Why states act through formal International Organizations - Essay Example

?Why s act through formal International Organizations? Introduction In the earlier centuries, humans spread out to new geographical territories for various purposes. These territories with the passage of time evolved into civilizations, kingdoms and eventually into states or countries. However, this ‘evolution’ part was not a smooth affair, as certain territories wanting to annex more territories and also to dominate others, indulged in wars and other aggressive actions. These aggressive actions led to major wars including two World Wars. On the positive side, from the last few centuries, especially from the second half of the 20th century, states have become more ‘civilized’ and are acting in a more controlled manner. This happened and is happening due to various factors and one of the key factors is the formation of formal International Organizations (IO) by the states themselves. States wanted to develop omnipresent overseeing organization or organizations, which can handle a state’s ‘interaction’ with other countries in sensitive issues, pre-empt any detrimental actions carried out by one state against others, warn and act against states and their governments, when they act against their own people and also to manage social welfare issues like health, education, refugee issues, science, etc. This formation of IOs have actualized a positive environment throughout the world, with the countries acting with self-discipline, minimizing aggressive overtures, and at the same time indulging in welfare activities. However, this is not the scenario all the time, because certain countries without following the tenets of the IOs continue to act aggressively and unilaterally. Even amidst these dishonouring of the IOs, countries tend to obey and act through IOs for certain valid reasons. Historical Background The earliest precursor or the historical prototype of the present day International Organizations is the Delian League. According to Zweifel (2006, pg.31) Delian League was started around 4th century AD as an association among the Greek city-states, dominated by Athens, with the main “purpose of facilitating military cooperation against their common enemies”. Although, other regional groupings were formed by the territories to oversee and manage the relations among themselves throughout the last few centuries, nothing materialized on a large geographical scale. One of the main reasons why that did not actualize is because of the absence of sovereign states all over the world particularly in Europe. The evolution of territories and kingdoms into states or modern-day nations did not start till 17th century, with the complete evolution taking place mainly in the second half of the 20th century. According to Archer (2007, pg.4) the key turning points for the formation of IOs were the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, which ended the Thirty Years War and the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Before that, the concept of European unification based on Christianity dominated the political circles of various European territories. However, when that did happen, it facilitated the formation of sovereign state system in Europe, and later throughout the world. Thus evolved states also understood the need to actualize a natural law or entity that can guide and manage the relations between them, and in that direction created bilateral, trilateral and even quadrilateral agreements. However, those agreements among states and did not enlarge maximally. However in the next few centuries, nothing concrete evolved due to various historical reasons including conflicts among the various states, imperialism, etc, etc. Although, international cooperation in terms of collective action happened with the Concert of Europe (1815-1914), Geneva Convention in 1864 and even Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in 1889, it was not until after the First World War, that the work for the development of International organizations got started. Because of the unprecedented suffering caused by the First World War, various states and other groups wanted to come up with an overseeing International organization that can prevent the recurrence of similar large scale wars, and also support the affected people, thus leading to the formation of League of Nations in 1919. “The states' representatives were also concerned to create a new, permanent world organization that would deal with the problem of peace and security and with economic and social questions.” (Archer 2007, pg.3). Although, League of Nations is a failure, it is still considered to be the first international organization and importantly lead to the formation of more IOs throughout 20th century. Role of IOs From the above discussed historical background of the IOs, it is clear that IOs were developed to fulfil various purposes. Although, sizable IOs were established to handle the relations between the states, particularly during any conflicts, in course of time, many IOs were established to manage economic and various social aspects. Braveboy-Wagner (2009, pg.5) provides the list of the purposes for which IO’s set up and that includes “facilitating the negotiation and implementation of agreements” between the states, resolving disputes and managing conflicts between the states, carrying out economic and social based operational activities, “shaping international discourse”, etc. When viewed from another perspective, IOs are organizations set up by the states incorporating certain set rules and protocols, so it can carry out constructive activities for those states and its people. This perspective was pointed out by Hurd (2010, pg. 17), who stated that “international organizations are actors in world politics, constituted by international law as independent entities, separate from the states that make them up as their founders and their members”, having legal standing. This role of states in IOs’ formation is crucial, because IOs formed by states gets maximum recognition and validity by the states themselves, and are only ‘allowed’ to play extensive roles throughout the world. IOs’ that are not accepted and importantly not ratified by the states particularly by the strong countries will mainly be a toothless body, without major influence. This clearly shows how states are the key building blocks for the ‘construction’ of strong and stable IOs. States will have many motivations to develop and also prep up IOs. These motivations could border on creating common goodwill among the states and for the world citizens, and importantly for various personal wants. “The growing need to manage international cooperation has led to a steady rise in the number and prominence of international organizations (IOs) and in the use of formal international agreements more generally.” (Hafner-Burton, von Stein and Gartzke 2008, pg.175). Although, as mentioned above by Hafner-Burton, von Stein and Gartzke (2008), IOs are developed and supported by states to foster cooperation, goodwill and peace among the nations, each state had or still having various personal motivations or self-interests to support IOs and importantly act through them. As pointed out earlier, IOs started evolving after the formation of sovereign state system, and as states only form and operate IOs, states have major stakes in them. So, states act through IOs in the matters of international relations, and for other social and economic purposes. However, most of the issues involving IOs are political in nature. States act through IOs before crisis and also to manage the crisis Countries will want to manage their internal affairs maximally on their own, without wanting any outside ‘interference’ or help from the IOs. However, there are occasions, when the countries would want IOs to manage certain aspects of their internal affairs, and importantly, there are occasions, when the IOs themselves without the ‘invitation’ of the state could forcibly enter and manage those internal issues. Thus, the role of IOs could not be restricted on the basis of a state’s geographical boundaries. However, the moot point is, states would want IOs to play a role maximally in the issues that happens outside their border. Thus, states use formal IOs to manage both their everyday interactions with foreign or neighbouring states and also use it to manage many significant areas of Interstate Relations. (Zweifel, 2006). Every day interactions in the sense, certain states have involved IOs to manage a particular part of their affairs with other state, throughout the year, by having a permanent structure for the IO. For example, United Nations (UN) and its arm United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), monitor the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea on a daily basis. With the two Koreas not able to achieve peace bilaterally, the role of IOs assumes importance. Thus, states will be forced to act through IOs, when they themselves due to historical reasons and non-flexibility could be forced to involve IOs as part of everyday operations. (Botchway 2011). In addition, IOs like UN and other significant formal IOs could play everyday role throughout the geographical territory of war-torn states, and that happened and is happening with many states including Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. Immediately after the war is initiated by the external forces, a power and governance vacuum may exist, and to fill that vacuum, UN and its related organs could be asked by states to play sizable governance role. Even before the wars between states, when the environment for the war builds, IOs could be asked by one of the either states to mediate and solve the issue. This role was played by UN before many conflicts, and although it failed sometimes, it was able to achieve success in many cases in various geographical territories. For example, before US invasion of Iraq in 2003, US asked UN’s weapons inspector under the auspices of United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to scan Iraq for Weapons of Mass destruction (WMD), albeit unsuccessfully. Then, when the war starts, IOs will be welcomed by one of the states involved and imandated by the International community to solve the conflict, and importantly start the rebuilding or rehabilitation process, if the state has been damaged extensively. As Abbott and Snidal (1998, pg.3) states, the proposed UN functions in situations of international conflict includes “fact finding, early warning, and preventive deployment; mediation, adjudication, and other forms of dispute resolution; peacekeeping; sanctions and military force; impartial humanitarian assistance; and post-conflict rebuilding.” From the above analysis, it is clear that states act through formal IOs after the wars, when they are not able to arrive at a solution, and before the wars, when they sense there is a possibility of averting the conflict and getting peaceful solutions. States act through IOs, as IO exhibit centralization and independence States would act through formal IOs during wars or conflicts and also for the management of other political, social and economic issues because of the two key characteristics of the IO, which are centralization and independence. These two characteristics ‘makes’ the IOs and differentiate it from other international institutions, thereby ‘enticing’ the member states to use it. Abbott and Snidal (1998, pg.9) states the these two key characteristics distinguish IOs from other international institutions and adds validity to it, as centralization gives IOs a “concrete and stable organizational structure and an administrative apparatus managing collective activities.” Here centralization implies centralized operational process and not based on physical and geographical aspects. That is, when IOs are supported by the states by providing all the powers as well as the necessary stability, power accumulates there in the form of a central structure. Logistically speaking, creating a central structure, where all issues can be discussed means the member states will have a permanent representative there and that will lead to quick responses and solutions. This was pointed by Abbott and Snidal (1998, pg.10) who stated centralized stable forum always allows for a fast response to sudden developments, with The Security Council being the prime example because with each member state “required to maintain continuous representation at UN headquarters,” it can function and discuss on short notice. Thus, centralization of IOs in a way forces the states to have a full-time representative or even a special representative on call, and that will make the state to act through the IOs. In addition, Abbott and Snidal (1998, pg.9) states the independence of the IOs means it has the “authority to act with a degree of autonomy, and often with neutrality, in defined spheres”. Importantly, both these characteristics are interrelated because a centralized independent infrastructure for the IOs in a way means that the IO has operational autonomy. However, that autonomy could be “often limited to administrative and technical matters and subject to close supervision by governments” (Abbott and Snidal 1998, pg.9). On the positive side, this autonomy to the IOs is provided by the member states themselves, when they become members of those IOs by signing or agreeing to its rules and regulations. By signing the agreements at the time of joining it, member states agrees to abide by all the rules, judgments, etc of the IOs, which makes it mandatory on the part of the member states to act through those IOs. “The legal terms in each treaty are the authoritative source of the obligations that states owe to each other and will be finely parsed long into the future.” (Hurd 2010, pg.3). This way of giving autonomy and powers to the IOs by the states themselves places the IOs at the ‘central junction’ in the ‘path’ of global politics, so that the IOs can bring in its member states to solve major issues and thereby foster cooperation. This perspective about IO and member states is in line with the Regime theory, as that theory mainly focuses on how IOs can make waring states to converge and think about the solutions. According to Krasner (cited by Botchway 2011, pg.370), regime theory lays the emphasis on the institutions, which possessing the norms, decision rules, and the procedures, can “facilitate a convergence of expectations” among the states or make the states “converge in a given issue-area.” When the IOs exhibit the above pointed out characteristics of centralization and autonomy, in line with the Regime theory they act as the central power, bringing in the disputed parties to its location and build agreement between them. Mossberger and Stoker (2001, pg. 812) also toed the same line, when describing the regime theory, by stating that when disputes arise, IOs act “as the collaborative arrangements through which governments and even other private actors” can assemble to come up with solutions. Thus, IO’s with the two characteristics provide not only a physical forum for the disputed states to discuss their issues, but also through other powerful friends or countries will try to influence the waring states. With the IO’s playing the facilitating role and assuming such importance in line with the regime theory, the states had to act through them. States act through IO for personal motivations including for legitimacy Apart from these IO centric aspects, which make states give credence to the IOs, states also obey the laws of IOs and act through it due to valid reasons, which mainly borders on self-interest and their need for self-legitimacy. Self interest in the sense, states would follow and support IOs to create a positive image for itself. That is, when states participate in all the transnational legal process and act through the IOs, without any unilateral and detrimental actions, it could be bestowed with the positive identity that it obeys international laws and wants cooperation with other countries. (Nye 2003). States do not want to get the tag of ‘law breaking nation’ or even a rogue nation, which will make other countries view it negatively, isolate it and even impose debilitating sanctions on it. In order to avoid negative tags and to get a positive identity, states will tend to act through the IOs, obeying the international laws. As another form of self interest, states will provide constant support to IOs to make or even demand other states to do the same. That is, by acting through IOs, they will set an example and thereby facilitate or even indirectly force other states to follow the same. The other key personal motivation for the states to act through IOs is to get legitimacy to its actions. That is, when states carry out certain military and offensive actions to protect their territorial integrity or to nullify threat to them in the foreign soil, they would want legitimacy to their actions. This was pointed out by Abbott and Snidal (1998, pg.8), who stated states consciously use IOs both to reduce transaction costs in the narrow sense and, more broadly, to create to legitimacy for the actions, thereby enhancing their capacities and power even more. Thus, when states acts through IOs and gets its legitimacy, which will be given by the IOs after due process, there will be very minimal opposition to it, and instead more states will join it to enhance its capabilities. USA’s self-interest actions in Iraq in 1990’s, and then again in early 2000s provide a contrasting perspective to this aspect of legitimacy. That is, while in 1990s, it was able to get UN sanction for its actions in Iraq, in 2003, it was not able to do. “Had the Security Council been able to agree that force was warranted, it would have provided unique (and incontestable) legitimacy for U.S. military action” (Tharoor 2003). This again shows that if the states act through IOs, they would get legitimacy to its self-interest actions. From the above analysis, it is clear that nations could act through formal IOs when they want to get positive identity, to make or demand other states to follow the IOs and also to get legitimacy to its actions, thus exhibiting how self-interest decides their actions in relation to IOs. This focus on self-interest as the reason for supporting IOs is in relation with IR theory of Realism, because that theory focuses on how states will only focus and act for safeguarding its self-interest, suppressing other perspectives. This was pointed out by Korab-Karpowicz (2010), who stated “Realists are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests.” Although, there are occasions, when nation’s self-interests made them disregard IOs, the above points clearly show that by following IOs, states’ many self-interests will be fulfilled. Thus, it is clear that, states to optimally further their self-agenda would act through IOs. Conclusion From the above analysis of IO’s evolution, its characteristics and states’ stake in it, it is clear that states have valid reasons to act through IOs. In the discussions about the historical background of the IOs, there are clear evidences to point out how IOs started to develop mainly with the development of the sovereign state systems in Europe and in other continents. In addition, states only played or play the constructive role in the formation of IOs. With this being the case, it is natural for the states to act through IOs in various scenarios. Also, when the states have difficulty in solving the issues with other states in a bilateral manner, then also they will approach the IOs. When viewed from the perspective of IOs, its two characteristics of centralization and autonomy placed it in the ‘altar’ of world politics, thus necessitating the states to act with the ‘blessing’ of it. Importantly, as mentioned above, the states will utilize IOs, when they want positive identity and legitimacy to their self-interest actions. When states get the legitimacy, it will enhance their power and capability to manage the issue, and would also be able to bring in those IOs like UN into the centre of action to carry out more constructive works. References Abbott, KW and Snidal, D 1998, Why States Act through Formal International Organizations, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 42, no. 1, pp. 3-32 Archer, C 2007, International organizations, Routledge, London. Botchway, FN 2011, Natural Resource Investment and Africa's Development, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK. Braveboy-Wagner, JA 2009, Institutions of the Global South, Routledge, New York. Hafner-Burton, EM., von Stein, J and Gartzke, E 2008, International Organizations Count, Journal of Con?ict Resolution, vol. 52, no. 2, pp.175-188 Hurd, I 2010, International Organizations: Politics, Law, Practice, Cambridge University Press, New York. Korab-Karpowicz, WJ 2010, Political Realism in International Relations. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, viewed on March 4, 2012 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/Realism-intl-relations/ Mossberger, K and Stoker, G 2001, The Evolution of Urban Regime theory, Urban Affairs Review, vol. 36, no.6, pp.810-835. Nye, JS 2003, The paradox of American power: why the world's only superpower can't go it alone, Oxford University Press, London. Tharoor, S 2003, Why America Still Needs the United Nations, Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, no. 5, 67-80. Zweifel, TD 2006, International organizations and democracy: accountability, politics, and power, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London. Read More