with the focus that these attacks were focused on the nuclear weapons in Japan, rather than the citizens. How are nuclear weapons currently perceived? Nuclear weapons are extremely powerful, and have the ability to decimate cities, destroying buildings and killing people with no prior warning and no method of defense (Krieger 2003, 3) The devastation that occurred from Hiroshima and Nagasaki was extreme, and even now the events are considered with deep sadness and a considerable sense of loss. Photos from ground zero are painful to observe, and show the charred remains of humans, and civilians whose flesh is literally dripping as a result of the radiation (MacLear 1999, 37-38). Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent the only times that nuclear weapons have been used directly in warfare, although nuclear weapons have been used in other ways such as to form alliances, to threaten other countries and to deter attacks (Tannenwald 1999, 433-434). Currently, nuclear weapons are not used, even in wars where their use would be possible and potentially advantageous. This change from use to non-use of nuclear weapons has not been driven by fears of retaliation. This can be seen by the fact that the United States did not employ nuclear strikes during the Vietnam War, or the Persian Gulf War. Likewise, Britain did not make use of nuclear weapons during the Falklands. This can be explained in part by the perception that nuclear weapons are ‘taboo’ or prohibited, and that their use is inhumane. This perception is not limited to a particular country, but has proliferated worldwide. This can be seen in international agreements, such as the move of the United Nations to call for all nuclear weapons to be banned, as well as general laws that apply to any armed conflict, which exclude the use of nuclear weapons as a viable method of war (Tannenwald 1999, 435). International law currently takes an abolitionist stance, arguing that actions, such as the development of nuclear weapons, which are not acceptable under its law, should not be allowed under any circumstances, even if the intervention would save lives (Blum 2009, 1-2). Therefore, under current international law, the action taken by the United States in bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have been considered illegal and immoral. However, these laws were not present in 1945, and their development was influenced by the use of nuclear weapons then. Why did the United States develop and deploy atomic weapons? The atomic bomb was not developed for use against Japan. It was first conceived in the weapons race against Germany during the Second World War. However, by the time the weapon was ready for use, Japan had become a more valuable target, and Germany’s involvement in the war had mostly ended (Bernstein 1995, 135). Therefore, although the playing field had changed significantly between the time that the weapon was developed and when it was ready for use, there was still a strong push for the weapon to be deployed to bring about the end of the war. In bombing Japanese cities the United States hoped to bring about a fast ending to the war by forcing Japan to surrender (Blum 2009, 1). One of the primary aims from the American perspective was to avoid the planned invasion, scheduled for the first of November. If this invasion went ahead, approximately 767,000 troops would be involved, with an estimated death toll of around 31,000 within the first 30 days alone (Bernstein 1995, 148-149). During the decision-making process and the years after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, it was perceived that the only alternative to the use of these bombs would be a long and bloody invasion of Japan. Those that purported this belief gave no evidence concerning why they thought this was true (Miles 1985, 123). Were the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 justified? The perceptions of the use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki differ considerably between America and Japan. In America, this is generally seen as a technological feat and a significant accomplishment. Although the bombs killed a large number of people, the consensus feeling is that it saved many more lives that it destroyed, and it was a necessary part of a violent and bloody war (Krieger 2003, 4) It is traditionally believed that if the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not occur then approximately half a million Americans would have died (Miles 1985, 121-122), while other estimates suggest that the bombings saved a million lives (Bird and Sherwin 2005).The myth was perpetuated by the autobiography of President Truman ten years after the war had ended. In the same document, Truman suggests that a large number of British and Japanese deaths were also prevented by the bombings. Examination of the figures associated with the war and the decisions of those responsible shows that it is unlikely more than 20,000 American lives would have been saved by the bombs, and this number may have been significantly lower (Miles 1985, 121-122). However, many researchers and historians argue that the United States could have brought about the speedy end of the war without ever dropping the bombs. Conventional bombing occurred on Japan before, during and after the atomic bombs were dropped and it is possible that this alone would have compelled Japan to surrender. Additionally, the Japanese planned to seek peace after the first bombing, making the loss of life that occurred during the bombing of Nagasaki pointless. Throughout the development, discussion and deployment of the bombs, there was little to no consideration of alternative options. Those that were suggested were quickly pushed to one side, or ignored altogether (Bernstein 1995, 148-150). Another suggestion for a potential solution at this time would have been for the United States to negotiate for peace with Japan, allowing them to keep their Emperor, rather than enforcing unconditional surrender. By May of 1945, the Japanese forces were severely decimated, and it appears likely that they would have considered surrendering (Miles 1985, 124). It is also considered that it was not the bombings that led to the surrender of Japan, but the entry of the Soviets into the Pacific which occurred two days later. This would have occurred regardless of whether the United States had used nuclear bombs on Japan or if they had held off. In many ways, the United States bombed an enemy that was already all but defeated, and which the decision-makers in America knew were looking for peace (Bird and Sherwin 2005). Killing citizens, an acceptable loss? The atomic bomb project was first developed in 1941, and code-named the Manhattan Project. It was believed to be a weapon that could be useful against Germany. Prior to the war President Roosevelt had pleaded with the countries at war that civilian lives not be used to obtain military victory. However, as the war progressed, both sides began to attack civilian as well as military targets with strategies such as firebombing. Consequently, by the middle of the war the moral ground had significantly changed, and Roosevelt was no longer against the use of the bomb, even though the civilian casualties were likely to be significant (Bernstein 1995, 135-136). It is often considered in modern times that the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were primarily for military purposes and that civilians were caught in the middle. One strong rumor is that the United States dropped leaflets on the cities prior to the bombings, urging them to evacuate. While leaflets were dropped on some Japanese cities warning of the dangers of nuclear attack, this occurred after the atomic bombings. Consequently, the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki received no warning from the United States about the bombings (MacLear 1999). This suggests that there was no desire to evacuate citizens, and that is likely that these were the main targets of the bomb. The plane carrying the atomic bomb destined for Hiroshima, the Enola Gay arrived with two scout planes, which had passed by the time the Enola Gay reached the site. Because of this, there was no air raid siren in the city below, and the citizens of Hiroshima had no warning for the decimation that was about to occur. Approximately 80 percent of the buildings in the city were destroyed, and it is estimated that at ground zero there was a zero percent chance of survival. Causalities were not limited to the bomb explosion, but the ionizing radiation that occurred as a result of the bomb had significant long-term impacts that are not accounted for in estimates of the number of deaths that occurred in either of the bombs (MacLear 1999, 30-33). Deaths among those that had survived the bomb continued for many years, mostly due to gradation poisoning (Krieger 2003, 4). The selection of targets The initial task of selecting targets for the atomic strikes was given to General Groves, who was in charge of the Manhattan Project. The bomb was to be detonated above the ground so that the blast effect would cause substantial damage to the structures in the city. Groves met with a committee to determine what the best sites for the bomb would be. Unlike earlier sentiments during the war, the aim was not to minimize civilian casualties, but instead to maximize them. Based on this, four cities were chosen as potential targets. The first was Hiroshima, as it was the largest target that was not the focus of other bombings. Other cities on the list were Tokyo, Yokohama and Yawata. However, while the last three cities had some tactical advantage, they had already experienced so much damage from bombings that there was little less to destroy. The discussions following this examined the way that the bomb would work, and what cities would produce the strongest effects (Bernstein 1995, 135-142). When the bombings began there were three potential cities which would be struck, depending on their weather conditions. These were Hiroshima, Kokura and Nagasaki, in order of preference. On the second day of bombing, the planed headed for Kokura, but bad weather meant that the bomb was instead taken to Nagasaki (Morgan 1980, 843). The decision to target the center of the cities, which were predominantly civilian was made based on the small and dispersed on the perimeters of the city. Therefore it would not be possible to attack all of these, and the imprecise nature of bombing meant that a target on the outskirts of the city had the potential to miss altogether (Bernstein 1995, 140-142). However, the decision to move away from military targets to civilian ones was not easily made, and the initial opinions were that the target should be a war plant, which was surrounded by workers houses (Bernstein 1995, 144). Hiroshima was a target that had some military importance, as it housed a military base, however, the bomb was not targeted at this base, but instead at the center of the city, apparently designed to inflict the maximum number of casualties. Consequently, most people that died in the attack were civilians, many of who were either women or children (Krieger 2003, 3) Limitations There are many things about the decision-making process that occurred prior to the use of the nuclear bombs that are unknown. Furthermore, it is difficult to know fully know what factors were influential in the minds of the men making the decisions, or what the outcome would have been if the bombs were not dropped. The thesis in this paper argues that the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in an attempt to end the war quickly, and assumes that any evidence that the war would have ended on its own, or by other means, was not known, or ignored by those involved in decision making. However, an alternative proposal is that these men were aware that Japan would surrender soon, and chose to use the bomb for a different purpose. One perspective on this is that the United States bombed Japan mostly because the weapon was completed and it was assumed that it would be used. From the early beginnings of the Manhattan Project most people involved assumed that the bomb would be dropped on the enemy, and on a substantial target. The first evidence of any discussion of possible targets for the bomb was in May of 1943, and here the discussions focused on the Japanese fleet that was concentrated in the Harbor of Truk. This target purely military, and would have resulted in little loss of civilian life (Morgan 1980, 151). Discussions from this point onwards centered on where the bomb would be used, and not whether it would be used. Because of this assumption, there were few considerations of not using the bomb physically, or of detonating it as a demonstration of power, rather than to kill (Bernstein 1995, 135-140Bernstein 1995, 135-140). Thus, because of this Japan was bombed because it presented the most viable target at the point in time when the bomb was ready. Conclusion This review shows that the United States bombed the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in an attempt to end the war before they were forced to invade Japan, a move that would have been time consuming and cost a large number of American troops, as well as troops of their allies and their enemy. The situation was viewed by decision-makers and the general population during this time, and even into the modern day, as a dichotomy, America had to choose between two options, both of which would have led to a significant loss of life. However, many studies suggest that this was not the case, and that the United States could have used other measures to end the war. One potential reason why they did not is if the bombing did not occur because America wanted to end the war, but because the weapon had been built, and it was assumed that it would be used. References Bernstein, B.J. (1995). "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered." Foreign Affairs: 135-52. Bird, K. and Sherwin, M.J. The Myths of Hiroshima. Los Angles Times (2005). Blum, G. (2009). The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil”. Proceedings of the 103rd Annual Meeting, JSTOR. Krieger, D. Remembering Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Blackaby Papers (2003). MacLear, K. Beclouded Visions: Hiroshima-Nagasaki and the Art of Witness. (Albany, State University of New York Press 1999), 30-45. Miles, R.E. (1985). "Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half a Million American Lives Saved." International security 10(2): 121-40. Morgan, C. (1980). "Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Rerf." The American Journal of Pathology 98(3): 843. Tannenwald, N. (1999). "The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use." International Organization 53(3): 433-68. Read More