Reasons for Israels Invasion to Lebanon in 1982 - Essay Example

? Reasons for Israel’s Invasion to Lebanon in 1982 The relations between Israel and Lebanon have a long history, and vary depending on the historical timeline. To understand the reasons behind the Israeli Invasion to Lebanon in 1982, one needs to highlight the history of the two nations. Before the emergence of First World War, the Ottoman Empire was the ruler of the land that is currently Lebanon and Israel. The empire had a division system over the land, setting up series of sub districts (sanjaqs) and districts (vilayets)1. During this time, Palestine had no administrative or political establishment, and Lebanon was a term that referred to the area between mountains and the Sothern Syria. The boundary between Lebanon and Palestine was the district of Beirut2. The Zionists, influential at the time, were silently taking notice of the Lebanon in the early 1900s, especially the southern parts. In 1916, the region’s division into zones by the Sykes-Picot agreement was the first attempt of establishing a border between Palestine and Lebanon. Britain was controlling the southern part (Palestine), and the French had the other northern half (Lebanon). The Zionist began lobbying for the Liwani River to be part of Palestine, arguing that the viability of the northern side was dependent on the river’s resources. The lobbying process had other participants: the strong Maronite catholic community, and the Muslims groups. At the time, Lebanon was an Arab country with a significant portion of its population being Muslim, and with a strong political dominance. The Maronites and the Zionists had common interests in the region, and began cooperation. Despite their common interests, the Zionists were attempting to include the southern Lebanon into the Jewish home. Both the Zionists and the Maronites overlooked the large Shiite community (which was to make its presence felt later). Nevertheless, the Maronites were successful in their effort to make southern Lebanese a part of their land, with negative consequences on their relations with the Zionists. However, the Maronites drifted their attention from southern Lebanese, allowing the region to grow economically and become part of the northern Palestine. The growth was an attraction for the Zionists for the southern Lebanon. Later, anti-Zionists Arabs became the dominating political power in the southern Lebanon, and that was the beginning of security issues in the region. After the Second World War, Britain and France were again focusing on the issue of the border between the Syria, Palestine and Lebanon. Some of the lessons the Christians in Lebanon learnt were that the southern part of Lebanon was better off a part of Palestine. This would be an effort to restore Lebanon as a truly Christian nation. The border matter was now in the hands of the UN, but still there was no solution. The result was the development of extremist anti-Zionist Arabs in the southern parts of Lebanon, and the eventual involvement of PLO forces in the border conflicts3. Israel and Lebanon had been having conflicts since the onset of the twentieth century, with Israel directing its effort to have a peaceful North. On the other hand, Lebanon was harbouring terrorists within its boundaries like the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), down playing Israel’s efforts. The PLO terrorists began infiltrating Israel in the late 1970s, and spread terror to the non-enthusiast civilians against them. Around March 1978, the terrorists from the organization kidnapped and killed an American tourist in one of Israel’s beach, and proceeded to hijack an Israeli civilian bus. On interception of the bus by Israeli police force, the terrorists began firing on the police. Among the passengers in the bus, 34 Israeli civilians lost their lives in the attack, leading to more severe damage of the relations between the two countries. Responding to the attacks, the Israeli force invaded Lebanon destroying terrorist bases near its borders in the southern parts of the nation. After two months of destroying PLO bases (and significant pressure from America), the Israeli defence Force (IDF) withdrew from Lebanon leaving the invasion tasks to the UN forces and terminated their operation: Litani River Operation. UN forces were not able to deal with the terrorist group effectively, which led further infiltration of the PLO members into the borders of Israeli. This time, the terrorists were armed with new arms that were more dangerous. The border conflicts between the PLO forces in the southern side and the Israel forces became persistent, with attacks from the Lebanese terrorists and counterattacks by the Israeli forces. UNFIL, a task force of the UN trying to assist the Lebanese government in re-establishing its government, and civilians on both sides were killed because of these attacks, both parties being responsible. After withdrawing from Lebanon, Israeli’s were unable to protect their borders. The only action they could do was to support the Lebanese Christian Militia under the leadership of Major Saad Haddad, who were also against the PLO forces. The US government, under Ronald Reagan administration, was fast to condemn the border conflicts between the two countries4. Tension between the two countries was on the rise in 1981, forcing the US government to send Philip Habib (a Lebanese American), to try to negotiate a durable cease-fire solution between the two countries5. After three weeks of negotiation, Habib announced the agreement between the PLO and the Israeli forces on the decision to cease all hostile border attacks. This was a milestone achievement for both the countries, as the cease-fire agreement was a peaceful border solution, but for only some times. Nevertheless, the PLO militias were waging attacks on Israeli thus violating the agreement. In a report to the UN, Israel presented a count of 270 terror acts by the PLO members in the West Bank, Gaza, and along the Jordanian and Lebanese borders, with the death of twenty-nine Israeli civilians and three hundred injuries. In April 1982, a landmine planted by the PLO terrorists claimed an Israeli Officer. The IDF resumed with air strikes and missiles attacks on PLO bases6. At around the same time, the PLO force was increasing its labor, with more than 15,000 members travelling to locations in Lebanon. Most of these individuals were mercenaries from Mozambique, Iraq, India, Libya, Chad, and Sri Lanka. The group had five brigades. Some of the weapons that the new terrorists came with included Katyusha rockets, mortars, and new antiaircraft devices. The final act of provocation was an attempt by a Palestinian terror group under the led by Abu Nidal to assassinate Shlomo Argov, the Israeli ambassador to Great Britain. The IDF’s response to the assassination attempt was a series of attack on Lebanon between the June 4 and June 5, 1982. To counter the attacks, the PLO forces initiated an enormous mortar attack on Israeli civilians in Galilee. These were the build up activities to the invasion of Israel to Lebanon in 1982. The main reason that led to the invasion of Lebanon by Israel was the shelling by PLO, and not entirely the shooting of Argov. Israeli defence Minister Ariel Sharon gave direction for the invasion of Lebanon in June 6, 1982, under a massive force dubbed Operation Peace for Galilee7. The operation’s mission was to drive all the PLO operatives all the way to Beirut and putting a siege for both the PLO and civilians in Lebanon8. For justification, Israel cited the breach of the Habib cease-fire agreement by the PLO terrorists, the attempted assassination of its ambassador to Greta Britain, and the persistent shelling by the PLO forces in Galilee. The US government did not oppose the invasion plan, stating that no sovereign state was subject to toleration on persistent build up of insurgency in its borders, especially with a military force whose objective was to cause destruction and terror to that country. The statement, considered as a green light for the US government to IDF, was by the then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. President Reagan backed the US government’s standing on the operation by sympathizing with the Israel community. The IDF invasion to Lebanon was successful, with the initial progress leading the Israeli force to expand their objective to eliminate the PLO from the country and help Lebanon re-establish its own leadership. The international community was eyeing the operation closely, with the US contribution becoming visible in a press conference by Secretary Haig. The G-7 head of states were suggesting the restoration of the Habib cease-fire agreement. The restoration was the ceasefire agreement was successful, but with a provision that the Multinational Force (MNF) would be deployed in Lebanon9. The force was to include 800 US soldiers, 800 French soldiers and 400 Italian soldiers. The mission of the task force was to be thirty days or less, depending on the prevailing conditions in Lebanon. Meanwhile, the IDF was taking control of major PLO outposts, which did not discourage the terrorists from infiltrating and going back to the Slopes of Mount Harmon and Southeast Lebanon. Despite the labelling of the buffer region as a security zone by the IDF, PLO operatives continued to carry out attacks. As part of its strengthening strategy in the invasion, Israel engaged in talks with Christian leaders in Lebanon10. The agenda was the possibility of an association in the fight against the PLO. The Christians were afraid that if Palestinians gain control of the country (especially by PLO led by Yasser Arafat), their presence in the country would further deteriorate. The agreement between the IDF and the Christian Phalanges was a pivotal success in the fight against the Syrians and the PLO from Lebanon. After seizing Beirut, the PLO and the Syrian forces began moving out of the country under the protection of the Multinational Force. The IDF was in agreement with the new Habib peace pact, which enabled the PLO soldiers to retreat from the war with their weapons. The IDF had surrounded more than 6,000 terrorists from the PLO movement. The process took five days, beginning from August 25, 1982. The terrorist group was developing a new strategy for controlling the ceasefire violations while inflicting more casualties to the Israeli forces. In addition, the PLO operatives were invoking the IDF forces in order to blame them for the violation of the peace agreement. The operatives were now hiding among civilians and using churches and underground facilities to hide their ammunitions. The PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, agreed in principle to the ceasefire treaty to leave the country at first, but later refused to go to any other country. Bashir Gemayel, a Christian leader, became the president of Lebanon. Nonetheless, he was killed a few weeks later in Beirut, which led to the entering of IDF in Western Beirut. According to the agreement between the Christian Phalanges and the IDF, the remaining terrorist threats that were in the Western sections of Beirut were the responsibility of the Christian forces. The mission was to go through the refugees camp while combing out the all the remaining terrorists hiding within them, and hand them over to the Israeli forces. The first camps, Sabra and Shantila, were the first. In September 1982, the Christian forces went through the refugees in two refugees’ camps, uprooting Palestinian civilians. Instead of handing them over to the IDF, they sought revenge. The result was a massacre of more than 800 Palestinian civilians, which was a shock to the international community11. The aftermath of the massacre was pressure directed at the Israeli forces to withdraw from the country. The then Prime Minister for Israel, Menachem Begin, had to form a committee to investigate the incident. Establishment of Kahan committee in September the same year served justice. Among the committee’s recommendation was the resignation of Israeli defence minister Ariel Sharon on grounds of incompetence in the office. The Chief of Staff for IDF, Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan, was found to be negligent, but his remaining short term in office gave him a chance to remain in his position. The obvious move by the IDF was to withdraw from Western Beirut and let the Multinational force take over. This was the beginning of a gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, with severe casualties during the withdrawal process. The war was costly to the Israeli government, loosing more than 1,200 Israeli soldiers12. Israel was successful in driving PLO forces away from its borders, but the threats of attacks were still rife. The initial withdrawal was the beginning of a 22-year long complete withdrawal by the Israeli forces from Lebanon. The traditionally held belief that Israel wanted some parts of Lebanon’s territory was not correct. To prove this, Israeli forces were continuously withdrawing from Lebanon, leaving behind a 1000-man force. The country’s concern was security of its northern borders and safety of its civilians in Galilee. The aftermath effects of the invasion affected the Israeli, the Lebanese, and the PLO forces. Some of his soldiers took Arafat’s consent to the ceasefire agreement negatively, leading to a rift among the force. The critics of Arafat, under the leadership of Abu Musa, remained in locations held by Syrians, while the rest of the PLO force moved out of Beirut. Nevertheless, Arafat was still the leader of PLO as far as Arab states were concerned. Arafat ran with his loyalties to Tunisia, but returned to Lebanon in 1983. His return mission failed, benefiting from the pressure of the US to Israel. The Israeli government‘s effort to restore a Christian role in the leadership of Lebanon had failed with the assassination of Bashir Jemayel. The Christian phalanges had also gone against its initial agreement with the IDF, committing a massacre against the Palestinian civilians. Jemayel’s younger brother, Amin, was the next in the country’s leadership. The problem was that he had no friendship ties with the Israeli government. Nevertheless, Amin finally agreed to sign a treaty that would allow Israel to control the southern border, but countered the agreement due to pressure from Syria. The result was that Syria’s dominance in Lebanon grew stronger, more than it was before the invasion of Israel. The same period saw the emergence of a political group among the Lebanese, Shiites. The group was developing to become a guerrilla movement, with opposition of the Israeli. In conclusion, the main reasons for Israel’s invasion in Lebanon was the consistent shelling by the PLO forces to its citizens in borders, and the terror invasion of the group’s members to Israeli and other nationals in Israel13. The attack on its ambassador to London only contributed to the reasons for invasion, but it was not the main reason. Some of the traditionally held beliefs that Israel was fighting to obtain part of Lebanon’s territory do not have sufficient evidence. Bibliography Aloni, Shlomo. Arab-Israeli Air Wars 1947-82. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2001). 88. Bregman, Ahron, Israel's Wars: A History since 1947, (New York: Routledge, 2010). 190. Bregman, Ahron. A History of Israel, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 199-202. Bregman, Ahron. Elusive Peace: How the Holy Land Defeated America, (London: Penguin Group, 2005). 243. Dusso, Aaron. Israel and Lebanon: History and Analysis. Web. 29, November, 2011. Hartley, Cathy, Lea, David & Rowe, Annamarie. A Survey of Arab-Israeli Relations. (London: Europa Publication Limited, 2005). 91. Katz, Samuel, Russell, Lee & Volstad, Ronald. Armies in Lebanon 1982-84. (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005). 12. Schulze, Kirsten. The Jews of Lebanon: Between Coexistence and Conflict, (Eastbourne: Sussex Academies Press, 2009.) 59. Stephens, Elizabeth. US Policy towards Israel: The Role of Political Culture in Defining the ‘Special Relationship’. (Eastbourne: Sussex Academies Press, 2006). 174. TicketMayor. Israeli Invasion of Lebanon 1982: Why did Israel Invade Lebanon in 1982? Web. 29, November 2011 Read More